but he is a meeting climate commitments this after the i m f, ones of serious global economic consequences following the russian invasion of ukraine. and as several nations tried to isolate russia from the world economy, with russian oil exports under fire. well, joining me now from chicago as economist, political scientist, professor james robinson of global conflict studies at the university of chicago harris school of public policy. thank you so much. you're at professor robinson coming back on. so away from obviously there was a bombing of yemen. this week that the bombing of damascus this week, but there's only one story, obviously, as regards some. well what's in your title of your um chair, vest of global gov. it is ukraine, given now that it appears mosque who may be cutting off energy supplies or threatening to, why didn't they just try that? to avenge the 14000 killed him to hands can don't yet go over the bus to since since 2014 than a full scale invasion. and i think there were some people at the hoover institution

saying, why didn't he try cia activities, destabilizes events. he government, why send in armored personnel carriers in the military? and as we witnessed the pictures of, of death and destruction of civilians on all our tv screens. well i, you know, i don't think this is really about economics. i think it's about, you know, some national project nationalist project in 2 tins. mind you know, that he wants to reclaim about a year ago. he wrote a ranting, a several 1000 word essay about, you know, how there was no basis in history for an independent ukrainian states. and this was part of russia. and so, you know, so i think i think that he's willing to tolerate the independence of belarus as long as they're, you know, they're happy to kind of cody up totally up to him. but since, you know, the regime change in ukraine that you know, there's a much more independent,

much more democratic prey western regime. then he just decided he couldn't tolerate that. so he's, you know, so, so i think it's not much to do with economics. i suspect that is going to have very negative economic effects on russia but, but i think he's willing to tolerate that because of his nationalistic agenda. if it's not a can amik. and obviously russia says that it can replace all the demand from my western europe in the united states, from the global south, obviously, from china and india, and other purchases. why? why did washington suddenly recognize the government of president maduro in caracas? this week of the years of saying that some other person was the president of the country with the largest no, no reserves enough. good. i'm not sure i have a lot of insights into that. so i think the attempt to recognize this other person as the governor, as the president of venezuela,

was not very successful international politics. so i think that taking a new, the, taking a new strategy a but, but, you know, as i got to do with oil, i don't know, you know, that you eso only 3 percent of oil imports into the united states. come from russia . so, you know, so it's actually pretty easy for the united states to take a principal position. and the russian imports that, that's, that's altogether different thing, you know, i'm talking to you from europe and from that. and then i understand it's a completely different thing in europe. and it is in the united states, but i'm just making the point that, you know, i, i'm not sure that the venezuelan thing has anything to do with the oil because the russian oil is a very small thing in, in the united states. and, and, and, you know, but for the european union, it's a very different, it's a very different issue. but i think, you know, there's been a very if there's been a failed policy in diplomatic policy with venezuela for the last few years. so

maybe they're just trying a different tack. i mean, obviously someone else at the university of chicago, john mash, i'm a said, what we're seeing now would happen because of nato expansion. we know the barack obama in 2016 in peace was interviewed for the atlantic. he said, whatever you we do, we mustn't emphasize ukrainian nato membership because it will, he implied to create war. what is it about joe blinkin and sullivan? to put their foot down and said, this is our red line. after the red lines of for russia saying it must be neutral for so long. and the minsk accord saying, you must recognize these places which would not allow you claim to be a part of nature. what is it about the by ministration letter that said douglas heels and said they must be allowed to join nato if they want. yeah, that doesn't seem terribly sensible at the present and you know,

the present context, you know, in the sense that it seems quite plausible. or if it was, could go on for years in the ukraine and, you know, some sort of negotiated settlement needs to happen. you know, i think what we've seen in chechnya and other places that is that who is willing to engage in india amounts of violence and destruction are, you know, if he's pushed so so, so, so, so, so we need some sort of negotiated settlement that seems to me and that likely involves some kind of commitment that ukraine will not join nato. and you know this a better or worse today and sees this as part of russia sphere influence, you know, in the same way as you know, in the past the united states is declared various types of doctrines that the america was. it spirit influence central america. latin america. it's influence on it. you know and i think you know it's back to coldwell politics. no i would say

and so it's very much a logical co will politics that you have to make these compromises. so i think, i think miss, i'm is right. yeah, i mean, you don't think the hideous instruction will be on a scale similar to what the 10s of millions killed wounded or displaced by britain in the united states in iraq or 377000 killed in yemen, or is not the scale of nato destruction which ok, or do you think fusion will beat even the nato destruction from the i don't know, but i think, you know, what's happened so far suggest it could get, it could get very ugly. you know, he's, i think he's, he's not going to be affected domestically by boy military casualties by destruction and ukraine. you know, he's control, he controls the media. you know, he managed to control a lot. no, most, most independent media basically disappeared in russia. so what the average russian, those about this is going to be, you know, is going to be limited. and also we don't actually know what the average russian

thinks about this. you know, like i, you know, we don't know how much support putin actually has for kind of annexing ukraine. you know, you didn't hear a lot of russians protesting about, you know, the dawn bass, all these places in the east, the ukraine being effectively annexed or crimea, did you see russia was complaining about crimea being annexed? well, i mean that there was certainly been massive arrest. thousands of russians been arrested demonstrations against putin's decision to invade and media well since 2014 and the maiden revolution is continually said booting should act. you say that we don't know. i mean, there been some opinion polling even quoted in nature, nation media, that is popularity as often happens when leaders engaging will, has gone up and jump by 10 percent. but obviously there's this, i mean, there is a media blackout in europe at the moment. no, no other side is loud. i mean,

as you have heard, russian caps are banned. but more seriously, all media and journalists are being banned slowly across. i'm sure. in chicago, you can't turn on and hear a voice that supports the boot in invasion. i don't know, you know, there's some pretty ambiguous stuff on fox news about the foods in evasion. you know. ok. and so i, you know, i think, i think it's, it's thrown a bit of a wild card in the republican parts republican party because president trump was a big fan. and so, you know, i think as trumpet, trump put on the fierce a sanctions on russia during his tenure to me. i mean, he, but he also said complimentary things about putin as a leader. yeah. so how far do you think individuals as way of processing history, you're talking about putin themselves work your academic field because i thought that that kind of fashion of thomas carlyle,

we lost that maybe 50 years ago or more? no, i think you're right. so i think i think that the near the tendency in social science is definitely to down play the role of leaders, you know, and i think it's difficult. i don't think we have a really good sense of the extent to which puts in is kind of reflecting a more general russian sorts of position. but that's sort of why i said, we don't really know how popular or unpopular this is. you know. sure, thousands of people are protesting because 150000000 russians, you know, so, so, so, so what does the average russian think about this and is pretend reflecting on this kind of post, soviet angst. or is he, is he really just a brilliant sort of dictates, of manipulating everybody i, you know, i, i personally think that, you know, it's, it's hard to imagine that china would be the same, had it not being for thank shout, pings, sort of political scales or singapore would be the same without leak one use of the

project to transform the society. i think social science has a hard time dealing with, with the role of these individuals. but i think it's probably undisputable, but they do play some role. yeah. but you don't think that george w bush and tony blair with dictators in the west when the illegal invasion of iraq happened. overwhelming support by the people or differently had popular support the iraq invasion. when blair and bush did it. you wouldn't therefore say that they would dictators, would, you know, they weren't dictators, but they played an important role in sorts of framing what issues were and you know what the options were, what the consequences of not doing something was so so i think as individuals they frame for people, they frame the debate in a way which, you know, one strategy much more attractive and politically acceptable than another. so, so, you know, i know that so, so, so they had to bring people along with,

the more than putin has to, you know, he has more freedom to kind of do what he wants. i suppose. i mean, you don't think there are many in the global south which takes a very different view or you just have to listen to their media to realize how different they are. and that the media is free for you in the global south, obviously than europe today. which is which bands descent or they don't think many feel at last nature is getting a good kicking this kind of a hedge, a monic power lea, vassals states of washington in europe. finally, they are going to understand economically, if don't militarily that there is now new age upon us, the age of china. yeah, i mean, i think, i think there's a lot of history that, you know, if you think about this whole breaks concept, you know, there's this anti western kind of idea of development. you know, a lot of our own lines and, you know, development in our own way without,

without sort of humiliating dependence on the united states. western europe. you know, but, but, but, you know, i find it extremely sure. i find it extremely my, oh pick and you know, i'm sure that there's a lot in that, you know, the legacy of colonialism and all sorts of things. so, so, so, so you know, i think that's understandable where that's coming from. but, but i find, i find it a little surprising that india, for example, you know, would, would be, would be happy with what was going on in ukraine. you know, like, in some sense, moving to a world order, a room where there are no rules. you know, that seems like a fairly frightening thing to me and i would, i would think it was fairly frightening to india. you know, after all, india was with china in the relatively recent. in fact, they have an ongoing both dispute at this moment. you know, so it seems kind of all that india would think this was sort of so, so, so ok, if you see, i mean, present, james robinson, i'll stop you. the more from the economist, political scientist,

professor of global conflict studies at the higher school, the public policy at the university of chicago to the spray. who is the aggressor today i'm authorized to additional strong sanctions. today. rusher is the country with the most sanctions imposed against it. a number that's constantly growing. figure fisher, for almost a year. it's becoming a more streamline the we're we're banding all in ports of russian oil and gas. news . i, with a good regarding joe biden, imposing these sanctions on russia. jo has destroyed the american economy, so there's your boomerang. ah, ah,

needs to come to the russian state local narrative. i've stayed as i'm phone and ignore santini div asking him, i'm not getting his house. none of that for me could been this is he babbled. it's been okay. so mine is coupon speaking with weaver van in the european union, the kremlin. yup. machines, the state on russia today and split our t spoke neck even our video agency, roughly all band on youtube and pinterest and with

welcome back. i'm still here with james robinson, professor of global conflict studies of the legacy of chicago's, or a school of public policy. as, as a scholar, what do you think about the fact that even questioning the historical context of what the russians have done, is to make yourself be a put in apologise. it's as if, i mean, i don't know if you, if you look at too much about the treaty of versailles and churchill serv, killing of maybe 250000 in the rhineland, in 1919 or something and trace routes of world war 2. you weren't called a nazi. why is it now that if you start to look at these contexts of global conflict, you watch a magic mirror calder, your putin apologist. yeah, well it's very emotional moment. ah, it's like football teams or something. no, i. yeah, i don't, i, it's difficult to have a sort of rational discussion,

perhaps about these historical roots of these conflicts, or, you know, territorial disputes in the middle of a conflict like this done. well, you saw the light in history also is varied, is difficult and ambiguous. do you think the china can replace demand that may be lost from nato countries from european countries? how can they replace all the demand for commodities and services? well, i think that depends on what happens. so china's economic growth over the next on or what, what period of time we're talking about, you know, but, but i think most people would expect china, china's economic growth is likely to slow down more than anything else. you know, and there's many contradictions in the way the chinese system works, which, which, you know, which maker sort of reversal all of this very dynamic economic growth over the last 40 years. much more likely than that kind of acceleration. so, so i don't know,

china has some sort of strategic interest in buying up vast amounts of oil, natural resources. but i think if you just looked at the economic fundamentals and asked, you know, with, with, with the trajectory of the chinese economy make up for european demand, i'd say the answer to that is not. and well, i remember very well the foreign policy magazine front cover in 9099 saying the anything all this talk about chinese economic development is exaggerated. china is actually just your average developing world, the country. but of course, there is a relevance here regarding children being in putin's meeting at the winter olympics, in that john bolton was particularly concerned about it. on our show on saturday, the former national security adviser and us about is the un that join made a statement saying taiwan is not ukraine because taiwan is part of china. i do think that the china will take

a more aggressive militarily aggressive strands as it lies. they're surrounded by m o. u. s. bases and weaponry. yeah, i think that's quite possible actually. yeah, i mean, china does think about taiwan in a civil away to are russia thinks about you cray. i would say, you know, if there's more, not far more historical precedent for ukrainian independence of the risk for taiwanese independence. you know, well, it depends how you think about it. you know, try one was independent for many years during the imperial kind of periods in china as a sort of, you know, it was a not really controlled by beijing or whatever. but i, i do think it's very worrying. yeah. because i think, you know what the chinese see is that nobody's going to really protect, go to protect you crate like understand weapons, but nobody's really going to protect you grain or, you know, or do anything militarily, if russia annex is it. and i, you know, i suspect they think the same thing would happen in taiwan. but, but i, you know,

i think the chinese are perhaps kind of more strategic and long, you know, kind of for cited then puts in this, you know, the chinese have an ideology, you know, and they have a kind of institutional set up that putin doesn't really have you know, put in this one man show, you know, and, yeah present. she, he, you know, he's a, he's a very kind of, you know, he's a manager or thing again professor, i think that's different in china. i think, you know, i think it's much less individualized in china, and this is in russia, you know, i mean, that's actually the good. you see the, in some sense wants to, teen goes, it's hard to sort of see one can, you know, it seems more difficult to imagine that this agenda will continue. whereas the chinese, the gender is much more deeply seated and institutionalized than, than good sense agenda. why are in them obviously the russian duma in its entirety supported, supported the decision of vladimir putin. and i think russians would beg to differ

about it being some monolithic place where everyone just worships this cult of huge in. similarly, as you say, obviously in china. but how quick was china to immediately replace visa, mastercard with union pay, the credit card 2nd biggest credit card in the world? how quickly were they just say we will start to take wheat. and how quickly are they stopping bank systems to enable moscow to enter a parallel economic system? you said it wasn't economic. clearly, every analyst you talked to in china or russia says, this war and your grain is economic because it may presage the end of the dollar. well, i mean it's a, it's not economic in the sense i don't think it's motivates. it's not motivated by economics. you know, it may have economic consequences, you know, but i, you know, i think it's much too early to, to see, at least for me, it's too early to see what those economic consequences are. you know, could be,

you know, china could make russia dependent on its technology or its institutions or whatever, you know, that maybe they'll be able to make rush or a client state of china. i don't know. i mean, i do think, you know, the china, china, china is very sophisticated technologically, in many ways. you know, it's been competing on many margins with western technology in western institutions . and this, another instance of it. and it creates a kind of pretext for them to, to do things that perhaps they, they didn't think of doing before. but you know, but i think it's hard, it's hard for me at the moment to see what the long run economic consequences are. my point was just, it's not motivated by economics. i think the economic consequence, russia should surely gave me the economic consequences. and ukraine are surely going to be disastrous. i think the economic consequences to russia are going to be disastrous to what are they going to be for china? i, you know, i don't know. he's only russia was tired and the sanctions,

all the sanctions have gone on for so many years. just as iran is tied to the sanctions, venezuela's died of the sanctions. a, my impression is that the sanctions didn't really have much impact on anything in russia. you know, russian elite went, went, went when told, with their business and their life styles. and you know, they capital selling natural resources and got in here. so i, i didn't seem to it, it didn't seem to really have a big impact on what was going on. so i'd be surprised if that was what precipitated this. i mean, i was a child has been annoyed about sanctions against china too, but the only way to alternately evade sanctions is to destroy the power clearly of, of the dollar. so i was one other aspect of this is sadie arabia could it fill the gap in terms of energy resources that is being removed from the market and resulting in. i don't know what the gas prices are like as a petrol pump, as we call them over here in chicago, in a working class is

a pangs with their lives in ukraine. and it has come to the ask and they're paying price. now not being able, having to choose between aging and eating, as we often say on this program where you live, what 40000000 can only tonight by virtue of food stamps. yeah, i, i, i'm not sure what the, the centers of the saudi arabians. i'm sure that the, you know, the united states government will be leaning on them to, to increase production. but i expect the saudis a very happy to see the oil prices increase. you know, so, so, and it's very good, you know, for some governments like venezuela, we were mentioning you mentioning earlier because the venezuelan government does well when the oil price goes up, they have money to spread around and i support and popularity. so i didn't know that there would be a big enough increase in production to actually maybe it'll ameliorate the price

rise, but i expect oil prices again to go up and we'll be stuck with that. you know, so is this conflict a global conflict? i wouldn't say, yeah, that's a good question. you know, is having global repercussions, you know, going go lou repercussions politically, economically. you know, i think it's actually having the rather good effects of, of making european western european countries realized that, you know, many of their institutions have atrophied and, you know, and that's probably probably a bad thing, you know. and so it's going to make it, i think the european union is reacted in the way, which is much more which of us more much less stronger than people anticipated. and perhaps, you know, they understand as i understand they can't rely on the united states. they're the united states, as sort of turned out much more isolationist now, after the call, the humiliation in iraq and afghanistan. and, you know, and domestic politics is so overwhelming in the united states and disputes about domestic issues that the european union is going to have to think differently about, about politics and an international politics. and so there's also,

or is it the way the opposite or is quite the opposite. they are being union in swapping their a gas terminals to be able to take in l. n, g from the united states refract gas there. that europe will do what emma, the united states tells them to do. they will send weapons into ukraine to fight a war that ukraine will be defeated in allowing the cannon fodder of ordinary ukrainians in a war that they are always going to lose. at the same time has now become wholly reliant on fossil fuel energy resources from the united states. they like literally just following everything. washington tells us, i don't think that's united states driving these decisions by, by, by germany and the european union actually to starts to start sending weapons to you. great. i think that's, that's a, just a change in european policy, which is, which is independent of the united states. i think, i think germany steam realizing, you know, for the last few years that you can't rely on the united states. and so, you know,

i mean, that's part of the sort of a time to kind of reach a new, a new relationship with russia, which could be a total failure. but, but nevertheless, you know, that doesn't mean it wasn't a good idea to try. and i, you know, i, i think, yeah, i think, i think they'll be, you know, where else in the, what else in the short run you do in terms of buying and it's, you know, so you have to turn to the united states. but i, i, yeah, i don't agree with that assessment. i think i think the european union has understood that it, it needs to take a new path. now without the so might say ridiculous idea of a no fly zone. even without that, zalinski has said that what has happened as in terms of the violation of ukrainian sovereignty, means the agreement to get rid of that nuclear weapons is also invalid. and that, of course, got a retaliation from the russian saying, and nuclear war and nuclear weapons are now on high alert. they put it to

a higher their, a tactical nuclear weapons that russia has. what sir, given that nuclear war is now mentioned, i think on every news program in every nation country about once an hour. how likely do you think are a limited nuclear war may be more shy? my room you mentioned earlier, said that if russia really wants to choose ukraine is a line in the sand about the dollar about economics, about all the rest of it, about the new world order of new countries. the killing may resemble the u. s. fire bombing of tokyo in the 2nd world war, what scale of killing a we can we expect? yeah, i don't think he's talking about nuclear weapon. so easy. i mean, i think, as you know, with the eventual, thankfully, i honestly, everything is bad, obviously. no, absolutely, absolutely. i think, i think, you know, i think he's making analogies to what, what putin has been willing to do before, you know, in no, wherever. so so, well, i sort of all, do you know,

because i don't think coaching thinks the chechens are russians of but, but, but somehow he thinks the ukrainians all attach and was settled quite a while ago, which is why church and special forces of fighting alongside russian leader, he managed to put a puppet regime in place and a very kind of brutal, autocratic puppet regime in place. yeah. who is now supporting him in ukraine. i think i think profession miss ramirez, right, you know about, about the by how terrible it could get. but i, you know, about nuclear war. you know, i'm not an expert on that. he's much more an expert on that. i, i think, i think in, during the cold war at least, ah, you know, they manage to avoid any sort of even limit that nuclear war. the, i don't of, it's an oxymoron. the notion of a new limited nuclear war that seems unlikely to me like so far they're stopping short of things, which i think would move to that so. so i, you know, but i'm, i'm not, i'm not an expert on that. that's it for one of your favorite shows of this season,

the team and i will be back soon with a brand new look. but until then you can keep in touch my all social media if it's available in your country. and remember, you can continue to watch all going underground episodes on odyssey and, and r t dot com see very soon and who is the aggressor today? i'm authorizing the additional strong sanctions. today. russia is the country with the most sanctions imposed against it. a number that's constantly growing up in your future. literally just a moment. but when you're sitting in the morning the we're, we're, we're banding all in ports of russian oil and gas, new g. i. g. with regard to joe,

by imposing these sanctions on russia has destroyed the american economy. so there is your boomerang with the refusal of a number of western countries from having normal cooperation has already hit millions of european this provoking a real energy crisis. and we are putting that uses that way, so provoking energy, payoffs among its citizens, jude to it's refusal to trade with russia also had on the program as german officials, warren reserves will only last until the often the russian gas supplies are cut. and some members know, returning to coal, we debated the prospects and realm of occasions of the flock cutting itself all from brushing energy. you cannot run an economy like the european.