on the bill, can you call us? oh boy a, what is the well, she my indiana on site is and more a month or put them out that they give us a mm hm. hello and welcome to worlds apart. for the last 3 decades since the collapse of the soviet union, russia has been floundering through an identity crisis, unsure about what it is, an insecure about what it wants to be. a jubilee configuration of with the west

proved short lived on the brother on the reciprocated wild. the relationship with the rest of the world was more talked about than attended to. and then came the military operation in ukraine. that changed absolutely everything. what does it leave russia in the search for its own identity and relations with others? to discuss it, i'm now joined by federal louisiana research director of the vault di discussion club feather. it's great to see you in the studio again. thank you very much for coming over. thank you for reminding me. now i'm in psychology, the 4th decade of life is usually associated with a midlife or an identity crisis, which could be quite cataclysmic if the manifesting problems are not attended to in time. or if they are allowed to accumulate. and i wonder if we can also apply that metaphor to russia, which now finds itself in pretty unprecedented circumstances both externally,

internally. yes, but the question is whether this identity crisis is just beginning or this crisis began 30 plus years ago when russia lost the previous identity, which was called food union. and try to become, as you said, at the beginning of truly integral part of the international system. led by united states and western allies. and it's difficult to imagine today in this atmosphere, but those who remember the know that russia did, it's best to, to accommodate itself to the western the system. and it happens in 1990 us, but it was not successful because of internal cows and internal mass in russia for both the states and people and society were mostly occupied with survival. but into

silence. one lot of them important became russian president. she the, the enormous efforts to, to, to try to offer it to the west, something that would suit both so well, not just something as year. recently, i wrote, russia made some pretty difficult, although an implicit concessions, for example, tacitly agreeing to nato enlargement. although it also allowed itself pretty blunt criticism of the system, and i wonder if this inability on the part the frosh or to simply shut up and comply, was it mainly due to moscow's wounded pride? was it at least in part the realization that the system itself objectively is going downhill? i don't think it was that kind of elevation at the time in 990 s and early 2000. everybody was convinced that the western dominance will,

at least last for very long time. by the way, i think many of us remember the late american commentator and philosopher charles krauthammer, who wrote his famous piece about the you and he pull the moment as early as 990. and that was the big, the benchmark he, he rode that and that was before. so we do new co ops. but he was convinced that the new era was in the starting one. united states will be, will be able to do what they wanted. but what i wanted to, to, to remind you, crowd camera was wise enough to write that we should not believe that this you in the pool or moment will last forever. he wasn't my, she didn't believe that it will be approximately 25 years. so he was absolutely

right about coming back to your question. i think that at that time, only a few most insightful people believed that that might change soon. so rational times to, to become part were dictated and led by the willingness to create better conditions for the developers of the country. but detailed, i mentioned the nature enlargement already. and i was surprised to read somewhere at the 2008. booker, a summit, which discussed potential membership of georgia ukraine conduct leaves arise, done. you a secretary of state, explicitly sat on the record that the cold war is over russia save, or rather russia last, and that war. and she or brother, it has to accept that. and we all know that that led to the same as

paper that extended the welcoming invitation to ukraine and georgia. i wonder if when it comes, comes to nate, do you think its efforts incessant efforts to expand? are they dictated by strategic thinking by the calculus? or are they also in part driven by primitive psychology of, you know, making russia recognize that it was a loser both. but primarily i think that nathan longe rent was motivated by the ceiling of this kind of only borton's that we can do whatever we believe is right. and the concept of european security arrangements after the cold war. and this concept was basically agreed with the soviet union with gorbachev. leadership, 989,

and then 900. 19 the parish charter for new europe was to put it very simple and simplistic. was that nature or euro land taken situations? this is security. well, security need to equal security, but i want to, you know, these people, if they are in did live by strategic thinking, they could not have ignored the consequences of that own actions. and nature has been involved and some pretty well, i wouldn't say disaster is that and the value term, but pretty ineffective campaigns, even from the nato point of view. so do you think they truly believe that the nader is security on, on an objective basis? so i think at that time, yes, they did need to feel completely in areas which actually did not belong to the responsibility never belong to the dentist on or iraq. some member states in

europe from the beginning, from the more much of acceptance of unified germany membership, benita that worked pretty well. and again, so with you and then russia, the successor basically accepted that. and this is when, when we now talk about how need to betray us, partially, yes, partially, we should be in the sincere so that that was the vision which was maybe not completely would be said the suction that there was an honest mistake on, on russia bar there's that there was no mistake and or an illusion. illusion mistake and probably expectation that we can play bigger all inside the system. okay. now you said that native failed in areas where it had nothing to do.

let's say i've gotten a son in iraq. what about the ukraine? you know, and the efforts to draw your crate in because obviously your credit is much closer to our home than native home. could ukraine be considered as one of those failed strategic failures on the part of nato, as we've seen years. but initially, by the way, the 1st, the front runner of ukrainian integration into the west was no need to, it was a rather european union. and the whole ukrainian crisis, which we see now in the full scale, started with the idea of association agreement to dial. 13 of course, now we see that there is basically no difference in the european union, but at that time, your opinion emphasized that is something completely different. and russia actually accepted this, saying that it hurts our interest. but to understand that it's not about security.

why need to was so keen to expand her? of course, in the instinct drupal, the go instinct, we cheer would shoe is there. or if we look at the battlefield today in ukraine, we will see the names of cities and towns which were mentioned in the same convex 100 years ago, 300 years ago. so this is an area of field, for instance, and permanent jew blue, the co competition in eastern europe. so that when you talk about instant ad, your political competition, it has a sort of instinctual and somewhat unconscious filter because you come from a school of real politic. and this is a very cognitive, very sort of mentally based school. you calculate the interest of one party a your own interest. you see how they can be compatible. you try not to ah,

buy more than you can choose, which is the major liability in foreign policy. but when we look at the ukranian case, it's deeply irrational. i mean, i understand rushes irrationality, you know, their historical connection and ties. but i don't understand the western insistence on getting a crane into the camp when it's, i think from the real political list point of view, it's absolutely clear that they cannot absorb that. they cannot integrated fully so why did they need it? i think dear appetite or to white, as i mentioned, was produced by the su fauria. we generated from the feeling of end of history. we sure came as a result of the collapse of the soviet union, which in fact was totally unexpected by americans. the couldn't even dream about this to happen. and i think her story of leadership and all our domestic

troubles created such a dream full situation for the worst. and when it happened, and then helped her legal help. and so, but also they concluded, based on new concept developed at the time the concluded that this victory was not because of failure, just failure of the sort of leadership which, which was the case. but it was like a natural develop historical development, which should be prolonged and continued so, and they claim history for themselves. is that what you're saying is they sorta took the natural development of history, has their own achievement? absolutely. i think so. that was one of the leading god means actually yeah. and that was, that was some kind of for well to the real politics otherwise . and at the same time, you can,

you can see that this attempt to take ukraine on the control from the point of view, real politics it's, it's quite, quite talk, quite normal because this is strategically important area. most western leaders and analysts are characterized rushes, actions there as totally and provoke. but i think among foreign policy thinkers, there is a realization that ukraine starting from 2014, perhaps even before that. but especially since 2014 was and major should teja, problem for russia, not an irrational law, the style jake issue, but the major strategic problem that the military personnel that the commander in chief had to address. can you spell out what was the actual problem there? you know, those month of military operation demonstrated that it least in one point fujen was absolutely right. ukraine was heavily preparing for

a war and home with russia. oh, we don't know, but for a war, probably with russia because with whom else and the level of engagement with ukraine on the side, the u. s. u. k. european countries and they are, but they are assistance to ukraine to be prepared for a big military conflict. and now everybody says it openly. it was the night before, but now even the officials in the, in britain in us, they say yes we were there. we did, there was think look, they fight very good because over and i think in this regard of whether they were prepared for a war for, for attacking russia or for resisting russia. it does matter because here put in a last to quote, i think of it. so who said the intentions, and it was a bismark. yeah. intentions don't matter. what matters is that the 10,

yeah, exactly. and the potential of ukraine has been increased significantly, whether russia, rightly and correctly calculate the devil to sing. that's another big discussion. but to say that this operation was a totally unprovoked, irrational move, that's a bit too far. okay, well better we have to take a very short break right now, but we will be back in just a few moments statement. ah ha. yet the deal good. ah, i think is 70 percent of even 80 percent of so be of the blood for

why serbia in to me. if you say i want to approach need go, it means i want this best with this one. me not a toyota me sale possibly to login and then roseann roseann with . mm hm. welcome back to worlds. apartments said that a piano research director of the, of all day discussion club. for before the break, we were talking about the military operation that russia conducts in the ukraine. and i think authorizing something like that would have been

a major a tab before any historically minded russian leader, but especially so i think for vladimir putin given everything he said about how the russians and the ukrainians, a part of one people would he have to part with this rather romantic geopolitical notion in order to green light, the military operation, and don't you think that rushing the way was held hostage of that idea that you know, we and the ukrainians are brothers and wasn't the west using that in a sense, calculating, counting on rushes inability to take a military step against ukraine for thought i would not overestimate the intellectual capacity of the west. so well, then you said that they were rational in center for rational. yes. but as you say that the county calculate how to provoke russia. i don't know, probably not. so the movement of thinking in the west,

as we see in the end of the cold war might be pretty disastrous for who us. and paula says, what is true? yes, the narrative are and which put in and that many russian decision makers base the pros to ukraine is a good mind and not the only one. so you can argue quite grounded about this concept one nation and one people. because for example, in the soviet union was completely different idea in russia before 900 century, it was another version of this and we'll put in the revive is actually the approach which prevailed in russian history in the russian state building since

me the 19th century, it was it an emotional idea or was it because, i mean, the way i see it that he, as a commander in chief, had to take rushes interest 1st and foremost and, and many analysts, including, i think people are associated with, well, they have claimed that, well, he sort of push this, solving of the ukrainian issue are off for quite some time that perhaps if that have been addressed earlier, we wouldn't have to deal with the, you know, with the casualties and this level of destruction and the level of west and put it back as we are dealing with right now, do you think he has it hated perhaps for a little bit too long. some people believe that this action had to be taken 2014. whenever the thing started it's easy to be wise for somebody. yeah. i don't know what it is.

i'm also to show that it wasn't the emotional put in is not that very much emotional person. yes, he believes in this narrative and he believes in this idea about one nation. but actually, many of us, including myself, were very much surprised with the beginning of this operation and not, not to call it shocked. but actually approaching was very frank. if we remember his article published in july 2002 into one. exactly about this, the genesis of russian and ukrainian relationship and the conclusion that the article was absolutely clear. that's the question to us, why we didn't read it as, as what was written. she said that, yes, we believe this is one nation. but we respect realities which emerged for many reasons,

that there are 2 states, fine, and we are rated to recognize to accept this state with one condition that the state is friendly to our state, then find they can corporate, like, i don't know, you as canada and so on, but if the 2nd state will be based on the anti russian ideology and become the anti russian bulwark, then the state will not be there. you mentioned the 2014 and how this whole debacles started with the association association agreement. and just a few days ago, the e leaders formerly granted ukraine animal dover, candidate status, calling it a historic moment, a good day for europe. although there were some negative comments as well, for example, from you, commission president, are still on the line. who said that this decision was taken in the face of the russian imperialism. i wonder it's been the same question as with nate,

or do they authentically want ukraine in or is it another case of an expansion or promised expansion for the sake of expansion and spiting russia? no, no. i think this is like a trip. so they don't want to green in the understand very well that ukraine is absolutely unfit to become member of the european union. even if we take the full decides all the traditional problem. so you can buy this as a country at war. it's going through to all rules and principles of the european integration to accept such a country. what is interesting and coming back to the beginning called conversation europe in union and european leaders who launched this project and then continued that. and i'm, i believe that this project was one of the most successful in european political history. ever. human, the, the, i mean,

the european integration from the beginning, you, the, the, the, the, the, the, the closer to me actually, okay. but the initially tried to dig distance to every sink which has to do with job politics. it's not about politics except it's about development. it's about democracy, it's about economic corporation, but please, nor geo politics anymore. europe fed up with your politics into, into essentially so that and now it's their way around the other way around because boss or mr from the line and sharma share the chairman of european council d. c openly. this is our job political duty to take ukraine and probably looking from this angle. yes, they the, they have to give some, some hope to ukrainian in this edition. but that basically eliminates the all idea

about the european integration because in integration was not about that. and that's the question, not about the future of ukraine in the european union, but about the future of new york in your opinion prosy. and i think there is another concurrent example, all fine, the war is not just being warrants, but being followed by actions. and i mean the, the effort on the part of the e u to limit its dependence on russia's energy sources because energy up until recently served as anchor ropes for the whole relationship and in some sense, prevented from deteriorating, given how both size. now try to cut it off. are there any safety catches left against further escalation or even against the bigger war of wider conflict given how irrational or geopolitical things tend to be? you know, i'm afraid the only mean which still works is

nuclear deterrence. unfortunately, that's very sad and that's very primitive. actually we are back to 17060 s, maybe fifty's above to yes indeed you are. so you're right that the network over can make into dependencies, which has been developed very carefully since late 906. this and yes indeed, it was an enormously useful mean to protect you repeat countries including the soviet union and then russia from escalations. now it's gone, so we see that interdependencies now play the opposite role that for that the weapon. and unfortunately, in this situation, the only irrational instrument to deter, isn't nuclear arms and we see that into work. it's very bad. let me ask you

a broader question about how the international system is changing because we talked about the collapse of the so if union, but the roads recently that the changes that we are witnessing right now. i in fact much broader because the collapse of the soviet bloc was absorbed by the system without significant changes. but nowadays, according to you, we're seeing an avalanche which is streaming down the hill and nobody, no country, perhaps not even the united states can influence, let alone stop at. can we at least speculate about the direction, the trajectory of these concentrations, whereas it heading? no, i don't think we can project and we can predict this point because we are in the middle of a snow storm and it's quite senseless to try to to picture how the world's system will look like say 5 years for 10 years from now. but yes,

i'm not so sure that the change today is much deeper than the change we witnessed. and i remember from my late eighty's early ninety's, because at the time at least we had an idea where to go. not everybody was happy with this, but most people believe that the it was the only the only possible way. now, there are no way simple and many things happening are actually undermining not just the international political order, but some basic principles like capitalist competition. the market economy, all those extra creation, so essence based on what based on loss. no, not necessarily attempts to create a huge cargo of gas and oil.

consumers to put prices under control. it has nothing to do with the liberal economy as renew it. and most likely it will continue and we will see something completely different. so very soon we have to leave it there. but it's as always, had great pleasure talking to you. thank you. and thank you for watching hope to see her again next week on wells apart. ah, with mm. ah, lou needs to come to the russian

state will never be as tight as i formerly know. santini, diva jimenez ingles, medical benefits. he babbled the keys on my knees. gustavo speaking with, we will van in the european union, the kremlin. yup. machines. the state aunt, rush up to date and school r t sport neck, given our video agency, roughly all band on youtube with me. ah,

ah . oh. hello people i think is 70 percent of even 80 percent of serbian people. oh for sure. but you know, you cannot make it like a person or like something that you you know number people who come to the book and then you may conclusion. they are pro russians or not. also phobia means also cerebral for.