i, with that you for that ah, with on the welcome to oil, to part for the last 3 decades since the collapse of the soviet union, russia has been floundering through an identity crisis. i'm sure about what it is an insecure about what it wants to be. a jew political infatuation of with the west proved short lived on the brother on the reciprocated wild. the relationship with

the rest of the world was more talked about than attended to. and then came the military operation in ukraine. that changed absolutely everything. what does it leave russia in the search for its own identity and relations with others? to discuss that, i'm now joined by federal kiana research director of the vall die discussion club for it's great to see you in the studio again. thank you very much for coming over . thank you for reminding me. now in psychology, the 4th decade of life is usually associated with a mid life or an identity crisis, which could be quite critical is make, if the manifesting problems are not attended to in time or if they are allowed to accumulate. and i wonder if we can also apply that metaphor to russia, which now finds itself in pretty unprecedented circumstances, both externally and internally. yes, but the question is whether this identity crisis is beginning war. this crisis

began 30 plus years ago when russia lost the previous identity, which was called so union. and try to become, as you said, in the beginning, truly integral part of the international system led by united states or western allies. and it's difficult to imagine today in this atmosphere, but those who remember they know that russia did, it's best to, to accommodate itself to the western system. and it happens in 1990 s, but it was not successful because of internal cows and internal mass in russia. for both the state and people and society were mostly occupied with survival by the into silence when the light important became russian president, she the,

the enormous efforts to, to, to try to offer to the worst something that would suit both so well. not just something as year recently wrote, russia made some pretty difficult, although implicit concessions, for example, tacitly agreeing to nato enlargement, although it also allowed itself pretty blunt criticism of the system. and i wonder if this inability on the part of russia to simply shut up and comply, was it mainly due to moscow's wounded pride? was it at least in part the realization that the system itself objectively is going downhill? i don't think it was that kind of l is ation at the time in 990 s and early 2000, everybody was convinced that the western dominance will at least last for

very long time. by the way, i think many of us remember the late american commentator and philosopher charles krauthammer, who wrote his famous piece about the you and he pull the moment as early as 990. and that was the big, the benchmark he, he wrote that and that was before. so we doing in co ops. but he was convinced that the new era was in the starting one. united states will be it will be able to do what they want. but what i wanted to, to, to remind you, crowd camera was wise enough to write that we should not believe that the few in the pool or moment will last forever. she wasn't my, she didn't believe that it will be approximately 25 years. and he was absolutely right about coming back to your question. i think that at that time, only

a few most insightful people believed that that might change soon. so rational times to, to become part were dictated and led by the willingness to create better conditions for the developers of the country. but detailed, i mentioned the nature enlargement already. and i was surprised to read somewhere at the 2008. booker, a summit, which discussed potential membership of georgia ukraine conduct leaves arise, done. your secretary of state, explicitly sat on the record that the cold war is over russia save, or rather russia last, and that war. and she or brother, it has to accept that. and we all know that that led to the same as

paper that expanded the welcoming invitation to ukraine and georgia. i wonder if when it comes, comes to nate, do you think its efforts incessant efforts to expand? are they dictated by strategic thinking by the calculus? or are they also in part driven by primitive psychology of, you know, making russia recognize that it was a loser both. but primarily i think that nathan longe rent was motivated by the ceiling of this kind of only bulletins that we can do whatever we believe is right. and the concept of european security arrangements after the cold war. and this concept was basically agreed with the soviet union with gorbachev. leadership, 989, and then 900. 19 the paris charter for new europe was to put it's very

simplistic, was that nature or euro atlantic institutions. this is security, security need to equal security. but when you know these people, if they are in did live by strategic thinking, they could not have ignored the consequences of that own actions. and nature has been involved and some pretty well, i wouldn't say disaster is that and the value term, but pretty ineffective campaigns, even from the nato point of view. so do you think they truly believe that the nader is security on, on an objective basis? no, i think at that time yes, they did need to feel completely in areas which actually did not belong to the responsibility never belong to the dentist on or iraq. some member states in europe from the beginning, from the more much of acceptance of unified germany membership,

benita that worked pretty well. and again, so with you and then russia, the successor basically accepted that. and this is when, when we now talk about how need to betray us, partially, yes, partially, we should be in the sincere so that that was the vision which was maybe not completely with the said the suction that this was an honest mistake on, on russia bar there's that there was no mistake and or an illusion. illusion mistake and probably expectation that we can play bigger all inside the system. okay. now you said that nature failed in areas where it had nothing to do. let's say i've gotten this done in iraq. what about the ukraine?

you know, and the efforts to draw your crate in because obviously your credit is much closer to our home than native home. could ukraine be considered as one of those failed? she tgm failures on the part of nader as we've seen. oh yes, but initially, by the way, in 1st, the front wrong or of ukrainian integration into the west was no need to. it was rather european union. and the whole ukrainian crisis, which we see now in the full scale, started with the idea of association agreement. 2013 of course, now we see that there is basically no difference in the european union. but at that time, your opinion emphasized that is something completely different. and russia actually accepted this, saying that it hurts our interests. but to understand that it's not about security . why nature was so keen to expand, of course,

and the instinct jupiter, they go instinct which here, which is there. and if we look at the battlefield today and ukraine, we will see the names of cities and towns which were mentioned in the same context 100 years ago, 300 years ago. so this is an area of field, for instance, and permanent jew political competition in eastern europe. so that when you talk about instance geopolitical competition, it has a sort of instinctual and somewhat unconscious filter because you come from a school of rail politik. and this is a very cognitive, very sort of mounting the base school. you calculate the interest of one party or your own interest. you see how they can be compatible. you try not to buy more than you can choose, which is a major liability. and in foreign policy,

but when we look at the ukranian case, it's deeply irrational. i mean, i understand rushes irrationality, you know, their historical connection and ties. but i don't understand the western insistence on getting your grant into the camp when it's i think from the reality political point of view, it's absolutely clear that they cannot absorb that they cannot integrated fully. so why do they need it? i think they are appetite or to bite. as i mentioned, was produced by the c fauria we generated from the feeling of end of history. we sure came as a result of the collapse of the soviet union, which in fact was totally unexpected by americans. the couldn't even dream about this to happen. and i think her saw it leadership and all our domestic troubles created such

a dream full situation for the worst. and when it happened and help us medical help . and so, but also they concluded, based on new concept are developed at the time the concluded that this victory was not because of failure, just failure of the sort of leadership which, which was the case. but it was like a nature of the historical development which should be prolonged and continued to and they lately, claim history for themselves. is that what you're saying? they sorta took the natural development of history, has their own achievement? absolutely. i think so. that was what the living god means actually. yeah. and that was, that was some kind of for well to the real politics otherwise. and at the same time, you can, you can see that this attempt to take ukraine on the control from the point of view,

real politics it's, it's quite, quite talk, quite normal because this is strategically important area. most western leaders and analysts are characterized rushes actions there as totally and provoke, but i think among foreign policy thinkers that there is a realization that ukraine starting from 2014 perhaps even before that. but especially since 2014 was and major should teach it problem for us. not an irrational law, nostalgic issue. but the major strategic problem that the military personnel that the commander in chief had to address. can you spell out what was the actual problem there? you know, those month of the reservation demonstrated that at least in one point, fujen was absolutely right. ukraine was heavily preparing for a war with russia. oh, we don't know, but for a war,

probably with russia because we pull miles and the level of engagement with ukraine on the side to us, u. k. b in countries. and they are perhaps their assistance. do you agree to be prepared for a big military conflict? and now everybody says it openly. it was the night before, but now even the officials in the, in britain, in the us. they say yes we were there. we did think look, they fight very good because a lot. and i think in this regard, whether they were prepared for a war for, for attacking russia or for resisting russia. it doesn't matter because here, put in last to quote, i think was causing it. so who said that the intentions don't match? it was a bismark intentions don't matter. what matters is the potential exactly,

and the potential, the grain has been increased significantly, whether russia, rightly and correctly calculated the thing. that's another big discussion. but to say that this operation was a totally unprovoked, irrational move, that's a bit too far. ok, well, better we have to take a very short break right now, but we will be back in just a few moments, said she and me i use ah, yes, absolutely. co with a free heater, when enough will shut me jelly nauseous,

come on with some stuff done with all the help but need some i wrote up with to deal with with just a minute and it was up here at the office with

a photo with ah, hell come back to was a part that said that i look on the for such director of the all the discussion up there before the break. we were talking about the military operation that russia conducts in the ukraine. and i think authorizing something like that would have been a major a taboo for any historically minded russian later. but especially so i think

for vladimir putin given everything he said about how the russians and the ukrainians are part of one people with he have to part with this rather romantic geopolitical notion, you know that your green light the military operation and don't you think that rushing the way was held hostage of that idea that you know, we and the ukrainians or brothers and wasn't the west using that in the sense calculating, counting on rushes, inability to take a military step against ukraine for thought. i would not overestimate the intellectual capacity of the west. so well, did you say that they were rational in center or rational? yes. as you say, that the county calculate how to provoke russia. i don't know, probably not a movement of thinking in the west. as we see in

the end of the cold war might be pretty disastrous for who us and call us us. what is true? yes, the narrative. ok. and which putin and that many russian decision makers base the pros to ukraine is a good mind and not the only one. so you can argue quite grounded about this concept, the one nation and one people. because for example, in the soviet union, that was completely different idea in the russia, the for 9 to century, it was another version of this and put in the revived is actually the approach which prevailed in russian history in the russian state. building. seeing

me the 19th century, but was it an emotional idea or was it because, i mean, the way i see that key as a commander in chief had to take rushes interest 1st and foremost, and many analysts, including, i think people associated with that have claimed, as well, he's sort of push this, solving of the ukrainian issue off for quite some time that perhaps if that have been addressed earlier, we wouldn't have to deal with the, you know, with the casualties and this level of destruction and the level of west and put it back as we are dealing with right now, do you think he has it hated perhaps for a little bit too long. some people believe that this action had to be taken down 14. whenever the thing started it's easy to be wise for somebody. yeah. i don't know what is

i'm sort of to show that it wasn't the emotional put in is not a very much emotional person. yes, he believes in this narrative and he believes in this idea about one nation. but actually, many of us, including myself, were very much surprised to the beginning of this operation and not, not to call it shocked. but actually approaching was very frank. if we remember his article published in july 2021. exactly about this, the genesis of russian and ukrainian relationship and the conclusion that the article was absolutely clear. that's the question to us, why we didn't read it as, as what was written. she said that, yes, we believe this is one nation. but we respect realities which emerged for many reasons,

that there are 2 states, fine, and we are rated to recover nice to accept this state with one condition that this state is friendly to our to our state, then fine. they can corporate, like i didn't know you last, canada and so on. but even the 2nd state will be based on the enter ration ideology and become the m to ration bulwark. then the state will not be there. you mentioned the 2014 and how this whole tobacco st started with the association association agreement. and just a few days ago the your leaders formerly granted ukraine animal dover, candidate status, calling. it's historic moment a good day for europe. although there were some negative comments as, as well, for example, from you commission president goes to a phone line who said that this decision was taken in the face of the russian imperialism. i wonder, it's pretty much the same question as with nader, do they authentically want ukraine in or is it another case of expansion promised

expansion for the sake of expansion and spiting russian know now i think this is like a trap, so they don't want to grain in the understand very well that ukraine is absolutely unseen to become member of the european union. even if we take the full decides all the traditional problem. so we agree, but this is a country where it's going through to all rules and principles of the european integration to accept such a country. what is interesting and coming back to the beginning of our conversation, unity and union, and european leaders who launched this project and then continued that. and i'm, i believe that this project was one of the most successful in european political history. ever. human d, e, the, i mean the european integration from his beginning

e, you, the deal and the, the, the, the, the cause of the actual data. but the initially tried to dig distance to every sink which has to do with job politics. it's not about politics, except it's about development, it's about democracy. it's about the economic corporation, but please, nor geo politics anymore. europe fed up with you politics into, into essentially, so that, and now it's the other way around the other way around because boss or mr. from the line and sharma share the chairman of european council d. c openly. this is our job political duty to take ukraine and probably looking from this angle. yes they the, they have to give some, some hope to ukrainian in this edition. but that basically eliminates the all idea about the european integration because it'll be an integration was not about that.

and that's the question, not about the future of ukraine in the european union, but about the future of the european union policy. and i think there is another concurrent example, all fine, the war is not just being warrants, but being followed by actions. and i mean the, the effort on the part of the e u to limit its dependence on russia's energy sources because energy up until recently served as anchor ropes for the whole relationship and in some sense, prevented from deteriorating, given how both size. now try to cut it off. are there any safety catches left against further escalation or even against the bigger war of wider conflict given how irrational or geopolitical things tend to be? you know, i'm afraid the only mean which still works is nuclear deterrence. unfortunately,

that's very sad and that's very primitive. actually we are back to 176. this may be fifty's above 2. yes indeed, you are right that the network cannot make into dependencies, which has been developed very carefully since late 900 sixes. and yes, indeed, it was an enormously useful mean to protect you repeat countries including the soviet union and then russia from escalations. now it's gone. so we see that interdependencies now play the opposite role that for that the weapon. and unfortunately, in this situation, the only irrational instrument to deter isn't nuclear arms and we see that it was, it's very bad. let me ask you

a broader question about how the international system is changing because we talked about the collapse of the so if union, but the roads recently that the changes that we are witnessing right now. i in fact much broader because the collapse of the soviet bloc was absorbed by the system without significant changes. but nowadays, according to you, we're seeing an avalanche which is streaming down the hill and nobody, no country, perhaps not even the united states can influence, let alone stop at kennedy at least speculate about the direction, the trajectory of these conflicts. whereas the heading no, i don't think we can project and we can predict at this point because we are in the middle of a snow storm. and it's quite senseless to try to, to picture how the world system will look like say 5 years for 10 years from now.

but yes, i'm absolutely sure that the change today is much deeper than the change we witnessed . and i remember from my late eighty's early ninety's, because at that time at least we had an idea where to go. not everybody was happy with this, but most people believe that the it was the only the only possible way. now there are no way simple and many things happening are actually on the mining, not just the international political order, but some basic principles like capitalist competition, the market economy, all those extra creation. so essence based on what based on loss. no, not necessarily attempts to create a huge cargo of gas and oil

consumers to put prices under control. it has nothing to do with the liberal economy as renew it, and most likely it will continue and we will see something completely different. so very soon we have to leave it there, but it's as always, had great pleasure talking to you. thank you. and thank you for watching. called to sir again next week and wells apart. ah with blue ah, ah

ah . so what we've got to do is identify the threats that we have. it's crazy even foundation, let it be an arms race is on offense. very dramatic development. only personally and getting to resist. i don't see how that strategy will be successful, very critical time time to sit down and talk.