you know, some, some people in brussels as well. so, you know, let's see what a referendum would say, you know, but i don't think, you know, they said that they don't, they don't plan to hold a referendum. you know, and i can see why, you know, there are some tough questions would have to be posed, you know, some, you know, someone might come and say, well why, you know, we've had, we haven't had any military problems with russia. why do we want to have our cities targeted by russian miss styles? i think that would cause some very unpleasant questions to be asked, you know? and so they're trying to kind of sneak in by the back door without asking their own voters. but again, i, turkey's playing spoiler so it may not happen out. alex tundra is always, we appreciate your time. alex, under poverty, political on the last live from belgrade. ok, just before we go,

this our some news reaching us. several people have been injured in my shooting out a shopping center and copenhagen, danish police, and ambulances were sent immediately to the mall, to treat on a vacuum. people. witnesses at reported, seeing an armed man with an automatic weapon, opening fire on the local authorities, say one person is not in custody. local authorities or advising anyone inside them all to stay inside and wait assistance. yeah, we'll keep an eye on verified information coming from the danish kept on. bring it to you. when we know more now it's been remarked that brushes had something of an identity crisis since the end of the soviet union. so how, how so ukraine conflict impacted. that's the head of the discussion club tacos, that topic right ahead in world support. ah

mm hm. mm hm. welcome to worlds apart. for the last 3 decades since the collapse of the soviet union, russia has been floundering through an identity crisis, unsure about what it is, an insecure about what it wants to be. jubilee congratulation with the west proved short lived on the brother on the reciprocated while the relationship with the rest of the world was more talked about than attended to. them came the military operation in ukraine. that changed absolutely everything. what does it leave russia in the search for its own identity and relations with others? to discuss it, i'm now joined by federal louisiana research director of the vault di discussion

club for their. it's great to see you in the studio again. thank you very much for coming over. thank you for reminding me. now in psychology, the 4th decade of life is usually associated with a mid life or an identity crisis, which could be quite cataclysmic if the manifesting problems are not attended to in time. or if they are allowed to accumulate. and i wonder if we can also apply that metaphor to russia, which now finds itself in pretty unprecedented circumstances, both externally and internally. yes, but the question is whether this identity crisis is just beginning or this crisis begin. so to pause years ago, when russia lost the previous identity, which was called food union. and try to become, as you said, in the beginning, a truly integral part of the international system led by a united states or western allies. and

it's difficult to imagine today in this atmosphere, but those who remember the know that russia did its best to, to accommodate itself to the western system. and it happened in 1990 us, but it was not successful because of internal cows and internal mass in russia. for both the states and people and society were mostly occupied with survival by the, into silence one little or them important became russian president. she did enormous efforts to, to, to try to offer to the worst something that would suit both so well. not just something as year recently wrote, russia made some pretty difficult, although an implicit concessions, for example, tacitly agreeing to nato enlargement,

although it also allowed itself pretty blunt criticism of the system. and i wonder if this inability on the part the frosh or to simply shut up and comply, was it mainly due to moscow's wounded pride? or was it at least in part a realization that the system itself objectively is going downhill? i don't think it was that kind of elevation at the time in 990 s and early 2000 everybody was convinced that the western dominance will at least last for very long time. by the way, i think many, remember the late american commentator and philosopher charles krauthammer, who wrote his famous piece about the you and he pull the moment as early as 990. and that was the big benchmark he, he rode that and that was before. so we doing

a co ops, but he was convinced that the new era was starting one united states will be it will be able to do what they wanted. but what i wanted to, to, to remind you ground camera was wise enough to write that we should not believe that these few in the pool or moment will last forever. he wasn't my, she didn't believe that it will be approximately 25 years. so he was absolutely right about coming back to your question. i think that at that time, only a few most insightful people believed that that might change soon. so rational times to, to become part were dictated and led by the willingness to create better conditions for the developers of the country. but it failed. i

mentioned the nature enlargement already. and i was surprised to read somewhere at the 2008. booker, a summit, which discussed potential membership of georgia and ukraine conduct. lisa rise, done. you a secretary of state explicitly sat on the record that the cold war is over russia save, or rather russia lost in that war. and she, or rather, it has to accept that, and we all know that that led to the same as paper that expanded the welcoming invitation to ukraine and georgia. i wonder if, when it comes, comes to nate, do you think its efforts incessant efforts to expand? are they dictated by strategic thinking by the calculus? or are they also in part driven by primitive psychology of, you know, making russia recognize that it was

a loser both. but primarily i think that nathan longe went, was motivated by the ceiling of this kind of only borton's that we can do whatever we believe is right. and the concept of european security arrangements after the cold war. and this concept was basically agreed with the soviet union with gorbachev. leadership, 989, and then 900. 19 the paris charter for new europe was to put it's very simple and simplistic. was that nature or euro atlantic institutions. this is thank you, richard. well, security need to equal security, but when you know these people, if they are in did live by strategic thinking, they could not have ignored the consequences of the own actions. and nader has been

involved and some pretty well, i wouldn't say disaster is that. and the value term, but pretty ineffective campaigns, even from the nato point of view. so do you think they truly believe that the nader is security on, on an objective basis? so i think at that time, yes, they did need to feel completely in areas which actually did not belong to the possibility, never belong to the dentist on or iraq, some member states in europe from the beginning, from the more much of acceptance of unified germany membership benita, that worked pretty well and again, so with you and then russia is a successor, basically accepted that. and this is when, when we now talk about how need to betray us. partially, yes, partially,

we should be sincere, so that that was the vision which was maybe not completely would be said the suction that there was an honest mistake on, on russia bar there's that there was no mistake and or an illusion. illusion mistake and probably expectation that we can play bigger all inside the system. okay. now you said that nature failed in areas where it had nothing to do. let's say i've gotten this done in iraq. what about the ukraine? you know, and the efforts to draw your crate in because obviously your credit is much closer to our home than native home. could ukraine be considered as one of those failed strategic failures on the part of nader as we've seen? oh yes, but initially, by the way, in 1st, the front runner of ukrainian integration into the west was no need to. it

was rather european union. and the whole ukrainian crisis, which we see now in the full scale, started with the idea of association agreement, 2013. of course, now we see that there is basically no difference in the european union. but the time being union emphasized that is something completely different, and russia actually accepted this, saying that it hurts our interest. but to understand that it's not about security. why? nature was so keen to expand. of course, and the instinct jupiter, they go instinct which here, which is there. and if we look at the battlefield today and ukraine, we will see the names of cities and towns which were mentioned in the same convex 100 years ago, 300 years ago. so this is an area of field,

for instance, and permanent jew political competition in eastern europe. so that when you talk about instant geopolitical competition, it has a sort of instinctual and somewhat unconscious filter because you come from a school of free l politic. and this is a very cognitive, very sort of mounting the base school. you calculate the interest of one party a, your own interest. you see how they can be compatible. you try not to buy more than you can choose, which is a major liability. and in foreign policy, but when we look at the ukranian case, it's deeply irrational. i mean, i understand rushes irrationality, you know, their historical connection and ties. but i don't understand the western insistence on getting your credit into the camp when it's i think from the reality political point of view, it's absolutely clear that they cannot absorb that they cannot integrated fully. so

why do they need it? i think dear appetite, or to bite as dimension was produced by these 2 fauria we generated from the feeling of end of history. we sure came as a result of the collapse of the soviet union, which in fact was totally unexpected by americans. the couldn't even dream about this to happen. and i think her saw it leadership and all our domestic troubles created such a dream full situation for the worst. and when it happened and then helped her legal help. and so, but also they concluded, based on new concept are developed at the time the concluded that this victory was not because of failure, just failure of the sort of leadership which,

which was the case. but it was like a natural develop historical development, which should be prolonged and continued so, and they lately claimed history for themselves. is that what you're saying? they sorta took the natural development of history, has their own achievement? absolutely. i think so. that was what the living god means actually. yeah. and that, that was, that was some kind of for well to the real politics otherwise. and at the same time, you can, you can say that this attempt to take ukraine on the control from the point of view, real politics it's, it's quite, quite, quite normal because this is strategically important area. most western leaders and analysts characterize rushes, actions they are as totally unprovoked, but i think among foreign policy increased, there is a realization that ukraine starting from 2014 perhaps even before that. but

especially since 2014 was a major tgm problem for russia. not an irrational on the style, jake issue, but the major strategic problem that the military personnel that the commander in chief had to address. can you spell out what was the actual problem there? you know, the dose month of minute duration demonstrated that it least in one point. fujen was absolutely right. ukraine was heavily preparing for a war annual with russia. oh, we don't know, but for a war, probably with russia because with whom else and the level of engagement with ukraine on the side, the u. s. u. k. european countries and they are, but they are assistance to ukraine to be prepared for a big military conflict. and now everybody says it openly. it was the night before,

but now even the officials in the, in britain in us, they say yes we were there. we did, there was think look, they fight very good because or, and i think in this regard of whether they were prepared for a war for, for attacking russia or for resisting russia. it does matter because here put in a last to quote, i think was the cause of it. so who said the intentions and it was a bismark? yeah. intentions don't matter. what matters is the 10. yeah, exactly. and the potential of ukraine has been increased significantly. whether russia, rightly and correctly calculated, they were saying that's another big discussion. but to say that this operation was a totally unprovoked, irrational move, that's a bit too far. ok, well, better we have to take a very short break right now, but we will be back in just a few moments state she didn't.

ah, for what we've got to do is identify the threats that we have. it's crazy confrontation, let it be an arms race is very dramatic with i don't see how that strategy will be successful, very political time. time to sit down and talk with. mm hm. welcome back to worlds of parts good. that'll okay on the research director of the all day discussion club for before the rick,

we were talking about the military operation that russia conducts in the ukraine. and i think authorizing something like that would have been a major tab before any historically minded russian leader. but especially so i think for vladimir putin given everything he said about how the russians and the ukrainians, a part of one people would he have to part with this rather romantic geopolitical notion in order to green light the military operation. and don't you think that rushing the way was held hostage of that idea that you know we and the ukrainians brothers and wasn't the west using that in the sounds calculating, counting on rushes, inability to take a military step against ukraine for so i would not overestimate the intellectual capacity of the west, so well, you said that they were rational in center and rational. yes. but as you say that

the county calculated how to provoke crush, i don't know. probably not. so the kill to kill movement of thinking in the west as we see in the end of the cold war might be pretty disastrous for western bullets is what is true. yes, the narrative. and which boot in and that many russian decision makers base the approach to ukraine is to put in mind the not the only one. so you can argue quite grounded about this concept of one nation and one people. because for example, in the soviet union, that was completely different idea in the russia before 900 century, it was another version of this. and put in the revived is actually the approach

which prevailed in russian history in the russian state building. since mean the 19th century, but was it an emotional idea or was it because, i mean, the way i see that he, as a commander in chief, had to take rushes interest 1st and foremost, and many analysts, including, i think people associated with the vault. i have claimed that, well, he sort of push the solving of the ukrainian issue off for quite some time that perhaps if that have been addressed earlier, we wouldn't have to deal with the, you know, with the casualties and this level of destruction and the level of west and put it back as we are dealing with right now. do you think he has it hated perhaps for a little bit too long. some people believe that this

action had to be taken down 14. whenever the thing started, it's easy to be wise for somebody. yeah. i don't know what it is. i'm also to show that it wasn't the emotional. put in is not a very much emotional person. yes, he believes in this narrative and he believes in this idea about one nation. but actually, many of us, including myself, were very much surprised to the beginning of this operation and not, not to call it shocked. but actually approaching was very frank. if we remember his article published in july 2021, exactly about this, the genesis of russian and ukrainian relationship. and the conclusion that the article was absolutely clear. and that's the question to us, why we didn't read it as,

as what was written. she said that yes, we believed this is one nation, but we're respect realities which emerged for many reasons that there are 2 states, fine. and we are rated to recognize, to accept this state with one condition that this state is friendly to our, to our state than fine. they can corporate like, i didn't know you as canada and so on. but if the 2nd state will be based on the anti russian ideology and become the anti russian bulwark, then the state will not be there. you mentioned the 2014 and how this whole debacle started with the association association agreement. and just a few days ago, the e leaders formerly granted the ukraine animal dover candidate status, calling it a historic moment, a good day for europe. although there were some negative comments as well, for example, from you commission president. those 2 are fund line. who said that this decision

was taking in the face of the russian imperialism. i wonder it's been much the same question as with nate, or do they authentically want ukraine in or is it another case of expansion or promised expansion for the sake of expansion and spiting russia? no, no, i think this is like a trip, so they don't want to grant him. they understand very well that ukraine is absolutely unfit to become member of the european union. even if we take to the sides, all the traditional problems, so you couldn't, but this is a country at war. it's contrary to all rules and principles of the european integration to accept such a country. what is interesting and coming back to the beginning, called our conversation, european union and european leaders who launched this project and then continued that. and i'm,

i believe that this project was one of the most successful in european political history. ever. human d e a. d, i mean the european integration from his beginning of the, the, the, the, the, the, because the, yeah, but the initially tried to dig distance to every sink which has to do a job politics. it's not about your politics except it's about development. it's about democracy. it's about economic corporation, but please, nor do politics anymore. europe fed up with your politics into, into century so that and now it's the other way around the other way around because boss or mr from the line and michelle, the chairman of european council d. c openly, this is our job political duty to take ukraine and probably looking from this angle. yes they the, they have to give some,

some hope to ukrainians in this edition. but that basically eliminates the all idea about the european integration because in integration was not about that. and that's the question, not about the future of ukraine in the european union, but about the future of the european union policy. and i think there is another concurrent example of 5 the war is not just being warrants, but being followed by actions. and i mean the, the effort on the part of the e u to limit its dependence on rush of energy sources because energy up until recently served as anchor ropes for the whole relationship and in some sense, prevented from deteriorating, given how both size. now try to cut it off. are there any safety catches left against further escalation or even against a bigger war of wider conflict given how irrational or geopolitical things tend to

be? you know, i'm afraid the only mean which still works is nuclear deterrence. unfortunately, that's very sad and that's very primitive. actually we are back to 176. this may be fifty's above to yes indeed you are. so you're right that the network over economic into dependencies, which has been developed very carefully since late 906. this and yes indeed, it was an enormously useful mean to protect you repeat countries including the soviet union and then russia from escalations. now it's, it's gone. so we see that interdependencies now play the opposite role that, for that the weapon. and unfortunately, in this situation,

the only irrational instrument to deter isn't nuclear arms and we see that it was, it's very bad. let me ask you a broader question about how the international system is changing because we've talked about the collapse of the so if union, but the roads recently that the changes that we are witnessing right now. i in fact much broader because the collapse of the soviet bloc was absorbed by the system without significant changes. but nowadays, according to you, we're seeing an avalanche which is streaming down the hill and nobody, no country, perhaps not even the united states can influence, let alone stop had, can re, at least speculate about the direction, the trajectory of this consequence. whereas it's heading. no, i don't think we can project and we can predict this point because we are in the middle of a snow storm and it's quite senseless to try to to

picture how the world system will look like say 5 years for 10 years from now. but yes, i'm not so sure that the change today is much deeper than the change we witnessed. and i remember from my late eighty's early ninety's, because at the time at least we had an idea where to go. not everybody was happy with this, but most people believe that the it was the only the only possible way. now, there are no way civil and many things happening are actually undermining not just the international political order, but some basic principles like capitalist competition. the market economy, all those extra creation, so essence based on what based on loss. no,

not necessarily attempts to create a huge cartel of gas and oil. consumers to put prices under control. it has nothing to do with the liberal economy as renew it. and most likely it will continue and we will something completely different. so this one we have to leave it there, but it's as always a great pleasure talking to you. thank you. and thank you for watching hope to see you again next week on wells apart. ah, with me ah,

with russia lead force is established full control over lou dance republic territory. after the last city there is taken also ahead on the program with at least 4 civilians, including free citizens from ukraine, are killed in the deadliest ever ukrainian miss. i'll i talk on russian directory.