crane that changed absolutely everything. what does it leave russia in the search for its own identity and relations with others? to discuss that i'm now joined by federal piano research director of the di discussion club. so there is great to see you in the studio again. thank you very much for coming over. thank you for reminding me. now i'm in psychology, the 4th decade of life is usually associated with a mid life or an identity crisis which could be quite critical is make if the manifesting problems are not attended to in time or if they are allowed to accumulate. and i wonder if we can also apply that metaphor to russia, which now finds itself in pretty unprecedented circumstances, both externally and internally. yes. but the question is whether this identity crisis is just beginning, or this crisis began 30 plus years ago when russia or the previous identity, which was called food union. and try to become, as you said,

in the beginning, truly integral part of the international system led by united states and western allies. and it's so difficult to imagine today in this atmosphere, but those who remember the know that russia did, it's best to, to accommodate itself to the western system. and it happens in 1990 s, but it was not the successful because of internal cows and internal mass in russia for both the states and people and society were mostly occupied with survival by the into silence one little or them important became russian president. she the, the enormous efforts to, to, to try to offer it to the worst. so think that will suit both so well. know,

just something. as your recently wrote, russia made some pretty difficult, although implicit concessions, for example, tacitly agreeing to nato's enlargement. although it also allowed itself pretty blunt criticism of the system. and i wonder if this inability on the part of russia to simply shot up and comply was it mainly due to moscow's wounded pride? was it, at least in part the realization that the system itself objectively is going downhill. i don't think it was that kind of elevation at that time in 990 s and early 2000. everybody was convinced that the western dominance will, at least last for very long time. by the way, i think many lots. remember the late american commentator

and philosopher charles krauthammer, who wrote his famous piece about the you and he pulled a moment as early as 990. and that was the big benchmark he, he wrote that and that was before. so we do new co ops, but he was convinced that the new era was in the starting. one. united states will be it will be able to do what they want. but what i wanted to, to, to remind you, crowd camera was wise enough to right that we should not believe this. you in the pool or moment will last forever. she wasn't my, she didn't believe that it will be approximately 25 years. so he was absolutely right about coming back to your question. i think that at that time, only a few most insightful people believed that that might change soon. so rational

times to, to become part were dictated and led by the willingness to create better conditions for the developers of the country. but it failed. i mentioned the nature enlargement already. and i was surprised to read somewhere at the 2008. booker, a summit, which discussed potential membership of georgia ukraine conduct leaves arise, done. your secretary of state, explicitly sat on the record that the war is over, russia favor, or rather russia last, and that war, and she or brother, it has to accept that. and we all know that that led to the famous paper that extended the welcoming invitation to ukraine in georgia. i wonder if when it comes, comes to nate or do you think its efforts incessant efforts to expand?

are they dictated by strategic thinking by the calculus? or are they also in part driven by primitive psychology of, you know, making russia recognize that it was a loser both. but primarily i think that nathan launch rent was motivated by the ceiling of this kind of only port. and then we can do whatever we believe is right. and the concept of european security arrangements after the cold war. and this concept was basically agreed with the soviet union with gorbachev leadership, 989, and then 990 in the parish charter for new europe was to put it's very simplistic. was that nature or euro atlantic institutions. this is

security. well, security need to equal security, but you know, these people, if they are in did law by strategic thinking, they could not have ignored the consequences of that own actions and nature has been involved and some pretty well, i wouldn't say disaster is that and the value to turn, but pretty ineffective campaigns, even from the nato point of view. so do you think they truly believe that the nader is security on, on an objective basis? so i think at that time, yes, they did need to feel complete in the area which actually did not belong to the responsibility will never belong to that kind of denison or iraq. some member states in europe from the beginning from the war, but shows acceptance of unified germany's membership. benita that worked pretty well and again, so with you and then russia is a successor,

basically accepted that. and this is why when we now talk about how need to betray us, partially, yes, partially, we should be sincere, so that that was the vision which was maybe not completely with the, except the suction that there was no, no mistake on, on russia birth is that that was not mistaken, or an illusion. illusion mistake and probably expectation that we can play bigger all inside the system. okay. now you said that native failed in areas where it had nothing to do. let's say i've got this done in iraq. what about the ukraine? you know, and the efforts to draw your crate in because obviously your credit is much closer to our home to native home. could ukraine be considered as one of those

failed strategic failures on the part of nato as we see? no, yes. but initially, by the way, the 1st, the front runner of ukrainian integration into the west was no need to, it was a rather european union. and the whole ukrainian crisis, which we see now in the full scale, started with the idea of association agreement. 2013 of course, now we see that there is basically no difference in the european union by the death time european union emphasized that is something completely different, and russia actually accepted this, saying that it hurts our interest. but we're understand that it's not about security. why need to was so keen to expand? or, of course, in the instinct drupal, the go instinct, we cheer, which is there for if we look up to the battlefield today in

ukraine, or we will see names of cities and towns which were mentioned in the same convex 100 years ago. 300 years ago. so this is an area of field for the instant and permanent jew blue, the co competition in eastern europe. so that when you talk about instant ad geopolitical competition, it has a sort of instinctual and somewhat unconscious filter. because you come from a school of realpolitik and this is a very cognitive, very sort of mentally based school. you calculate the interest of one party at your own interest. you see how they can be compatible. you try not to, ah, by more than you can chew, which is the major liability in foreign policy. but when we look at the ukranian case, it's deeply irrational. i mean, i understand rushes irrationality, you know, their historical connection and ties. but i don't understand the western insistence

on getting a crane into the camp when it's i think from the real political list point of view, it's absolutely clear that they cannot absorb that they cannot integrated fully. so why do they need it? i think dear appetite or to bite as a mention was produced by the c fauria we generated from the feeling of end of history. we sure came as a result of the collapse of the soviet union, which in fact was totally unexpected by americans. the couldn't even dream about this to happen. and i think her saw it leadership and all our domestic troubles created such a dream full situation for the worst. and when it happened and then help us medical help. and so, but also they concluded,

based on new concept are developed at the time the concluded that this victory was not because of failure, just failure of the sort of leadership which, which was the case. but it was like a nature of the historical development which should be prolonged and continued to and they claim history for themselves. is that what you're saying? they sorta took the natural development of history, has their own achievement? absolutely. i think so. that was what the living god means actually. yeah. and that was, that was some kind of for well to the real politics otherwise . and at the same time, you can, you can see that this attempt to take ukraine on the control from the point of view, real politics it's, it's quite, quite talk, quite normal because this is strategically important area. most western leaders and

analysts are characterized rushes actions there as totally and provoke, but i think among foreign policy thinkers, there is a realization that ukraine starting from 2014 perhaps even before that. but especially since 2014 was and major should tgm problem for us or not an irrational, nostalgic issue. but the major strategic problem that the military personnel that the commander in chief had to address. can you spell out what was the actual problem there? you know, the dose, month of military duration demonstrated that at least in one point, fujen was absolutely right. ukraine was heavily preparing for a war and with russia. oh, we don't know, but for a war, probably with russia because with whom else and the level of engagement with ukraine on the side, the u. s. u. k. european countries and they are,

but they are assistance through green to be prepared for a big military conflict. and now everybody says it openly, it was denied before, but now even officials in britain, in us they say yes, we were there with the there were think look, they fight very good because over and i think in this regard of whether they were prepared for a war for, for attacking russia or for resisting russia. it does matter because here, put in a last to quote, i think was a close of it. so who said that intentions? a bismark. yeah. intentions don't matter. what matters is that for 10. yeah, exactly. and the potential of ukraine has been increased significantly, whether russia, rightly and correctly calculate that they were saying that's another big discussion

. but to say that this operation was a totally unprovoked, irrational move, that's a bit too far. ok, well that are we have to take a very short break right now, but we will be back in just a few moments state. she didn't. ah ha lou needs to come to the russians state little narrative. i've stayed on the most landscape div asking him, and i'm not getting his house for a group in the 55 we did. okay, so mine is 2000 speedy. one else with we

will ban in the european union, the kremlin media machine, the state on to russia for date and split our t spoke neck. even our video agency, roughly all band to on youtube with . mm. 2 yes, it's a good i think is 70 percent of you been 80 percent of so be a view below for why serbia intimate. if you say i want to approach and it means i want this best buy

this one. me not a toyota. me. sale boss. little to login and then we'll proceed with . mm hm. welcome back to worlds of parts that said that i'll okay on the for such director, dave. all the discussion today before the break, we were talking about the military operation that the russia, conduction ukraine. and i think authorizing something like that would have been a major a tab before any historically minded russian leader, but the specially so i think for large and put and given everything you sad about how the russians and the craniums a part of one people would he have to part with this rather romantic

geopolitical notion, you know, that your green light, the military operation and don't you think that rushing the way was how hostage off of that idea that you know we and the ukrainians or brothers and wasn't the west using that in a sense calculating, counting on rushes, inability to take a military step against ukraine for so i would not overestimate the intellectual capacity of the west. so when you said that they were rational in center or rational, yes. and you say that the county calculate how to provoke russia. i don't know, probably not a movement of thinking in the west as we see in the end of the cold war might be pretty disastrous for us and call us us. what is true?

yes, the narrative are and which put in and that many russian decision makers base the approach to ukraine is a good mind and not the only one. so you can argue quite grounded about this concept of one nation and one people. because for example, in the soviet union was completely different idea in russia before 19th century, it was another version of this. and we'll put in the revived is actually the approach which prevailed in russian history in the russian state building since me the 19th century. it was it an emotional idea or was it because, i mean, the way i see it that he, as a commander in chief, had to take rushes interest 1st and foremost and, and many analysts including,

i think people are associated with, well, they have claimed that well he sort of push the solving of the ukrainian issue off for quite some time that perhaps if that have been addressed earlier, we wouldn't have to deal with the, you know, with the casualties and this level of destruction and the level of west and push it back as we are dealing with right now, do you think he hasn't hated perhaps for a little bit too long, but some people believe that this action had to be taken down 14. whenever the thing started it's easy to be wise for somebody. yeah. i don't know what it is. i'm sort of to show that it wasn't the emotional put in is not very much emotional person. yes, he believes in this narrative and he believes in this idea about one nation. but

actually, many of us, including myself, were very much surprised to the beginning of this operation and not, not to call it shocked. but actually approaching was very frank. if we remember his article published in july 2021. exactly about this, the genesis of russian and ukrainian relationship and the conclusion that the article was absolutely clear. that's the question to us, why we didn't read it as, as what was written. she said that, yes, we believe this is one nation. but we respect realities which emerged for many reasons, that there are 2 states, fine, and we are rated to recognize to accept this state with one condition that the state is friendly to our, to our state, then fine, they can corporate,

like i didn't know you as canada and so on. but if the 2nd state will be based on the anti russian ideology and become the anti russian ball work, then the state will not be there. you mentioned the 2014 and how this whole debacle started with the association association agreement. and just a few days ago the e leaders formerly granted to ukraine and moldova candidate status, calling it a historic moment, a good day for europe. although there were some negative comments as well, for example, from you commission president or sewer on the line. who said that this decision was taken in the face of the russian imperialism. i wonder it's been much the same question as with nate, or do they authentically want ukraine in or is it another case of an expansion or promised expansion for the sake of expansion and spiting russia? no, no, i think this is like

a trip. so they don't want to grain in the understand very well that ukraine is absolutely unfit to become member of the european union. even if we take full decides all the traditional problems. so you're grinned, but this is a country at war it's. i've gone through to all rules and principles of the european integration to accept such a country. what is interesting and coming back to the beginning color conversation, europe in union and european leaders who launched this project and then continued that. and i'm, i believe that this project was one of the most successful in european political history. ever. human, the, i mean, the european integration starting from the beginning, you the, the, the, the, the, the, the cause of the actual data. but the initially tried to dig distance to every sink which has to do with your politics. it's not about

politics, except it's about development. it's about democracy. it's about economic corporation, but please, nor geo politics anymore. europe fed up with your politics into, into, essentially, so that and now it's the other way around the other way around because boss or mr from the line and the machine, the chairman of european council d. c openly. this is our do political duty to take ukraine and probably looking from this angle. yes, they the, they have to give some, some hope to ukrainian in this edition. but that basically eliminates the all idea about the european integration because in integration was not about that. and that's the question, not about the fusion of ukraine in the european union, but about the future of the european union policy. and i think there is another concurrent example, all fine, the war is not just being warrants,

but being followed by actions. and i mean the, the effort on the part of the e, u, a to limit its dependence on russia's energy sources because energy up until recently served as anchor ropes for the whole relationship and in some sense preventative from did deteriorating, given how both size. now try to cut it off. are there any safety catches left against further escalation or even against a bigger war of wider conflict given how irrational or geopolitical things tend to be? you know, i'm afraid the only mean which still works is new to the terms. unfortunately, that's very sad and that's very primitive. actually we are back to 176. this may be fifty's above 2. yes indeed, you are right that the network cannot make into dependencies,

which has been developed very carefully since late 900 sixes. and yes, indeed, it was an enormously useful mean to protect you repeat countries including the soviet union and then russia from escalations. now it's gone. so we see that interdependencies now play the opposite role that for the weapon. and unfortunately, in this situation, the only irrational instrument to deter isn't nuclear arms and we see that it was, it's very bad. let me ask you a broad question about how the international system is changing because we talked about the collapse of the so if union. but he wrote recently that the changes that we are witnessing right now. i in fact much broader because the collapse of the

soviet bloc was absorbed by the system without significant changes. but nowadays, according to you, we're seeing an avalanche which is streaming down the hill and nobody, no country, perhaps not even the united states can influence, let alone stop at kennedy at least speculate about the direction, the trajectory of these concentrations. whereas it heading no, i don't think we can project and we can predict at this point because we are in the middle of a snow storm. and it's quite senseless to try to, to picture how the world's system will look like say 5 years from now. but yes, i'm absolutely sure that the change today is much deeper than the change we witnessed . and i remember from my late eighty's early ninety's, because at this time at least we had an idea where to go. not everybody was happy

with this, but most people believe that the it was the only the only possible way. now, there are no ways at all and many things happening are actually undermining not just the international political order, but some basic principles like capitalist competition. the market economy, all those extra appreciation. so essence based on what based on last, no, not necessarily attempts to create a huge cargo of gas and oil. consumers to put prices under control. it has nothing to do with the liberal economy as renew it. and most likely it will continue and we will see something

completely different. so this one, we have to leave it there, but it's as always, had great pleasure talking to you. thank you. and thank you for watching called to see her again next week on wells apart. ah, with mm ah, ah, yes, absolutely. well, with the formula 3

people would end up with shock because generally, you know, sure somebody who can watch some stuff with to deal with with a minute. and it was a double up which can you with

a rush and lead force is established full control over lou down republic territory after the last city there is taken also ahead on the program a you see a at least 4 civilians, including free citizens from ukraine, are killed in the deadliest ever ukrainian miss i'll, i talk on russian territory after it's all it is thank.