a, a with hello and welcome to worlds apart. for the last 3 decades since the collapse of the soviet union, russia has been floundering through an identity crisis. i'm sure about what it is an insecure about what it wants to be. a duplicate satcher ation with the west, proved short lived on the brother on the reciprocated wild. the relationship with

the rest of the world was more talked about than attended to. and then came the military operation in ukraine. that changed absolutely everything. what does it leave russia in the search for its own identity and relations with others? to discuss it, i'm now joined by federal louisiana research director of the vol die discussion club. for there, it's great to see you in the studio again. thank you very much for coming over. thank you for reminding me. now i'm in psychology, the 4th decade of life is usually associated with a mid life or an identity crisis, which could be quite cataclysmic if the manifesting problems are not attended to in time. or if they are allowed to accumulate. and i wonder if we can also apply that metaphor to russia, which now finds itself in pretty unprecedented circumstances, both externally and internally. yes, but the question is whether this identity crisis is just beginning war,

this crisis would begin. so to pause years ago, when russia lost the previous identity, which was called food union. and try to become, as you said, at the beginning of truly integral part of the international system led by a united states and western allies. and it's difficult to imagine today in this atmosphere, but those who remember the know that russia did, it's best to, to accommodate itself to the western system. and it happens in 1990 us, but it was not successful because of internal cows and internal mass in russia. for both the states and people and society were mostly occupied with survival by the, into silence one little or them important became russian president. she the,

the enormous efforts to, to, to try to offer it to the west. something that would suit both so well, not just something as year recently wrote, russia made some pretty difficult, although an implicit concessions, for example, tacitly agreeing to nato enlargement, although it also allowed itself pretty blunt criticism of the system. and i wonder if this inability on the part of russia to simply shut up and comply, was it mainly due to moscow's wounded pride? was it at least in part a realization that the system itself objectively is going downhill? i don't think it was that kind of elevation at that time in 990 s and early 2000 everybody was convinced that the western dominance will least

last for very long time. by the way, i think many lots. remember the late american commentator and philosopher charles, called candler, who wrote his famous piece about the you and he pulled a moment as early as 990. and that was a big benchmark. he, he wrote that and that was before. so we doing a co ops, but he was convinced that the new era was in the starting one united states will be, will be able to do what they want. but what i wanted to do to remind you krauthammer was wise enough to write that we should not believe that this you in the pool or moment will last forever. she wasn't my, she didn't believe that it's, it will be approximately 25 years. so he was absolutely right about coming back to

your question. i think that at that time, only a few most insightful people believed that that might change soon. so rational times to, to become part were dictated and led by the willingness to create better conditions for the developers of the country. but detailed, i mentioned the nature enlargement already. and i was surprised to read somewhere at the 2008. booker, a summit, which discussed potential membership of georgia ukraine conduct leaves arise, done. your secretary of state, explicitly sat on the record that the cold war is over russia saved, or rather russia lost in that war. and she, or rather, it has to accept that. and we all know that that led to the famous

paper that expanded the welcoming invitation to ukraine and georgia. i wonder if when it comes, comes to nate, do you think its efforts incessant efforts to expand? are they dictated by strategic thinking by the calculus? or are they also in part driven by primitive psychology of, you know, making russia recognize that it was a loser both. but primarily i think that nathan longe rent was motivated by the ceiling of this kind of only bulletins that we can do whatever we believe is right. and the concept of european security arrangements after the cold war. and this concept was basically agreed with the soviet union with gorbachev. leadership, 989, and then 900. 19 the paris charter for new europe was to put it very simple and

simplistic. was that nature or euro atlantic institutions. this is security. well, security need to equal security, but when you know these people, if they are and did live by strategic thinking, they could not have ignored the consequences of that own actions and nature has been involved and some pretty well, i wouldn't say disaster is that. and the value term, but pretty ineffective campaigns, even from the nato point of view. so do you think they truly believe that the nader is security on, on an objective basis? so i think at that time, yes, they did need to feel completely in areas which actually did not belong to the responsibility. never belong to that, like, i don't understand or iraq some member states in europe from the beginning from the more much of acceptance of unified germany membership.

benita that worked pretty well. and again, so we went in and then russia, the successor basically accepted that. and this is when, when we now talk about how need to betrayed us, partially. yes, partially, we should be sincere. so that that was the vision which was maybe not completely would we be accept the section that was an honest mistake on, on russia bar. there's that there was no mistake and or an illusion. illusion mistake and probably expectation that we can play bigger all inside this system. okay. now you said that nature failed in areas where it had nothing to do. let's say i've gotten his son in iraq. what about the ukraine?

you know, and the efforts to draw your crate in because obviously your credit is much closer to our home than native home. could ukraine be considered as one of those failed strategic failures on the part of the nader as we've seen years. but initially, by the way, in 1st, the front wrong or of ukrainian integration into the west was no need to. it was a rather european union. and the whole ukrainian crisis, which we see now in the full scale, started with the idea of association agreement, 2013. of course, now we see that there is basically no difference in the european union. but at that time, your opinion emphasized that is something completely different, and russia actually accepted this, saying that it hurts our interests. but to understand that it's not about security . why nature was so keen to expand, of course,

and the thing jupiter go instinct which here, which is there. and if we look at the battlefield today and ukraine, we will see the names of cities and towns which were mentioned in the same context 100 years ago. 300 years ago. so this is an area of field, for instance, and permanent jew political competition in eastern europe. so that when you talk about instant geopolitical competition, it has a sort of instinctual and somewhat unconscious filter. because you come from a school of rail politik and this is a very cognitive, very sort of mounting the base school. you calculate the interest of one party a, your own interest. you see how they can be compatible. you try not to buy more than you can choose, which is a major liability and in foreign policy. but when we look at the ukranian case,

it's deeply irrational. i mean, i understand russia's irrationality, you know, their historical connection and ties. but i don't understand the western insistence on getting your credit into the camp when it's i think from the reality political point of view, it's absolutely clear that they cannot absorb that they cannot integrated fully. so why do they need it? i think dear appetite or to bite as a mention was produced by these 2 fauria we generated from the feeling of end of history. we sure came as a result of the collapse. so the soviet union, which in fact was totally unexpected by americans. the couldn't even dream about this to happen. and i think her saw it leadership and all our domestic troubles treated such

a dream full situation for the west. and when it happened and then helped us where they can help us out. but also they concluded, based on new concept are developed at the time the concluded that this victory was not because of failure, just failure of the sort of leadership which, which was the case. but it was like a nature of the historical development which should be prolonged and continued date. the claim history for themselves. is that what you're saying is they sorta took the natural development of history, has their own achievement? absolutely. i think so. that was what the leaning got means actually. yeah. and that, that was, that was some kind of for well to the real politics otherwise. and at the same time, you can, you can say that this attempt to take ukraine on the control from the point of view,

real politics if it's quite, quite, quite normal because this is strategically important area. most western leaders and analysts characterized rushes actions. they're as totally unprovoked, but i think among foreign policy increased, there is a realization that ukraine starting from 2014, perhaps even before that. but especially since 2014 was a major. should teja problem for russian. not an irrational on the style jack issue, but the major strategic problem that the military personnel that the commander in chief had to address. can you spell out what was the actual problem there? you know, those month of military duration demonstrated that it least in one point fujen was absolutely right. ukraine was heavily preparing for a war annual with russia. oh, we don't know, but for a war,

probably with russia because with whom else and the level of engagement with ukraine on the side of u. s. u. k. european countries. and they are, but they are assistance to ukraine to be prepared for a big military conflict. and now everybody says it openly. it was the night before, but now even the officials in britain in us, they say yes, we were there with the there were think look the, the, the fight. very good because or, and i think in this regard of whether they were prepared for a war for, for attacking russia or for resisting russia. it does matter because here, put in a loss to quote, i think was the cause of it. so who said the intentions, and it was a bismark? yeah. intentions don't matter. what matters is the 10. yeah, exactly. and the potential of ukraine has been increased significantly,

whether russia, rightly and correctly calculate the devil to sing. that's another big discussion. but to say that this operation was a totally unprovoked, irrational move, that's a bit too far. ok, well for we have to take a very short break right now, but we will be back in just a few moments state she didn't. ah, or for ah, ah, ah

mm ah mm hm. mm hm. welcome back to world department said that i'll account for such director of the vault i discussion club. but before the break, we were talking about the military operation that russia conducts in the ukraine. and i think authorizing something like that would have been a major a tab before any historically minded russian leader,

but especially so i think for vladimir putin given everything he said about how the russians and the ukrainians are part of one people. i would he have to part with this rather romantic edge, a political notion, you know, that your green light, the military operation and don't you think that rushing the way was held hostage of that idea that you know, we and the ukrainians or brothers and wasn't the west using that in a sense, calculating, counting on rushes, inability to take a military step against ukraine for thought, i would not overestimate the intellectual capacity of the west. so when you said that they were rational in center rational, yes. and you say that the county calculate how to provoke russia. i don't know, probably not a movement of thinking in the west as we see,

since the end of the cold war might be pretty disastrous for, for some policy. what is true? yes, the narrative are and which put in and that many russian decision makers base the approach to ukraine is a to put it mildly, not the only one. so you can argue quite grounded about this concept of one nation and one people. because for example, in the soviet union, it was completely different idea. in russia before 19th century, it was another version of this. and we'll put in the revived is actually the approach which prevailed in russian history in the russian state building since me the 19th century. it was it an emotional idea or was it because, i mean,

the way i see it that he, as a commander in chief, had to take rushes interest 1st and foremost and, and many analysts including, i think people are associated with, well, they have claimed that well he sort of push the solving of the ukrainian issue off for quite some time that perhaps if that have been addressed earlier, we wouldn't have to deal with the, you know, with the casualties and this level of destruction and the level of west and push it back as we are dealing with right now, do you think he has it hated perhaps for a little bit too long. some people believe that this action had to be taken down 14. whenever the thing started it's easy to be wise for somebody. yeah. i don't know,

what is the answer to show that it wasn't the emotional put in is not there very much emotional person. yes, he believes in this narrative and he believes in this idea about one nation. but actually, many of us, including myself, were very much surprised to the beginning of this operation and not to call it shocked. but actually approaching was very frank. if we remember his article published in july 2021. exactly about this, the genesis of russian and ukrainian relationship and the conclusion that the article was absolutely clear. that's the question to us, why we didn't read it as, as what was written. she said that, yes, we believed this is one nation. but we respect the realities which emerged for many

reasons, that there are 2 states, fine, and we are ready to recognize to accept this state with one condition that this state is friendly to our, to our state then find they can corporate, like i didn't know us canada and so on. but even the 2nd state will be based on the enter ration ideology and become the m to ration bork. then the state will not be there. you mentioned the 2014 and how this whole tobacco st started with the association e association agreement. and just a few days ago the your leaders formerly granted the ukraine and most of our candidate status calling it historic moment a good day for europe. although there were some negative comments as, as well, for example, from you commission president goes to a phone line who said that this decision was taken in the face of the russian imperialism. i wonder it's been the same question as with ne, to do they authentically want ukraine in or is it another case of expansion

promised expansion for the sake of expansion and spiting russian know now i think this is like a trap, so they don't want to grain in they understand very well that the ukraine is absolutely unfit to become member of the european union. even if we take the full decides all the traditional problem. so we agree, but this is a country at war. it's. i've sprung through to all rules and principles of the european integration to accept such a country. what is interesting and coming back to the beginning of our conversation, unity and union, and european leaders who launched this project and then continued that. and i'm, i believe that this project was one of the most successful in european political history. ever. human d. e, the, i mean the european in the grill from the beginning, you are the, the, the, the,

the, the, the cause, the actual data. 3 but the initially tried to dig distance to every sink, which has to do a job politics. it's not about politics, except it's about development. it's about democracy. it's about economic corporation, but please, nor geo politics anymore. europe fed up with your politics into, into essentially so that and now it's the other way around the other way around because boss or miss. so from the line and the machine, the chairman of european council d. c openly. this is our job political duty to take ukraine and probably looking from this angle. yes, they the, they have to give some, some hope to ukrainians in this edition. but that basically eliminates the all idea about the european integration because in integration was not about that. and

that's the question, not about the future of ukraine in the european union, but about the future of the european union, per se. and i think there is another concurrent example, all 5 the war. it's not just being warrants but being followed by actions. and i mean the, the effort on the part of the e u to limit its dependence on russia's energy sources because energy up until recently served as anchor ropes for the whole relationship and in some sense, prevented from deteriorating, given how both size. now try to cut it off. are there any safety catches left against further escalation or even against a bigger war of wider conflict given how irrational or geopolitical things tend to be? you know, i'm afraid the only mean which still works is new to new terms. unfortunately,

that's very sad and that's very primitive. actually we are back to 176. this may be fifty's above to yes indeed you are. so you're right that the network over economic into dependencies, which has been developed very carefully since late 906. this and yes indeed, it was an enormously useful mean to protect you repeat countries including the soviet union and then russia from escalations. now it's gone. so we see that interdependencies now play the opposite role that for the weapon. and unfortunately, in this situation, the only irrational instrument to deter isn't nuclear arms and we see that it was, it's very bad. let me ask you

a broader question about how the international system is changing because we talked about the collapse of the so if union. but you wrote recently that the changes that we are witnessing right now. i in fact much broader because the collapse of the soviet bloc was absorbed by the system without significant changes. but nowadays, according to you, we're seeing an avalanche which is streaming down the hill and nobody, no country, perhaps not even the united states can influence, let alone stop at kennedy at least speculate about the direction the trajectory of these concentrations, whereas it's heading. no, i don't think we can project and we can predict at this point because we are in the middle of a snow storm and it's quite senseless to try to to picture how the world system will look like say 5 years from now. but

yes, i'm absolutely sure that the change today is much deeper than the change we witnessed . and i remember from my late eighty's early ninety's, because at this time at least we had an idea where to go. not everybody was happy with this, but most people believe that the it was the only the only possible way. now, there are no way simple and many things happening are actually undermining not just the international political order, but some basic principles like capitalist competition. the market economy, all those extra operations who essence based on what based on laws? no, not necessarily attempts to create a huge cargo of gas and oil.

consumers to put prices under control. it has nothing to do with the liberal economy as renew it. and most likely it will continue and we will see something completely different. so that is what we have to leave it there. but it's as always, had great pleasure talking to you. thank you. and thank you for watching. called to sir again, next week on wells apart. ah mm hm. mm ah ah

. so what we've got to do is identify the threats that we have. it's crazy foundation, let it be an arms race is very dramatic. development only really i'm getting to resist. i don't see how that strategy will be successful, very difficult time to sit down and talk a

little people, i think is 70 percent of even 80 percent of serbian people for russians. but you know, you cannot make it like a person or like something that, you know, number people who come to the book and then you may conclusion. they are pro russians are not phobia, mean social cerebral phobia. and we were, we have passed through this. so we know how the, the russian brothers are feeling at the moment. a .