i can amik system, but it also says the important component of this. so the, a divorce between the west and russia. now for some time, we did, the west has been wanting to cut its reliance on russian energy because sir, international system, what you want to have our symmetrical interdependence that you want other to be dependent on you, but you should be dependent on them. so again, russia's been dependent on western met, technologists, industries, transportation corridors, so banks, currencies, insurances, payment system, so across the board, one problem for the west us, we've been reliant on russian energy and was russian, our group, cultural and yes, i agree culture as well. so the, the problem now of course is by reducing or cutting reliance on russian gas and oil, or we actually her, to our, on the economists obviously because her in often would treat this idea that we're buying russian energy or some kind of a charity to rush about,

of course this is if you want competitive industries in europe in the key ingredient is always cheap energy, so cheap energy resources to match it, metals and different resources. and we can always got this from russia, visits, and through all history, the germany about it, not only in recent times and started actually during the height of the cold war. and the at that time, both sides are respected. i have contracts and respected what you actually called the, the balance of dependence. and this is a term that writing and put in the present of this country used to refer a lot. but he also was making a point that in order for the balance of dependence to function properly, it needs to be mutually respected and appreciate it. do you think the europeans fully understood and appreciated their reliance on russia's energy because it gave them an enormous competitive advantage? i mentioned that that prosperity, or at least in germany, was, was billed on it. i don't think it's an exaggerate. no, and i,

i think it's obvious that it wasn't appreciated because if you saw the rhetoric and bah, back in the february, march, the argument was, will, when don't need russia, gas, and all, we can cut it completely and we'll, we'll be just fine. but as we discovered, are we not find an old industry, some depended on this entire competitiveness. so even if it was possible to reduce reliance on russian energy it women, but nonetheless be importing elegy and other more expensive source of energy. so air which means that our industries will be less competitive, especially the germans and her and the so, so the long term repercussions are, yeah, are staggering. but in reality, i don't think we're even able to replace it cheap russian gas with expensive it from other places. so i think after this, probably there will be bit more appreciation. can i ask you something because it's very hard for us. the russians to understand that the, you know, we have the saying measure 7 times and cut once. when out we are talking about the mass, if a fundamental economic issue and yet, ah,

this level of corporation that exist that for many decades was cut in a matter of a couple of months. don't you think that the decision makers, at least looked at the, at the balance sheets? i mean, how would something like that be done in such a short period of time in that miss? so little consideration for, for the facts and went on on their own domestic economists. i think it's for leadership to be honest because a dinner, a switch from the germans side to have recognized starting cutting. for example, north stream 2 would be suicide. cutting off swift would be suicide, and of course, stealing in the half of their reserves from the russian central bank would also be horrible for trust. so, but i guess so in the heat, a moment when the emotions were running high, it became common sense come, became impossible is this is a lot of self harm, cuz all the areas where russia has been dependent on the west. oh, it's kind of relied on trust that is in a using western technologies,

banking system. all this is relied on, not just the russians trusting the west, but what we're now seeing is, after this sanctions and cutting off, trying to destroy the russian economy, the rest of the world is looking at the west north, you know, with admiration about their standing of principle, but the west, the seem to be more rogue now in, in the international it can't the international economic system, so gress of the world. china, india in all facing possible threats to trade with her russia than our questioning it. always it's safe to be have us reply lines dependent on in a western industry. some technologists is safe to use euros in dollars to swift, to use their banks. they're starting to, you know, question all this. and this is why the economic system, which has been so centralized and western centric is now fragmented. so, you know, this should have been obvious. i mean, i've been warning since 2015, at least that this is their direction. we're moving and i'm sure that, you know, the european leaders are also aware of this, that this is the direction we're heading. but nonetheless, sir, they only impulse now is to double bowman. we continue to do it even though,

you know, there are consequences. keep piling on. that's actually a very interesting question. because a few years ago it was fashionable to use the terms of game theory, you know, ah, non 0 sum game mutual benefit. sienna, a is crash my back as great your is. but it seems that even the whole idea of neutrality, if it's russia or china and deriving those benefits is politically unacceptable. right now, how we come to the point when only the neutrality of harm, i, hon. myself, in order to harm you is politically admissible. this? well, well i guess to some extent is always been like this. if you know, for example, if do not have states can break the chinese to come in half the, it would be beneficial to that for the us to do it. even if 10 percent of its own economy would be wiped out. so we always look at the interdependence, you look at the relative, at least, look at the gains for yourself. at this point of time, russia is gaining from diverting and supplies to you are the market. and that's

what makes this irrational castillo, you know, let's say we're all on board like, it's a great thing to harm a russian economy. well, if this is the measurements we're going for it still it will, it we're no, we're not shaving it because it went from, you know, we're close a lot of pain to russia and only small to us. and now we're see, it's been completely reversed now. and the sanctions are actually hurting the west more than russia like 1.2 example is and we're not going by russian guess. so we bite from ellen g from china instead will brush us export the the functions the russia keeps the energy price high. russia exports to china, china takes a markup, and exports to the u. rush, us being benefiting cost. the price are pushed up. russian export less energy, but still make much more money or all our leaders from usaa, britain, you the all kind of bet their entire political legitimacy on, on this fight that we were going to beat the russians. but now, or when this all failing, they don't really have any other solutions. threatened us,

double down professor didn't. this is actually again, a very interesting question. and perhaps even i under explore and how much political mythology and rhetoric influence soul and economic decisions. because here in russia, we usually think of the westerners as those, you know, hard nosed capitalist who are good at procuring profits will only mind their own business. but these, the, this again, i, our typical stereotypes of their westerners. i define what is the basic i guiding principles of european and western approach at this point of time, not necessarily to russia, but just the approach to policy, both domestic and engine international. what i've been named values of, of the decision makers. well, i think it's, sir, it's holding on to this a unipolar moment, which, which you, which is already gone because while it was, and the unipolar moment, meaning that i'm the only one who is good and noble and they're entitled to making decisions. yes. so because the way the international system work is when all

economic power is concentrated in one place, such as it was in the west, in a 990 s. and you have certain, or you're very comfortable and you can the and, but you also have the incentive to build trusts because you're administrating the global economy. now, the problem is, when the hedge am on the client's end, it looses this edge money. if you see that the edge amount is more likely to use economic state craft in order to punch down on other icing power. so for example, china, russia and you know, we, we didn't have this kind of pulses in the ninety's. but us, we use this economic levers of power to punish and hot and prevent address. our address is from rising her, you know, you only create more incentive for the rest of the system to shed this reliance and dependence on the west. so i think this is so if this is some of the dynamic you're seeing because said the west has a dilemma one hand, we can just wait and see it that you know,

our slips from our fingers or we can use what we have left of economic power, in order to try to, you know, crush our enemies, sir, you know, the enemy's artless other serious china and russia, and the, it's, well, it's not working. so there's also a 3rd option you can work with you and so called animals to make sure that in, in b and new world that is already being born, you can ensure the best positions for yourself because as the, as the harris of the previous system, you still have an advantage over everybody else, don't you? yes, i actually argued this in a book in 2015. i was arguing that the u. s. and the collective west kind of had 2 different that paths to take because b in polarity was over. and we had 2 options, we could either facilitate a multiple or order where the u. s. could be like the 1st among equals about still, except there's a system based on multiple, arty, or we, the united states had the option of a trying to prevent the rise of other states. but in this instance, yes, you could prevent a multi order of multiple order from for developing self,

but then you'll probably see this multiple or order being developed in opposition to the united states. to see the brick says he had a china russia partnership business, this assa, ofen, oh, other overt show objective of containing or balancing united states. and obviously the 1st option would have been preferable, even the big brzezinski. he also recognized this dilemma in 2012. i think in the are also said he was no friend the russia would have and still he was recognizing that the it's better now to make a. 2 for the us to use it current influence to create a new system, a multiple, a system were held a privilege place. but instead, if we are where we are, we have to take a very short break right now, but we will be back in just a few moments fetching. ah sh

to what we've got to do is identify the threats that we have. it's crazy confrontation, let it be an arms race, move his on offenders. very dramatic or development only personally. and going to resist. are those 3 how that strategy will be successful? very political time. time to sit down and talk. ah, the 1st time in history, an entire country's culture has been cancelled the very modern weapon cancel. culture. really desperate. wonderful. i will, sheffield my last little daughter, william frog here, just sitting there with the phrase now, particularly for us to canceling russian culture. yet the know what to create the

few orders. because i get to when you miles for sure, which will be all there. it's, charlie will fill out that the most of the sub richland, m, e w. what rushes created over the past 1500 years. there's no question. partially condemned, reviled and reject it to sort of like a bullet, but i will. there's a lot closer on a hold all the time, i guess it'll show the list. joining total condemnation, gross daily and now includes dostoevsky to cascade shostakovich that i need to you all the tour left. but yes, you see that what that done? will you do a bomber lee? you're not going to do that a lot. ah

ah ah ah welcome back to wells of course with isn't a professor at the university of south eastern norway, professor decent before the break. weaver, we touched on multiple rarity and i think there's

a difference in how this term is interpreted in the east and in the west. as i speak to the delegate for this forum. what is actually, what they mean by multiple parity is the recognition that each country, even though there are some common laws of economy and the, you know, social organization, et cetera. each country develops according to its own historic trajectory at its own unique pace. and it's not about so much, you know, trying to push everybody in the same direction as the west tribe or the united states tried to do for frankly, for its own benefit, but rather respecting the difficulties. the differences are various countries and try to find, you know, a middle ground between that. and that's why i think i would disagree with your assumption that breaks and all the other organizations of integration in asia were built against the united states. because it looks like they're building a lot of mutual benefits to, to their members will read it. well, yes. well i,

i would argue that they were an auction of necessary credit only against us. there were seem to be parallel institutions because the u. s. centric institutions couldn't adapt to the emergency multiple power to take. for example, the asian infrastructure investment bank. the, the chinese were trying to have the i m. f. reform to the extent to could accommodate the china more properly. it in accordance with its relative power. but the united states were sna really willing to reform in terms of the voting power. so, you know, the chinese began to break away and they just established a and parallel economic infrastructure. what i mean is that the, if, if united states uses this or organizations course of li against russia, against china, then you will see these parallels, parallel institutions being used as a way of, of balancing the americans. what would it be fair to say that the main feature of those institutions, even though they pursue an individual countries interest is neutrality? whereas the main feature all western dominated institutions is ultimately courage.

and sure there some soft power and sung, trying to entice. but when push comes to shop shop, it's always about courage in advance. there were, that's because there unipolar they're seeking to establish their dominance. so which means see, you know, use this a symmetrical or interdependence to it's impulse, it's will on other countries. so you mentioned before, and you know that the, the country all the world should the, and develop according to the da western model. this is the only reason you can have this. i have the ologist because in the ninety's had reflected the international power distribution. but, but power is really at the core because beginning at night, this one's unipolar, if you would sanction, for example, russia than russia would have to adjust or, you know, change its policies in order to get to lead back in 2 into the good grace of the west, the problem in the multiple order it is multiple

a system is because you have different centers of power and you put anxious and russia. then you're simply giving away a huge market share. this is the problem of the multiple order. this is why it's important in the west to recognize the unit polarity is gone. did the world this multiple are the tools of the unit polar order doesn't exist anymore. now i understand out why a unipolar world would be beneficial to the united states from the political and even economic point of view. but when it comes to history, when it comes to collective psychology, i simply cannot understand how anyone can assume that one collective psyche can develop in accordance or, or take the path. and we're not a collective psych. i mean, we are all different, even on the individual level. i cannot be you, you cannot be me. where does this idea that it is possible to develop countries as different from the united states as, let's say, china, russia, afghan is done where this idea comes from that there. we can essentially be all like that, like the americans. it seems so stupid to be honest with you. my friends were all

from like the realist theory perspective, i think everything derives from power even though the ologist a reflection of power. when your dominant asked us was in the ninety's, it's very appealing to a, to accommodate the ideologies which promote universalism. because sir, when have a universalist idea, 2nd old world should develop in one specific way. it is effectively means that, you know, the should develop in the american way. and the way there is, while universalism is, is appealing, is because now are, you know, that we're borders matter less. now you have a system of sovereign inequality. and this is what you want when you are the dominant power, co sovereign in called him his sovereignty for me, but not for you. so when we talk about democracy, promotion means i can interfere in your country. you can hit friend mine or you know, i can topple governments, you can't, i can go to war. as long as you have this liberal democratic care reasoning. this is something john hurts, pointed out in the 1940 said that then often you find that the more

a countries are democratic domestically the more they will learn, sis, dead, international democracy. because swill cedar us, i need to protect the democracy from the majority, which again becomes a contradiction in terms but the but again to it, i think will socrates so little long time ago m, m a made this argument that, you know, i'm a citizen of the world you had that you had a good intention we, we shouldn't have all this borders between us or them. but then you had alexander, great saying, the same thing are, i'm a citizen of the world and then expense an empire in part of the east. so i can also be a citizen of the world, respecting myself and respecting how different you are from me and respecting the fact that if i scratch your back, yes, great mind we, we will make, we may not get the maximum of what we one bed each one of us will get something and at the end the peace between us will manifest. no, i agree, and i think that's why russia probably looks at the rice of china with more comfort than, than united states because it, with united, within states,

it has this universalist, a demonic an objective. but the chinese, they kind of, they've been up suggesting that their development model should be exported to the rest of the world. so this sir, you know, in universalist, ideal where they become the owners of this ideal. because this is really where the problem is because this began democracy. human rights is all a great, great concepts. but the problem is the, the united states and the collect, the west, and a tide, all of this big ideas to an entity of power which are them. so. so this is the core of liberal hedge money. and they saying the only way liberalism can survive is if we are in power. so we, we haven't really seen this from other rising power such as china. if so i think this is a, this is why do they always become sir? yeah, i'm very you had to have dangerous aspects, but it's also a reflection of power, i believe was if the u. s. reduces empower now. it will surely want to embrace new

principles such as the sovereign equally, the mutual constraints, the thinks we back against sitting in the early 19 like this. well. so i would argue that this may already be happening, at least in a sense that before, you know, even 5 years ago, the americans, the europeans, dallas, were able to conduct whatever foreign policy they wanted without much cost to themselves. nowadays, if he's home his home in europe, we discussed the difficulty of getting through the winter. the difficulty of actually finding a new foundation for the european economy, energy foundation, i mean, and also his home with americans. there are major elections, mid term elections coming up in the united states, and it's clear that the trump base is as strong as it was before and perhaps even more intensified, more reach full. do you think there will be any change in our western foreign policy? because of the internal unrest or do thing on the country,

foreign policy of the west is likely to get even more adversarial because they are facing difficulties at home. it could go both ways. some in the german or for ministers just said that he doesn't care what the germans voters say, it's pretty amazing. it is about the she will, you know, so good the support, the ukraine, no matter what the german voter said, this is an interesting development. but jewels had this new push now in or of, sorry, the protest in, in prague was, i think 70000 people took to the streets, arguing let's have a more neutral role in this conflict. oh, they were labeled as our russian sympathizers by that i grew in the, in the numbers. i'm pretty impressive but, but i think it, it all depends on how this conflicts gonna sort out. because at the moment you have 2 possible narratives. if, if, if the united states prevails and nato prevails, then the narratives going to be, you know, we have this huge filter block here in the rogue russians tried to rise soccer. the

. this demonstrates the valley of nato and in a native will be more important than ever before. however, if, if a d u. s. and nato fails in this conflict, then, and then the new narrative will come up to one you seeing now in prague. the one that, that nato isn't security student said, which is, you know, it's exists to deal with the problems caused by its own existence and the in which should have made the post cold or peace agreements with the russians instead. then you will see them because made a course of this problem, but are in unable to actually win and protect us. then you will see problem, morse. countries said breaking off a little bit like hungary trying to seek their own peace with russia. and in this instance, you will see natal severely weakened, so whether or not you're going to have a natal dominated europe or a weakened nate or again, it all depends on this. this is why this conflict so dangerous because both sides have bet. everything on, on this and that every time i agree with you because i, for rush, aids, existential inches, are on the line. i'm not sure that america's,

or even europe's essential. well, europe, 6 essential interests are engaged here economically. but for the americans say it's not a matter of their survival, a law unlike it is not the russians. i think the miracles are fighting down to the loss of cranium and down to the last 0 in this conflict. so i, i agree with aspect now also agree that the russia considering this to be an existential threats, is also very reasonable. or it's, it's never clear to me what they think russia supposed to do. if russia, you know, even pulls out where it was, on the 23rd of february, you will see nato and usaa mil to hold or follow it. so it's going to be, this has been recognized for russia to be an existential threats for 20 years, which we ignored. or what i mean is that it's become an extension threat for nato. i think naples entire political legitimacy has been put on the line by fear. of course, it can't necessarily compare that to an existential threats to her, but neither is it just as a, a, an organization at the end of the day, it's supposed to be serving the interests of the population. it represents. which

brings me to my final question. here and the forum you will hear a lot of our russian and the chinese and indian speakers talk about being proud about lifting, you know, millions of people out of poverty in the east. that's considered the main goal. the main purpose of state policy, both domestic and international, but it seems that in the west decision makers are ready to sacrifice people's living standards. people say basic economic necessities for the sake of fire, conducting their foreign policy. is that a sustainable arrangement? how long do you think it will take for the europeans to actually, you know, bring their governments, their decision makers to, to the account and tell them that, you know, we elect your 1st and foremost to make our lives better and not worse? well i, i think that the, yes we talked about for the, i think there's a part of the curse of the in a polar order, which is when we had all this power concentrated in the west during the ninety's.

the problem is you can afford to make a lot of silly mistakes. so in afghanistan, iraq, libya, syria, we kind of been able to do this and we've been able to absorb los and absorb the cost. and the, i don't, and i think that we all assume that since we, we can absorb all of this. so i think that we're reaching the breaking point now this so you know, we, we can't take on more debts. we comes of more on favorable trade gaps. i think this has kind of a, it blinded us a bit to walk to the pain we're able to absorb, i think in other countries, and have to stay with more focus being india, china to make sure that the it a, the protect the base, the living standard at home and, you know, before the go on to this kind of adventurous. hm. and, but i, but i think that might move there towards, at least in europe as well. again, you do see the backlash ada countries are now starting to rethink you at least a population whether or not. and this has been a great idea, like why not just go back to where this began, the problems which will sterling 90 minus when we fail to establish our

a mutually acceptable cold war post cold war security system with russia. and they don't deal with the core of the issue, which isn't good countries versus bad. but rather that we have a european security architecture which is put incompletes. there are some so i think the, as soon as we give up on the idea that we can simply break the russian stem and hopefully we can then start to move. some are more productive. and i think at the end of the day will probably be the european citizens are feeling a lot of pain, which will be trying to remove governments which, you know, go against this or what i would think would be an obvious and sensible objective. well, professor didn't, this is all we have time for. thank you very much for being with us. of my pleasure and thank you for watching hope to see her again and was apart with

ah ah ah ah, need to come to the russian state patrol never. unfortunately, no sun ski with anyone else with will ban in the european union. the kremlin media machine, the state on crush us for date and split our t spoke neck, even our video agency, roughly all band to on youtube

with ah, with i knew barbara charlotte worse with the one up with a question given him with

i serve you with a word in belgrade call on the residence of 2 border villages to evacuate as ukrainian shells fall on russian territory and killed one person. and for more while you're crazy that you receive an installment of 5000000000 euros of a from the e. u. locals in gaza. are suffering from the flow reconstruction process. as many fear they will be homeless for years to come. a lot of we're asking the donors instead of paying money to you.