building on top of it or to discuss that now and join by glen deason, professor at the university of south east and norway. professor indian is great to talk to you. thank you very much for your time. oh, my pleasure. and there it's a bit of a surprise for. 6 for me to speak to a western academic at their russian conference because, you know, the changes are even intellectual had changed within the russians. and the westerners are not really encouraged that at this point of time, aren't you concerned about any political or career repercussions are for speaking to r t? well, luckily i work for a university, which is sir, quite strong on the defending academic freedom. so are they pretty much given me your rights to do or so please, sir, within certain boundaries, of course, i guess the main problem is in the media where there's a greater push for controlling the narrative. this is where you find that russian meet us. being censored or completely shut down and also we find our own media

doesn't never really accommodates the russian argument or presents even russian interests. so it becomes very difficult or if i could them instruction do their job in order to understand what was a challenge to russia. in order to explain what it's doing so it's, it's not a great time for academics in the west. i'm afraid i know that your politics and you cannot mix is your primary academic interest in your area uh, expertise in you for many years. we've been following on russia. i use of energy for its economy as well as in trade with other countries. we are speaking just days after gas from suspended all its gas applies to europe, citing technical more functions on the north stream one pipeline. what does it mean for both sides? well, this is sir. another step in the complete breakdown i think of the entire international economic system. but it also says the important component of this search,

the divorce between the west and russia. now for some time, we did, the west has been wanting to cut its reliance on russian energy because sir, in international system, what you want to have our symmetrical interdependence. that if you want other to be dependent on you, but you should be dependent on them. so again, rush has been dependent on western air technologists industries. sir. transportation corridors, sir banks, currencies, insurances, payment system. so across the board, one problem for the west us, we've been reliant on russian energy and. 7 russian agriculture and the us agriculture her as well. so the, the, the problem now of course, is by reducing or cutting reliance on russian gas and oil, or we actually her to our own economists obviously because, oh, in, often with trip, this idea that we're buying russian energy of some kind of charity to russia. but of course, this is it, if you want competitive industries in europe a, you did,

the key ingredient is always cheap energy, so cheap energy resources to match it, metals and different resources. and we can always got this from russia, and it's been through all the history, the germany, about it, not only in recent times and started actually during the height of the cold war. and yet at that time, both sides are respected, dia, contracts, and respected what you actually called the balance of dependence. and this is a term that rising and put in the present in this country used to refer a lot, but he also was making a point that in order for this balance of dependence to function properly, it needs to be mutually respected and appreciate it. do you think the europeans fully understood and appreciated their reliance on our rushes energy because it gave them an enormous competitive advantage? i meant that prosperity, or at least in germany, was, was billed on it. i don't think it's an exaggeration. no, and i think it's obvious that that wasn't appreciated because if you saw the

rhetoric and bah, back in february, march, the argument was, will we don't need rush and gas and all, we can cut it completely and we'll, we'll be just fine. but us, we discovered or will not find them. old industries have depended on this entire competitiveness. so even if it was possible to reduce reliance on russian energy, it will none, but nonetheless, be importing energy and other more expensive source of energy. so air which means that our industries will be less competitive, especially the germans and the, and the so, so the long term repercussions are, yeah, are staggering. but in reality, i don't think we're even able to replace it cheap russian gas with expensive from other places. so i think after this, probably there will be bit more appreciation. can i ask you something because it's very hard for us. the russians to understand that the, you know, we have the same measure 7 times and cut once. when out we had talking about the massive f fundamental economic issue, and yet at this level of corporation that exist that for many decades was cut in

a matter of a couple of months. don't you think that the decision makers at least looked at be at the balance sheets? i mean, how would something like that be done in such a short period of time in that miss? so little consideration for, for their facts and went on on their own domestic economists. i think it's for leadership to be honest because it didn't respite from the german side to have recognize starting a cutting for example, north stream to would be suicide. cutting off swift would be suicide, and of course, stealing the half of the reserves from the russian central bank would also be horrible for trust. so, but i guess so in the hit a moment when the emotions were running high, it became common sense come, became impossible is this is a lot of self harm. all the areas where russia has been dependent on the west. oh, it's kind of relies on trust that is a, you know, using western technology banking system. all this had relied on not just the

russians trusting the west. but what we're now seeing is, after this sanctions and cutting off trying to destroy the russian economy, the rest of the world is looking at the west knocked, you know, with admiration that they're standing of principal. but the west, the seem to be more rogue. now, in, in the international it can the international economic system. so the rest of the world, china, india, in all facing possible threats to trade with sir russia. then our questioning, you know, is it safe to be, have us reply lines dependent on, in a western industry. some technologists is safe to use euros and dollars to swift to use their banks. they're starting to, you know, question all of this. and this is why the economic system, which has been sol centralized and western centric is now fragmented. so, you know, this should have been obvious. i mean, i've been warning since 2015, at least that this is their direction. we're moving and i'm sure that, you know, the european leaders are also aware of this, that this is the direction we're heading. but nonetheless, her, they only impulse now is to double down and we continue to do it even though,

you know, there are consequences, keep piling on. that's actually a very interesting question. because a few years ago it was fashionable to use the terms of game theory. you know, ah no 0 sum game you chill, banner, fancy, you know, i, you scratch my back as great your is. but it seems that even the whole idea of neutrality, if it's russia or china and deriving those benefits is politically unacceptable. right now, how we come to the point when only the neutrality of harm, i, hon. myself in order to harm you is politically admissible this, well, well, i guess to some extent has always been like this. if you know, for example, if do not have states can break the chinese to come in half the, it would be beneficial to that for the us to do it. even if 10 percent of its own economy would be wiped off. the always look at the interdependence, you look at the relative, at least, look at the gains for yourself. at this point of time, russia is gaining from diverting and supplies to you are the market. and that's what makes this irrational castillo, you know, let's say we're all on board like,

it's a great thing to harm a russian economy. well, if this is the measurements we're going for it still it will, it, we're not, we're not shaving it because it went from, you know, we close a lot of pain to russia and only small to us. and now we're see, it's been completely reversed now. and the sanctions are actually hurting the west more than russia like 1.2 example is and we're not going by russian guess. so we bite from ellen g from china instead will brush us export it to the sanctions. russia keeps the energy price high. russia exports to china, china takes a markup, and exports to the u. rush us being benefiting cost, the price our per stock, russian export less energy, but still make much more money or all our leaders from usaa, britain, you the all kind of bet their entire political legitimacy on, on this fight that we were going to beat the russians but now, or when this all failing, they don't really have any other solutions. threatened us, double down profession isn't. this is actually again,

a very interesting question. and perhaps even an under explore and how much political mythology and rhetoric influence solid economic decisions. because here in russia, we usually think of the westerners as those, you know, hard nosed capitalist who are good at procuring profits will only mind their own business. but these, the, this again, i, our typical stereotypes of their westerners. i define what is the basic i guiding principles of european and western approach at this point of time, not necessarily to russia, but just the approach to policy, both domestic and engine international. what i've been named values of, of the decision makers. well, i think it's, sir, it's holding on to this a unipolar moment, which, which you, which is already gone because, well, and the uni pull our moment, meaning that i'm the only one who is good and noble and they're entitled to making decisions. yes. so because the way the international system work is when all economic power is concentrated in one place, such as it was in the west, in

a 990 s. and you have certain, or you're very comfortable and you can the and, but you also have the incentive to build trusts because you're administrating the global economy. now, the problem is, when the hedge am on the client's end, it loses this edge money. if you see that, that amount is more likely to use economic state craft in order to punch down on the other rising power. so, for example, china, russia, you know, we, we didn't have this kind of pulses in the ninety's, but us, we use this economic year levers of power to punish and hot and prevent address our addresses from rising her, you know, you'll create more incentive for the rest of the system to shed this reliance and dependence on the west. so i think this is so if this is some of the dynamic you're seeing because said the west has a dilemma one hand, we can just wait and see it that, you know, power slips from our fingers or we can use what we have left of economic power,

in order to try to, you know, crush our enemies, sir, you know, the enemy's artless other serious china and russia, and the, it's, well, it's not working. so there's also a 3rd option you can work with you and so called animals to make sure that in b and new world that is already being born, you can ensure the best positions for yourself because as the, as the harris of the previous system, you still have an advantage over everybody else, don't you? yes, i actually argued this in a book in 2015. i was arguing that the u. s. and the collective west kind of had 2 different paths to take because the inequality was over. and we had 2 options, we could either facilitate a multiple or order where the u. s. could be like the 1st among equals about still, except there's a system based on multiple artie or we, the united states had the option of a trying to prevent the rise of other states. but in this instance, yes, you could prevent a multi order multiple order from for developing cells, but then you'll probably see this multiple or order being developed in opposition

to the united states. to see the bricks is he had a china, russia partnership business, his assa, ofen o, other overt shows, objective of containing or balancing united states. and obviously, the 1st option would have been preferable. even the speaking of basinski, he also recognized this dilemma in 2012, i think in the are also said he was no friend the russia would have and still he was recognizing that the it's better now to make a. 2 for the us to use the current influence to create a new system, a multiple, a system were held a privilege place. but instead, if we are where we are, we have to take a very short break right now. but we will be back in just a few moments. stay tuned. ah ah ah

ah, ah, what he's got to do is identify the threats that we have. it's crazy even foundation, let it be an arms race is on the offensive. very dramatic, bad development. the only personally and getting to disease, i don't see how strategy will be successful, very difficult. i'm time to sit down and talk with

welcome back to was of course, midland isn't a professor at the university of itself. eastern norway, professor, decent before the break. we were, we touched on multiple rarity and i think there's a difference in how this term is interpreted in the east and in the west. as i speak to the delegate for this forum. what is actually, what they mean by multiplier to is the recognition that each country, even though there are some common laws of economy and the, you know, social organization, et cetera. each country develops according to its own historic trajectory at its own unique pace. and it's not about so much, you know, trying to push everybody in the same direction as the west tribe or the united states tried to do for frankly, for its own benefit, but rather respecting the difficulties. the differences are various countries and try to find, you know, a middle ground between that. and that's why i think i would disagree with your

assumption that breaks and all the other organizations of integration in asia were built against the united states. because it looks like they are building a lot of mutual benefits to, to the members will read it. well, yes. well i, i would argue that they were enough to necessary credit only against us. there were seem to be parallel institutions because the u. s. centric institutions couldn't adapt to the emergency multiple power to take it. for example, the asian infrastructure investment bank. the, the chinese were trying to have the i m. f. reform to the extent to could accommodate the china more properly in accordance with its relative power. but the united states were sna really willing to reform in terms of the voting power. so, you know, the, the chinese began to break away and they just established a and parallel economic infrastructure. what i mean is that the, if, if united states uses this or organizations course of li against russia, against china, then you will see these parallels parallel institutions being used as a way of,

of balancing the americans. what would it be fair to say that the main feature of those institutions, even though they pursue an individual countries, interest is neutrality, whereas the main are feature, all western dominated institutions is ultimately courage. and sure there some soft power and sung trying can ties. but when push comes to shop shop, it's always about courage in advance. there were, that's because they're unipolar, they're seeking to establish their dominance. so which means see, you know, use this a symmetrical or interdependence to its impulse. it's will on other countries. so you mentioned before, and you know that the, the country all the world should the, and develop according to the, the western model. this is the only reason you can have this. i of the ologist because in the ninety's had reflected the international power distribution. but, but power is really at the core because beginning that night, this was unipolar. if you would sanction, for example,

russia than russia would have to adjust or change its policies in order to get to lead back in 2 into the good grace of the west. the problem in the multiple order it is multiple a system is because they have different centers of power and she puts anxious and russia. then you're simply giving away a huge market share of this is the problem of the multiple order. this is why it's important in the west to recognize the unit polarity is gone. did the world this multiple or that the tools of the new polar order doesn't exist anymore? now i understand out why a unipolar world would be beneficial to the united states from the political and even economic point of view. but when it comes to history, when it comes to collective psychology, i simply cannot understand how anyone can assume that one collective psyche can develop in accordance or, or take the path of without a collective psych. i mean, we are all different even on the individual level. i can be, you can be me. where does this idea that it is possible to develop countries as

different from the united states as, let's say, china, russia, afghan is done where this idea comes from that there. we can essentially be all like that, like the americans. it seems so stupid to be honest with you, my friends weller or from like the realist theory perspective, i think everything derives from power even audiologist, a reflection of power when your dominant asked us was in the ninety's. it's very appealing to, to accommodate the ideologists which promote universalism, because when have a universalist idea, 2nd old world should develop in one specific way. it is effectively means that, you know, the should develop in the american way. and the way there is, while universalism is, is appealing, is because now are you know, that where borders matter less, now you have a system of sovereign in equality. and this is what you want when you are the dominant power. the sovereign in call to me is sovereignty for me, but not for you. so when we talk about democracy, promotion means i can interfere in your country. you can to defend mine, you know,

i can topple governments, you can't, i can go to war. as long as you have this liberal democratic here recently, this is something john hurts, pointed out in a 1940 said that then often you find that the more a countries i've democratic domestically the more they will learn, sissy dead international democracy. because swill cedar us. i need to protect the democracy from the majority, which again becomes a contradiction in terms but the but again to it, i think we'll sacrifice so little long time ago, m m, m a made this argument that, you know, i'm a citizen of the world. you had that you had a good, good intention we, we shouldn't have all this borders between us or them. but then you had alexander, great saying, the same thing are, i'm a citizen, the world and then expanse and empire in part of the east. so i can also be a citizen of the world, respecting myself and respecting how different you are from me and respecting the fact that if i scratch your back, yes, great mind we, we will make, we may not get the maximum of what we one bed each one of us will get something and,

and then be peace between us will manifest though i agree. and i think that's why russia probably looks at the rice of china with more comfort than, than united states because it, with united, within states, it has this universalist hedge, a monic, an objective. but the chinese stay kind of, they've been up suggesting that their development model should be exported to the rest of the world. so this sir, ill universalist, ideal where they become the owners of this ideal. because this is really where the problem is because this began democracy. human rights is all a great, great concepts. but the problem is the, the united states and the collect, the west, and a tide, all of this big ideas to an entity of power which are them. so. so this is the core of liberal hedge money if it, and they sing the only way. liberalism can survive if we are in power. so yeah, we, we haven't really seen this from other rising power such as china. if so i think this is a this is why do they always become sir?

yeah, a very dangerous aspect, but it's also a reflection of power. i believe. because if the u. s. reduces, empower, now. it will surely want to embrace new principles such as the sovereign equally, the mutual constraints, the thinks we back against sitting in the early 19 like this. well. so i would argue that this may already be happening, at least in a sense that before, you know, even 5 years ago, the americans, the europeans, dallas, were able to conduct whatever foreign policy they wanted without much cost to themselves. nowadays, if he's home his home in europe, we discussed the difficulty of getting through the winter. the difficulty of actually finding a new foundation for the european economy energy foundation, i mean, and also his home with americans. there are major elections, mid term elections coming up in the united states, and it's clear that the trump base is as strong as it was before and perhaps even

more intensified, more reach full. do you think there will be any change in our western foreign policy? because of the internal unrest or do thing on the country, foreign policy of the west is likely to get even more adversarial because they are facing difficulties at home. it could go both ways. some in the german or for ministers just said that the doesn't care what the germans voters say, it's pretty amazing. it is about the she will you know, so good the support, the ukraine, the matter what the german voter said, this is an interesting development. but jewels had this new push. now in or of star, the protest in, in prague was i think 70000 people took to the streets, arguing let's have a more neutral role in this conflict. oh, they were labeled as our russian sympathizers by that i grew in the, in the numbers. i'm pretty impressive but, but i think it, it all depends on how this conflicts gonna sort out. because at the moment you have

2 possible narratives. if, if, if the united states prevails, the nato prevails, then the narrative is gonna be, you know, we have this huge filter block here in the rogue russians tried to rise soccer. the . this demonstrates the valley of nato and in a native will be more important than ever before. however, if, if a d u. s. a nato fails in this conflict then, and then the new narrative will come up to one you seeing now in prague. the one that nato isn't security students, which is, you know, it's exists to deal with the problems caused by its own existence and the in which should have made the post cold or peace agreements with the russians instead. then you will see them because native causes this problem, but are in unable to actually win and protect us. then you will see problem, morse. countries said breaking off a little bit like hungary trying to seek their own peace with russia. and in this instance, you will see natal severely weakened so whether or not they're going to have a natal dominated europe or weakened nader. again, it all depends on this,

this why this conflict so dangerous because both sides have bet, everything on, on this and that every time i agree with you because i, for rush, aids, existential inches, are on the line. i'm not sure that america's or even here of the central well, your mistakes essential interests are engaged here economically. but for the americans say it's not a matter of their survival. a law unlike it is not the russians. i think the miracles are fighting down to the loss ukrainian and down to the last euro in the search conflict. so i, i agree with aspect now agree that the russia considering this to be an existential threats is also very reasonable. for a it's, it's never clear to me what they think russia supposed to do. if russia, you know, even pulls out where it was. on the 23rd of february, you will see nato and usaa mil to hold or follow it. so it's going to be, this has been recognized for russia to be an existential threats for 20 years, which we ignored. or what i mean is that it's become an extension threat for nato.

i think naples entire political legitimacy has been put on the line, but of course it can't necessarily compare that to an existential threats to her. but neither is it just as a, an organization at the end of the day, it's supposed to be serving the interests of the population it represents. which brings me to my final question. here in the forum, you will hear a lot of our russian and the chinese and indian speakers talk about being proud about lifting, you know, millions of people out of poverty in the east. that's considered the main goal. the main purpose of state policy, both domestic and international, but it seems that in the west decision makers are ready to sacrifice people's living standards. people say basic economic necessities for the sake of fire, conducting their foreign policy. is that a sustainable arrangement? how long do you think it will take for the european? so actually, you know, bring the government, that decision makers to, to the account and tell them that, you know, we elect your 1st and foremost to make our lives better and not worse. well i,

i think that the, yes we talked about for the s d. i think there's a part of the curse of the in a polar order, which is when we had all this power concentrated in the west during the ninety's. the problem is you can afford to make a lot of silly mistakes. so in afghanistan, iraq, libya, syria, we kind of been able to do this and we've been able to absorb los and absorb the cost. and the, i don't, and i think that we all assume that since we, we can absorb all of this. i think it, we reaching the breaking point. now this is, you know, we, we come take on more debts. we comes of more on favorable trade gaps. i think this has kind of a, it blinded us a bit to walk to the pain were able to absorb, i think in other countries and have to stay with more focus being india, china, to make sure that the it a, the protect the base, the living standard at home and you know, before the go on to this kind of adventurous and, and, but i, but i think that might move there towards, at least in europe as well. again,

you do see the backlash and countries on our starting to rethink you at least a population, whether or not. and this has been a great idea, like why not just go back to where this began, the problems which was thoroughly 90 minus when we failed to establish our a mutually acceptable cold war post cold war security system with russia and the, you know, deal with the core of the issue, which isn't good countries versus bad, but rather that we have a european security architecture which is put incompletes. there are some so i think the, as soon as we give up on the idea that we can simply break the russian stem and hopefully we can then start to move. some are more productive. and i think at the end of the day will probably be the european citizens are feeling a lot of pain, which will be trying to remove governments which, you know, go against. this is what i would think would be an obvious and sensible objective. well, professor didn't, this is all we have time for. thank you very much for being with us. my pleasure and thank you for watching. move to syria again on was apart

with ah, ah ah, in needs to come to the russian state will never be tied as on ending those landscaping div, asking him not getting calls within the 55 when. okay, so mine is cuz i'm speaking with we will van in the european union, the kremlin. yup. machines the state on russia today and split our t spoke neck,

even our video agency, roughly all band to on youtube with me. hold me is the aggression today, i'm authorizing the additional strong sanctions today. russia is the country with the most sanctions imposed against it and about those constantly growing. but i figure which of the problem was to call sure, as we speak on the bill in your senior mostly mine, the will ship were banding all in ports of russian oil and gas, fuji. i mean, i know they, plenty of those with the letter from, you know,

we're given regarding joe biden and imposing these sanctions on russia. you know, has destroyed the american economy. so there's your boomerang self with ah, there is in belgrade call on the residence of 2 border, the immaculate does ukrainian or russian territory. getting one person i learned in call more casualties are reported among the forces of both as of a john and armenia austin exchange a fire on the border between the 2 countries. shoppers, the 5 down, the going to cover up to a is own you. great locals. in garza suffer from a low reconstruction pro.