of to discuss that now and join by glen deason, professor at the university of south east in norway. profess indian is great to talk to you. thank you very much for your time. oh, my pleasure. and there, it's a bit of a surprise for me to speak to a western academic at their russian conference because, you know, they changes or even intellectual exchanges between the russians and the westerners are not really encouraged that at this point of time, i'm too concerned about any political or career repercussions are for speaking to r t. well, luckily i work for a university, which is sir, quite strong on defending academic freedom. so are they pretty much given me rights to do? or so please, sir, within certain boundaries, of course, i guess the main problem is in the media where there's a greater push for controlling the narrative. this is where you find out a rush. meet us being censored or completely shut down. and also we find our own

media doesn't really accommodates the russian argument or presents even russian interests. so it becomes very difficult or if i could them instruction do their job in order to understand what was a challenge to rush in order to explain what it's doing. so it's, it's, it's about a great time for academics in the west. i'm afraid, i know that geo politics and geo comics is your primary academic interest in your area. expertise in you for many years and been following on russia. i use of energy for its economy as well as in trade with other countries. we are speaking just days after gas from suspended all its gas applies to europe, citing technical malfunctions on the north stream. one pipeline. what does it mean for both sides? well, this is sir, another step in the complete breakdown i think of the entire international economic system. but it also says the important component of this search,

the divorce between the west and russia. now for some time, we did, the west has been wanting to cut its reliance on russian energy because sir, in international system, what you want to have our symmetrical inter dependence. that if you want other to be dependent on you, but you should be dependent on them. so again, rush has been dependent on western air technologists industries. sir. transportation corridors, so banks, currencies, insurances, payment system, so across the board, one problem for the west us, we've been reliant on russian energy and was russian agriculture and the us agriculture her as well. so the, the problem now of course is by reducing or cutting reliance on russian gas and oil, or we actually her to our own economists obviously because o, in, often with trip, this idea that we're buying russian energy of some kind of charity to russia. but of course, this is if you want competitive industries in europe, in the,

the key ingredient is always cheap energy, so cheap energy resources to match it, metals and different resources. and we can always got this from russia, and this is in, through all the history that germany about it not only in recent times and started actually during the height of the cold war. and yet at that time, both sides are respected. i have contracts and i respected what you actually called the, the balance of dependence. and this is a term that writing and put in the present in this country used to refer a lot. but he also was making a point that in order for the balance of dependence to function properly, it needs to be mutually respected and appreciate and do you think the europeans fully understood and appreciated their reliance on russia's energy because it gave them an enormous competitive advantage i mention that prosperity as at least in germany, was, was billed on it. i don't think it's an exaggeration. no, and i think it's obvious that that wasn't appreciated because if you saw the

rhetoric and bar back in the february, march, the argument was will when don't need rush of gas and all, we can cut it completely and we'll, we'll be just fine. but us, we discovered are we not find them all the industry, some depended on this entire competitiveness. so even if it was possible to reduce reliance on russian energy, it will none, but nonetheless, be importing elegy and other more expensive source of energy. so air which means that our industries will be less competitive, especially the germans and her and the so, so the long term repercussions are, yeah, are staggering. but in reality, i don't think we're even able to replace it cheap russian gas with expensive from other places. so i think after this, probably there will be bit more appreciation. can i ask you something because it's very hard for us. the russians to understand that the, you know, we have the saying measure 7 times and cut once. when out we are talking about the mass, if a fundamental economic issue, and yet this level of cooperation that exists, that for many decades was caught in

a matter of a couple of months. don't you think that the decision makers at least looked at be at the balance sheets? i mean, how would something like that be done in such a short period of time in that miss? so little consideration for, for their facts and went on on their own domestic economists. i think it's for leadership to be honest because a dinner, a switch from the germans side to have recognized starting cutting. for example, north stream 2 would be suicide. cutting off swift would be suicide, and of course, stealing a half of their reserves from the russian central bank would also be horrible for trust. so, but i guess so in the heat, a moment when the emotions were running high, it became common sense con became impossible. it's, it's a lot of self harm. all the areas where russia has been dependent on the west. oh, it's kind of relied on trust that is a, in a using western technology banking system. all this had relied on,

not just the russians trusting the west, but what we're now seeing is, after this sanctions and cutting off trying to destroy the russian economy, the rest of the world is looking at the west, knocked, you know, with admiration about their standing of principal, but the west, the thing to be more rogue now in, in the international it can be international economic system. so the rest of the world, china, india, in all facing possible threats to trade with sir russia than our questioning it. always it's safe to be have us reply lines, dependent on in a western industry. some technologists is safe to use euros in dollars to swift to use their banks. they're, they're starting to, you know, question all of this. and this is why the economic system, which has been so centralized and western centric is now fragment thing. so, you know, this should have been obvious. i mean, i've been warning since 2015 at least that this is their direction. we're moving. and i'm sure that, you know, the european leaders are also aware of this, that this is the direction we're heading. but nonetheless, sir, they only impulse now is to double bowman. we continue to do it even though,

you know, their consequences keep piling on. that's actually a very interesting question because a few years ago it was fashionable to use the terms of game theory, you know, ah, non 0 sum game. you shall benefit sienna, a, you scratch my back as great your is. but it seems that even the whole idea of neutrality, if it's russia or china and deriving those benefits is politically unacceptable. right now, how we come to the point when only the neutrality of harm, i, hon. myself in order to harm you, is politically admissible. yes. well, well i guess to some extent has always been like this. if you know, for example, united states can break the chinese to come in half the it would be beneficial to that for the us to do it. even if 10 percent of its own economy would be wiped off the always route. look at the interdependency look at the relative, at least, look at the gains for yourself. at this point of time, russia is gaining from diverting and supplies to you are the market. and that's what makes this irrational castillo, you know, let's say we're all on board like,

it's a great thing to harm a russian economy roll. if this is the measurements we're going for it still it will, it, we're not, we're not shaving it because it went from, you know, we're close a lot of pain to russia and only small to us. and now we're see, it's been completely reversed now. and the sanctions are actually hurting the west more than russia like 1.2 example is and we're not going by russian guess. so we bite from ellen g from china instead will brush us export the the sanctions. russia keeps the energy price high. russia exports to china, china takes a markup, and exports to the u. rush, us being benefiting cost. the price are pushed up. russia can export less energy, but still make much more money or all our leaders from usaa, britain, you the all kind of bet their entire political legitimacy on, on this fight that we were going to beat the russians. but now, or when this all failing, they don't really have any other solutions. threatened us, double down professor didn't. this is actually again, a very interesting question. and perhaps even i under explore at how much political

mythology and rhetoric influence soul and economic decisions. because here in russia, we usually think of their westerners as those, you know, hard nosed capitalist who are good at procuring profits will only mind their own business. but these, the, again, i, our typical stereotypes. over there, westerners, i define what is the basic i guiding principles of european and western approach at this point of time, not necessarily to russia, but just the approach to policy, both domestic and engine international. what i've been named values of, of the decision makers. well, i think it's, sir, it's holding on to this a unipolar moment, which, which you, which is already gone because while it while, and the uni pull are moment, meaning that i'm the only one who is good and noble and they're entitled to making decisions. yes. so where, because the way the international system work is when all economic power is concentrate in one place, such as it was in the west, in

a 990 s. m. you have certain or you're very comfortable and you can the and but, but you also have the incentive to build trusts because you're administrating the global economy. now, the problem is, when the hedge am on the client's end, it looses this edge money. if you see that, that amount is more likely to use economic state craft in order to punch down on the other ice and power. so for example, china, russia and you know, we, we didn't have this kind of pulses in the ninety's. but us, we use this economic levers of power to punish and hook and prevent address our addresses from rising or no, you only create more incentive for the rest of the system to shed this reliance and dependence on the west. so i think this is, so it did, it did, this is from the dynamic you're seeing because said the west has a dilemma one hand. we can just wait and see it that, you know, power slips from our fingers or we can use what we have left of economic power in

order to try to, you know, crush our enemies. sir. you know, the enemy's artless other serious china and russia and the it's, well, it's not working. so there's also a 3rd option. you can work with your so called animals to make sure that in b and new world that is already being born, you can ensure the best positions for yourself because as the, as the harris of the previous system, you still have an advantage over everybody else don't you, yes, i actually argued this in a book in 2015. i was arguing that the u. s. and the collective west kind of had 2 different the paths to take because the inequality was over. and we had 2 options. we could either facilitate a multiple or order where the u. s. could be like the 1st among equals about still, except there's a system based on multiple, arty, or we, the united states had the option of a trying to prevent the rise of other states. but in this instance, yes, you could prevent a multi order multiple order from for developing cells, but then you'll probably see this multiple or order being developed in opposition

to the united states. to see the brick says he had a china, russia partnership business his assa, often, oh, other overt show objective of containing or balancing united states. and obviously the 1st option would have been preferable, even the big brzezinski. he also recognized this dilemma 2012. i think in the are also said he was no friend the russia would have and still he was recognizing that the it's better now to make. 2 for the us to use it current influence to create a new system, a multiple, a system were held a privilege place. but instead, if we are where we are, we have to take a very short break right now, but we will be back in just a few moments fetching. ah katy, here's the aggression to day i am authorized to additional strong sanctions to day russia is the country with the most sanctions imposed against it. a numberless

constantly growing figure sich of little owen was of course renewed as he's becoming louise senior mostly moine. the we're, we're sure we're banding all imports of russian oil and gas news. i, i know they said she was lower with the literature. or did you have regarding jewel, by imposing these sanctions on russia? you has destroyed the american economy. so there's your boomerang self. ah ah ah

welcome back to wells. of course, midland isn't a professor at the university of south eastern norway, professor decent before the break. weaver. we touched on multiple guarantee, and i think there is a difference in how this term is interpreted in the east and in the west. as i speak to the delegates of this forum. what is actually, what they mean by multiple parenting is the recognition that each country, even though there are some common laws of economy and you know, social organization, et cetera. each country develops according to its own historic trajectory at its own unique pace. and it's not about so much, you know, trying to push everybody in the same direction as the west tried toward the united states tried to do for frankly, for its own benefit, but rather respecting the difficulties,

the differences of various countries and try to find, you know, a middle ground between that and that's why i think i would disagree with your assumption that breaks and all the other organizations of integration in asia were built against the united states. because it looks like they're building a lot of mutual benefits to, to the members will read it. well, yes. well i, i would argue that they were not necessarily created only against us. there were seem to be parallel institutions because the u. s. centric institutions couldn't adapt to the emergency multiple power if you take, for example, the asian infrastructure investment bank, the, the chinese were trying to have the i m f. reform to the extent to could accommodate the china more properly. it in accordance with its relative power. but the united states were sna really willing to reform in terms of the voting power. so, you know, the chinese began to break away and they just established a and parallel economic infrastructure. what i mean is that the, if,

if united states uses this or organizations course of li against russia, against china, then you will see these parlance ireland institutions being used as a way of, of balancing the americans. what would it be fair to say that the main feature of those institutions, even though they pursue an individual countries interest is neutrality. whereas the main feature off western dominated institutions is ultimately courage. and sure there's some soft power and sung trying to in ties. but when push comes to shy shop, it's always about courage in advance. there were, that's because there unipolar they're seeking to establish their dominance. so which means see, you know, use this a symmetrical or interdependence to it. impulse it's will on other countries. so you mentioned before, and you know that the, the country all the world should the, and develop according to the, the western model. this is the only reason you can have this. i of the ologist

because in the ninety's had reflected an international power distribution. but, but power is really at the core because beginning that night, this one's unipolar. if you would sanction, for example, russia than russia would have to adjust or, you know, change its policies in order to get to lead back in 2 into the good grace of the west. the problem in the multiple order it is multiple a system is because they have different centers of power and she puts anxious and russia. then you're simply giving away a huge market share of this is the problem of the multiple order. this is why it's important in the west to recognize the unit polarity is gone. did the world this multiple are the tools of the unit polar order doesn't exist anymore. now i understand out why a unipolar world would be beneficial to the united states from the political and even economic point of view. but when it comes to history, when it comes to collective psychology, i simply cannot understand how anyone can assume that one collective psyche can develop in accordance or, or take the path. and so now the collective psych,

i mean, we are all different, even on the individual level. i cannot be you, you cannot be me. where does this idea that it is possible to develop countries as different from the united states, as, let's say, china, russia, against them? when this idea comes from that there, we can essentially be all like it, like the americans. it seems so stupid to be honest with you, my friends weller or from like the realist theory perspective, i think everything derives from power even though the ologist a reflection of power when your dominant asked us was in the ninety's, it's very appealing to a, to accommodate the ideologies which promote universalism, because when have a universalist idea, 2nd old world should develop in one specific way. it is effectively means that, you know, the should develop in the american way. and the way there is, while universalism is, is appealing, is because now are, you know, that we're borders matter less. now you have

a system of sovereign inequality. and this is what you want when you are the dominant power, the sovereign in called him his sovereignty for me, but not for you. so when we talk about democracy, promotion means i can interfere in your country. you can to defend mine, you know, i can topple governments, you can't, i can go to war. as long as you have this liberal democratic care reasoning. this is something john hurts, pointed out in 1940 said that then often you find that the more a countries i've democratic domestically the more they will, the cist dead international democracy. because swill cedar us, i need to protect the democracy from the majority, which again becomes a contradiction in terms but the but again to it, i think we'll socrates so little long time ago m, m a made this argument that, you know, i'm a citizen of the world you had that you had a good, good intention we, we shouldn't have all this borders between us or them. but then you had alexander, great saying, the same thing are, i'm a citizen of the world and then expense an empire to the east. so i can also be a citizen of the world, respecting myself and respecting how different you are from me and respecting the

fact that if i scratch your back, yes, great mind we, we will make, we may not get the maximum of what we one bed each one of us will get something and, and then the peace between us will manifest though i agree, and i think that's why russia probably looks at the rise of china with more comfort than, than the united states because it, with united within states, it has this universalist hedge a monic, an objective, but the chinese, they kind of, they've been up suggesting that their development model should be exported to the rest of the world. so this sir, ill universalist, ideal where they become the owners of this ideal. because this is really where the problem is because this began democracy. human rights is all a great, great concepts. but the problem is the, the united states and the collect, the west, and a tide, all of this big ideas to an entity of power which are them. so. so this is the core of liberal hedge money. and they saying the only way liberalism can survive is if

we are in power. so we, we haven't really seen this from other rising power such as china. if so i think this is a, this is why do they always become sir? yeah, very dangerous aspects. but it's also a reflection of power, i believe was if the u. s. reduces empower now, it will surely want to embrace new principles such as the sovereign equally, the mutual constraints, the thinks we back against sitting in the early 19 like this. well. so i would argue that this may already be happening, at least in a sense that before, you know, even 5 years ago, the americans, the europeans, dallas, were able to conduct whatever foreign policy they wanted without much cost to themselves. nowadays, if he's home his home in europe, we discussed the difficulty of getting through the winter. the difficulty of actually finding a new foundation for the european economy energy foundation, i mean, and also his home with americans. there are major elections,

mid term elections coming up in the united states, and it's clear that the trump base is as strong as it was before and perhaps even more intensified, more reach full. do you think there will be any change in our western foreign policy? because of the internal unrest or do thing on the country, foreign policy of the west is likely to get even more adversarial because they are facing difficulties at home. it could go both ways. some in the german or for ministers just said that the doesn't care what the germans voters say, it's pretty amazing in it is about the she will you know, so good the support, ukraine, the matter what the german voter said. this is an interesting development. but y'all's had this new push now in or of, sorry, the protest in, in prague was, i think 70000 people took to the streets, arguing let's have a more neutral role in this conflict. oh, they were labeled as their russian sympathizers by that i grew in the,

in the numbers. i'm pretty impressive but, but i think it, it all depends on how this conflicts gonna sort out. because at the moment you have 2 possible narratives. if, if, if the united states prevails, the nato prevails, then the narratives going to be, you know, we have this huge filter block here in the road. russians tried to rise soccer. the, you know, this demonstrates the value of nato and in a native will be more important than ever before. however, if, if a d, u. s. and nato fails in this conflict, then. and then the new narrative will come up to one you seeing now in prague, the one that, that nato isn't security situations. which is, you know, it's exists to deal with the problems caused by its own existence and the in which should have made the post cold or peace agreements with the russians instead. then you will see them because native causes this problem, but are in unable to actually win and protect us. then you will see problem, morse. countries said breaking off a little bit like hungary trying to seek their own peace with russia. and in this

instance, you will see, natal severely weakened, so whether or not you're going to have a, natal dominated europe or a weakened nato's. again, it all depends on this. this is why this conflict so dangerous because both sides have bet, everything on, on this and they have everything i agree with you. because for rush, aids, existential inches, are on the line. i'm not sure that america's or even europe, since essential. well, europe's existential interests are engaged here economically, but for the americans say, it's not a matter of their survival. a law unlike it is no for the russians. i think the miracles are fighting down to the loss of cranium and down to the last euro in the same conflict. so i, i agree with that aspect. now also agree that the russia considering this to be an existential threats, is also very reasonable. and it's, it's never clear to me what they think russia supposed to do. if russia, you know, even pulls out where it was. on the 23rd of february, you will see nato and usaa mil to hold or follow it. so it's going to be,

this has been recognized for russia to be an existential threats for 20 years, which we ignored. or what i mean is that it's become an extension threat for nato. i think naples entire political legitimacy has been put on the line, but of course it can't necessarily compare that to an existential threats to her. but neither is it just as a, an organization at the end of the day, it's supposed to be serving the interests of the population. it represents. which brings me to my final question here and the forum you will hear a lot of our russian and the chinese and indian speakers talk about being proud about lifting, you know, millions of people out of poverty in the east. that's considered the main goal of the main purpose of state policy, both domestic and international. but it seems that in the west decision makers are ready to sacrifice people's living standards. people say basic economic necessities for the sake of fire, conducting their foreign policy. is that a sustainable arrangement? how long do you think it will take for the europeans to actually, you know,

bring their governments, their decision makers to, to the account and tell them that, you know, we elect your 1st and foremost to make our lives better and not worse? well i, i think that the, yes we talked about for the do, i think, is a part of the curse of the, in a polar order, which is when we had all this power concentrated in the west during the ninety's. the problem is you can afford to make a lot of silly mistakes. so in afghanistan, iraq, libya, syria, we kind of been able to do this and we've been able to absorb los and absorb the cost. and the, i don't, and i think that we all assume that since we, we can absorb all of this. i think it, we reaching the breaking point. now this is in a we, we can take on more debts. we come to have more on favorable trade gaps. i think this has kind of a, it blinded us a bit to walk to the pain were able to absorb, i think in other countries and have to stay with more focus being india, china, to make sure that the it a, the protect the base, the living standard at home and,

you know, before the go on to this kind of adventurous and, and, but i, but i think that might move their source at least in europe as well. again, you do see the backlash ada countries are now starting to rethink you at least a population whether or not. and this has been a great idea, like why not just go back to where this began, the problems which was thoroughly 90 minus when we failed to establish our a mutually acceptable cold war post cold war security system with russia and the, you know, deal with the core of the issue which isn't good countries versus bad, but rather that we have a european security architecture which is put incomplete, sarah some. so i think the, as soon as we give up on the idea that we can simply break the russian stem and hopefully we can then start to move. some are more productive. and i think at the end of the day, it will probably be the european citizens are feeling a lot of pain, which will be trying to remove governments which, you know, go against. this is what i would think would be an obvious and sensible objective.

well, professor didn't, this is all we have time for. thank you very much for being with us. of my pleasure and thank you for watching. move to syria again on the was a part with ah, ah ah ah ah ah ah, ah,

with ah, a you might look and you live most schools. if you look on the initial, be one of them not to get a, you can use them. but by your one you do do or 2, but you also still done a

what i see the student both use the little gear. lation says do it on both sub ah, your top headlines right now. one our teeth as a 4th is fire. heavy artillery across the border into russia, the belgrade region, hundreds of ukrainian refugees flee to those areas from cities recently retaken by kia, how some of the asylum seekers site phase of upcoming repressions by key authorities in the u. back tracks on imposing price limits on russian energy supplies. it's according to a late document at the block struggles with shorter jerusalem at the sanctions. it's already posted against moscow.