short sighted political folly is the fundamental economic factor on which the entire economy of the eurozone depends. it's part of the foundation on which european prosperity was built. can you replace that foundation, that without damaging the building on top of it? well, to discuss that i'm now joined by glen deason, professor at the university of south eastern no re, professor decent is great to talk to. thank you very much for your time. oh my pleasure. and it's a bit of a surprise for. 6 for me to speak to a western academic at the russian conference because, you know, they change is even intellectual exchanged between the russians. and the westerners are not really encouraged at this point of time on too concerned about any political or career repercussions for speaking to our t. well, luckily i work for a university, which is sir, quite strong on the defending academic freedom. so are they pretty much given me your rights to do or so please, sir, within certain boundaries, of course,

i guess the main problem is in the media where they saw a greater push for controlling the narrative. this is were you find out a rush to meet us being censored are complete to shut down. and also we find out that our own media doesn't merrily. her accommodates the russian argument or presents even russian interests. so it becomes very difficult or if i could them expect to do their job in order to understand what was a challenge to rush. i not explain what it's doing. so it's, it's not a great time for academics in the west. i'm afraid i know that your politics and geo comics as your primary academic interest in your area uh, expertise in you for many years and been following on russia. i use of energy for its economy as well as in trade with other countries. we are speaking just days after gas from suspended all its gas supplies to europe, siding,

technical more functions on the north stream one pipeline. what does that mean for both sides? well, this is sir. another step in the complete breakdown, i think of the entire international economic system. but it also says the important component of this search, the divorce between the west and russia. now for some time, we did, the west has been wanting to cut its reliance on russian energy because sir international system, what you want to have our symmetrical interdependence. that is you want other to be dependent on you, but you should be dependent on them. so again, rush has been dependent on western and technologists industries. sir. transportation corridors, so banks, currencies, insurances, payment system, so across the board, one problem for the west us, we've been reliant on russian energy and the russian, our gra, cultural and the us agriculture her as well. so the, the, the problem now of course is by reducing or cutting reliance on russian gas and oil

. her, we actually her to our own economists obviously because o, in, often with trip, this idea that we're buying russian energy of some kind of charity to russia. but of course, this is it, if you want competitive industries in europe in the key ingredient is always cheap energy, so cheap energy resources to match it, metals and different resources. and we can always got this from russia, and this is in, through all the history, the germany of on it, not only in recent times and started actually during the height of the cold war. and yet at that time, both sides are respected. dia, contracts, and are respected what you actually called the, the balance of dependence. and this is a term that riding and put in the present in this country used to refer a lot, but he also was making a point that in order for this balance of dependence to function properly, it needs to be mutually respected and appreciate it. do you think the europeans fully understood and appreciated their reliance on our rushes energy because it

gave them an enormous competitive advantage? i mention or prosperity or at least in jo, any was, was billed on it. i don't think it's an exaggeration. no, and i think it's obvious that that wasn't appreciated because if you saw the rhetoric and bar back in february, march, the argument was will wind don't need rush of gas and all, we can cut it completely and we'll, we'll be just fine. but us, we discovered or will not find them. all the industries have depended on this entire competitiveness. so even if it was possible to reduce reliance on russian energy, it will none but none the less be importing elegy and other more expensive source of energy. so air which means that our industries will be less competitive, especially the germans and the, and the so, so the long term repercussions are, yeah, are staggering. but in reality, i don't think we're even able to replace it cheap russian gas with expensive from other places. so i think after this, probably there will be bit more appreciation. can i ask you something because it's

very hard for us. the russians to understand that the, you know, we have the saying measure 7 times and cut once. when out we are talking about the mass, if a fundamental economic issue, and yet this level of corporation that exist that for many decades was cut in a matter of a couple of months. don't you think that the decision makers, at least looked at the, at the balance sheets? i mean, how would something like that be done in such a short period of time and that miss so little consideration for, for the fact that went on on their own domestic economists. i think it's for leadership to be honest because i do know this is from the germans side to have recognize starting a cutting for example, north stream too would be suicide. cutting off swift would be suicide. and of course, stealing the, the half of their reserves from the russian central bank would also be horrible for trust. so, but i guess so in the hit a moment when the emotions were running high,

it became common sense. con became impossible, is this is a lot of self harm. all the areas where russia has been dependent on the west. oh, it's kind of relied on trust that is it, you know, using western technologies, banking system. all this is relied on, not just the russians trusting the west, but what we are now seeing is, after this sanctions and cutting off trying to destroy the russian economy. the rest of the world is looking at the west, knocked, you know, with admiration that they're standing of principal, but the west, the seem to be more rogue. now in, in the international it can be international economic system. so the rest of the world, china, india, in all facing possible threats to trade with sir russia. then our questioning, you know, is it safe to be, have us reply lines dependent on, in a western industry. some technologists is safe to use euros and dollars to swift to use their banks where they're starting to, you know, question all of this. and this is why the economic system, which has been sol centralized and western centric is now fragment thing. so, you know, this should have been obvious. i mean,

i've been warning since 2015 at least that this is their direction. we're moving and i'm sure that, you know, the european leaders are also aware of this, that this is the direction we're heading. but nonetheless, her, they only impulse now is to double down and we continue to do it even though, you know their consequences keep piling on. that's actually a very interesting question. because a few years ago it was fashionable to use the terms of game theory. you know, ah, non 0 sum game, you shall benefit sienna, a, you scratch my back as great your is. but it seems that even the whole idea of neutrality, if it's russia or china and deriving those benefits, is politically unacceptable. right now, how we come to the point when only the neutrality of harm, i, hon. myself in order to harm you. it's politically admissible. this, well, well, i guess to some extent it's always been like this. if you, you know, for example, if do not estates couldn't break the chinese economy, half the, it would be beneficial to,

for the us to do it. even if 10 percent of its own economy would be wiped off the always the route look at the interdependency look at the relative, at least, look at the gains for yourself. at this point of time, russia is gaining from diverting and supplies to you are the market, and that's what makes this irrational castillo, you know, let's say we're all in board like, it's a great thing to harm a russian economy. well, if this is the measurements we're going for it still it will, it, we're not, we're not shaving it because it went from, you know, we chose a lot of pain to russia and only small to us. and now we're see, it's been completely reversed. now, there the sanctions are actually hurting the west more than russia like $1.00 example is and we're not gonna buy russian gas. so we buy it from ellen, g from china instead will rush us export. it did the sanctions, the russia keeps the energy price high. russia exports to china, china takes a markup, and exports to the u. s. rushes being benefit in cost. the price are pushed up. russian export less than a g, but still make much more money, or all, all are leaders from usaa, britain you,

they're all kind of bet their entire political legitimacy on, on this fight that we were going to beat the russians. but now, or when this all failing, they don't really have any other solutions. threatened us, double down professor didn't. this is actually again, a very interesting question. and perhaps even i under explore and how much political mythology and rhetoric influence sole and economic decisions. because here in russia, we usually think of the westerners as those, you know, hard nosed capitalist who are good at procuring profits will only mind their own business. but these, this again i, our typical stereotypes of the westerners. i define what is the basic ad guiding principles of european and western approach at this point of time, not necessarily to russia, but just the approach to policy, both domestic and engine international. what i've been named values of, of the decision makers. well, i think it's, sir, it's holding on to this a unipolar moment, which, which you, which is already gone because, well,

what and the unipolar moment, meaning that i'm the only one who is good and noble and they're entitled to making decisions. yes. so where, because the way the international system work is when all economic power is concentrated in one place, such as it was in the west in 19 nineties. and you have certain, or you're very comfortable and you can the and, but you also have the incentive to build trusts because they're administrating the global economy. now, the problem is, when the hedge him on the client's end, it loses this edge of money. if you see that the edge amount is more likely to use economic state craft in order to punch down on of the rising power. so for example, china, russia, you know, we within have this kind of pulses in the ninety's. but us, we use this economic here levers of power to punish and hook and prevent address our addresses from rising her. you know, you'll create more incentive for the rest of the system to shed this reliance and

dependence on the west. so i think this is, so it did, it did, this is some of the dynamic you're seeing because said the west has a dilemma one hand. we can just wait and see it that, you know, power slips from our fingers or we can use what we have left of economic power in order to try to, you know, crush our enemies. sir. you know, the enemy's artless other serious china and russia and the it's will, it is not working. so there is also a 3rd option. you can work with your so called animals to make sure that in b and new world that is already being born, you can ensure the best positions for yourself because as the, as the harris of the previous system, you still have an advantage over everybody else don't you, yes, i actually argued this in a book in 2015. i was arguing that the u. s. and the collective west and i had 2 different paths to take because the people are to was over. and we had 2 options. we can either facilitate a multiple or order where the u. s. could be like the 1st among equals about still,

except there's a system based on multiple artie or we, the united states had the option of a trying to prevent the rice of other estates. but in this instance, yes, you could prevent a multi order multiple order from for developing cells, but then you'll probably see this multiple order being developed in opposition to the united states. to see the brick says he had a china or russia partnership. this is his assa, ofen oh, of the overture objective of containing or balancing to united states. and obviously the 1st option would have been preferable. even the speaking of brzezinski, he also recognized this dilemma 2012, i think. and he also said he was no friend, the russia would have and still he was recognizing that the it's better now to make it for the u. s. to use it current influence to create a new system, a multiple, a system were how the privilege place. but instead, if we are where we are, we have to take a very short break right now, but we will be back in just a few moments. stay tuned, ah ah,

who is the aggressor today? i'm authorizing the additional strong sanctions. today. russia is the country with the most sanctions imposed against it. and um, but as constantly growing i figure which of the problem was to course renewed as we speak on the new senior, mostly mine or sheila were banding all in ports of russian oil and gas. new g, a g, with the letter from, you know, we're pretty good regarding joe,

by imposing these sanctions on russia has destroyed the american economy. so there's your boomerang. ah, ah, welcome back to wells. of course, napoleon isn't a professor at the university of south eastern norway, professor decent before the break. weaver. we touched on multiple guarantee and i think there is a difference in how this term is interpreted in the east and in the west. as i speak to the delegates of this forum, what is actually what they mean by multiplier to is the recognition that each country, even though there are some common laws of economy and you know, social organization, et cetera. each country develops according to its own historic trajectory at its

own unique pace. and it's not about so much, you know, trying to push everybody in the same direction as the west tried toward the united states tried to do for frankly, for its own benefit, but rather respecting the difficulties, the differences of various countries and try to find, you know, a middle ground between that and that's why i think i would disagree with your assumption that breaks and all the other organizations of integration in asia were built against the united states. because it looks like they're building a lot of mutual benefits to, to their members. will read it? well, yes. well i, i would argue that they were and knocked and um, this is hell credit only against us. there were seemed to be parallel institutions because the u. s. centric institutions couldn't adapt to the emergency multiple power if you take it. for example, the asian infrastructure investment bank, the,

the chinese were trying to have the i m f. reform to the extent to could accommodate the china more properly in accordance with its relative power. but the united states were never really willing to reform in terms of the warning power. so, you know, the chinese began to break away and they just established a and parallel economic infrastructure. what i mean is that the, if, if united states uses this or organizations course of li against russia, against china, then you will see these parallels, parallel institutions being used as a way of, of balancing the americans. what would it be fair to say that the main feature of those institutions, even though they pursue an individual countries interest is neutrality. whereas the main feature off western dominated institutions is ultimately courage. and sure there's some soft power and sung trying to in ties. but when push comes to shop shop, it's always about courage in advance. there were, that's because there unipolar they're seeking to establish their dominance. so which means see, you know, use this

a symmetrical or interdependence to it's impulse, it's will on other countries. so you mentioned before, and you know that the, the country all the world should the, and develop according to the, the western model. this is the only reason you can have this. i of the ologist because in the ninety's had reflected the international power distribution. but, but power is really at the core because beginning at night this was unipolar. if you would sanction, for example, russia than russia would have to adjust or in or change its policies in order to get to lead back in 2 into the good grace of the west. the problem in the multiple order it is multiple a system is because you have different centers of power and you put anxious on russia. then you're simply giving away a huge market share. this is the problem of the multiple order. this is why it's important in the west to recognize the unit polarity is gone. did the world this multiple or that the tools of the new polar order doesn't exist anymore? now i understand out why a unipolar world would be beneficial to the united states from the political and

even economic point of view. but when it comes to history, when it comes to collective psychology, i simply cannot understand how anyone can assume that one collective psyche can develop in accordance or, or take the path of we not a collective psych. i mean, we are all different even on the individual level. i can be, you can be me. where does this idea that it is possible to develop countries as different from the united states as, let's say, china, russia, afghan is done where this idea comes from that there. we can essentially be all like that, like the americans. it seems so stupid to be honest with you, my friends weller or from like the realist theory perspective, i think everything derives from power given audiologist a reflection of power when your dominant us to us was in the ninety's. it's very appealing to, to accommodate the ideologists which promote universalism, because when have a universalist idea,

2nd old world should develop in one specific way. it is effectively means that, you know, the should develop in the american way. and the way there is, while universalism is, is appealing, is because now are you know, that where borders matter less, now you have a system of sovereign in equality. and this is what you want when you are the dominant power. the sovereign in call to me is somebody for me, but not for you. so when we talk about democracy, promotion means i can interfere in your country. you can hit friend mine or you know, i can topple governments, you can't, i can go to war. as long as you have this liberal democratic care recently. this is something john hurts, pointed out in the 1940 said that often you find that the more a countries of democratic domestically the more they will learn cist dead international democracy because we will cedar us on need to help protect the democracy from the majority which again becomes a contradiction in terms, but the, but again to it, i think we'll sacrifice so little long time ago. m m a. maybe it's our argument that you know, i'm a citizen of the world. you had that you had a good,

good intention we, we shouldn't have all this borders between us or them. but then you had alexander, great saying, the same thing are, i'm a citizen, the world and then expense an empire empire to the east. so i can also be a citizen of the world, respecting myself and respecting how different you are from me and respecting the fact that if i scratch your back, yes, great mind we, we will make, we may not get the maximum of what we want. but each one of us will get something and, and then the piece between us will manifest though i agree, and i think that's why russia probably looks at the rise of china with more comfort than, than the united states. because it, with united, within states, it has this universalist hedge, a monic, an objective, but the chinese, they kind of, they've been up suggesting that their development model should be exported to the rest of the world. so this sir, ill universalist, ideal where they become the owners of this ideal. because this is really where the

problem is because this began democracy. human rights is all a great, great concepts. but the problem is the, the united states and the collect, the west, and a tide, all of this big ideas to an entity of power which are them so. so this is the core of liberal hedge money. if in this thing, the only way liberalism can survive is if we are in power. so we, we haven't really seen this from other rising power such as china. if so i think this is a this is why do they always become sir? yeah, a very dangerous aspect, but it's also a reflection of power. i believe. because if the u. s. reduces empower now, it will surely want to embrace new principles such as this sovereign equally. the mutual constraints the thinks we back against sitting in the early 90 like this? well. so i would argue that this may already be happening, at least in a sense that before, you know, even 5 years ago, the americans, the europeans, dallas, were able to conduct whatever foreign policy they wanted without much cost to

themselves. nowadays, if he's home his home in europe, we discussed the difficulty of getting through the winter. the difficulty of actually finding a new foundation for the european economy energy foundation, i mean, and also his home with americans. there are major elections, mid term elections coming up in the united states, and it's clear that the term base is as strong as it was before and perhaps even more intensified, more reach for do you think there will be any change in our western foreign policy? because of the internal unrest or do thing on the country, foreign policy of the west is likely to get even more adversarial because they are facing difficulties at home. it could go both ways. some in the german or for ministers just said that he doesn't care what the germans voters say, it's pretty amazing. it is about the she will, you know, so good the support,

the ukraine, the matter what the german voter said, this is an interesting development. but jewels had this new push. now in or sorry, the protest in, in prague was, i think 70000 people took to the streets, arguing let's have a more neutral role in this conflict. oh, they were labeled as their russian sympathizers. by that i grew in the, in the numbers. i'm pretty impressive, but, but i think it, it all depends on how this conflicts gonna sort out. because at the moment you have 2 possible narratives. if, if, if the united states prevails, the nato prevails, then the narratives going to be, you know, we have this huge filter block here in the road. russians tried to rise soccer to, you know, this demonstrates the valley of nato and in a native will be more important than ever before. however, if, if a d u. s. a nato fails in this conflict, then, and then the new narrative will come up. the one you're seeing now in prague, the one that that nato isn't security students, which is, you know, it's exists to deal with the problems caused by its own existence and the in which

should have made the post cold or peace agreements with the russians instead. then you will see them because native causes this problem but are in unable to actually win and protect us. then you will see problem worse. countries said breaking off a little bit like hungary trying to seek their own peace with russia. and in this instance, you will see, natal severely weakened, so whether or not you're going to have a, natal dominated europe or weakened nato's. again, it all depends on this, this why this conflict is so dangerous because of both sides of bet, everything on, on this, and that every time i agree with you, because i, for russia, it's as essential inches are on the line. i'm not sure that america's or even europe's essential well in europe says essential interests are engaged here economically. but for the americans say it's not a matter of their survival. a law unlike it is. oh, the russians. i think the americans are fighting down to the last the cranium and down to the last 0 in this conflict. so i,

i agree with aspect now also agree that the russia considering this to be an existential threats is also very reasonable. and it's, it's never clear to me what they think russia supposed to do. if russia, you know, even post outwards was on the 23rd of february, you will see nato and usaa mil to hardware follow it. so it's going to be, this has been recognized for russia to be an existential threats for 20 years, which we ignored. or what i mean is that it's become an extension threat for nato. i think naples entire political legitimacy has been put on the line, but of course it can't necessarily compare that to an existential threats to her. but neither is it just as a, an organization at the end of the day, it's supposed to be serving the interests of the population. it represents. which brings me to my final question here and the forum you will hear a lot of our russian and the chinese and indian speakers talk about being proud about lifting, you know, millions of people out of poverty in the east. that's considered the main goal. the main purpose of state policy, both domestic and international,

but it seems that in the west decision makers are ready to sacrifice people's living standards. people say basic economic necessities for the sake of fire, conducting their foreign policy. is that a sustainable arrangement? how long do you think it will take for the european? so actually, you know, bring that governments, that decision makers to, to the account and tell them that, you know, we elect your 1st and foremost to make our lives better and not worse. well i, i think that the, yes we talked about for the s d. i think there's a part of the curse of the polar order, which is when we had all this power concentrated in the west during the ninety's. the problem is you can afford to make a lot of silly mistakes. so in afghanistan, iraq, libya, syria, we kind of been able to do this and we've been able to absorb los and absorb the cost. and the, i don't, and i think that we all assume that since we, we can absorb all of this. so i think it, we reaching the breaking point now this or you know we, we can't take on more debts. we can't have more on favorable trade gaps. i think

this has kind of a, it blinded us a bit to walk to the pain we're able to absorb, i think in other countries, and have to stay with more focus being india, china to make sure that the it a, the protect the base, the living standard at home and, you know, before the go on to this kind of adventurous and, and, but i, but i think that might move there towards, at least in europe as well. again, you do see the backlash and countries are now starting to rethink you at least a population whether or not. and this has been a great idea, like why not just go back to where this began, the problems which was thoroughly 90 minus when we failed to establish our a mutually acceptable cold war host, cold war security system with russia. and the, you know, deal with the core of the issue which isn't good countries versus bad, but rather that we have a european security architecture which is put incompletes. there are some. so i think the, as soon as we give up on the idea that we can simply break the russian stem and

hopefully we can then start to move. some are more productive. and i think at the end of the day will probably be the european citizens are feeling a lot of pain, which will be trying to remove governments which, you know, go against. this is what i would think would be an obvious and sensible objective. well, professor didn't, this is all we have time for. thank you very much for being with us. my pleasure and thank you for watching. move to syria again on was a part with

a cranes, recent battlefield successes with a supportive nato may change the course of the conflict. russia special military operation long on february 24th has been slow and methodical. none the less, the crumbling has made it clear it will cheap and security goals. does that mean an escalation of the conflict with the land, asia, african who what is the best time on the i do about them. this is a little bit of a vehicle with what i see school because my port backwards. thank same here. nothing in my skin report to me it got daughter, destiny, a national krinski part of the data which is said to jeff. i use the menu to when it can be coma, lucinda and the com la,

somebody mp community that they've comma left really not all like it's supposed to start out like he's gonna affect it. or only out of that to the media with us. that's a disclaimer. but how much the routing does spoken when you're writing for william to full for soaking at them during the summer? because i've met with cornell. that was, it was the case and i was there then you big as well for you will that they sure i see it? yes. to north of chicago. there were still a when are you with it with is the aggressor tune chose is war.