once a half the west miscalculated put his calculations well to discuss it. i'm now joined by a senior fellow at the washington based institute for china. america studies is a very rare treat for me to speak to anyone who is based in the washington base. so i'm very grateful for your time and i'm looking forward to an honest and an elliptical rather than propaganda driven conversation. thank you for the invitation, mr. michael. i'm looking forward to the conclusion to now that you wrote not so long ago that i didn't put in like joseph style and back in the late 19 forties. miscalculated in applying, quote, unquote, brute force to its neighbors. and i'm sure it's a tantalizing and very gratifying comparison to force some of your readers. but what makes you believe that the russia as a stay in its current form, is led by the same expansionist, self aggrandizing ideological aspirations as the soviet union was after the 2nd

world war? absolutely, thank it. absolutely is not. russia is a defensive country and a defensive force and is just looking to secure its voters. it is absolutely not the country that the soviet union was. and the analogy which i brought in out there in the report that i was written is about how that can be miscalculations in terms of responses from the from the other side. even at that point of time. ok, joseph stalin did not wish to bring upon the sort of school walk containment that the americans brought on. and to be very frank, the americans over clear the hand at that point of time in the late 1940 s. but america was so powerful at that point of time that it couldn't get away with that

and it could create the institutions like it did, you know, the marshall plan and the nato, etc, etc. that was successful. the americans mistakenly believe that they can do that today. they are not in that position and power to do that today. but that having being said, the analogy that i wanted to bring out here was that mister putin's actions have provoked the response that most unexpected at most schools and, and to which to some extent have under cut to it's broader geopolitical positioning in the end. i think it's pretty clear that any incursion into another country is bound to have pretty serious ramifications. and i think the kremlin was fully aware of that from the get go. but there is also a lot of discussion here in russia about how the ukranian operation and the very likely admission of the former ukrainian regions into russia proper will

divert resources from russia's own domestic. these, for example, the drive to develop the far east. but there is also recognition that these moves serve. he, security and national identity goals repelling nater as well as shielding the people of eastern your brain from ethnically and motivated prosecution differently. dismiss those motives. no, i don't. i don't believe those. i think motives what i would have actually suggested if mr. couldn't had this plan special military operation. as we've seen, the initial operation went all the way to here. now let's step back a moment or 2. we had the mental cause means 2 in particular. and the irony is that the west was reading off the russia on the russian hill sheet. and telling you, chris, that you must do what is written in men's, which is the special status,

et cetera, et cetera in trying that in the constitution. and i would have suggested that mr. wooten hammer on those points that the miss cook or all were and all were, and we'll, or whether it's in the normandy format when it's the clusters proposal was being violated by men's. and that's the reason foreign operation, which would be limited to the non best area. i think the best response would have been calling tentatively different in that regard to no western sanctions response . it would not have been a happy response, but it would not have been also as far reaching. this is the modus operandi on what the west has done between iraq, et cetera, et cetera. it has for soften the ground for its own military operation and then going forward. and so that would be my suggestion in this regard that you also wrote that the, one of the most important 4 sides of the western architect or after the 2nd world

war was their decision to an international system. and then a cholesterol economic system that was based on openness and universal isn't a global economy that could belong to essentially every member of the global community. and i wonder if one of the main underlying factors not only in the ukrainian culture, but in this broader confrontation have been russia in the west and to some extent the west and the rest is in fact, some presumption, unexplored, inexplicable presumption on the part of the was that the global economy belongs to the west only, and that it's up to the west to decide who has access to it. they are mostly correct and i, and i stand by what i, what i mean, the west design, the plumbing out there. and it terms of the that, that we cannot make infrastructure planning is designed by the west and it's one by the west and it can shut it off when it wants to. and that's completely wrong

because the u. s. doesn't have that are and capability anymore. and i would add one more, one more feature. oh till this was just the same, you know, in the 1940. so, you know, i talked about the comparison, started, the west was confident when it was confident, it did not have to take this thought off radical action. the fact that it is taking radical action now is itself, it's a lack of confidence that back in germany that it enjoyed can be perpetuated. and so it is now trying to realize all the gains from underwriting that system on a short term basis, regardless of whether that system will then can be maintained to the u. s. without extracting as much out of that system when it was used, a poor underwrite that system. and that itself is a reflection of how the best itself feels that it's day in the international system is coming to an end thinking about extraction. mr. got that until recently the west

was indeed capable of extracting whatever it wants from the rest of the world and being an skate by. but with this late, the confrontation and the policies of sanctioned against russia, it seems that it can no longer shield its south, its own societies from the consequences of its own action. have we come to a point, perhaps even a turning point when the chickens have come home to ruth? but your current on that front, i think there, on both sides. i mean there's, there's mutual damage, especially in europe. i think particularly when i look at germany, i just don't understand the country. 50 years of diplomacy has really, truly gone. been flushed down the toilet in a half a year and they're going to have a very difficult winter. and yes, those blow back all around. but i would also submit that this has her rush. you're standing and rushes capabilities going forward for some period of time. and so this

has not been, it's been lose lose for both parties, frankly. and it's time to tell who has lost more in this context. well, i know that you have dedicated a lot of years of your career to political risk analysis. so it's not just about wishful thinking, or, you know, best hope it's about calculating no means versus goals and help us understand that this is one thing that many in russia i'm not able to understand what we hear a lot of politicians and the west say that ukraine needs to be supported until it defeats russia. what exactly these people mean predict, visiting russia and what kind of risks it involves. so great question i to be very honest, i have no understanding on the west, just thinking in terms of defeating russia. what i would submit to i'll kill is

well, ukraine feels that has been a violation of its territory. it deserves a chance to fight back and recoup as much of its territory as it can. this is an inherent right to self defense. it isn't in him, so it is doing that. it should be given an opportunity. but we'll see how far as it goes in capturing to defending territory is a lot easier than capturing territory. but ukrainians need to capture re capture territory. and i mean, there's been a lot of glee and jumping around that. they've got little bit of care, some problems and a little bit here in a little bit. but my argument would be like, let them have like one chance. and after the 2 still made those 2 areas where the stalemate becomes should become more permanent lines across which if the settlement can then be, you can then reinforce not mr. gov to your role so long ago that russia's quote unquote invasion of ukraine is as naked violation of international law as it

can be. and i personally agree video, although vladimir putin being illegal is provided or sought to provide some legal justification. you know, people of them by officially appealing to russia for support and protection, but regardless of how weak or how strong that legal justification is. i would argue that international law can only be international and law when it's universally applied systematically and universally applied when it's applied selectively. it undermines it's very purpose and it becomes a weapon of injustice rather than means to justice. i simply don't understand why would people still make this argument about international law? does international law even matter anymore? i understand your point. i want to, i would submit would be that yes, international law has been violated. really let me, let me be very frank about this thing. this was yes,

the most make it in naked violation of international law since and i will say moved into quit. but there been many violations of international law by the west. and in the intervening time and the amount of people who have died as a result of that violations of international law wanted magnitudes higher than what's happening in millions of people and cross at the arab states across africa. and frankly, even across europe. precisely, no, no, no doubt, no question about that, but i would, i would still submitted at this point of time is if there is going to be something as international and international on or not liberals rule based order, which is, which is an external, which is which is not, not a very honest characterization, but if that is going to be international owner, then international relations is not, must not be, not just be about power and interest. but it should also be about certain lose norms which can be respected by all parties. i think most of the most of the

decision makers, in most would agree with the i know that you often you also point out that balance is one of the key values in foreign affairs. and i think that the russians ultimately are very byzantine in their approach. they're all about dancing and even the soviet union as communism as it was in the art of balancing. but the question is whether the west is opening is open to balancing in any shape or form because at least from most it seems that washington, once everything for itself is not interested in any power sharing, am i wrong on that? well, you're not wrong that you're correct on that. i think george kennan point of the song 1996. that if you are going to take it all right, to russia, morris, you are going to the european settlement is going to fail. you know, when president put out those very reasonable demands to the american side in

december to president biden, it was about let's on, on men's men stu, let's ensure that we have legal guarantees. let's ensure that the natal doesn't get on to the russian borders. let's not have offensive every systems in adjacent states. i think those are all reasonable and a basis for conversation and left to me, i would have said at the end of the 2nd, then of the cold war. yes, look, the sacred country should have been allowed into nato, but nato should have been stopped. nato expansion should have been stopped. that moment, not the more takes, not even romania and bulgaria. and from that point on, the way i see should have been made as the primary framework within which european security was regulated for the, for the west, essentially the cold war didn't. and it was, they told russia or the cold war ended for you. and you know, need to do all these things, but for us we will continue with us will mentality. and that's and we've come to

the logic, logical situation today in seeing what's happening and you can unfortunately, and the germans could have done better. me are up, it's like, well, we cannot talk loudly because of i see softly also they were the ones against giving nato membership. actually, can you create a membership actually? well, they did nothing about it. i'm very ukrainian on asking for more from new to well, mr. group the last to discuss the issue of german or product german rationality after a short break, which we need to take right now. but we'll be back in just a few moments. ah, who is the aggression today? i'm authorizing the additional strong sanctions. today. russia is the country with

the most sanctions imposed against it. a number that's constantly growing. a list of course, if you click on the billing you're seeing the most in mind the we're, we're, we're banding all imports of russian oil and gas new g. i g with regard to joe biden, imposing the sanctions on russia, has destroyed the american economy. so there's your boomerang ah, ah, well, oh, oh, oh, oh,

i ah with ah well come back to was a party with a senior fellow at the washington based institute for china, america studies. it's a good thing before the break. re touched upon the issue of german rationality and it's true that the russian, germany cannot make relationship based primarily on gas, but not only so hm managed to ensure that the cold

war stayed cold. so it's not cold anymore. and we have a major kinetic conflict in the middle of europe. and just now the dancer you heard the news about the explosions of then nor stream one gas pipeline, which for sure will leave germany in the number of other countries in a, in a very hard situation. energy wise, this, this winter. now, as a russian, i don't care about how germans warm up their homes, but what i'm really concerned about is the state warfare, turning to industrial turn tactics. what do you think about it? how worrying is that? i think it is maureen and i would say what's more worrying is the fact that the german russian relations have splintered and spent so badly of their perhaps been for quite some time. it'll take a lot of effort to repair that relationship. and it's in some ways to the us china relationship on the us pushing for deep coupling and the damage that that can do

not just the bilateral relationship, but to the broader global economy. i taught russia, russia, german relations was the ballast for economic security in europe, and that ballast has gone. and it's now uncertain as to what sort of profile, what sort of a country germany itself will be this 100 single joan. you would want to speak up, talk out and do things. and of course it's going to be hard to economically, but i think it has really hurt it's long term foreign policy by seeking a policy of bad relations with russia. i think it could have done a lot more to preserve that relationship. but to preserve that relationship, we're not required to be aggressive much earlier and say this is auto nonsense to have folks like the ukrainians internet or we just don't oppose their membership action plan. we of course, lower the even the request for them to join me to because this is nothing but

a public issue, but the germans didn't do that and now did themselves. as i said, going to see the ramifications of 50 years of wise diplomacy. just go down with you . now, i think there is a feeling here in russia that germans and to a larger extend the west has taken both russia and china for granted as a sort of the underpinning the base for that industrial might. it's very easy to ignore the, the basement of a house when you only look at the roof where there was, but many would argue that access to relatively affordable russian energy sources. somebody would say cheap energy sources was the very basis for german economy. do you think, in terms of economic analysis, do you think the europeans understand how much they actually depended, how much they are? well being dependent on russia? to a point, i'm assuming that they didn't know about how much they depended mother called that

there are certain values and rules or norms that needed to be defended regardless. and so they chose to do that. and unfortunately, everybody's going to live out the consequences of that. and so i would say that it's not a knee jerk reaction from the europeans, but i would have hope that they might have been much more wiser in which live, in which they are laid their counter sanctions. because these are effectively, i mean, the equivalent of nuclear sanctions on russia and they cannot expect then that normal business intercourse is police and in the, in terms of energy supply would, would, would operate. with that, i would understand that some of the rushes actions may seem extremely distasteful to the europeans or somebody else, but they are beans also have to do with the americans. and some of the american policies that we, europe are hard to describe as friendly and even if we look at this latest attack on the north stream pipeline,

which has not been attributed to fernley to anyone yet. but we've seen a former polish minister of foreign minister, right x, of course, the thinking america going up the russian pipeline, bringing gas to, to germany. i mean, i understand that they would be extremely angry with russia and they would feel the need to stand up. you know, for certain values, but what about the american don't they need to stand up for the same values with that closest ally? yes, they do what i mean america. america alliances are alliances of convenience. when it wants it to be in the lines. and it can, americans operate like that? and yes, i mean, the defense guarantees will stay on the defense. part of it is from an unshakable but on all of the trucks, i mean, the americans are competing as much with the europeans as competing with other people. and you see that, you know, if we have. 6 in america, 1st president in 20242028. i mean policy might change and point to it's pretty

radically in this regard. and the r p, and then we'll be on the on trying to figure out their own destiny. and i know them running down their own rituals at this point of time. so they had their warning, donald trump, which gave him a very comfortable time to acquire a certain degree of autonomy. if not sovereignty, both economic and political. and they attempted to do it to do that. there was some lip service from president cron from then leadership of germany, but it don't seem to evaporate very quickly when joe biden came back to office. now let me ask you about the american thinking, because you are in washington after all, and you're more exposed to that mentality. i think many people here in russia believe that american decision makers have lost any existential fear. that the reason why they behave this extremely provoke if manner not only does that mean russia, but also with regards to their own population,

is simply because they have absolutely no accountability. do you agree with that? and does russia have any option of bringing that message home to the decision makers in washington without threatening the entire world? that is without using a nuclear option? no, i think it's gonna be difficult and it gets dangerous to go down the top often nuclear option, because the way it is received though, is that this is irresponsible talk. and the response of course, is a responsible but, you know, sending weapons that kill our service. men is also responsible, blowing up. major gas pipeline is not an example of the best behavior. so i mean that you have to respond to other acts of irresponsibility. provided that you do that in the, in the moral way that respects the rest of the world. what i would say is, you know, what the americans are trying to do is move the needle as far up, right to russia motor. what, right. and then what, what that is,

and then just then and just create insecurity in russia. and perhaps you hope for is you change in russia and hope that are a super liberal administration then follows on its way. and i would submit that russia has a great bar, must be able to hold the lines that it has new lines, and it has drawn in ukraine and create a steel made out there. because once we have still met and winter comes out, that the call will, i think that will be a crescendo sooner or later. and after winter with all the hardships that are going to happen, that we need to have some form of the settlement. there's one very well respected political analyst here and asked me to try and we used to be very well received in washington. and he said the other day that even though i didn't put in it, pretty straightforward them communicating russian red lines. and he said there is simply no space in washington playbook for russian or in fact,

any other nations read lines. in fact, one most good tries to draw any limits. people in washington believe that that obligation is to show very publicly to demonstrate it to moscow, to the point of humiliation that insensibility is simply don't count. am i right on that morrow unless you are correct on that, but i would say, i mean the house in some limits of what little u. s. has gone up to and stop the u. s. has not been o. u. s. is a de facto participant in the wall, and i think to this day, it provides a lot of very significant intelligence support which has not been reported much. but the u. s. has not itself got engaged physically in terms of, you know, kinetic way in terms of the war. so it does understand well where those limits are . and also, as we saw earlier, you to ensure that there would be no actual from in it or stated, no, the armaments would be sending to you print and then you can can do stuff and, but it should not target russian territory even though it has followed some on the

boundaries, so there are limits and that's a new thing mister. good. you say that there are limits and yet quite clearly, they are not really being observed. i wonder if those limits i'm posed for the sake of the united states itself. so that the president biden can tell the american people that okay, we're not participating. participating, even though everybody knows that the americans are in key, that they're advising the ukrainian military leadership that they're providing. all the satellite data that they've providing weapons is it, is it really authentic to argue that they are no longer a part of the direct party to this conflict? you can make a bona lancaster. yes, they are a part of those conflict in awful regine rebel. there also, they also are because they themselves are not directly in works. and as i said, their goal is to take it all up to nato, to russia's border. i'm and create insecurity in russia and

a one level ended for the us on the call. and then so just part of the prosecution all that cor, well, which they don't want to get hot from their perspective. but as you said, they're willing to fight with the last you grievances. well, if they're willing to take nato all the way up to your rushes borders, do you think it would be a wise strategy on the part of russia to take that war closer to the american homeland? i'm thinking about the industrial infrastructure. i'm thinking about all kinds of special forces operations. i'm thinking about even targeting american forces in 3rd countries and perhaps a credible threat of a nuclear strike on the american homeland. do you think something like that could bring those people in check with reality? yeah, but i think we would cross an important line if there is a direct exchange between the russians and the americans are russians and a needle state. i think that line needs to be preserved because if that line is

violated, i think we could be in for a conflagration. and so i think those some element of even self restraint from the russian and which needs to happen. and that's why i said, i mean the real concentration should have some day and one should have been about don bass and even today it should be about preserving frontlines in don bass and let them leave madison that. well, mr. group, i hope your advice is heated for the time being. we have to leave it there, but i'm very, very grateful for your participation. thank you very much. you're most welcome. thank you. have a pleasure speaking to you and thank you for watching and hope to see you again on . busy apart, ah, a ah,

ah, a nato faces a dilemma member countries are divided on how to proceed regarding ukraine. 9 countries walk, membership or ukraine, immediately 21 member countries disagree. then there is the issue of what exactly ukraine is today. is nato willing to liberate the regions that are joining russia with

oh, for the 2nd world war i think 2 millions of people. during the conflict, the balance of power was held by the leaders of 3 nations. the united kingdom, the united states, and the ussr. ah march the 31st.