but really i see me and then rummaged by the un human rights inquiry cheese back then it was based on 70000 inquiries, questionnaires being sent out in libya, when there was no functioning money should function postal office to create the idea that was widely disseminated in western grass that daffy had been using b, i files is a b i a drug as a weapon. i mean that was proved to be fake news. why is this reemerging again now? oh many thanks. keeping his company here on r t international. don't forget, you can keep up to date with the latest find, visiting our website all see don't comp ah a

with mm well, it welcome to all the part he's out of biography, the great american writer mark twain describes being at the end of the earth club and witnessing its chairman, a retired army officer, pronounced that we are of the anglo saxon race. and when the anglo saxon, once i think he just takes it a sentra later. this attitude is enshrined in many americans, strategic documents and speeches of its politicians, but can finally find it and in the ukraine, hopefully without the end of the earth. well discussed that i'm now joined from australia by benoit. com, mark, senior lecturer in the school of global urban and social studies at

r m i t university and melbourne professor is great to talk to you. thank you very much for your time. it's a pleasure being with you. now you are very far away from the focal point of this new confrontation between russia and the west. the confrontation in which references to nuclear strikes are becoming more and more frequent. i wonder if this distance give you any relief because if things in the go nuclear trailer will be among the last to feel the impact. it's a very nice question. well, it's a great question, but it's a nice question and away. because i don't know if you are familiar with the particular novel by novel shoots call on the beach. on the beach was actually films made into a film. the 1950s in it ever got the actually visited melbourne, where based out of the moments now it's never been quite concerned whether she said this the same as some american actress. but she had these wonderful lines of said,

if this is a place to film the end of the world, this is exactly where we need to be. and the irony of the story is that of course, the novel features strange as the last place, rare radioactive fallout comes in the aftermath of the nuclear holocaust. so straight is last place supposedly where these things will happen. and in fact, it's an interesting point to note that there are individuals from the united states multiple and a few other countries who are buying up places because they want to retreat in the event that might be a nuclear holocaust. well that's, that's an interesting observation. and the reason i ask you this question is because there's a lot of gallo humour here in moscow and in just the other day, one of my military friends tried to reassure me that in the case of a nuclear apocalypse mostly is a good place to be because of the instantaneous death, you don't have to suffer it, but i think we can take it as

a defense against the very green possibility that only a couple of years ago seems fully dystopian. how do you think we found ourselves in this place after spending? so much time and effort and money on nuclear disarmament only 30 years ago. well, i think the, the response to that question is based in a few things. one is i actually don't think the nuclear shot really went away. i think the, the threats of nuclear weapons is always been the threat of using them as always in simmering. be it's example pakistan in india that stages. but let's face that throughout the acquisition example of pakistan's nuclear capability. and when india acquired a potential bucket, obviously new require 11 needs to hinder one, what needs a muslim bomb and these sorts of things. but in the context of it, it's not really gone away. we shouldn't forget, for example, that even before you know the attack on the rock. so for example,

the just and this by the way, the 1st one, this is the in 919091. when of course, the coalition of the united states has, by president george bush's father, george w bush's father, his defense secretary then who, of course, ends up being vice president with bush junior as it was when he comes to power. and laser. dick cheney actually advocated the use potential use of nuclear weapons against the rocky forces. it's never really gone away. so i think now it's spin, articulated so a high extent because of the circumstances where call a desperation call a rhetoric, whatever it might be. the fact is that if one is in a situation where one needs to potentially, as you know, ways to save, you know,

jangle a few notes in what this is, what's happening. i understand that they said these references to nuclear charges. they can be very distressing for some people, but there was a, during the cold war and that fear is actually very instrumental in politics because it's keep the politicians thinking, ground the, you know, this is something that limits the emission and you make the point in your writing that there was a desire for quote, unquote victory over russia has become a succession and a fixation without the full understanding of what that victory may actually mean in practical terms. as far as you can deduct from the speeches of politicians or from strategic documents. if the west could have its ideal way, what would that mean with regards to russian? so guess about question. let me just put it like this. your listeners may be familiar with an old monster, a store and he's no longer with us. he died actually no longer. his name is eric pumps born and he was

a very fine student and pupil of that complex negotiation between east and west and also the coal wolf course famous very much in the tradition of that, danesh english appraisal about, you know, the cold war, but also the 20th century, and in fact, the 19th century he's, he's very famous putting together this list of works, trying to understand these very, to miles davis last 150 years or so. and, you know, for every congress probably make this very striking remark. but i'll forget that the end of the soviet union was essentially the end of a stable system, a control system from trysts and the west of course, and then of lot of our stock. so, and that was of cause writing at that point when the soviet union that ceased to exist, the object of this kind of thing and, and i, i'm sad to say that it's reached the point where the fixation on the obsession was

dealing with russia is such that they, and this is this kind of defeat obsessional, they want to defeat russia and, and it's, you know, as much as one can understand where people have stakes in this, it's a very dangerous prospect to trying to talk about all of the seats and things like that because that may raise the stakes and all the areas, but it also raises the prospect about what happens in russia. and i think that that is also very problematic on several levels. the fact of the matter is that, you know, people are coming to this in good faith and i know it's right up to come to good faith in terms of warm bathroom and whatnot. but there's so many people from various countries investing in attacking russian. now that it becomes difficult to miss, you know, the idea is not to see, you know, a consensus and understanding about peace between your grand russia. but the idea

is essentially we've got russia on the rum and this is what we're going to do. and this is where things become very dangerous. but professor you said a moment ago that it's hard to sort of approach war in a good faith. but i'm in the military science is a science. and i mean, at least in russia and i hope in the west, it's approach from a strategic and tactical point of view. you have to consider your goals, you have to consider your means. you have to consider possible consequences. i mean, and there is a long list of literature by american writers on how you actually operate or how you try to achieve the results. and i sometimes get a get a sense that the american, that decision makers and western decision makers don't even bother about, you know, 2nd order consequences, let alone something that may come. i don't know, 5 or 10 years down the line. do you share that impression? well, if you think you mentioned one of them is the times, well, i'm afraid to say is yes, it's true that it's been elevated,

this notion of military doctrine to science, but sadly, it's sort of to me, it more symbols are kind of a solid platform. you know, when it comes to military adoption and what i mean by that is that you just need to look at the writings of the trash and general stuff. so the old german stuff before so before germany was unified as defense unification. and there was a famous 1st martial, as famous general helmet, one motor actually said that. so you can of course, always plan you know, assigned typically as you want to say scientifically, you didn't quite use those words, but he said you can plan for every scenario. you want the best, you can plan for any plans for the site, you know, as rigorously as you want. 10 scenarios better on battle and in circumstances the lessons happens. the same thing in terms of strategy have to be speaking. the issue is to be wise enough to anticipate that there has to be leg group,

that's the court. and the, the issue here is yes. so, you know, i think it's, you know, if you look at every historical strategy in history, these are usually strategies of all dictates. so the documents, when you talk about referring documents they, they already data. they already have the musty smell of the library of the archives . they don't apply for the circumstances that i mean, i mean there's a consensus i knew. but then the very least that one has to consider. he can analyze an opponent and the rush at this point of time. is it at its strongest point, militarily? i economically i was the claim socially. then it has ever been, if the goal is to, let's say, we can rush out, or as we've been hearing lately, change the regime in russia. why would the west wait for so long and then allow russia to accumulate that strength? and the 2nd question to that does there was actually have the resources,

it's own capabilities, military military capabilities, strategic capabilities, political capabilities, to take on the country, the size of russia. well, 1st and foremost, i don't think, and this is the general consensus. so, you know, very sadly that when i say, i mean, broadly in the west and complex, the strategic community is that there is a perception that russia is actually not that strong. and then rush raise in typing week. i mean that's, that's the general. surely know, all the, you know, and put in is very good at signaling. he, he showed them what russia possesses in terms of hypersonic, hypersonic weapons and what have you. i mean, people who are in the no, no, it's the general public that may be led astray. but people who make decisions, they actually know about that. and my understanding of history generally, you know, there was this that in the context of the festival was example, it was sets rather well. those who started to write about adopt. that's

the example the british army were led by you know, you know, they were led by donkeys, the lions being that i don't case. so you know, in terms of strategic sense. i think you to understand the audience, understand this, the thing, it's important to realize that the general approach and thus this is the media cycle here. whether whether the thing privately and not being the, what they're doing here in terms of signal you mention. but let me witness during signaling that the singling is the opposite, it's the mirror opposite its rushes weekend. russia does not have enough, in terms of its weaponry. it does not have targeted weapon range running out of it . it's using now indiscriminately weapons that it has from service era. so that's, that's the context. it's happening. yes. so beyond that context and i think this is the thing and i think that gets back to the question that you mentioned, which is very important. what is the ultimate goal? the outside go is a weak and russia, and that raises all sorts of deep problems,

of course, one. but of course, i'm sure you would agree with me. one cannot, we can russia by pretending that it's weak. i mean, if you actually want to win over a powerful adversary, you need to be fully aware of the strengths and weaknesses. look, you mentioned something about a country that is, of course, very power. i mean, food for food mistake, the largest on the planet. as straddling the ration landmass, of course, from europe to the borders we, japan, i mean there's no question about this. not it's not that it can be taken that has to be taken seriously and that, but i think this is one of the reasons why it troubles me a lot. is that a lot of b, tactical and strategic approach to this is not realizing the fact that one rushes bumped to russia has genuine considerations in the context of the grand street. yes, whatever. one describes in the context of aggression,

the reality also remains that there were serious issues that were linked to the conflict. originally, these have been ignored. nato wants expansion, and they to wants to be globalized, and it's role. but just extraordinary and very dangerous to this. this is a fascinating point that we have to explore in more detail. so let's take a very short break right now, but we will be back in just a few moments station. ah . okay. only one main thing is important, not as an internationally speaking that is that nations that's allowed to do anything. all the mazda races, the reason us, hey jim, it is so dangerous. is it the law, the sovereignty of all the country?

or is business and business is good and that is the reality of what we're facing, which is fashion with a with ah

ah, welcome back to wells appointment benoit complex senior lecture in the school of global urban and social studies at r m. i t university in melbourne, professor, come tomorrow before the break. we touched upon the prevailing attitudes. i'm a western elite, and it is my perception that when it comes to russia, they roughly fall within the 2 camps. both one, thrushes, capitulation, but one camp is mindful all i am concerned about limiting the costs of achieving that goal to themselves while the other camp are represented by, for example, your secretary said anthony blink. and believe that this is something that has to be accomplished at any cost. so the distinction between the dogs and the,

the hawks is not really about what they are aiming at, but rather about the cost of that policy. or am i right here or do you perhaps see a 3rd? campbell was somewhat saner and decision makers. many years ago in the context of your question. so just this is to give a background even throughout, throughout the ninety's when there was this kind of sort of the you fauria but sort of the sense that things have changed. that the code or as it was done, there was not a sense of worrying about things in the world that old they were very sharper madison observations made by various individuals throughout smith, some of them for example, like professor mir shineman who's made this point very clearly that, you know, russia has its strategic interest that need to be respected. we even have, of course, the person, former state department official,

george kennan. there is no longer with us. but he famously said he's be all some fuel, have you as might be to minute he was famously the, all of the telegram in the 1940s that led to the adoption of containment of the soviet union. and he said in the aftermath of the, of the cold war and with the mutterings of the advance of nature, this was falling. this is very dangerous. and this added to the fact that the bush administration business bush, senior administration, of course, house, many of the presided over the reification of germany and arrange all of the things and negotiations with gorbachev. the promises double made these fun, not binary things. many individuals were parts of promises and assurances given to the russian delegation than soviet delegation. constantly. if you accept these

propositions and it was extra name by the way to go, but trump didn't have to do what is it? the late of course, who did out of the good will and i think 11 of the factors that is not the way appreciative in the west is that russia actually support the de reification of, of germany. i mean, russia allow this to happen and it felt deceived afterwards. and now it feels that if it has to protect some of the last that were formerly the soviet lance or the ukrainian lives, it can do that. i mean, if you remember after the reification with crimea putting specifically address the germination, saying that we supported you back them, we count on the same historic justice from your side. but obviously it's not coming . you make that plan. this is exactly what i was getting out. the fact is that there were various gestures made on the stroke rate and that sounds good. well from

then they're going to trust me when, when it came to the issue, the fall of the berlin wall and not sending and tanks and so on. i mean, these kinds of things the and the issue of reading instigation was extraordinary. there was a lot of opposition, even in some european quarters, but the fact of the mattress it came from the kremlin that that particular point said that this could happen and so reassurances or undertakings were given. and then what happened subsequently, was that actually, you know, president bush seen actually just made the remarks specifically, oh god, there was a throwaway line. so the archives actually have that. they actually have these remarks made by individuals who gave those undertakings. and then in the scheme and that's the dangers who press you know, that old i agree being so confident in having a week in russia, the dissolution of the soviet union. that okay, we gave undertakings but the circumstances have changed now. so, you know,

you're absolutely right to acknowledge the historical role here and the fact that it's, you know, and, you know, back to what you was saying with these 2 comes about, well, you know, we accept elements of the russian issue. but also there are those who want gentle victory, but they have been those, you know, actually suggesting that this is absolute madness and very dangerous to keep assisting along the line. and it's worth noting that many of those who do say that have been subjected to call it's a black labeling labeling you name it does. it's very hard to get a debate about this in any career and context in the strategic communities, militarily and politically and west and circles. you mentioned nathan before, and i think we need to transition to that subject. i think there is a belief here in moscow that may to doesn't actually want ukraine in because i think sense right now they're already getting everything they one from your brain

without having any obligations without having they need to come to the defenses. they can just use it without any consequences. and i wonder if that makes this conflict even more dangerous because of all the a symmetry between what is sad and what is being done. because russia, after all, you know, it's subscribed to a really point of view. and it doesn't look at the speeches of paula western leadership, but looks at what is being done on the ground. and if your crane is being militarized, if western infrastructure moved there without any formal association with nader, it's still a threat for russia said, don't you think that this way of sort of a proxy taking over in your crane is even more dangerous than that. you know, you're being part of nato, the treatment of in line of what you are saying. the treatment of you train is not . it reminds me of the way that the proxies, other allies in the context,

for example, is united states of pakistan. the way the pakistan has been treated in the u. s. constellation of power stages. there was a pakistani general that explains also why the relationship is so tense between those 2 powers. the pakistani general in question said that we essentially americans conduct the dispose of us when they want to reviews it. so they use south prop season to use this notion that ukraine will be slaughtered in and of course festival, any sort of slotting in there's not going to be a sloughing and it's going to say yes, not even after, not even during this conflict. we've seen individuals from nato and the general and a european and us strategic community say, well, come on, thank you very much for welcome you and your i to say that this is becoming a kind of this, this proxy war web. so testing ground, it's a means where it's been used to try to get to russia, but it doesn't necessarily mean that they're going to go full and full. ukrainian,

you know, for the use of ukraine as part of the nature of the, i actually don't necessarily see that at all. and i think, you know, reminds me of the, the terrible tragedies that happened when allies or individuals. but then at a certain moment, abandoned, and it's not, you know, do not look away from the fact that when it comes to certain, as you say, the real how reality is realism and so on. it may well be that ukraine times something the middle again, that censor. now, you said the also a moment ago that this warring spirit is fueled, implied by nato's strive to become global and on the psychological level. i think we can hold understand it nipple and fantasy, but i wonder if if that is even possible. i mean, when we look at the america's own capabilities, right now, its ability to shower money on to other countries is it's really realistic,

given that many of america's own. alice look for example, and saudi arabia. i'm going that all the way does need to have the power of the resources to become global at this point of time, regardless of russia, not as it know, it doesn't need books. it's like, you know, and i can't say i missed the man, but i have to say that always find very comical. but of course, the recently deposit boris johnson, a u. k. prime minister, who at this idea of global britain, well no, is not local anymore. and i did say it was at one point, but certainly not, this is the kind of ambition for nature, sort of, you know, having hubs here and then having some kind of ambition beyond its limits, borders. but because ultimately, let's face of what was its kind to do its ultimately the north atlantic treaty organization. but what has happened is that they've been trying to use the ukraine, russia conflict to expand its relevance. and you've got even in

a bizarrely individuals such as the current strain in prime and stance beneath it of course wants to be added to the list. some are, feels important in wanting to add as bit to the ukraine, russia conflict. and so what do you do you start jumping up on these particular things and not quite understanding the implications. it's the same thing with the, the all cas agreement, the security arrangement that straight to the united states and the u. k. signed declared in september. okay. we know who's running it, we know that the u. s. essentially is running the of it is essentially just, you know, the butler's trying to make sure that the drinks are served. well, let me actually let us finish this fun because we began with charlie weekend and with this charlie as well. this countries in a very interesting position because it is far away from all the war theaters. it is

safe, it wouldn't be the safest place to be in, in, in the event of a nuclear apocalypse. and yet on the other hand, it seems to be very eager to do. the u. s. has been bidding, not only with ours, but also with other formats. even though it comes at a cost of very profitable, very lucrative corporation of china and perhaps some others as well. what is the rational they are the practical rational law would the decision makers but for, for the people of the continent? not much reflection has been given about this issue. a stranger has had a strange habit over the years of doing the fighting of other countries. it's one of these strange things. you know, the, the british have this net police lead unit the girl because, and i like to always upset that before i written about it and sent that straight to attend to be the good sense of the united states. so their sense and the stress and government claims or tries to get some kind of added advantage from the united

states by providing forces. but it's never really clear also and should be added the fact that with this new agreement, we don't know when i say we, i mean, strangely, we don't know in terms of how, what the use of the nuclear submarines what is deployment issue and so on. it's coming to huge cost to the chinese stretching relationship and a more independent thinking approach would, would change this. it's also worth noting, just on that point as a straight, it's encouraged by us analysis essentially tends to sort of see the ukraine, russia conflict by looking at the way china behave since quite intriguing. so to me it's, it's quite designed some points, but then trying to see the way russia behaves in ukraine to the way china might behave towards ty one. and again, that's dangerous because that's a potential conflict. wedding to happen when a country that has no interest in dealing with that will probably get involved because of fairly dobbs politicians. well,

maybe that will lead to migration of those multi millionaires somewhere closer to siberia. we would not mind that. on this new professor work, we have to live in there, but i me, i appreciate your expertise today. thank you very much for your time. don't the pleasure being with you. i really enjoyed it. thank you. i think of watching this here again, walter part ah ah ah .