i don't know who you're going to know for the don't know as much of a subpoena for losses come up with . mm. welcome to was a part of the conflict in ukraine has manifested a new security paradox in europe. many in the west contend until russia is fully democratic, whatever that means. ukraine will need western security guarantees and its active military support. for its part. most people believe that until global governance is

truly multi polar, whatever that means, any extension of 4 in the military infrastructure towards russian borders will be considered. and that is essential security threat. can this to contentions be reconciled without another continental war in europe? well, to discuss it now joined by thomas gram anger, director of the geneva center for security policy and former secretary general of the organization for security and cooperation in europe. is great to see you a great you talk to you and i have to express a double of gratitude for being here in moscow because to be honest with you, we don't see many western visitors here these days. did you have any 2nd thoughts about coming here? because of, you know, reputational risks to yourself personally, and the organization that you're heading. them are advisors, are, in a lot me about traveling to moscow at this time. but you know, i,

i always leave in dialogue and dialogue, i think is particularly important in times of crisis. and so not coming to moscow was basically a for the, not an issue. after i got the mutation to these prestigious remark off readings. and i don't regret to have called them i think i had excellent discussions in the setting off the conference. but also of course the taking advantage to talk to quite the number of important for defendant this both within and without outside of the state structures. now you've been talking about the fact that this conflicts may have not only regional but also global implications. and i think we're increasingly seeing at least one as far as sanctions are concerned. but i wonder as a, as a former had of the oil. what do you make of the fact that this potentially very

dangerous situation is being dealt with by the policy of boycott and ostracizing? russia, which i think is preferred course of action for many european countries as well as for the united states. so they look on the one hand, i have understanding for a very determined attitude by best in countries regarding this very severe breach of a large law that the russian military invasion in ukraine represents about the same time. i think it is that they clean these times. it's important to remain on speaking terms to to discuss if it's at least to prevent further escalation. but also if you want to

come out of the current situation, the need a platform for dialogue. so, you know, by the, i mean favor off, you know, very air term language. at the same time, i don't believe that isolating, excluding an important interlocutor. it serves the purpose of managing conflict and also taking us closer to resolving a conflict. you mentioned the need for platforms, for dialogue and the oil caea, the organization for security and cooperation in europe, which you used to have a few years back was once considered such a such a platform. and i interviewed you a couple of years back when you just assumed that leadership position. and at that time there were already doubts whether the osi was relevant. do you think it's still relevant,

given that not only the fail to prevent an active kinetic conflict between russia and ukraine and some would argue russia and the west. but it also now being used to as, as a platform for political posturing and pushing out one of the sides. i'm speaking about russian. do you think the oil see currently stands for either security or corporation? i would absolutely estimate that. currently, if you always see a crisis and clearly i think there is no doubt about it, but you ought to say, you know, that you always see a very valid vert beats where it's feed missions into basketball. comes in central asia or in parts of europe. the story institutions are, it's the, the programmatic work off it here. it, it, but of course this is politically not but they play relevant. i think while

participating, say self. d, always see what i hope you always see being able to play a role in preventing or at least now in managing a conflict between russia and ukraine, or, or russia and the best, by the way, how do you see it? and given that you are now in, i guess a lesson diplomatic position you perhaps more freedom may have you perhaps, can afford yourself more freedom of speech. do you see that as a conflict between russia and ukraine or something large? and i think it's an overlapping conflict then in this is by the way, this was, i think, something back to the saw for years these 2 lines of conflict, the more narrow between a russia and ukraine, and the wider between russia and the best. but i would immediately act that

both conflicts could have been managed in an online fe. and i regret you know, that the missed many opportunities to do so and, and including asti always see, you know, and that, you know, we see the hot platforms today. they both lines of conflict and the up important stakeholders are important. but this is eddie. say south d r c. joe was not to use these tools all the and partly whom do you mean by those important stakeholders? they looked at, let's say, take example off arms control these been beaten, they're saying, well, yes, i am. is valerie, say sham and lessons? i stross them on key stakeholders of your be in security and unraveling off at

a very complex net of arms control agreements that you know have been built off the air since the end of the cold war and a surf or fightin provide to those to be a peace and stability. so we beat this to that unraveling office architecture graham. and if i'm interested here just for a 2nd because you're trying to be very neutral and diplomatic and i understand why . but i was doing the piece and the d conflicting efforts service when we are trying to sort of smooth the lines. so diplomatically here, because it's not just the, the, the random unraveling, isn't it? it's the west taking a decision, making a decision that they want to pursue certain policies that when strongly against russian interests and those russian interest and concerns were very clearly communicated for many, many number of years. are we doing reality ever didn't choose the service when we

just describe it as single unraveling it? i would say the agreement here with that it was for a beat. some of these are you paler saw off this or arms control like architecture? it was indeed the united states that pulls out of it. i bought what i was a, a c, v, a try to provide an alternative platforms, for instance, a structured dialogue to create a by a decision off. i mean a, c, l, a counselor has been humbled end of 2016. and i think for by that was no hope that this platform would serve to this cost, made it very risk, adoption confidence and security security measures. and perhaps also great. again,

a common understanding on how to resume series arms control conditions and negotiations. but unfortunately, they offer was not taken up and it's a vest. nato did not seem to be publicly interested, but frankly, also from the russian federation. i did not really a sense of urgency, you know, to kind of get back and try to reinvigorate this arms control architecture. so that was, i think, my lack of interest to all the relevant stakeholders. and this was frustrating and look at the same is true for the other example that i wanted to address. and that is it means agreements. you know,

that i tried to deal with the conflict in the, in the don't boss. and i think of course, being far from perfect, but they would have re present the blueprint to resolve at least the conflict ended on boss and partly, bob vicky exception off a relatively short period of time. i think that was never at the same time, at a genuine political commitment on either side to take a dease agreements are seriously or on the one side. there was a reluctance to implement 2 tacos, the political formations on the other. there was, are a reluctance to really if you seriously beat the security provisions. and basically there was an ongoing blame game and, and, and, and, and, and, and the fight want to come 1st only think of revisions. i'll security probation

well and that's why it was going on as dumbass was being continuously shelf from the ukranian side and the majority of the dental. we know that like it's documented and import thanks to the always see emissions that the majority of casualties of that war. a starting from 2014 was on the eastern ukrainian side on the separate to side. but putting that aside, i want to ask you about a sort of the, whether the negotiating process holds any prospect whatsoever it at this point, because russia took a very dramatic step for itself. i think many russians are shocked by the actions of their russian government aid, and it only came at the time, i think, when the decision makers would that come to a point or to conclusion when they would not believe in the negotiating process. and i think there is a strong sense in moscow that piece process the conflicting efforts have been methodically abused. that all the negotiations i used simply as a measure of getting some respite from military action and never are never

committed to with, you know, a will to implement that. is there any and legitimacy to, to that kind of opinion, i would agree that did all the sites are in that, and i use the bureau eventually and not the plum optically or decides ver, bit never a certain time period, but never, never overlapping. ben, i felt that was a genuine commitment to move forward with implementing or means agreements. for instance, a few months after president landscape to power. i really had the feeling that, that, that, that was a genuine commitment. but then you know, the window of opportunity cost and, and when i last of my mandate, the 2nd to child, i kind of felt that very meats or something,

barry protracted and i didn't see ebay out, which in my view doesn't justify a war. bob, i have sympathy bits the prostration, but again, i would put the blame on both sides for this lock off genuine be to implement the means to pre k. well mr. grandmother, we have to take a very short break right now, but we will be back in just a few moments station with. mm hm. so what we've got to do is identify the threads that we have. it's crazy, even foundation, let it be an arms race is often very dramatic development only personally and getting to resist. i don't see how that strategy will be successful,

very difficult time time to sit down and talk with me. welcome back to wells fargo. mr. thomas bremond or director of the geneva center for security policy on former secretary general of the organization for security and cooperation in europe. at mister graham anger, in 2025, the house in k ag, the, the founding document for the oil, c will mark it's 50th anniversary and it has some beautiful principles there that actually helped us to put an end to the cold war. and i think one that

i asked was signed, there was a clear recognition that differences exists and that they have to be dealt with. and yet when we look at your of right now, there seems to be so much stress on unity that there's barely any room for even the negotiation. not only between russia and europe, or russia and the west, but even within the west. why do you think 50 years after the creation of the oil see, which is supposedly dedicated to freedom of speech, to you know, dialogue as contentious as it may be? why do you think there is such a fervor such a demand on uniform agreement within the western camp? i think me a half again or come back to were and euro off very tough jail political, a competition. and unfortunately, you know, the frame principles of fact, you refer to that for a great in a,

in the framework of the helsinki final accord in 1975. and then re committed by states again in 90909099 into in a, 2000. and 10, nina now somehow, unfortunately, it by nobody questions. these principles, i think the have as the slate did not been a serious attempt to deal with the delay must be in these principles. and these delay must stay in by f, a v by delay mustang needs to be addressed in they stana not addressed it. they lead to quality intentions and, and conflict. and let me illustrate that point. you know, there is a,

regarding all those states that the, our geography jell graphically between the russian federation and natal and there isa. and you alluded to it in your introductory comments, and there is an issue, a star status, right? because you half the a less be specifically in their security state is because russia never precluded down from developing their democracy, the markets, whatever they won, the issue was always as the name of that organization stresses on security, correct? correct. so there isa, there are 2 principles, are backed by each other, if down all the dress diplomatically. there is the principal off in the visibility of security. that is, you asked to say, chilton, increase your security at the expense of an offer. and there is another principle and allows us a state to freely choose your security arrangements. now if you apply these 2

principles to states like georgia, ukraine, armenia as a by john bella, russo, moldova, you half a dilemma. and you can as a drive to solve this dilemma a by force and up that's probably not advisable. oh, i think dar diplomatic, i mean to deal with this issue and the faculty properly then lead to an o. m, an agreement on the state of these countries that is coastal non alignment neutrality. something like that, combined with security guarantees, combine are obsolete arms control agreements. you know that both prevent her, for instance, nato in establishing natal infrastructure at their ukrainian or russian border. you think that's still a reality specifically on the principle of individual ability security because i

heard you say in the meanwhile, i think it's some panel that you would lag. the countries that the member stays by 2025, not only would commit to the old principles, but to try to redefine them in the, in a new way that would be workable for all. do you think that's still a possibility? i think not by 2025, a box, you know, is she think conflict prevention long term india or atlantic in your asian area? i don't see any other way than to deal with the de la must be. be these brains because i don't think i'm global conflicts, could be one way of dealing with it. absolutely, and i think if you wouldn't that i would need either. and i think at some point beneath to come back to the negotiation table and then building on dr. drive to we construct their european security order in that that allows us to, we commit to these principles box by open to addressing

a d c landmarks. and i think that these are vision. it's not gonna happen tomorrow. thought it might happen. they stories, police to go bill in 58 years. well it for that to have happened. besides, also need to come to sit in calculus. that piece is more beneficial for their goals than war. and i think on the russian side, it's pretty, it's easier to define the way the russians can draw their line because they, they, we've been very open about it. but what about the west? when do you think the western powers will calculate that? that piece is better for that long term security and goals than war or that and proxy conflict. look, i don't have a crystal ball or it, but i would agree with you with that that that was a hartman calls,

the mutually hurting stalemate, which makes a conflict ride for a solution is not reached yet. and i think of both sides. they seem to be belief that the by military means they can reach a much more advantageous negotiation position. i wouldn't exclude that at some point, you know, they're at ration exhaustion, se seen and, and you know, there is a resumption of negotiations i bought for the time being that my year that the most realistic scenario that i see for months is to companies. unfortunately, continuation of a high density conflict. now, in previous conflicts in which european powers took part, i mean in various conflicts of the century. but the cost to the european population was either minimal or none. this time around is different than the economic and energy corporation that has long as the killer also both stability and concept

convention. and here has been separate. how big of a challenge is it for european countries as far as you're concerned? and do you think that will lead to any sort of reassessment in values or political commitments in europe? i would absolutely agree that the cost half enormous in terms in economic terms, in political terms. you know, if you will see us currently again moving in some sort of a cold war, i think in the short term and it's a shortage is et cetera. i think that being at that with people, people suffer about my perception. you know, off of the political situation. european countries is clearly, you know, that this is soley barrett,

the ukraine, a sausage that you know, did these sufferings are taken into account and, and they always need or, you know, the refugee flows and or energy shortages that they change or at least in the medium term that the perception of the european audience. i remember that the, the always, the golden here is there was a lot of tension between political rights and economic rights and more developed, more prosperous countries were sort of in the habit of preaching down to a less prosperous authoritarian neighbors. and sort of prioritizing political rights over i cannot make necessity given that you're up for

the 1st time may this century has to deal with has to actually struggle with fulfillment of economic rights for its own citizens. do you think it may change in the discourse, at least in general, and the realization how, how important is a economy versus politics? i hope it elite us again to recognize how important a comprehensive approach to securities and basically the political rationale off the cac and you always see was always combining political, military issues, military assets, hard security issue, want economic and environmental affairs. the 2nd dimension and the human dimension, meaning respect for human rights, rule of law and democratic institutions. and i agree with your, with the, has been a history of the always see is

a history of playing one dimension against the other there. but again, at the same time, the organization has always been a browser for its comprehensive approach to security and the security channel i have always reminded participating states at the end, you know, the security. it consists of these different dimensions. and we should also be respectful of different dimension and also respect all the states, you know, that may perceive economic and environmental a fast will be a more, more relevant like the central asian style. basically, you're saying that we have to be respectful of diversity, which don't you think it has become a run? the controversial proposition is these that diversity of views, political, economic, humanitarian views should be respected. i agree with you, but unfortunately this is a feature asti, extremely polarized,

a political environment that we are currently in the it's, it's a feature of a cold war. for those of us, that half least through cultural walker don't call called warrant, correct me if i'm wrong because i was born in the final years of the cold war. but i remember that at that time, difference was actually respected because it was dangerous. there was a realization that was fear, that if you don't respect their, your partner enough, you know, they will, can blow up into pieces. do you think that here that respect for, for the enemy is there? i think there is, they lay, at least among the major powers, said there is still a certain respect in all for for instance, of the concept of mutually assured destruction. i think that hasn't been seriously on the mind or, and fortunately, and bob walked was the typical feature off the cold war was

basically a image is off the n b m. i ology. if i'm right, you're wrong by definition. and i think i see that happen again and on both sides. you know, i'm, i'm, i wonder if between the rules and i'm struck by that. and so both sides in best locked in at this dots are then being sold market that asked deep sold to well at that time, back in the seventy's, the 2 sides were wise enough to come up with a new forum when you east west forum to try to discuss those differences, let's keep our fingers crossed, that that is still possible in this day and age. in any case, i really appreciate your bravery and your time during this interview. thank you. thank you so much for your interest. and thank you for watching hope to hear again on wells in part. ah

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ah ah ah, so what we've got to do is identify the threats that we have. it's crazy even foundation, let it be an arms race is on offense. very dramatic development only personally and getting to resist. i don't see how that strategy will be successful, very critical time time to sit down and talk with .