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mm mm mm, welcome to, well, depart being part of your, of, if not geographically done culturally, has been a century long aspiration for the countries and its periphery, especially russia and turkey. they emulated european customs and tastes tried to borrow its best practices, but always felt sure golf over snubbed, why they're enlightened european neighbors. does these idealization of europe have anything to do with the war in the ukraine? well to discuss that i'm now joined by basil is 1st class professor of international politics and economics at the university of east london or has if was because it's great to talk to you. thank you very much for your time. thank you so much. nice to meet you. thank you. i'm not many people remember now, but the latter stage of the crisis in your brain began in 2013 with

this whole argument around the cranium association with the e. u seemingly and economic issue. at that time, it was mostly about ukraine associating itself with europe rather than the collective west. more generally, do you think there was ever or if there is still a distinction between the european and western? i don't know if a, that's a philosophical question, i think is more of a kind of a practical question or the west begins with europe in the collective imaginary, i mean, in history or in the western civilization. i mean, in europe, in, in, in an american american curriculum, you see on the western civilization a course called western civilization. that begins with n sion, greek philosophy,

ensign, gree collectors, moving to rome, and then center. when you look within lightman philosophy and the french revolution, and then you know, the serious of the light men. and then on the dynamism switching to the united states and then the dawn of the british empire, correct from, from then we have a system of european empire sprint spreading all over the world. a system that collapses in the 1st world war. we have a kind of an interim period, vain to war pier than then i'm after the 2nd world war, the united states. i assumes high galani over europe now days a big debate here, which i don't know if i, if, if it's, it's well known or known in eastern europe, russia, china, and elsewhere, which i examined with my team here long ago in fox. how the u. s. established high

game when you over europe, it wasn't easy. we had in the forty's for exam barely for this during the war, while the russians were fighting the germans to kick, you know the germans out of ukraine effectively. it was a big debate within the american executive. there were 3 main tendencies, see main views. one was represented by the, by franklin franklin delano roosevelt was a present for the united states. and his theme, who saw that we can rule in the new world order via the united nations in the, your, in security council. so if something goes wrong, can the war would, can have robust a robust the peacekeeping operations. and you know what, we are the majority within your insecurity cause. so we can isolate russia and to fit it. that was one view. that was one view. then we have kina,

which you know, it happens the they have the majority of, of, of historians and, and analysts believe that there was keenan's view that prevailed out of containment . and the famous long telegraph road from moscow wire to washington d. c. which keenan keenan was an officer balancer keen on fog because he knew russian, you russia very well, he thought the soviet system is weak internally. and with a little bit of post for boss, we can make it collapse also what will make the system collapses by, by, by using germany and japan from each end of your asia harassing the soviet system. plus it's in pedo contradicts us and that system will collaborate and one day, right? but i was too fast of if, if i remember my history lessons correctly even, you know, in so many times there were one could argue legitimate ideological differences between russia and the west. and it was no longer the case after the collapse of

the soviet union. i think russia really wanted to get into western graces. and even during this, only a time sensitive before that, i think the russians have long had a sack and very positive. i view all of your, of not so much of there was the definition of europe and we have long associated in the european continent, france, germany with progressive knowledge, you know, ours, ours communicated with the french from affairs and i, we always, you, europe as a how morning society d, and i think the same goes for turkey. by the way, do you think your has ever be in what the non european idealized of europe have? i imagine it to be in europe and russia, philosophy and the european light, and have very many, very many things in commerce. actually, russia is part of europe or intellectually, politically, politically,

where there was even in the anchor war period. when styling was accused of isolating. russia with his 5 year plans and so on. and that is a very good book actually never recently would called a red globalization. styling never wanted to exclude to exclude russia from west and paid for from western economist. but because of the, of the internal problems, economic problems of the west, with the collapse of, of, of the credit system in 19 dig 1929 crash and so on. the west itself became isolationist and protectionist. their eyes are fast as managing so therefore russia was excluded by definition there from the european her into war settlements, whatever. and then we had the 2nd world war. and so what i'm trying to explain is to point, and we'll come to your question is about 19 now and so 20132014 ukraine. and the

maiden thing. the strategy pursued by the united states, how united states embedded itself in europe after the 2nd world war was not because via keenan's theory of offshore balancing. he was not through the united nations security concept by was through a to 7 as sort of the nature some plan which was that united states strokes must remain in europe. was keenan did not want us troops in europe. i thought because he thought this, well, this will make carbon in the gold desert and we'll start rearming and we're going to have a new war and things like that at ages and said, no, we need to build situation. so strength in europe against not just against russia, but mainly to keep europe apart from russia. because it h,

as soon saw that there is a potential of cooperation because they're in the same continent after all, economic corporation, political corporation, between germany, france, and russia. and once this continent unites economically, politically, that's the end of the u. s. supremacy in the new world order built after the 2nd will work through the united states have, has had its troops and military bases in europe to can russia europe far away from each other. although there has been some beneficial corporation energy trade out with germany. there was some corporation and trade with friends and many other european nations. but even when the american troops present here in europe, there were certain limits to how far in the united states with push. and one could argue that it all changed in ukraine because for some reason, when it came to ukraine, somewhere around 20132014. and definitely

a around the early 2020, the united states decided that, you know, those red lines. no longer apply and we need to push as much as we can with militarized ukraine, with sending ad trained instructors there. and with making everything possible that its population becomes strongly. and i would even say virulently, anti russian. what do you think changed in the, in minds of american colace makers? why did they need to push that farm? like we need to see the structural tendencies all for the western ers economic system here. and good. why? what globalization means for the united states globalization for the united states means the american business classes must have a free ride to global expansion ad. so the push to nato expansion, u. s. a u s. increasing intervention is bargaining. so on that course is not,

this is not dissociated from the american business classes pushed to global domination. let me put that this way. and at the same time the united states protects its own business classes at hope. you see, look at what they could use the inflation reduction act, but with no concern for european economy or social manila, top notch. that protection is thing. and if you like the, there were similar protectionist bills past in the, to war period, which started the 2nd world war. in my books i, i, i stress the fact that it was the united states started protectionist measures 1st in vain. the war period, not the, not the nazi germany. and so, you see, this is the structural tendency of economic system which are called capitalism. you may disagree with that, but that, that is so therefore we need to, to see the structural trends of the western economic system,

especially after the recession. the massive crisis of 2007, 2009, the global financial crisis. the system didn't collapse the only way for the system, the why the system didn't collect because they had, they had the support of the banking sector, of the central bank to put the lawful of the fun into the system, into the banking system. and also they did not stop the global expansion, trying also incorporate that the war in ukraine is not dissociated with china. china is very much, very much part of the war and ukraine disrupts chinese business disrupt the project, the belgian road initiative, for example. you know, chinese capital penetration in eastern europe has been enormous intake is low. you know that we are killing many birds with just ones. so i, before we go to break, can i ask you all? one more question, because your analysis tends to be very practical, very rational and you know, russian political science is by and large subscribe to the real is the school of

thinking. i'm seeing the war in your craft through the lances of power guns. but i me, because i'm a woman that i see a lot of irrational factors, psychological factors there. and just as russia for centuries wanted to be here of that perhaps doesn't even exist. i think in the same way, ukraine's to wants to be something that it's not at the moment. and i would even argue that the west needs a psychological boost from somebody admiring it in such a way because its own image is rather fading. what do you think about that? what's the scope of the irrational factors in this whole quagmire? there's always, i don't disagree with you, you're absolutely right to point this out. ideation of fact this in bolton does, and you called a rational the russian is always part of the rational in every movement, never strategic wove. you know, nothing can come. nothing can come in reality as it was planned. there's

always a gap between what we planned and what comes to the realization in the n v. i d, a slower fuck. those are very important, especially the building of ukraine national identity here. i think that kremlin miscalculated, miscalculate in what sense? now, what's going on in the ukraine is a, is a building up often national identity. great for 1st time. i have a, i've always had the impression, and i wasn't wrong with that ukraine years. and russians are more or less mingled. they have mixed identities. they're not very, you know, in ukraine. pope are historically as well as politically in everyday life. they said a lot of things, michelle, most everything is like if you, if you say people between like, you know, the greeks i'm recorded and the people living in western park. thank you. i mean,

we're sad, everything, all the other, both and people will share almost everything. we don't have anything, you know. but now, with a invasion that it started, the process of, you know, amalgamating a strong national, i'm nationally, steven, ukrainian identity not in every part of the population. don't take the role. but in, especially in central western parts of ukraine, where before we eat was far more relaxed and to sail, we're brothers and sisters. we have nothing to do violence live together. so a, you know, in every struggle you need to sacrifice something, you can achieve anything without losing something. but anyway, we have to take a very short break right now. we will come back to the discussion in just a few moments say can, ah,

for isn't time to talk. it would seem so the western rhetoric is at odds with hard realities on the ground in ukraine. the chinese are presented to proposal and it is believe the u. k. france and germany are cobbling together a plan for zalinski. but are they will to talk to right? a welcome back to the fort smith with professor of international politics and economics at the university of london. now this, of course,

because we've been talking about all this as well as the irrational and rational factors and all of that. and i know it's not very politically correct these days to quote the russian president. but he has his own vision of what is happening and i want to run it by you without the obliging you it's you agree with that? in fact, i invite you to disagree with what he said, but essentially he and vision is that we've come to a point in history where the political domination of the west, which is also conditioned on pretty exploitive reliance on the resources of the rest of the world. that scheme, that paradigm is no longer sustainable by objective factors, and he believes that by picking up a battle with russia, the west is essentially trying to turn around this trend and perhaps 3 and the other nations. not only russia without the nations from pursuing their own

authentic path that, that is not necessarily in line with western preferences or prescriptions. what do you think about that? part of the answer to this, or common commentary if you like, and the view. so for the president presser, is that what they referred to earlier on us globalization? and it's crisis. i, it's make sense what the president says because, and the west doesn't deny that because part of the project of globalization is that we all, i mean the, what the world is flat, which has never been and can never become flat because is an even development. you know, that isn't even development. one part of the world grows, the other part of the world doesn't grow the same pace. doesn't have the same to chronological means to grow industry with the same pace of somebody. but the cell of globalization is that it's also whale, far bringing all the goodness and all the transfers of humanity. everybody can own

benefit from common technology from common financial system, et cetera. no is no company. and even both coleman papers shooters come and visit in the west and financial times unit, everything that will say that new liberal globalization because that's when somebody new liberal globalization has failed in pennsville. in pennsville, i keep in pays with a quality for exam with what is required is in inequality, increases is a climate change issue. and now in the west, they talk about green gate, the core logic of development assistant ability. so that means that no liberal globalization has failed. now you have one part that you said very well of the world, which includes russia, iran, middle east, parts of africa. obviously, the global south lead saying something like working for to be politically correct. well, actually not exactly south, i mean, why should we be saw? no, no. i know. i know,

i think it was. that's why i put in inverted commas side to say the less than the rest. ok. but something i did something by the identify geographically, at least devote the vulcan, the united nations that did not support the american motion. if you see latin american congress, african conversation companies did not support your right. don't know. well, that's to class, not to say so con, had produced raw materials counted here, produces, for example, there an elements. because without the red earth elements and the minerals that are produced, primarily in china and in africa. and also when russia has this, the west cannot have getting the clean logical growth and sustainability. ok. many people forget thought that all of green they come in. oh, they're all of area elements in building semiconductors in building microchips, in creating electric hybrid cars. what green development and the to good,

the 5th climate change due to achieve the carbonic jason at their west once very much this. so because if the west, the tubes thus is so we love that of be dependent anymore on oil or rush in oil and gas or bid list in oil or, and see. but in order to fully west, to have this to have bring the chronological development and it root the globalization or, and, and, and to have sustainable such the west. they need still need in a different when different, a respect or russia, china, and africa, and latin america. now i want to bring us back to europe because if you are written that europe has never been an independent actor in global affairs, and that it always dependent on the united states militarily and politically. and i think it can be argued that. 6 the lack of independence would be ignored when times are good. when people are enjoying prosperity,

i think it would be very likely to mistaken posterity for independence, but things are changing right now. they are turning sour in the united states, but even more so in europe, how long do you think it will be like that this political discourse, very religion, political discourse at a fair hearing from the european capitals? how long will it be able and will be able to sustain itself until people protest not against the or for russia, but against our own living conditions. you asked me to make a prediction, i would say hate. because any time i made the prediction, i doesn't come to i, i hate making a connection there because many european liter, judging from best teachers, believe that and you know, they can try me the patients, if you hurt the in citizens endlessly and that people will, the whatever they given i for the sake of this political agenda,

let's look at germany, which is the strongest european economy and the strongest country in political time, not in military sense, but in political and economic sense. is them the strongest power in europe? germany is distant. they policy of, for washington, over ukraine. you see that it is for years and germany wanted to have since the years of the asked politic friendly relationship with, with russia, if you like it. this is bismark policy, it goes back to bismark. bismark always insist that if we want to have the nation of western europe, although it in his times, was by different means. but if we want to have to dominate western europe, we need to have good relations with russia. ok. ok, so 10 minute is just it. but the more just with germany who is resisting 2 to 2 years policy, the more the years was pressurizing, germany,

to accept us policy. in my view, in this war, primarily humiliates germany, this war. it's a humiliation of germany, germany now, if america or you know, supply grain with whatever weapon of them, i don't know, it, it, it depends to answer your question depends how far the united states wants to go out with escalation with escalation up to war. because if the united states escalates, if they give f 60 an order of 35 war, you know, military, you know, judge to, to ukraine, then russia will respond. and then the big united says with something else and then russia, let's kill it. so that is what i don't like. so the question is how to be escalate? well, i know my question is not about how to de escalate, because i think at this point of time it's pretty clear that the americans are

opting for prolong conflict then. why would they not do that because it's a relatively cheap war for them. they're not losing soldiers, they're, it's having a major strategic geopolitical goal through the means of all of that. so called allies. so, i mean, it makes a certain sense, geopolitical sense for the americans to continue fighting. i'm asking you about europe, and i've seen that interesting pulled the other day. and that i think 16 percent of the europeans believe that ukraine with the support of the west will win this conflict. but when it comes to sanctions, only 40 percent of the europeans and 35 percent of germans believe that sanctions and being effective. and to me that says that when it comes to sort of bread and butter issues, people tend to be far more pragmatic. and i'm all, if i left letters trained by various, you know, glorious ideas and narrative. so let me ask you this way. do you think the full scope of european losses and you've written about that that you believe that your

will be a big loser in this call for? do you think the full scope of european losses have already been manifested? no, no, i don't think so. i think it is more to come to europe. um there be a very harsh transition period for europe if they want to switch completely. for example, american l, l n, g, they have to, you know, european have to sort out inflation problems and during that period, there be a lot of protest on deposit on the part of the european public and public opinion and into this. spect, i think russia should never stop talking to europe. ah, the civil society level are political level, all levels of the same time. i believe that domestically in russia, when i see that russian russian defense budget go, goes going up to come to one 3rd of their total budget. them into something like

100155 1000000000, which is a mean which is minuscule compared to what united states spends. but that increase in defense budget. it tells me that there will not be enough money to invest, to spend for schooling, for education, for social welfare, for hospitals, for pensions and things like that. so in other words, i see what my, my, my major, my major point of making here is that a lot depends not just what the europeans will be doing, but what also, what kremlin will be doing domestically to show that we care about our society here. our society and not just about winning a war. absolutely. and then professor was because i am just fresh from their presidential address to the problem and i was there in the audience. and it's pretty clear that, you know, i think for re quarters at least of his address,

where about the russian domestic politics. and the main point he was making is that we have everything here to develop. we have the resources, we don't need that much to rely on, on the west that we can develop our own technology. and we are going to use this moment in history and not to adapt to western sanctions, but to take russia on the whole new level of the stain, the will and self sufficient development. we one that we want to piece, we want a piece with the west. we want to piece and mutual respect with all the other nations. but from now on we are centered on itself and we ourselves are the that have been the masters of our own destiny. i have to leave it there, but the conversation. thank you so much. so pleasure talking to you. thank you so much. thank you and thank you for watching hope to see her again on worlds apart. ah

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ah with hello and welcome to cross stock where all things are considered. i'm peter lavelle . is it time to talk? it would seem so the west rhetoric is at odds with hard realities on the ground in ukraine. the chinese have presented a proposal and it is believed the u. k. france and germany are cobbling together applying for zalinski. but are they willing to talk to russia? ah.