[000:00:00;00] ah, ah ah ah mm mm mm ah hello and welcome to wells apart. despite its allegiance to communism china's foreign policy, it has never been particularly revolutionary. it was more in line with the dow

principle of non action. do nothing was seen as more conducive to restoring order than doing a potentially detrimental something. but with the recent release of its vision for bringing peace to ukraine and securing and globally, beijing seems to be gearing out for a more active role on the global stage. is inspirational, or does it indeed signify a major turn in the countries standing well to discuss it. i am now joined by zhang shing, associate professor at the school of politics and international relations at east china normal university. dr. zang is good to talk to thank you very much for your time. thank you for having me. now on china's global security vision, the release of which coincided with their 1st anniversary of russia's military operation in your brain doesn't contain anything particularly controversial. it's based on fairly broad and accepted principles and yet it caused

a lot of reactions in fully sized circles around the world. why do you think china, all the need to make such a move at this point of time? while on the global security initiative has been planned well in advance, it didn't plan to be released to correspond to any particular dates related to for example, the rushing crank military conflict right now. it shows chinese states overall interest and intent to, to talk to the world in a more straightforward and systematic way to get its opinion out in a systematic way. and before that, we already have this global development initiative. the released not long ago. so if you combine the 2 documents together, you get, i think fairly comprehensive view of what the chinese states position of the world and what the plan to do in 2 of the most important part of the field. one development, one security you stated that china is moving towards

a more proactive or more direct stamps in expressing its opinion. and i think what distinguishes a genuine great power from a stronger can only power is indeed the ability of not only expressing its opinion, but exerting its influence on, on the world. and i think many in russia at least interpreted the release of these 2 documents as china, wanting to be not just heard, but china wanting to influence the events in ukraine and elsewhere. do you agree with that? oh, i would not go directly to say it's, it's the time to influence the for example, outcome of the ukraine crisis right now. but does, it does show chinese stays to interest the to, to play active role. you're right in the us sense, but also possibly shape a shape where the direction of the whole situation is going in in the future. so if

you look at, look at the toy point position paper on how to solve the resolve the approval crisis in ukraine. it's, it doesn't contain a very concrete concrete proposal for action. it's actually hard to say what to what needs to be done if one follows this position paper. so it shows this 20 states overall position towards these big jo, political crisis. you political conflict, right? it's mostly get the voice out. what are the chinese states based extending on these issues, but it doesn't go deaf odd to propose or try to impose a certain truck of action. what to need to be done by whom, and what specific way does not in the,

in the position paper. now i heard you say before that russia, china relations have transition from do no harm to do something together face and given that most good and busy have very different attitudes to actions because russians far more into action then observing. i think china represents the other side of the spectrum. how far do you think beijing would be willing to not only preach as it's doing in this paper is but also practice and get itself involved in messy international affairs. i think you're right, russia relatively speaking is more capable, is more willing to use hard apollo to achieve policy goal. but for china, at least in the reform pure in the past 3 or 4 decades overall, it's to following this abiding low waiting for the right time mode in its diplomacy. so i will say in the foreseeable future,

you will see chinese state when going on to using openly, using like various show how to, how the power mean to achieve this policy goes. for example, a lot of us can countries are very concerned to try to my be sending russia, lisa weapons as a way to help rush us military campaign in ukraine personally. so that's my just personal view. i'm very suspicious of that. i don't buy does it contradicts to what i see the basic logic of all behavior pattern for the chinese state. can i ask you, since you mentioned that various conflicts, it is pretty clear that you know, china has its own sensibilities when it comes to taiwan. and i've interviewed a lot of i chinese experts and they always tell me that, you know, those are 2 incomparable situations that we should not compare the station crane to

the situation in taiwan. but there is one common denominator there. and it's the united states that is bound on stoking tensions, either in russia's neighborhood or within china's jurisdiction. and i want to ask you, when china's analysts or decision makers are watching what's happening in ukraine, do you only observe that in order to inform yourself or do you think it may have a relevance for your own future and for your own tense relations with the united states, i personally think there are great amount of structure similarity between your credit crisis right now and tell me about what we might see in only in the taiwan straits, but the initial pacific in general, on my reading of the trend. conf. conflict or the wall right now is it's a result of a more than 3 decades. so the security dilemma escalation of conflicts between russia on the, on one side and neutral on the other side. that means each side that wants to do something purely for the purpose,

maybe self defense or protecting its own security. regard each one regardless section of purely legitimate but the other side to say, well what you do is a direct direct encouragement to all my sense of security. so i need to do something in response. and then the escalation started, the application to get started. and then lead to ultimately lead to this unfortunate military conflict. we should right now structurally, i think there's something very similar going on right now. in asia pacific us launched one streets is part of that. so personally, i hope that seem similar sort of escalation of conflict leading to us or our warfare won't take place. but the history tell us that kind of escalation letter, once a started is actually very difficult to stop. the americans usually frame the sanctions . you're referring to as a struggle between democracy and talker says,

and it's clear that both of us are in the deep in the autocratic count. but i know that both most go and be seeing many other capitals around the world. also see that as a part of was try for more balanced, more predictable, sarah, more democratic, and indeed more peaceful, international system. i wonder whether you think that the americans could ever agree it to democracy among nations, democracy as a, as a form of international relations. and if not, can they ever be compelled to accept the de thing in the struggle between the west and the rest? not necessarily for dominance, but for, you know, a fair way of life and a fair way of dealing with each other. internationally. who do things will ultimately prevail for us? i do think that part of the west will put us in particular over play the democracy

. i'll talk to the distinction including reading the several ongoing major regional global conflicts through this this lunch. so it's always a struggle, existing social struggle between democracy and toxicity. and i think that's not the right reading of the situation. and for example, i think between us and china, myself, including a large part of the chinese colleagues, i interact with the silly solid consensus. what we see in this increasing confrontation between us and china is fundamentally it's not about so called the regime typo democracy. and i'll talk to see in other words, even if china today was a democracy, i seriously doubt whether doug were long what stopped this, this escalation of conflict, and then your last point. it's a big challenge of all world because it's not the non necessary the democracy.

i'll talk to the extinction that dictates the basic dynamics of the world. but i think a lot of the show the world on global cells actually have a very similar sense that this over the over use over reading for global politics through this less is actually turning against well, of the interest. not only the policy, but also a lot of the smaller country or countries in the, the global sauce. i haven't resentment the term present me against the yielding the word democracy to the westerners because i'm in democracy that kills people around the world. in large numbers, you know, it can call itself democracy, but it's not fair to that very concept. i mean, i know that the chinese also about democracy with the chinese characteristics. but at least they made major tribes in the lifting and millions and millions of people out of power. not only within china, but also around the world. where's the living standards of the americans?

they keep decreasing. do you think we as russians as chinese, i don't know if some other authoritarian, supposedly authoritarian nation should be really a yield democracy that you know, that play in that concept to the west. i think it's definitely not right for any particular political unit in the international system to monopolize sort of the ways to how the key concepts are supposed to define. we need to read it, it's historical context, how these concepts emerge. but notice this are regional diversity and a possible nuances when these of consul general concepts are being used or applied . but beyond its sort of original original sites. but having said that, i also want to emphasize it's not the just the only was some country that has contributed to the concept of, for example,

democracy or human rights and some of the key documents today, where we recognize as the foundation documents of international societies have already tried to incorporate this sort of cultural diversity, for example, how to understand the human rights that you and the documents on that back in the right after world war 2 actually tried to very hard to incorporate the elements from different culture bodies of different, different civilization of bodies and to some extent to reach quite some success. i think the for the she foundational concepts like a democracy security. the similar practice should be should be promoted. ok. well that's as angry. have to take a very short break right now, but we will be back in just a few moments. stay tuned. ah

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the me i welcome back to worlds apart, fishing associate professor of the school of politics and international relations of east china normal university. dr. jang big before the break we. i mentioned various reactions to the chinese security piece proposals around the world, but i was really surprised by how negative the western reception was. and particularly when the secretary of state anthony blank and was asked about the chinese plan. he said that all the fees, fire proposals need to be treated with utmost carefulness and i just want to stress it again for our viewers. he was talking about the fees, fire proposals being treated with utmost carefulness rather than weapons supplies, which they americans doing. nonetheless, i think the american reaction sounded somewhat rejecting,

rather than welcoming did that surprise anyone in beijing? oh, it does surprise me. probably didn't surprise many people in, in china. i think the logic by mister blink, blink, and is the sum of the general principles we see in the 12 point position. and paper can be read under the current condition can be read essentially of favoring russians position in the ongoing, ongoing conflict. so that's the way mister blink. and possibly somebody observer in the west or read it. so i think this, the position is you take a clear cut standing and you're either on the side on that side. you know, you're on the right side on the wrong side. and the ducks, not what the position papers messages about. i think it need to be pushed further

for concrete, a proposal for the possible dialogue and political settlement. i mentioned that if not in the document itself, but i think that so to use the, the several key general principle we see in the document as a way to, to reject it. i think it's a little bit too much. now it's been speculate and present biden, and present she lost here in the valley, reached sort of tentative agreement that they would limit of dire confrontation or their attentions for the next 2 years. and if that were to be, believe the recent balloon incidence cancellation of the secretary of state's visit to china. contradict trend. and or that intention, at least we all know about the sort of strategic view that the americans have of china as. and i'll just say a major competitor,

but i think also as an adversary and they, i mean, in many of the public statements, they express a pretty and inimical attitude. but what do you think this administration is trying to achieve in the short term? what is these all diplomacy all about what the diplomacy is all about? i think the overall trend is very clear and i think this not only this particular demonstration seems that within the united states. so there's a fairly strong bipartisan consensus of taking china, the competitor, but also major rivalry in the near future. so the corresponding policy solution to that as a new sort of a new containment. and we see that containment is playing out. i think in the pacific, in the fall, in the form of the various type of new or revived blocks like the

in the pacific strategy, all costs will cause such a structure. and sometimes the target is not explicitly stated very clearly. those new all involve the blocks, mostly men to contain china's rise order by the china in asia pacific. i think the kind of low incidence is unfortunate. i think there is a miscalculation probably on both sides. as i mentioned this, this escalation of complex mechanism. once a started, it's very difficult to, to, to stop and i think both sides need to think about carefully nor to intentionally escalate these sources of conflicts in the future. dr. dr. chang is if i may interest you here, because as far as i'm concerned, the americans are not doing these unintentional. this is their policy to be as

aggressive and as pushy as possible and they're pretty straightforward about it. they see any reticence be on the russian side. or on the chinese side as not some philosophical orientation, but the brother as a, as a weakness. and i asked you before we talked before about this will re principal, do that me assist in taking action and order will prevail. and china practice that in foreign policy. and i think my conclusion at least is that it's slightly moving away from that in it, on the brother international stage. but when it comes to the relationship with the united states, don't you think that china needs to be a little bit more proactive in expressing its own, not just disagreement, but its own counter actions, who pretty and friendly american policies? well, i think the chinese states overall sort of narrative and the policy of actions we

see in a posterior do show that kind of trend a little bit, at least under the mood was in the domestic political scene, is the external environment is increasingly hostile, unfriendly, and but we need to sort of get ready for, for the possible on possible flight. so it's not only in that kind of mentality, not only supposed to fly to it's in the neighborhood or the area near near china, but possibly be applied to too many other policy arena. us that are of concern to china. so yeah, i do see a little bit changing in the policy rhetorics and the possible mentality of the decision maker to, to get ready for the fight. now it's been reported the other day by reuters that the americans are now discussing with the g 7 partners,

the possible introduction of sort of collective centralized sanctions against china for supposedly supplying russia with weapons, even though both russia and china said that there they are not discussing any such deals with anyway, i think history has proven that the americans are all the americans need a pretext, and that much less concerned with solid proof. so my question to you, if, if the west indeed unites against china in a way similar to it was sort of put it together against russia. how do you think beijing will react? well, unfortunately, that become reality. and maybe not only just this round of a collective sanction against china, i think from a true political perspective that will give sort of increase even increase china sense of common grievance against wasn't blocks. and whether, whether one likes or not. that will probably push, trying to further closer to,

to russia. so watch out. i would have to tell my western colleagues to watch out what you, which would do in the near future my, and make a gendering, russia, china, a military alliance. so fulfilling a phenomenon by what you do right now, it's not. you know, what russia has to has to offer against their west. i think it's pretty self evident and rushes arsenal is pretty limited in this regard. assurance can rely on nuclear to turn that can try to limit the presence of western companies within russia, but overall rushes integration into the global financial and economic system leaves it with limited capabilities to respond to western economic pressure. i wonder what about china? what do you think china has at its disposal? what is it that the west should be watching out for? except for, you know, somewhat closer partnership between the russia and china. on the military side, of course,

the chinese states has been building up our candidly for the past few years tried to make itself capable of defended. cor, interest. both was in it's a traditional near neighborhood but even beyond us and also building a for example below gendering pollution. navy is definitely on the agenda. but i think the general mentality is getting ready before the fight. but still, you just mentioned a couple of minutes ago. it's not so completely in its traditional mentality how it look us a position in the world before you can see the past 3 or 4 decades. china has the best benefits and generally speaking, benefit of tremendously from the relatively stable, international environment and also for those international rule institution.

generally it's abided by it. it's only question how these institutional rules are in practice, the be unjustifiably exercise by a certain power. it's main beef with a sort of status course doesn't frontier no, didn't have a strong interest to, to have a revolutionary change of the status for that would be a very, very much a misreading reading of the, of the, of chinese space overall assumptions in the few minutes at the rehab. last, let me ask you specifically about the russian chinese relationship. because in one of his speeches, president of russia described them as an exceptional relationship in a sense that these are to huge powers that share a large border, but don't seem to share anything else. we have very different cultures. we have very different government and governing systems. we have a different social systems. and yet, these 2 countries have, have been pretty successful in not just core existing, but in implementing, and genuine corporation, genuine partnership,

and sort of teaching the framework of the long term relationship, strategic relationship above situational disagreements. we have plenty, by the way. what do you think made that possible? well, 1st of all, the biggest achievement of a relation between china, russia, in sicily, 990. 1 is exactly what you just just said that some manager, the 2 big neighboring power, both nuclear nuclear power, was a complicated history managed to found a way to reach a peaceful settlement to the border and then maintain that kind of peaceful relations relief each other of the biggest security concerns from both them, but it was mostly extra no sort of common security group grievance which has been exacerbated by external forces to push them together from what i say. i do not harm each other position gradually more and more to a position. well, let's,

let's jointly do something together. i think regardless of china's intentions, your weight, your power, you're increasing. i cannot make my, makes china, or puts china on par with the united states and the americans simply, i think they're incapable of treating any other power of comparable strength as and as anyone other than an adversary. and my last question to you would be, do you think anything could ever persuade the americans to abandon that stance to treat other great nations with respect? well, i think the sort of the perception that still matters and they're still way to influence, put perceptions on me and some other colleagues was similar. my side are trying to go beyond a certain political framework in all right. and now

a semi diplomatic works to convince, for example, there are rooms for both of china and us. so someone to work together, for example, the american, what do they call a b 3 w initiative? i don't see really don't see a 0 sum game results away between dark kind of initiative and the china spell tentative initiative even with the europeans europeans global gateway initiatives. so the impact of intellectuals or policy workers are limited by studio room to do, to partially shape people minus i to get partially get rid of the still my some mentality and also the, the very strong perception to stick with this democracy versus the autocracy distinction. and to see their actual progressive agendas or parties my

be able to gain from that well, doctor's angry, have to leave it here. our time is out that i'm very grateful for your perceived participation in this dialogue. thank you very much for that. and can very much, and thank you for watching hope to syria again on, well to part with . mm. ah, ah

. ah, the city is essentially surrounded, where is earlier we were fighting against the professional ukrainian army. now we're seeing more and more elderly men and boys, and the news is shaped the week they had to rush us. wagner group calls on ukraine's presidency. let's choose withdraw from the city of bach, also known as a film of envoy post his life at risk loss saving other children join a terrorist attack by ukrainian extremist group in the russian border region of. but i started taking off my coach and noticed the whole, the blood seeping through. i realize i've been shot,