ah, for a ton welcome to wealth apart, then merican have many sounds gratifying. madame horace. why they and only they are supposed to be at the top of the international pecking order that was leading democracy, shining on a heel and benevolence from german, all to support the idea that in the final analysis they have an inborn august. if you know and decide what's best for the rest and as order and peace preserving positioning wishes to appear isn't a bound to lead to conflict. want to discuss that i'm now joined from canada by victor tucker, who teaches at concordia university of edmonton, experienced great to talk to thank you very much for your time. thank you for the invitation. x on a pleasure to be in this program. make sure you have a very interesting take on the current tension between russia and the west,

which ultimately comes down to the sides. deep seated perception of themselves and the nature of reality, which you summarize as the u. s. is insistence on being the 1st among equals and rushes claim on being an equal among 1st. do you think such clash of self images could be resolved peacefully? well, i hope it can be, but of course it is problematic given the how deep this cultural difference is given how deep the psychological difference is ultimately in terms of the collective psychology of the leadership of the 2 sides. right? indeed this, this is the idea who came to me probably as a result of my chin for a number of years at 2 religious institutions, ultimately race to small university here in edmonton, both of which are protestant foundations as a beginning. and this just something that made me make it made me looked look into,

into the religious origins of political culture, of the west end of the united states of america in particular. and then of course, my own research as a historian had to do with the cultural history of the policy on the russian side, right. and specifically, the cultural history of the russian, autumn and wars. so there be that a lot of attention to the, once again, the, the cultural practices of diplomacy, the perceptions. so the representation, we will definitely discuss all of those differences. and i think your main point is that both russia and america are exceptionally distinct in how they are both historically, economically and socially. and before we go into that, i wonder if you can see any similarity and how these 2 big nations 2 great powers go about manifesting themselves in the world. well,

you see she story and. busy whole, those who look for differences, 40 clarity for unique qualities of historical entities, right? that are that confront each other. it is probably the task of the political scientists and the social is just still to focus on the similarity is not the universal, reproducible trans. right? but once again, i was above all emphasize this, this, this, this difference. and yes, you know, as much as the where periods, when the 2 sides treated each other on moral as equal terms. my argument would be that these were rather the exceptional in the, in the long history of their relations. let me see on that towards exception. exceptional because it's 1st and foremost associated with the american exceptionalism. and you argued that the united states is exceptional into major ways. it's jo graphy or rather geography granted,

security being buffer and by 2 oceans and 2 wicker and neighbors. and if exceptional ability to strike with impunity without fearing any retribution which essentially allow the americans to wage the wars over the last couple of decades and perhaps even longer. now, do you think russia is exceptional enough as an adversary to and my plan is intended to provide an exception to the typical ways of american exceptionalism? well, i would say that it's exceptional in his desire historically and his desire to be equal along the 1st, which was the prospect of its long efforts to join the european concert, the european balance of power. the european grew club of great powers. and also the fact that he was part of the club for about a century and a half what we have 2 centuries. and then it's exceptionalism is also a reflection of the fact that he's pretty much the only remaining great power of

this kind. now, in europe or even in the brother world, right, is a tragedy. you want to say russia is that this club of european great powers of which it's wanted to the parts for such a long time is no longer there. why don't interesting observation you're making that russia is perhaps the only, as you said, power that sort of pierce through the perception of being impervious on the part of the americans. and if we hear, if you listen to them or in the speech of american, the policymakers, they say that, you know, they're still the strongest nation in the world that nothing threatens them. but do you think the americans in the field asked the cure? and now, as they profess it to be it, well, certainly not. i mean one has to understand that until the end of the 2nd world war, right, there was no feasible prospect, a thing major attack on the continental techy of the united states. right. and in

that sense of the 1st century and a half of american history passed in exceptionally secure conditions. right? that explains so much in the transformation of the united states of america, inter major power, a global power of power that was actually superior. right. and it's in its capacities to any of the european great powers of the previous period. right. and then of course, comes the cold war, which as i would argue for a very long time, was still an f symmetrical confrontation given still the grade discrepancy in the resources of the, to the site as well as in the level of security that they enjoy. but still, i would say that the most significant achievement as well of the soviet union was to close that gap in terms of the, again, relative security that the 2 sites enjoyed. and in that sense, of course,

i would say that the, so it's unions compromised show will say, then better security to the point of leading a lasting impression on of that. again, the approach to foreign policy on their collective stakeholders, you on the perception of russia even today, but you know, weeks are i've spoken to many historians lately. and many of them point out that during the cold war, i mean one distinct feature of the cold war was the fact that both the united states and russia engage in a proxy conflict de number afforded to intervene directly in the neighborhood, which are the only exception of the cuban missile crisis, but it was also sparked by the turk case case. and many of them are going to the united states move to change data approach recently by pushing ever closer to rational borders and by militarize and ukraine. you agree

with this? this is, what do you think prompted this change of tactics on the american side? you know, essentially picking up a bottle with, with russian directly almost directly through ukraine. oh, yes, so, but 1st of all, i will actually question the, the magnitude of that change. because as you mentioned, the cold war was above all conflicts characterized by proxy wars between the 2 superpowers that were taking place in africa. se asia, other places, right? but which never turns into our actual war. and i think that this is part of the broader trend that we see in the 2nd world war in terms of this transition and a gray zone. busy of peace, no war right. and this clear distinction in peace and rule that was once again, the characteristic of the european system international relations in the 18th and 19th century. right. it's, it's, it's disappearing gradually. right?

and we are again, in this, increasingly in these grades on what, what makes the current conflict different of course, is it's geography, right? it's no longer goal. it's no longer yet. it's no longer cuba, it is in, in the ukraine, right? and this is something that makes this conflict different, including in terms of how real i'm free are the 2 sides to disengage right now. all we've got before this self assured attitude that the united states historically had about security. and i think russia couldn't have been more different. you argue in your article that russia has never been privileged by an abiding sense of security. quite on the contrary, has been chronically insecure. how has it shaped its own national and political psychology? well, i think that in the years of the cold war that's ultimately resulted in that rather

solid, i would say approach of the soviet military strategist. so that consistency in challenging the security of the opponent rather than trying to secure and sold absolute security, which i think is, is absolutely unattainable, is an illusion. ultimately, you see, and anyone who is only for, for russia or the soviet union, or i think it's on attainable for the united states as well. i think that ultimately it's on attainable for, for, for any, any power in today's world. and the reason for that is well known to any specialist on strategy. it's much cheaper, it technically easier to deny secure. you have all of them to secure absolute comfort for your, for, for you, for yourself as it where right to, to make sure that there is. busy no possible attack on your territory, right? and that's all to be something that let in the context of the cold war to that famous or in famous doctrine of mutually assured destruction whereby the security

of the 2 sides was kind of partially achieved through some, some kind of equity librium off terra and taken that's also an attempt on the part of russia to take that concept of the balance of power the that is on which the european concert was promised further or broad, broader and applied to the americans as well. why do you think that americans played along with it? for some time and now seem to be refusing to do so. yes. yes. so it says one, they say that's a matter of national destruction was a kind of recreational reproduction of the principles and approaches to foreign policy that characterized the european concert. and in that sense, you know, as much as russia and the soviet union were trying to continue that approach in international relations. they had success, but it's important to members of this, this concept of the overall interaction between the united states and the soviet

union in terms of de taunting terms of the, you know, it says you arms limitation talks, the anti ballistic missile treaty of the early 19 seventies then was, i would argue or other exceptional periods, right? of parity in, in the context of the cold war from which ultimately the united states out, you know, diverged or a parted by the late 19 seventies. right? so i would once again emphasize the exceptionality of these parity based approach in the domain of security. and that only means that russia or any other power has to make extra effort. do you know, bring it about now speaking about the exception, there's absolutely no exception to the rule that we have. take a break in the middle of our conversation. so stay tuned. feeling that we will be back in just a few moments. ah

ah hi, i'm exemptions and i'm here to plead with you whatever you do. do not watch my your show seriously. why watch something that so different my little opinions that you won't get anywhere else. look of it please. if you have the state department, the cia weapons makers, multi $1000000000.00 corporations, choose your fax for you, go ahead. i change and whatever you do, don't want my show stay mainstream because i'm probably going to make you uncomfortable. my show is called direct impact, but again, you probably don't want to watch it because it might just change the wayne thing.

ah ah ah i welcome back to one's apartment, victor chucky, who teaches at can coordinate university of edmonton. now, victoria, you have another fascinating view on to this conflict which i haven't seen many

specialist wars. and essentially, it's an argument that this evolution of the american self perception as sort of the direct presentation of god on this planet has been, i, in fact, a combination of not only geography, but also it's a, it's a religious thinking and particularly be the influence of the calvinist ideas of dividing people into and perhaps nations as well into the elect once and b o, what was the terrific they wrap rubbermaid? ah, yes. do you see playing out in their current politics as well? oh well you know, in the general sense, yes. well, 1st of all, if you say that, of course, united states is the only country was politically thought of themselves along those terms. and indeed, one can find similar themes in the history of britain, france,

russia, right? but when you look, for example, as the russian version of this nation, especially in special relation to god, right. but we find the bubble in russia 17th century. busy right, it definitely bears of the influence of the byzantine, a political culture in which exceptionalities was confirmed as it whereby exceptionally great challenges, hardships, sufferings, that the nation went through. because of course, god love, you know, god may suffer those from us. but i may be wrong here, but i think at least in the, in the russian conception of this idea does not presume that you know, this exceptionality denies everybody else exceptionality. there is no sort of aspiration. she be the only arbiter of world affairs. yeah. well, that does, because in addition to heading, that kind of byzantine legacy,

once again that we could see in the 17th century, russia was of the same time, geographically, objectively peripheral power. a peripheral nation which very early on on the level of its political elites, recognized its very thorough situation and began to make efforts to overcome it. right? so as a result of this exception is this really, really just providential is became diluted with a very healthy attitudes of disciples of europe and of the more advanced technologically advanced nations. also tested by reality, becca, because he make an argument that every major european power also aspire to be a gentleman, but it's to do morning ambitions. have all, all we've gotten some push back from, from the neighbors. that's just, you know, essentially a benefit. so to say also in a european environment. absolutely,

well that was the case stain the suffered major ticket in the sunday century. that was the case of rather the suffered a number of defeats of the sent early 900 century and supported being a major was right. and that was even the case of great britain, right? that was a global power for a long time. but then of course, at the moment, so the conclusion of the 2nd world war was very dramatically kind of declassified and termed, into a medium sized country, right? so all european nations ultimately experienced that transformation where they, where their exception that is, was kind of defeated by the car realities, right? or at least confronted with them in a very significant way. and, you know, the state of moral moral is the only exception to the general tendency. that, of course, has to do with the fact that the geographical situation of the states is fundamental . that of an island, that is the size of the continents. right. and that's something that makes them so secure i one day, so also manifest and solve domestically. because if you look at all the recent

presidential campaigns, you always get some variation of the hillary clinton deplorable comment. you know, i think donald trunk talk about talked about humans, campbell bite and also made some disparaging remarks about that sizable part of the population. do you think this sort of the division of people on nations in to be lacked? and the referent brain also manifest itself in domestic with perhaps in the current bill or is ation in the united states of us. yes, certainly liberal progressive. it can be seen as yet another kind of secular manifestation off off off of that kind of approach. right? because we have to understand that in its pure pre stein form, the religious consciousness of radical calvinists was present the bubble in the 17th century. at the time of the creation of the surgeon colonies. but since then,

it has become secularized for sure. already by the time of the american gordon independence, we can see significant singular ization of that, of that, of that trans that turns into a kind of ideology of success, right? that seems to be kind of confirmed by the actual developments. again, as a reflection above all, the exceptionally comfortable geographical situation bubble. now, what can i think? i understand why the americans would be so infatuated with their own orange and missed. but i think many countries have a similar mis, but again, claiming that your own mis supersedes all others. isn't that ultimately as well wishing is a man here? isn't that ultimately an attempt to deny all odd and they all have nations to manifest their own destiny? because i mean, in personal psychology,

we accept that each one of us is unique and have, as he's or her own unique way. but essentially what the american political doctrine try it tries to put forward is that know we know the right way for everybody else. while others, yes, yes, of course, i mean, one of the qualities that distinguishes human beings is the ability to recognize the other side. just the same human beings as yourself, right? and you know, that sense if we apply these psychological categories to the level of political leads of different countries. again, the exceptional geographical situation of the states, the exceptionally positive economic and demographic and social development of this country of war all night and the 20th century. definitely made it difficult wed say for the american leaders to recognize in the leaders of other countries that equals, as it were right. because once again, the,

the situations that concerns the circumstances in which the european leaders, in particular, historically where acting where sol so manifested different from those. so for the united states, now, i don't know if you would agree with that, but i think this very concept of the end of history could only be born on american soil and as present shows it as it may be. it reminds me on that spouton moment. you know, it's a still beautiful moment and essentially to stop the flow of history and revenge others from leaving their own version of what the americans have lived through. i mean, that sounds so impossible to even consider. and yet, for some reason the americans seem to be fully devoted to do you think that's an authentic belief or isn't ultimately a deliberate calculation to use the rest of the world and their resource base?

do you think the american can stand on their own 2 feet without using the rest of the world as a supporting base? oh, well, certainly much of that success story was the product of advantages, economic strategic relations. and we need a space where with, with other countries, right. but at the same time, i think that we have to take culture and political culture and particularly seriously. right? because i do think that here we are dealing with things with psychological realities that definitely determine or this condition, the choices, the foreign political choices, including the current crisis. now, as you mentioned in your p, b, in the united states, unlike the united states, europe has never been insulated from the interesting conflict and gave rise to this very specific diplomatic and political culture which we have already discussed. the

european content based on the idea of the balance of power balance of interest as a way to peacefully co exist and ensure and logical of what you want. you argued that this way of diplomacy, this way of coexisting was destroyed during the day. and the 1st 2 world wars, do you think there's any chance of recreating it as a ways away the 3rd world war perhaps as a result of this? well, i think that he's everybody's for, it should be everybody's hope that the research a possibility. right. and indeed, an ideal situation would be something like the reemergence of the european call search of bigger players on a, on an international scale. right? so obviously including mobile only the states and russia also. busy china, india, brazil, and perhaps other other, other brick nations. right. of course there is, there is one problem. so we'll say with great power equality concept that was

characteristic of the call search of the night century. and that was the fact that the great powers sometimes treated rather cavalierly in those nations that are smaller than that. right? so why has that they have to reinvent these, these idea of a global comsearch of big powers in ways that would be accommodating lee as durations and interests of the smaller regional nations. now are also in one of your articles. a, you mentioned that the united states or the americans always got surprised when other nations, non western, in the mentality gets sort of westernized or get a developmental boost without becoming like them or run them down, becoming subservient to them. and that applies not only russia but also to turn key to china. and perhaps there are many other countries producing a just different russians who cannot find keys to read them. merican version of the

world as. 9 lead only by them. no, i think that russia, you shouldn't use the 1st mod west the nation to on the go westernization without losing its job political sovereignty as well. right? but it's not the only one, right, because one can probably place awesome and empire than turkey in the same category . one can place japan until the 2nd world war into this category was chinese to be a little bit different, different because of course, there was of all the century of almost like, well they colonial situation in which in which china china was right in the late ninety's and early 20th century, but definitely we are dealing here with the fundamentally similar entities right, that are distinguished not only by the military importance, by their comic side, but that also by psychology, collective psychology of the lead that seek to integrate certain measured amounts

of westernization western influences with the japanese goal sovereignty. one could also replace the iran in the same category there use, likewise, a country that has a long history of westernization, but then also enter western attitudes. you mentioned in your article, very diplomatically that this historic lack of experience of weighing or negotiating your own interest against the interest of others may be somewhat problematic for the world today. do you think that americans could be abused of this kind of entitlement? if so, how well, i think that we have some, some, some examples off of all of that in the past. and i mentioned of the daytime of the late night and 6 years and early seventy's when the significance of form. but it defeats brought him all about for a moment of these, this pre valence of essential european style. diplomatic culture embodied by henry

kissinger writes the presidential adviser to richard nixon in later space is by the way on the european concert as well. absolutely. on the european diplomacy as the time of the young congress, the high point of the european all search, right. because of the great powers, right off of the european influences in the daytime. and the american aspects of the day turns off. i'm mistaken and denial, right? so of course, it is not excluded in principle, but of course it will be a very long process that will require a lot of effort on the part of once again, those, those countries that we mentioned right, that combine certain degree of westernization with the attachment to an independent and job political nature has been a fascinating conversation. thank you very much for that. thank you. it's been

a pleasure for me to thank you. i'm thank you for watching. i hope to hear again was a part ah, ah ah ah

ah ah ah ah, the headlines right now and out to international theory is right that the u. s. secretary of state anthony blinking is visiting ethiopia. i need jack to boost u. s. influence in africa, though that comes as at a korea acute is washington of impeding peace in the south region. australia to plan to buy 5 nuclear power submarines from the u. s. it does droll criticism from china to mid concerns. the deal puts non proliferation agreements at risk from the program are russia agrees to extending the black sea grain.