ah, ah mm mm mm one, welcome to well, support. the americans have many itself gratifying metaphors of why they and only they are supposed to be at the top of the international pecking order. there was letting democracy shining city on a heal and benevolent have gentlemen all to support the idea that in the final analysis, they have an inborn prerogative to know and decide what's best for the rest. and as order and peace preserving. as this positioning wishes to appear,

isn't it bound to lead to conflict? want to discuss that i'm now joined from canada by victor tacky, who teaches at concord de university of edmonton, bixler. it's great to talk to thank you very much for your time. thank you for the invitation, x on a pleasure to be in this program. make sure you have a very interesting take on the current tensions between russia and the west, which ultimately comes down to the sides. deep seated perception of themselves and the nature of reality, which you summarize as the u. s. is insistence on being the 1st among equals and rushes claim on being an equal among 1st. do you think such a clash of self images could be resolved peacefully? well, i hope it's where it can be, but of course it is problematic given the how deep these cultural difference is, given how deep the psychological difference is ultimately in terms of the

collective psychology of the leadership of the 2 sides. right? indeed this, this is, the idea came to me probably as a result of my chin for a number of years at 2 religious institutions, ultimately race to small university here in edmonton, both of which are protestant foundations as a beginning. and this, this is something that need, make me, made me looked look into, into the religious origins of political culture, of the west end of the united states of america in particular. and then of course, my own research as a historian had to do with the cultural histories policy on the russian side, right. and specifically, the cultural history of the russian, autumn and wars. so there i'd be that a lot of attention to the once again, the, the cultural practices of the mall, diploma. the perceptions so the representation,

we will definitely discuss all of those differences. and i think your main point is that both russia and america are exceptionally distinct in how they are both historically, economically and socially. and before we go into that, i wonder if you can see any similarity and how these 2 big nations 2 great powers go about manifesting themselves in the world. well, you see she story and. busy above all, those who look for differences for peculiarities, for unique qualities of historical entities, right? the other that confront each other. it is probably the task of the political scientists and the socialist still to focus on the similarity is not the universal reproducible trance. right? but once again, i was about, was emphasized this, this, this, this difference. and yes, you know, as much as the way periods when the 2 sides treated each other on moral as equal

terms. my argument would be that these were rather the exceptional in the, in the long history of their relations. let me see on that towards exceptional, exceptional, because it's 1st and foremost associated with the american exceptionalism. and you argued that the united states is exceptional into major ways. it's jo graphy or rather geography granted, security being buffer and by 2 oceans and 2 wicker and neighbors. exceptional ability to strike with impunity without fearing any retribution which essentially allow the americans to wage the wars over the last couple of decades and perhaps even longer. now, do you think russia is exceptional enough as an adversary to you? and my plan is intended to provide an exception to the typical ways of american exceptionalism? well, i would say that it's exceptional in his desire historically and his desire to be

equal along the 1st, which was the product of its long efforts to join the european concert of the european balance of power. the european grew club of great powers and also the fact that he was part of the club for about a century and a half what we have 2 centuries. then it's exceptionalism is also a reflection of the fact that he's pretty much the only remaining great power of this kind. now, in europe, or even in the brother world, right. the tragedy and the state of russia is that this club of european, great powers of which it's wanted to the parts for such a long time is no longer there. while an interesting observation you're making that russia is perhaps the only, as you said, power that sort of peers through these, that perception of being impervious on the part of the americans. and if we hear, if you listen to them or in the speech of american policymaker,

they say that, you know, they're still the strongest nation in the world that nothing threatened them. but do you think the americans indeed feel as secure and now as they profess it to be it? well, certainly not. i mean, one has to understand that until the end of the 2nd world war right, there was no feasible prospect of any major attack on the continental territory of the united states. right. and in that sense of the 1st century and a half of american history passed in exceptionally secure conditions, right? that explains so much in the transformation of the united states of america, the inter and major power, a global power of power that was actually superior. right? and it's in its capacities to any of the european great powers of the previous period. right. and then of course, comes the cold war, which as i would argue for

a very long time, was still an f metric co confrontation, gillan shield, who is a great discrepancy in the resources of the site, as well as in the level of security that they enjoy but still, i would say that the most significant achievement as it with of the soviet union was to close the gap in terms of the, again, the relative security that the 2 sites enjoy. and in that sense, of course, i would say that the so that unions compromise, shall we say them better than security to the point of living a lasting impression on of that. again, the approach to foreign policy on their collective stakeholders, you on the perception of russia even today, but you know, weeks are i've spoken to many historians lately. and many of them point out that during the cold war, i mean one distinct feature of the cold war was the fact that both the united states and russia engaged in proxy conflict de number for the to intervene directly

in the neighborhood of which they only exception of the cuban missile prices, but it was also sparked by the turk case case. and many of them are going to the united states move to change data approach recently by pushing ever closer to rational borders and by militarize and ukraine. you agree with this? this is, what do you think prompted this change of tactics on the american side? you know, essentially picking up a bottle with, with russia directly almost directly through ukraine. oh, yes, so, but 1st of all, i would actually question the, the magnitude of that change. because as you mentioned, the cold war was above all conflicts characterized by proxy wars between the 2 superpowers that were taking place in africa. se asia, other places, right?

but which never turns into our actual war. and i think that this is part of the broader trends that we see in the 2nd world war in terms of this transition and a great. busy zone of peace, no war right. and this clear distinction between peace and rule that was once again, the characteristic of the european system international relations in the 18th and 19th century. right? it's, it's, it's disappearing gradually. right? and we are again, in this, increasingly in the grades on what, what makes the current conflict different, the worst is, it's geography, right? it's no longer goal. it's no longer yet. it's no longer q, but it is in, in the ukraine, right? and this is something that makes this conflict different, including in terms of how real i'm free are the 2 sides to disengage right now, all we've discussed before this self, i assure the attitude that the united states historically had about security. and i

think russia couldn't have been more different. you argue in your article that russia has never been privileged by an abiding sense of security. quite on the contrary, has been chronically insecure. how has it shaved its own national and political psychology? well, i think that in the years of the cold war that's ultimately resulted in that rather solid, i would say approach of the soviet military strategists that consisted in challenging the security of the opponent rather than trying to secure and sold absolute security, which i think is is absolutely unattainable, isn't illusion, dollars, but you see, and anyone who is only for, for russia or the soviet union, or think it's on attainable for the united states as well. i think that ultimately it's on attainable for, for, for any 80 power in today's world. and the reason for that is well known to any

specialist on strategy. it's much cheaper, it's technically easier to deny secure. you have all of them to secure an absolute comfort for your, for, for you, for yourself as well. right to, to make sure that there is. busy no possible attack on your territory, right? and that's ultimately something that let in the context of the cold war to that famous or in famous doctrine of mutually assured destruction whereby the security of the 2 sides was kind of partially achieved through some, some kind of equity librium off terra speaking. that's also an attempt on the part of russia to take that concept of the balance of power the that is on which the european concert was promised further or brought broader and applied to the americans as well. why do you think that americans played along with it? for some time and now seem to be refusing to do so. yes. yes. so it says why they

say that's a mad issue of destruction was a kind of recreational reproduction of, of the principles and approaches to foreign policy that characterized the european concert. and in that sense, you know, as much as russia and the soviet union were trying to continue that approach in international relations. they have success, but it's important to members of this, this concept of the overall interaction between the united states and the soviet union in terms of day time in terms of. busy you know, it says you arms limitation talks, the anti ballistic missile treaty, or the early 19 seventies. that was, i would argue, rather exceptional periods, right? of parity in the context of the cold war from which ultimately the united states, you know, diverged or a parted. by the late 19 seventies, right. so i would once again emphasize the exceptionality of this parity

based approach in the domain of security. and that only means that russia, any other power has to make extra efforts to bring it about. now speaking about the exception, there's absolutely no exception to the rule that we have. take a break in the middle of our conversation. so stay tuned to it. we will be back in just a few moments. ah ha. mobile, the vocal issue for the mobile one, annual g d p per capita was about $4000.00 euros. a mobile with

a mobile number to reach a little thought they would have thought of unemployment is off the chance. moldova territorial integrity and sovereignty. we respect of the country which enjoys financial support from the u. s. n. b, you is constantly robbed by political and corruption scandals, but all that didn't stop moldova obtaining you. candidate status in 2022 is performed a master's ciocca diplomacy. it is broken in agreement that we'll see a ran and saudi arabia again reestablish diplomatic relations. this could be a step not only to reorder the middle east, but also usher in an air of stability in the region. today. washington is the odd

man out the me a welcome back to worlds apart. smith, victor, i talked with teachers at concordia university. i meant and now victor, you have another fascinating view onto this conflict which i haven't seen many specialist wars. and essentially, it's an argument and this of illusion of the american self perception as sort of the direct presentation off of god on this planet has been in fact, a combination of not only geography, but also it's, it's a religious thinking, particularly be the influence of the calvinist ideas of dividing people into and

perhaps nations as well into the elect once and be what was the terrific rep, robert? do you see playing out in their current politics as well? well, in a, in a general sense. yes. well, 1st of all, if you say that, of course you say says no, the only country was politically thought of themselves along those terms. and indeed, one can find similar seems in the history of britain, france of russia, right? but when you look, for example, as the russian version of this nation, especially in special relation to god, right. but we find the bubble in the russia 17th century. busy right, it definitely bears of the influence of the byzantine, a political culture in which exceptionalities was confirmed as it whereby exceptionally great challenges, hardships, sufferings, that the nation went through because of course, god love,

god makes suffer those from hill off. but i may be wrong. care, but i think at least in the russian conception of this idea that it does not presume that you know, this exceptionality denies everybody else. the exceptionality there is no sort of aspiration. she be the only arbiter of world affairs. yeah. well, that does, because in addition to heading, that's kind of byzantine legacy once again that we could see in the 17th century, russia was of the same time jo, graphically objectively peripheral power. a peripheral nation, which very early on the level of its political elites are recognized its very thorough situation and began to make efforts to overcome it. right? so as a result of this exception is this really, really just providential is became diluted with a very healthy attitudes of disciples of europe and of the more advanced

technologically advanced nations. also tested by reality. but because you make an argument that every major european power also aspire to be a german, but it's in the morning and missions have all, all we've gotten some pushback from, from the neighbors. that's just, you know, essentially a benefit. so to say also in a european environment. absolutely, well, there was the case of staying the suffered major defeat in the sunday century. that was the case of france suffered a number of defeats the cent early 19th century and supported being a major was right. and that was even the case of great britain, right? that was a global power for a long time. but then, of course, and the moment, the conclusion of the 2nd world war was very dramatically kind of declassified and termed, into a medium sized country, right? so all european nations ultimately experienced that transformation where they,

where their exception that is, was kind of defeated by the car realities, right? or at least confronted with them in, you know, very significant way. and, you know, the, the state of moral moral is the only exception to the general tendency. that, of course, has to do with the fact that the geographical situation of the states is fundamental . that of an island, that is the size of the continent. right? and that's something that makes them so secure i one day, so also manifest to solve domestically because if you look at all day in recent presidential campaigns, you always get some variation of the hillary clinton's deplorable comment. you know, i think donald trunk talk about talked about humans, campbell, but, and also made some disparaging remarks about a sizable part of the population. do you think this sort of the division of people on nations in to be elect and the referent brain also manifests

itself in domestic with perhaps in the current bill or is ation in the united states of us? yes, certainly liberal progressive. it can be seen as yet another kind of secular manifestation of off of that kind of approach, right? because we have to understand that in its pure pre signed form, this religious consciousness of radical calvinists was present the bubble in the 17th century. at the time of the creation of the surgeon colonies, but since that it has become secularized for sure. already by the time of the american gordon independence, we can see significant singular is ation of that of that of that trans. that turns into a kind of ideology or success, right? that seems to be kind of confirmed by the actual developments again, as a reflection above all, the exceptionally comfortable, geographical situation. level. now, what can i think?

i understand why the americans would be so infatuated with their own orange and math, but i think many countries have a similar mis, but again, claiming that your own mis supersedes all others. isn't that ultimately as well wishing is it may appear? isn't that ultimately an attempt to deny all odd and they all are the nations to manifest their own destiny? because i mean, in personal psychology, we accept that each one of us is unique and have, as he's or her own unique way. but essentially, what the american political doctrine try to try to put forward is that no, we know the right way for everybody else while others. yes, yes, of course, i mean, one of the qualities that distinguishes human beings is the ability to recognize the other side. just the same human beings as yourself, right? and you know, that says if we apply these psychological categories to the level offer,

but if you go a lead of different countries, again, the exceptional geographical situation of states, the exceptionally positive economic and demographic and social development of this country of war all night. and the 20th century definitely made it difficult wed say for the american leaders to recognize in the leaders of other countries. that equals as it were. right. because once again, the, the situations that concerns the circumstances in which the european leaders, in particular, historically where acting where sol so manifested different from those. so for the united states, now i don't know if you would agree with that, but i think this narrow concept of the end of history could only be born on the american soil and as present shows it as it may be. it reminds me on that spouton

moment that you know, it's a still beautiful moment and essentially to stop the flow of history and revenge others from leaving their own version of what the americans have lived through. i mean, that sounds so impossible to even consider. and yet, for some reason the americans seem to be fully devoted to, do you think that's an authentic belief, or is it ultimately a deliberate calculation to use the rest of the world and their resource base? do you think the american can stand on their own 2 feet without using the rest of the world as a supporting base? oh, well, suddenly much of that success story was the product of that had gone to just all me . so easy relations and we need a piece where with, with other countries, right. but at the same time, i think that we have to take culture and political culture and particularly

seriously. right? because i do think that here we are dealing with things with psychological realities that definitely determine or at least condition the choices, the foreign political choices, including the current crisis. now, as you mentioned in your piece, be the united states. unlike the united states, europe has never been insulated from the interest of conflict, and it gave rise to this very specific diplomatic and political culture which we have already discuss the european content based on the idea of the balance of power balance of interest. as a way to peacefully co exist and ensure and logical of what you want. you argued that this way of diplomacy, this way of existing was destroyed during the day and the 1st 2 world wars. do you think there's any chance of recreating it as a ways away the 3rd world war perhaps as a result of it?

well, i think that he's everybody's for, it should be everybody's hope that the research a possibility. right. and indeed, an ideal situation would be something like the reemergence of the european call search of bigger players on a, on an international scale. right? so obviously including local only the states and russia, but that also china, india, brazil. and so perhaps other other, other brick nations, right. of course there is, there is one problem simple say with great power equality concept that was characteristic off of the earth on call search of the night century. and that was the fact that the great powers sometimes treated the rather cavalierly in those nations that are smaller than that, right? so one has to be helps reinvent these of these idea of a global comsearch of bigger powers in ways that would be accommodating lee as to ration and interests of the smaller regional nations. now are also in one of your articles. a,

you mentioned that the united states or the americans always got surprised when other nations, non western in the mentality gets sort of westernized or get a developmental boost without becoming lag down, or rather down becoming subservient to them. and that applies not only russia, but also to turn key to china. and perhaps there are many other countries reducing and just the russians who cannot find keys to read them. merican version of the world as lead only by them. no, i think that russia, you shouldn't use the 1st mod west the nation to on the go westernization without losing its job to go solar energy as well. right. but it's not the only one, right, because one can probably place autumn, an empire than turkey in the same category. one can place japan until the 2nd world war into this category, which chinese to be a little bit different,

different because of course, there was of all the century of almost like, well they colonial situation in which in which china china was right in the late ninety's and early 20th century, but definitely we are dealing here with a fundamentally similar entities right, that are distinguished, not only by the military importance, by the comic side, but that also by psychology, collective psychology of the leads that seek to integrate certain measured amounts of westernization western influences with a job political sovereignty. one could also replace, perhaps iran in the same category there use, likewise, the country that has a long history of westernization, but then also into western attitudes. you mentioned in your article, very diplomatically that this historic lack of experience of weighing or negotiating your own interest against the interest of others may be somewhat

problematic for the world today. do you think that americans would be this abuse of this kind of entitlement? if so, how? well, i think that we have some, some, some examples off of all of that in the past. and i mentioned of the daytime of the late night and fixtures in early seventy's when the significant form. but it defeats brought him all about for a moment of this, this pre valence of essential european style. diplomatic culture embodied by henry kissinger, raises the presidential adviser to richard nixon. and later space is by the way on the european concert as well. absolutely. on the european diplomacy as the time of the younger congress, the high point of the european all search, right. because of the great powers, right off of the european influences in the daytime. and the american aspects of the day turns off. i'm mistaken and undeniable. right?

so of course, it is not excluded in principle, but of course it will be a very long process that will require a lot of effort on the part of once again, those are those countries that we mentioned, right? that, that combine certain degree of westernization with the attachment to an independence and job political nature. it's been a fascinating conversation. thank you very much for that. thank you. it's been a pleasure for me to thank you and thank you for watching the focus here again on the was the parts a with mm ah

ah ah, a terrorist attack is no longer with moreover, it was a terrorist act committed. we're getting a date level because no amateur mit, an attack like this. but all stream pipeline bombing was a stay phone terrorist attack. well, the western version of events is complete nonsense that's recording. i'm. let's go say the us military drone has crashed into the black sea of the crime in coast without any russian involvement of the violating on those lines on washington would want to destroy ty one semiconductor industry and let it fall into china's transit fe.