ah, ah with mm hm. hello, welcome to worlds apart. in the here since the ukranian conflict entered that's kinetic stage. international relations have changed more than in the decades prior to it. and the most surprising shifts occurred among countries not directly involved in this war. in deciding what stands to take, they have to carefully wave that interest and resources against longer geopolitical

and your economic trends. and almost all came up with that own version of neutrality in the trial into becoming a bi ward for sovereignty. well, to discuss it are now joined by moscow latasha associate professor for neutrality studies of care with or university of facilities. the great to talk to you. thank you very much for your time. thank you very much for having me. now i have to say that i'm a big fan of your youtube channel. i think it's a very rare source of genuine analysis which is such a very to disease. and i want to started by asking about this because political science is called science, because at least initially there was a presumption that it's done for the sake of finding objective trance and basing policy solutions in actual rather than preferred or concocted the reality. when did a change, when did it become so divorced from what is actually happening on the ground? well, it never really did. it was

a misnomer from the start. political science is considered part of social sciences and social sciences is fundamentally meets named. it's a stupid name to begin with. the natural sciences are real sciences because they're able to create hypotheses and then test them through experiments. now, social scientists at some point to people who do, who do politics and so on, got very envious of the, of the certainty that these people in the natural sciences are able to create. so what they did is they try to borrow these methods used to mean their own analysis, which has it's, i mean that's fair and square. that's ok. but one thing social sciences can never do, never is experiments. we cannot run history again. we cannot go back and look at what would have happened, had hitler been killed or something like that. we cannot run the experiments. so we are, we are living with this flaw and all the political sciences and international relations especially, hence, has a propensity towards bias. so we, we,

we interpret things that will be way more honest to call it a social philosophy. and within that we have methods to, to come to conclusions. but all that with all the limitations, i think your, your point is well taken. but i think throughout the whole history of diplomacy and international relations, there wasn't understanding that. first of all, there are certain trans, according to which countries in an international system develops. and 2nd, it was considered necessary to understand you are animals and parent hymns and red lines. and it was considered quite a way of doing due diligence because you know, it allowed countries to minimize their own policy costs. it allowed to minimize unnecessary escalation. and i think you made a point in one of your articles that, for example, in the case of ukraine and russia's security sensibilities in that region that was deliberately ignored. i wonder why was it as sort of ignorance out of ignorance,

or was it a deliberate stance? i. i don't know. so this is my one of my big questions there. so we see 2 things in when we look at the past, on the one hand, we have wars of choice that counties wanted to fight because they had some strategic object objectives. and i see elements of that in the current situation when we basically have a proxy war, ukraine is a proxy will hold a lot, much larger will, between, between nato and, and russia that's going on. and we have, we have forces on both sides, which would like to fight that. but on the other hand, we also have moments in history. when we see how ideology eats brain, right, the ideology takes over the crusades, were a dumb idea. the whole 30th war in europe was it was a really horribly dumb idea when people kill each other for ideological reasons. and what we're seeing at the moment, at least in the west, because i perceive russia and china as inherently realist. but in the west, we're seeing this dominance of id and the ideology that that portrays the world in

a very certain way. and if you follow that law, so then the idea of where they are very flattering ways of it. really a core that with their, with the actual history, at least the way it was recorded. no. so in my, i don't know whether the people in power in the west actually believe some of the stupidity stay alter because they're unable to actually compare with their own actions. or if they actually know that they are, that they're faking it on a. but use that in order to fight a war that they want to fight with russia because this war in ukraine was utterly presentable. every realist into west, from noam chomsky to, to henry kissinger. every one said this plot of land has to be neutral. it's a no brainer, everybody understood it and still we have these war which leads me to the question . all these people ideal, ideologically driven, or is there just that the faction that wanted it,

i'm having it and we are the propagandized masses at the moment, all over the place in russia and in and in the west, your old before. and he just said it now that the, the warning ukraine could have been avoided if the west and ukraine had misinterpreted russia's demand for security guarantees. and i remember when their security guarantees was put, were put on the table and openly discuss back in 2021, especially during the last in person meeting with in biden. and putin and geneva. russia had a sizeable contingent on ukraine's border, at least $80000.00 troops. and that strikes me as a pretty direct expression. oftentimes they, you know, like, they're not measurable for misinterpretation here. why do you think they're west that didn't change the russian signal the way it was sent, at least. so it was a huge mistake in december 2021, not to come to an agreement with russia. this would, i mean this, this,

these treaties said russia sent to nato, unto washington, didn't mention to word neutrality, but it's exactly what they demanded and mine to probation was to, didn't put the word in there in order not to try to force. i just wanted to say one to lansing, but i think it would be a crucial an know to make a considering your feel study. russia was asked what didn't ask when i tried it, but neutrality and that point of time was in means of protecting status. quan, it wasn't about the expansion of russia interest. it was simply preserving peace and status for if it looked at that that the tragedy of ukraine is that for the entire time that ukraine had a neutrality clause in its constitution up until 2014. as long as this was credible, there was no problem and as soon as it looked as if the ukraine could actually eventually become an a to member, that's the moment when crimea happened in 2014, then the calls went away and then everything went sour and south from there, so that was bad. and your initial question the why the west didn't take it serious

. i didn't believe russia wouldn't. it would invade. because in my view, this is so hurtful to russia because these people in ukraine are your brothers and sisters. and this is a civil war, basically, a late, a late civil war. so i didn't believe it will happen. and mister putin and like the russian leadership continuously said, we are not intending to fight a war. that's why i interpreted the troops as a way of saber rattling without wanting to do it because i believed the speech that was coming. this is such an important point. i think that is totally and missed and the west that for russia, it's a very, very difficult war. and not only in terms of material supplies or, you know, financial trasha, but for ethical and brother lee and, you know, reasons and i agree with you that, that nobody saw that russia would initiate that operation. but, you know, sometimes i think if the west actually counted on the fact that russia can pushed into the corner precisely on that premise that it was never ever dare to tag

the ukrainians, even in the ukrainian leadership is totally hijacked. and the ukranian territory is totally hijacked by the irony. don't you think that put in ultimately as a commander in chief, i'm not asking by the way for the endorsement of this policy, but definitely have to do something to our fulfill his duties as the commander in chief of russian. well, it is obviously, it is obviously now the, the conclusion that he took, i just thought to hurt or the, the fear of like how much it would hurt. what would actually not allowed it to happen. look to people who understood russia very well in the past. george kennan, and the one of the person to interviewed 1st on my channel ambassador chak matlock to last years ambassador to the soviet union. right before everything fell apart. these people said, if we push nato to the boldest, and if we're trying to integrate all of these countries, there will be a war and india and they were right now. does that?

does that justify the rushes actions? no, it doesn't. because we, we do have a fundamental problem, but the fundamental problem is much bigger than russia, which is that countries, especially great powers, take the right to self defend in other countries. it's the that is the original season of international relations ever after the 2nd world war. for myself, defense, i go and fight abroad. i'm russia committed that to. but the west has committed that like dozens of times since to law. since the end of the 2nd world i was witnessing our rushes actions to that of the west. and you even said that russia is i think ruthlessly using out the west plane book. but then a flying from the other side of the world. you know, like we are sending our own soldiers and we are suffering both in terms of our own economy in terms of our society we, i'm making our personal contribution in 1st of all, fighting, not only for our security, but also for our self who then this is something that i want to ask you about

because i also interview a lot of people from around the world. and i see this up search in not just sovereignty, but national self, who it's all around the world in india and china in latin america in africa. and i think this rise the collective emergence of self collective self, which is ultimately at odds with the western concept of itself. because there was only believe that only its way is legitimate and all the other countries having their own manifest destiny thing to be, you know, i, to magically a western atom is, is that, is this war only for security, or is it for something bigger than that it will, it will, it has already influenced international relations tremendously. right. and the way that other count pres behave and, and that the changes that we're seeing with saudi arabia with iran coming to, to, to new york courts and with the, with rochelle. so like having a new relationship with china and so on. these are tremendous changes. but i

wouldn't go as far as to say that this was probably the intent from the beginning. this is more, this is certainly an effect. but, you know, especially when we'll start and, and, and while i was, and they usually go very different from the way that people start to plan them. now i want to ask you specifically about the native because, you know, a couple of years ago, there was a lot of to talk whether nature threatens or doesn't threaten nature. and you wrote that it's pretty much irrelevant. was that what's important is the perception of thread, but given the recent statements by european leaders like angle america, friends all along that mince get agreements were never man to be see, sorry, agreements. they were only meant as an opportunity to give your crane time to regroup. and rearm, can you really blame russia for feeling very insecure about native intentions? i mean, the way it's interpreted in russia right now is the look. we were know,

paranoia call along these people plans you know, attack us or just threaten us from the territory of our neighbor. i agree with you . i mean, do you don't need to be a genius, 2 to 2 half strategic empathy. look at whom are these me sales pointed at. i mean, nato to cold war sees to, to be nato didn't, and to me, cells always pointed to moscow. that's absolutely clear. and the nato didn't, didn't expand to the atlantic, nate, to expand the, to the east and, and like the, also when you look at the rhetoric that comes from eastern european countries, which maybe for legitimate reasons, are afraid of the russians. that's, that's possible that, that they also feel threatened. that's the tragedy of international relations. everybody feels threatened by everybody and everybody feels like a victim. and if you feel like a victim you feel justified to defend yourself. right. so i, i understand that russians feel threatened, and they all, i mean there's, there's all of these publications just 2 days ago in foreign policy again, oh,

we should prepare for the colonizing russia for breaking up rush in 20 successor states. that's the only humane way of continuing with the entire regions, like i, you, people crazy and they write that they do write that and then they wonder why russia perceive them as a threat. well, i mean that, unfortunately, i'm sure they're not watching your channel or reading any history books because there are a number of you know, western leaders that attempted to do that in the past. and it never bode well for them. but let's take a very short break right now and we can come back to the discussion in a couple of minutes vacant. ah, he's got to do is identify the threats that we have. it's crazy confrontation, let it be an arms race, his offense, very dramatic development. only personally,

i'm going to resist. i don't see how that strategy will be successful, very critical time time to sit down and talk. ah ah ah ah ah welcome back to worlds apart with buzz cola, associate professor for neutrality studies of kill it or university professor like i just before the break. i cut you short them you had the i'm sure an interesting point to express. well, the point is like people in russia and ukraine would,

and most of them were old enough. remember that they were living in a completely different country. they were living in this, u. s. s. aren't and uses are broke apart into 50 success of states. people who, who went through that would naturally like b b, like think that maybe something could happen again. so i understand, i really understand that a lot of people in russia are legitimate, the afraid of what's going to happen to their country. now professor latania teaching in japan, and i think japanese history is very crucial for understanding. russia's deep mistrust of western intentions because japan was the only country there was subjected to an attack by and nuclear weapons for no apparent tactical reasons. and the way it was interpreted in both the soviet and the russian historiography is that it was an act of disproportionate, cruel black and blatant intimidation. just for the sake of making a geopolitical point, do you think the current are western and particular american leadership?

when it's current political culture with the fact that they still haven't recognize the bombing of japan as, as, as a historic mistake on, do you think they still capable of doing something like that to make that point? yes, although i must say that hiroshi ma, nagasaki were not that huge a point they were, they were bigger as a point towards to soviet union than against japan because he rushman arkansas keyword incineration of these 2 cities. but during that, at the, the entire previous month, several cities were incinerated. you know, more people died in the fire bomb rates of tokyo than died than during hiroshima, right at one in one single night. so the $9045.00 was a huge exercise of the united states terrorizing civilian populations illegally illegally. this was clearly illegal. this is a war crime. it just the way that japanese committed war crimes in china just the way that war crumbs have happened in europe. it was a war crime, it was never a and by a totally different kind of weapons. i mean, it's not that there isn't,

am i big difference for the, for the victims. but in terms of the effect that produces a public effect, nuclear weapons is not comparable. to anything else, it was late since i studied that period. i must say the nuclear. the fact that the nuclear weapon was dropped on japan was a good excuse for the dogs in tokyo, who wanted to surrender to actually surrender it helped those who wanted to surrender because there was an option of continue doing, continuing fighting. and we have this problem. so it was a horrible thing and it, it shouldn't have happened. but if you're asking me yes, i think to, we are capable of doing something stupid like that again. and i hope never a hope it won't happen. now let's talk about the international and impact of the of the conflict in ukraine. and i want to start my question with quoting polish prime minister imitation. was that what i, that's good will said the other day that russia victory in ukraine would amount to the end of the west golden age. as if that golden age was supposed to be eternal

putting aside russia. do you think other countries, especially on the western countries, have much sympathy or desire for the western golden age to continue? well, every country has an interest in their own, in their own well being. right. and we've seen now 500 years of european dominance or anglo european dominance of, of, of the world basically. right. i mean, we white people and i include, of course of russia we, we basically raped the rest of the website. and the way that we didn't have the colonial, colonial polish and so on. no, but the way russia expanded itself was absolutely different from the way the west did it. we didn't, we don't have the white man's burden. i mean, we have a totally different concept of integrating societies and it's still pretty visible in russia. is there ethnic and national relations,

especially during the soviet times, by the way, the russians were, the least politically endowed the national group or within the soviet union. but anyway, let's, let's, let's put that aside because i'm struck by this notion of the golden age because it sounds like extremely racist to me and openly in the for me. because the golden age for the west, you know, the way international system is structured man, significant and miss balances and much less precious conditions for many other countries. and most of those countries, one the international system to be, if not fair, then at least a balance that you know, they, they want to get their fair share. they want to get their fair and you do you thing in a western please, for this eternal privilege, resonate with them. well, know, and that's why actually south america, africa, and most of south east asia and, and asia in general is not going along. and doesn't,

doesn't swallow the west the narrative. i'm not entirely sure how much they believe the, the russian narrative neither but, but they got don't go along and they kind of like golden age stuff that's, that's exactly the thing that then outrages people outside of the bubble. and this doesn't help. it doesn't help to create followers, right? this is actually an interesting point. you just made that you're not sure how much they are buying both their western and russian narrative and, and these conflicts strikes me as one of the 1st conflicts where narrative don't even matter. because the countries seem to be of their own line. they are doing their own calculations, you know, and they're looking at their own reality to picture in order to decide where to position themselves. isn't that a new development about brought, brought in by this conflict that the, the influence of propaganda seems to be diminishing? well, the inference of propaganda is strongest inside these, these bubbles right inside the west, probably in. so i don't know,

rush hasn't been there, but probably there too. and probably also inside china, you know, in did the propaganda is targeted towards your own. because if you want to go to war, you really need to motivate people to take up arms and run towards the bullets. so you need to build a very strong argument at the west. this building at the moment, a very strong argument to basically hate on russia and break all the links, including the banding of your, of your network in the whole of europe. this is mind boggling to me. you know, it wasn't hard to hear. i'm in the classical write a check of i'm in there. what don't have to do with that but, and expelling a russian a sportsman and sports women. you know, all of this is supposed to break the links to the people so that we cannot feel compassion for each other anymore. and this is absolutely horrible. and we need to fight that dynamic. and we need to integrate the ukrainians. we need to integrate the russians. we need to build trust again because that's going to be the basis of any kind of piece that's going to come after this. well, if you're truly interested in peers, but do you think that's actually one of the western intentions?

because i think and other distinct feature of this conflict is that, unlike in any other piece, is not even paid lip service. i mean, there are no calls for negotiations, and fact there outright cause for continuing this war. do you think there is any sort of deliberate association that's when the continuation of this war and the western political agenda to preserve or you know what it is as it's strategic interest, which is dominance. now look, every country, once peace but only its peace. the west also wants peace, but only a peace at its own definition. and ra, a world going on, and the printer listed about, like, if you got the whole world, you got peace. you see, i mean, the, that's the whole point. you try to use weapons to bring the piece that you desire. now that the difficult part is always to accept a piece that is not perfect. and yeah, i do think that the way this is going like over the long run, they will have to be

a piece that nobody is happy with. now many countries, as i mentioned in my introduction, now describe their position as neutral, but i find from my line of work that neutrality has different shades to it. and the way the chinese new neutrality is there in different, from the way indian describe it, or the way it's seen in turnkey in south africa. what does neutrality even mean in this day and age? it means what countries needed to mean neutrality is one of the most flexible concepts and international relations that you can imagine, which is why it's so useful. but why it is so inherently different, difficult to grasp. so that the chances we have is that countries fill it with a meaning that is useful to them and hopefully to, to all those. because at its core, it means i'm not taking decide of either of these completely. i'm not going to have a military alliance, which is why i also think china is not actually in an alliance with russia. all the scholars also agree here because you don't have these natal mechanism and blah,

blah, blah, you have a good friendship. yes. and there's various degrees here and i would hope that more countries blaming neutrality would help to de escalate the spiral between these 2 rivals. speaking about russia and china, i think both last grand beijing and non describing their relationship as a, as an alliance. and even though this concept is not very particular popular in rush, i think it's more like an open relationship when they have mutual attraction. but they also have practical benefits of sticking together. and the flexibility of this arrangement is viewed as a, as a particular value within the contract off of the relationship. how does it compare with western insistence on alliances in unity and why do you think the concept of neutrality is ultimately saw and palatable to the west? because as we discussed it, there was that is against the concept of new crime neutrality, both for ukraine and as we saw for finland and sweden see neutrality is always

benefiting the weaker part of a conflict more, you know, you can be neutral, but you, your neutrality political neutrality will never be outcome neutral. it will always benefit one of both parties of a conflict and right now into conflict between russia and nato. russia has to, we is, is the weaker part. so russia is more interested in, in your trial at the, and to west understand that that's why they try to crack down and everybody else as hard as they can. because they know that there's neutrality ultimate to benefit russia. it's a very natural dynamic off of a triangular relationship. yeah, and it's, it's another way of like, imposing dominance. now for many countries and correct me if, if i'm wrong here. but i think for many western countries, neutrality is no longer a security concept. you know, the way they talk about it, it's couched in the very psychological language. it's either you're with us or you're against us. you have to be on the right side of history. and i wonder if you

think it will remain that way, especially considering that the united states is increasingly preferring its pacific allies more than its european ones. i mean, both in terms of economic development, in terms of military developments, the united states is looking more engagingly towards the pacific and that europe is sort of left to fend for itself. do you think it will do you think that will empower this? try for neutrality or do you think that would make it? we can, i can, i can predict it, but at the moment in europe, neutrality is shrinking. we flossed finland. we've lost sweden and on the other counties are also very much ideologically, ideologically captured. but ideally, neutrality is striving in the developing world of america, africa, most of asia. so there will be a change, you know, every international system creates, again, its own version of neutrality. that's then adapted to that situation. i cannot

foresee at what it is, but neutrality is moving out of europe and moving into the wider world, probably around some form of non alignment. for europe, the situation ain't great, really not. i mean, we now have like very hard fronts and this is very dangerous. so i would hope that in some level, some form of di escalation, not necessarily drug abuse. collation would come along because we need to live together. you know, our continent is not good at not slipping each other's throats. we have to stop these and we keep failing over and over on our a common duration continent. absolutely. but in order for a long piece to take place, a unit to leave and left leave and allowed the golden age to effect. not only yourself, but also your. your neighbor is far and wide. professional a t i, it's been a fascinating conversation. thank you very much. for that, thank you. and thank you for watching hope to hear again well to part ah,

a with mm ah with

with we see how the use we look horizon at the record base, turn it into an aggressive structure with this they could go containing russia. galeb rob calls out the west using ukraine as a low grade to distract from the problems at the middle east and global south. south africa decide to quake the international criminal court. that's according to the countries presidents who went on to leave off b. i see it in a rest wiring full bladder method. oh, so they found some distressing images. dozens of dead power, military fighters industry that following reports that have been battle with the sudanese army as violence in the country, wages for 10 days,

thousands of civilians and.