more liberal, it's more permissive and its nature and it's more toler, randolph. um, you know, the, the other players constituent, the peculiar at peculiarity. why do you seeing the chinese a so permissive about that, even though they have at least domestically a reputation for us to retire in tendency. oh, why don't think because we, it isn't possible to make another unit for a world. so everybody in china and russia or need to understand that the west will be the significant one of the most significant offense, but not the only one and the aisle toward tearing the order is possible only when you have one leader. so the new ball and the new world order will not have one later will have many leaders. and that means that the tool been democratic by default. that's an interesting notion of why this thing done to the americans for still have significant leverage. we enjoy norm as privileges

a trying to 5 history rather than making cars the use of it. well, because they don't know what to do, they don't know how to leave in the new world. they don't to, they don't have a name and any ideas on about how to, how to generate the incomes necessary to provide the internal stability and do not have states. so they may need others. so i yeah, as well, in a certain way they need it. they billed to the prosperity and not only on on the unique internal firstsource, so we cannot make model bod l on the ability to, to extract extra benefits from the rest of the world. no, i don't see any indicators. the united states or europe, to our intellectually prepared for the new ways of leaving you together with the states on the equal basis and before t, until until the will understand how to preserve the internal

stability without ultimate capabilities on international c. before the and to they will try to resist the new and the new, the changes now and just through the united states and europe in one basket. but historically, you're expressing your has a very different historical experience. and i would claim, collect a psychological makeup, that trajectory of development has been different the and they faced with different challenges. and you wrote a pretty hard to take seeing that the russia objectively and historically is an adversary of western europe, not of the united states, but of western europe fridge. as i said, it's hard to take because through all the cold, cold war and even after that we tried and for a while seemingly succeeded in establishing a relationship on more or less equal basis a place to come. normally,

they were cultural exchanges. there were some social interaction. why do you think we had due to being ever serious? well, well, russia has been having because i relationships and colleagues from the columbus was europe for hundreds years. but it did not prevent us from being converse or is as well rational by the, by the faith of history, by uh, by nature uh, has been the open until forced to your seems russia and moved as a big power seems the beginning of the 16th century and, and the authors agree that russia, as each neighbors europe use only one non european power, which has been able to defend feeds. so very nice international fairs, but the price which pressure pays for that and to replace for that is the permanent

of those scenario relationships. me, richard now i'm pretty much in the open but let's discuss that. in the 2nd part, we have to take a short break, but we'll get back in just a few moments stitch and the memory loss isn't the usual forgetfulness the a form of memory loss and ability to recall past events, the

can be general or concern. some specific events solely, in some cases, the memory loss can extend back in the decades. the starts an intensive course of the memory recovery on r t a . the welcome back to world to part with to mccain bought a that shelf program director of the, of all the discussion club. timothy you wrote recently that we leave in an era when even petitions cannot publicly acknowledge the end of its ability of power politics and a study psychology,

a collective psychology on the side. and it's an oxy on there that if we suppress or don't acknowledge something is bound to have, it's outside, i'm conscious influence. i wonder if the ukrainian conflict, which brought out this very serial relationship we discussed previous, the bits in the russia and the western europe into the open can change any of that . because in a way, it's a, it's a russian direct. the russian move against this proxy use of power by the west. well, uh, the peoples to discuss what is, what was 1st russia west under the federal relationships and you're creating conflicts as a consequence or otherwise, as you've said. so i think because there are to the conflict to about ukraine isn't the same time, is there conflict of is the continuation of russian history,

of course. and at the same time, the conflict about the future balance of power in your we believe that in many in you're applying to united states, assume that uh, the success afresh, or the successful accomplishment of the russian goals and ukraine will pull from the west in the very, very, very difficult position of growing crushing power advisor in europe was over. go to europe. uh so uh, but at the same time this is this construct, is it possible for us in history? the bottom freshman civilization is unfinished. the russian history is a, oh say here with this always i'm senior. so i mean to, and that would be finished the, that's a, that's not the last thing that matter. because i mean, the russians, the kremlin prize, the nasa line, and they're just course or the fight against snap citizen, uh, or against supremacy as an ideology. and we saw that we have uh,

dealt with that in the 20th century. reducing is, could ever be determinant. we finished this approach, the terminations explicitly better than others. and, you know, certain nations have certain rules for themselves, but uh, you know, apply, you ask whether we can defeat nationalism. yeah, no, no, no, it is impossible. nationalism, but the supremacy, the idea that you know, one group of nations or one nation is by definition, is better than the same nationally as one of the supremacy idea is the same. and the national is one, fortunately is the part of human nature. but it won't come on, there is a benevolent nationalism understanding your history, accepting dark and do hope that there's a better way to them. okay, well, nationally isn't ways about 14 to nation to put, you know, nation on the top, on the others and considering your nation as more advanced or more supreme to the

other nations. unfortunately, the emergence of the european of the present to europe in the nation state was a company i was, that was the national of these, basically the, the, the present, the friends of britain or e to lee or spain, all the products of nationally. so that's why for the western europeans, it is so difficult to understand what we say just for them. it is because for them ukrainian nationalism is nothing special. the french eliminated any national minorities in their own countries. they any, any capabilities for them, for, for the national minorities to express the political will. so for them, the nationalism is okay and do bringing nationalism is okay for the western europe . and this was one of the debris meant that and then, or when the completeness understanding between the russian investigator i'm sure we may play out some of these disagreements here. and because i think the core purpose

of the united nations, at least as an idea, is that to give a space for paint patriotism of all countries. but also to postulate some sort of structure that allows, you know, the differences, divergent interest of those countries to be sold out openly out in the open through los, through international legislation. but the merchants of proxy wars and various methods of, you know, accomplishing your goals through various methods is in fact the version of, of the united nation system. can we ever, at least come to a point when dealing out in the open is a preferred way of, uh, construing international politics? well, 1st of all, i think the, the, to the core purpose of the united nations as institutions was to integrate so between young and, and china, into the western dominate system. so to make and the soviet union and late to china,

not the revolutionary powers, but parts of the system and then deal with them within the system. as the the west deed and defeated soviet union within this, the western dominated system represented by and boarded by the united nations. but having said that, i don't think that the idea of united nations is the 1st one. i think that in the future, depending on the composition of power and on the abilities of the state, of the north western states and the west to get in terms of the united nation system, kind of where account can actually serve the purposes which you have to screen and perhaps not only because of some high brow principals, but because of the basic necessity. as you mentioned, the number of international players increases and from the i'm sorry, a win win. and i'll send think when, when proposition is the cheapest though, for everyone to accomplish something,

but also not to lose. a lot of war that we are facing right now is, is a very heavy and very expensive option for both russia, ukraine, and perhaps even the so for the west, do you think, what do you think will be the, the idea logical, or the conceptual outcome of of these experiments, this is too early to say. this is definitely too early to say, because what we're seeing is not the world form. uh, the international system has gone for several global wars which directly engaged many participants. so far we see that this has approximate going through between the washer and the west and the west side. so what is the hands of the a for your graham populations? so i think the, that the edition management, the international continue to need to go through many of such a conflicts before we will be able to, to see, to see the outcomes, to,

to, to see the more interest and more, more internally, balanced international order. and it's, it's institutional embodiment you mentioned before, the american strategic goal here is to we, can the russia to expand it cannot defend or perhaps the sorts itself, militarily, do you think it's a feasible goal? and i'm asking, you're not as a, you know, impact to patrons, but as somebody from the deluxe to the realist school, so i'm sure you, you look at it, i don't think ok, i don't think this thing to that it is, which is a poor cool. because we're afraid who's nervously kept my number's going to reach was it was surface. russian, the institutional system is very strong. russian state, there obviously is very strong and fresh and economy is doing well. and actually in russia has been never and before fighting the war in such as

gould and comfortable international environment. as we do have now, thanks to the change on the global distribution of power, sayings to the emergence of china, india, and others, as a toner, just bought those things to the ability to criteria to this rush. let those who come back to 100 years a go up to the october able to motion to clear what do for me in rush when the so the to actual was completely isolated, truly, completely isolated. there was no china, no region nobody. and so it this way we to action needed to stand alone against the colonial and fires of the west of the sure of the united states. now the situation is completely different. now if we keep talking about the powerful countries the use of power, do you think the means we assessed the power need to change as well? because, you know, people, at least the western economy is often to refer to gps the, you know,

like this paramount the benchmark. and it's pretty clear that there is a difference in feasible physical assets and the inflated artificial assets. again, the, the ability to use your power in a one country may have a basis all over the world, but the ability to actually effectively use that power may not be there. so do you think our approach is to how we assess, you know, great power or even mid sized power capabilities, economic, cultural, social, military influence? do they need to be reframe somehow as well? i think we need to judge by the outcomes from now we see that how many percent of global should be russia has 2 percent, most of the same significant the router. so now you see the country which represents about 2 percent of the global to do p e is able to stand against the west for more than one year. was only economic sanctions, so cetera,

et cetera. so what's power, my power, minute, those and the meaning of power at ease to, to make you able to defend your, your values for it was the sole meaning of fuel power your to defend your survival and your values. so we see that russian power is enough to defend our survival and the values begins the cumulative powers by the west. we have only a few minutes left and i.