and the strategy shifts in favor of limited nuclear capabilities as a result of this, the risk that the nuclear can be used now has increased like never before and this has never been observed. even the hottest moments of the cold war american colleagues professor legalda are also classics of strategic thought. alarmed and fearful of the frivolity of politicians who do not want to understand the scale of the threat, one of the most respected scientists in international affairs calls for reflection. what is the increase in pressure on the nuclear superpower, and the former director of the famous lamose hair labs, zikrit hecker, is in a very gloomy mood after everything that has happened in recent months, the entire world's nuclear order is in jeopardy. he must be saved. as for the role of nuclear weapons

in the strategic calculations of their owners, let's talk about the remarkable specialist, our interlocutor dmitry, mechvich. at what point did nuclear weapons cease to be considered as a means of warfare, it turned into a method of deterrence, that is, something not for use, and in fact, is it possible to reverse the perception of it as simply very powerful type of weapons in the fifties, when nuclear weapons began to enter the troops. it was considered. as a means of warfare . it went on practically. uh, well, until the sixties early seventies. military academies still, uh, studied the properties of nuclear weapons, like, well, like any other weapon, they built military strategies, taking into account the fact that the war will be waged with the use of nuclear weapons,

actually. e during the entire cold war, nuclear weapons. it was considered as a means of warfare on this. as a matter of fact, the containment strategy itself was based on containment. uh, suggests that the other country is the country you're holding back. uh, believes that she is absolutely convinced that under certain conditions you will, uh, start using nuclear weapons, so there are certain red lines, and so on was, uh, the joint statement of the united states and the soviet union in. e. already in the period of mikhail sergeevich gorbachev, when e in which it was e stated that a nuclear war in a nuclear war cannot be winners, respectively, it makes no sense lead. it should never be untied. uh, but, perhaps, here, uh, really, nuclear weapons ceased to be perceived as a means of

warfare only after the end of the cold war after the start of the period. eh, the failed integration of russia in the end e. western institutions into the western system and then, when this integration was recognized as unsuccessful and failed, and it was replaced by a cold snap, and then hostility and eventually confrontation from nuclear weapons gradually became, e, perceived again as means of warfare, although already at other levels at the level of tactical nuclear weapons. eh, no danger. how is it considered? you radiate a general nuclear catastrophe, although deterrence still remains the concept of nuclear deterrence was born in the sixties, the approaches of that time are in force on it worked in the usa and in the ussr or something needs to be updated already. today, the position that the general nuclear war

will put an end to is still relevant. e of the existence of mankind, in no case can it be started, but on the other hand. uh, there was an idea that more than the united states there, back in the cold war years , the theory of limited nuclear wars was spread, to some extent. uh, on the russian side , it started with a period of weakness in the nineties. er russian conventional armed forces, when nuclear weapons at a tactical, relatively speaking, pre -strategic level, er, began to be considered as an acceptable means to end the conflict, as i said, that is, if you lose the war using only conventional means of destruction is in order to avoid, uh, defeat and show your adversary

your determination to use all the means of warfare that you have, including nuclear weapons. you e produce either a demonstration or a real e, a nuclear explosion or the use of nuclear weapons in order to e, put an end to the conflict and proceed to negotiations in the most e, in detail this is a strategy described in american eh documents in american e studies, but also in our military doctrine. uh, there's a provision that that e russia, unlike the soviet union, which did not make such statements that russia could use the first nuclear weapon, e in conditions where e the development of hostilities could lead to e-th a threat to the very existence of the russian state, but the frequency of mention of nuclear war lately. is it a reflection of the high intensity of

contradictions, or is fear really growing, as it was during the cold war, real fear did appear, but along with this, it was not real for a long period after the end of the cold war, probably the first 20 years. uh, his pantry. uh, there was fear, indeed, there was a rather large number of publications, including military, uh, specialists, in which, uh, the expediency of using nuclear weapons to solve military problems, that is, since it was in the fifties years. uh, this in my opinion is a reflection. and the asymmetry that exists today between, uh, the united states of america on the one hand and russia on the on the other hand, if the ussr and the usa were equal parties in the e-cold war, then today the

united states, all the more so, together with its allies, is many times superior to the russian federation in terms of basic parameters, military power, with the exception of e -strategic nuclear weapons. and here there is temptations e. the temptation is based on the fact that, under certain conditions, it is possible to use nuclear weapons on the enemy. uh, since the opponent is considered as a rational author who will not apply. uh, a weapon capable of destroying all life on the planet. that is, he is more capable of admitting his own defeat than we are of destroying the planet. and uh, because again, uh, during the cold war, due to the period of attempts to integrate into the west that followed, the idea was widely spread that uh nuclear

weapons were strategic nuclear weapons, in no case should they be used. and by the way, this was recently confirmed by the leaders of the official five-nuclear nuclear powers. yes , strategic nuclear weapons cannot be used. here you can find weapons at a lower level, whether uh, if we talk about the west in order to implement some very specific uh military tasks, or in our case, uh, in the case of the russian federation, to compensate for the obvious uh, let’s say the obvious imbalance in conventional armed forces between russian forces and thanks to the forces of the united states. we talked with dmitry trenev. well, nuclear applications. god will give. after all, we will avoid the sense of self-preservation of the world authorities should work. but with conventional fighting appetite, seems to just flare up. american airbase

rammstein in germany hosted a meeting of defense ministers of 40 nato member countries and partners to coordinate military assistance to ukraine, it was decided to make this format a regular meeting once a month pentagon chief lloyd austin ramstein will be the manager of all efforts, the largest american base in europe, the european command of the us air force and since the founding of the base, the nato air force command has been used mainly as a logistics center for the transfer military cargo in the centers of regional conflicts now in rammstein, including weapons are arriving for their subsequent delivery to ukraine, their largest american military hospital in europe is located at the base, in fact. all this is a small american town in germany in addition to military facilities. there are american schools, shopping centers, a post office and a police

station here, often, american dollars are used as the only means of payment, but ramstein is not only geopolitics but also music in january ninety, fourth in germany , a group of the same name appeared, which soon gained worldwide fame on march 10 of this year. the musicians released a new video with the song side what does time mean? a six-minute ballad tells of war and peace, and the chorus is the phrase time, please stop the critics. it has already been regarded as a clear allusion to the current special operation of the russian armed forces in ukraine, the idea that ukraine should defeat russia on the battlefield and so put the end of russian expressionism in the west the near-

consensual voices calling for a deal are still ringing, but less and less coherent washington insiders. they say that biden is finally until he joined the party of the victorious end. but on the verge of bringing the victorious end closer, it is supposed to be massive supplies of more and more advanced weapons to kiev, we agreed on this in germany, and the us congress passed the land lease law, which greatly facilitates supplies, we will discuss the situation with maxim shapovalenko, deputy director of the center for analysis of strategy and technology. maksim to what extent does nato aid affect the course of the company? it increases the combat effectiveness of the ukrainian side. it is obvious that life in our military complicates these supplies? uh, well, i'm the only one who would not exaggerate the significance of these deliveries in terms of considerations. well, despite the importance of the military-technical aspect, still in the war, uh, everything is decided by people. but just with the people on the

opposite side there is a big problem. really up to a quarter of trained uh military personnel, yes, oh, which varied relatively, so to speak such a decent combat experience during their stay in the donbass, they were now, in fact, final , and all this equipment that is supplied. well, besides the fact that it is certainly partly, uh, of soviet origin hmm, and partly already western. eh, that is, this technique must be mastered. and here, uh, i suspect that the ukrainians will have big problems precisely because now they are making up for the loss. uh, in people, mainly due to those mobilized in general, the scale of western military assistance impresses ukraine, after all, the official there are no formal obligations to allies. before her, no, similar

cases come to mind in the past, further back in history. this is the vietnam war, especially after the americans got out. e. well, they withdrew their troops. vietnam is the end of 73 years and before the actual victory e. so to speak, the forces of the north well, probably two years, yes during this time. uh, well, americans mostly. yes, they managed to put weapons of military equipment worth five billion dollars there, and in fact, all this remained trophies. uh, hmm, vietnam couples, while we don’t was. uh, a formal ally of the united states. and there, in my opinion, there is also such a trick that the americans somehow tried to interpret the provision of the agreement that the regional military bloc could provide, well, on legal or close to legal grounds, military assistance to vietnam more interesting. it seems to me that

a comparison with the october war of 73 will look like. indeed, in a month or two, both the united states and the ussr carried out such a very impressive volume of supplies of special equipment to the opposing the parties, in principle, were even comparable in terms of volume. uh, there are about 670,000 tons of special equipment there in terms of timing and forces involved. uh, it was air transport and sea transport. what amounts are actually very comparable? with the fact that by now the west has delivered to ukraine, and one could still compare with whom the soviet union acted, e.g. samala, in the ethiopian war of the seventy-seventh

seventy-eight years. this, of course, is about a quarter less than the volume of deliveries and the amount. actually speaking, 1 billion. well, too. in general, it was done without the existence of a precious friendship treaty. a collaborative one was signed, in fact , after the end of the active phase of the conflict. on what basis are deliveries made? is it a gift or a loan? or something else, all deliveries go through the line of military-technical assistance free of charge, that is, for nothing. with rare rare exceptions, let's say, here, uh, they ordered anti-tank weapons. uh, the ukrainians are with the germans. uh, these funds are paid by an unnamed sponsor by someone obvious from ukrainian oligarchs. uh, this, yes from current production and uh with payment. and so almost 99% of all deliveries go through the line of military-technical assistance. this, if you call a spade a spade,

inscribed or inscribed uh, from the channels of western countries, the military armament is quite a large number, uh, investors and are ready to invest in securities, uh defense companies in western stock markets. and by the way, against this background , capitalization has also grown very much. well the marketing giants are there glynamics uh by systems uh, somewhere from a quarter, so to speak, up to 30% of the capital, but you often heard that europe is far behind the military-technical sphere, has forgotten how the current crisis will become a turning point in this context production of sophisticated weapons systems. well , it is clear that from generation to generation, the technical complexity of these systems of basic weapons systems increases and this is the case when

it is necessary, or collectively, to get down to business. yes, that is, a joint program and joint projects or integrated into the american system. e, scientific industrial cooperation in the defense and legal complex and participate in it on the rights to contractors, possibly key, but nonetheless contractors. and so, in general, in fact , if we look, then in the association in europe well, at most 3 4 e such diversified defense corporations. present and well comparable in any case in terms of its financial and technical power with the american leaders, so it will most likely be either a collective work of the europeans. but, most likely, still expect their connection to american programs. thank you. maxim shapovalenko was with us. classical war is accompanied by economic, and in it the front. it seems to be shifting to the energy side. in the european union, the moment the decision is

made to pay for russian gas in rubles, somehow moscow is demanding either to refuse to pay for gas as well. there is no unity, some countries are leaning towards the conditions of gazprom, since for a couple of years they see no alternative for themselves; others have gone on the principle that poland and bulgaria have never declared that they do not receive russian raw materials. today , russia supplies europe with gas by about 40%, and germany is supplied with 55% of russian gas to europe through four pipelines. the main one is the nord stream. one of them last year pumped 59 billion cubic meters of gas through ukrainian transit more than 40 billion cubic meters there is also the yamal europe pipeline built in 1999 to bypass ukraine and finally the turkish stream, in addition to germany,

finland austria latvia moldova is very dependent on russian gas in europe czech republic serbia and other republics of the former yugoslavia because of the refusal of poland and bulgaria to pay for gas in rubles on april 27, gazprom suspended the supply of fuel to these countries in other directions. the transit continues, while the european union and the united states have excluded restrictions on russian supplies from the main sanctions packages. energy resources, in addition to pipeline gas in the waters of the northern sea route, russia has tankers that deliver gas, they are capable of transporting liquefied gas from russian gas fields to the west all year round without icebreaking assistance. true, the share of russian liquefied gas does not exceed 4% of all lng supplies to europe. relations with specific countries are an interesting question, but more importantly, another time ends when relations in the european gas sector were measured,

an orderly system operated from the beginning of the seventies and strengthened economic stability and geopolitical crumble. she did not start right now, but it looks like the final stage has come, let's talk with our good friend marcel salikhov marcel how qualitatively the changes are taking place in the gas market. on the one hand, russia's demand to pay in rubles, on the other hand, its refusal to do so we are entering a new legal reality, when long-term contracts are becoming a thing of the past, a scheme that includes settlements through gazprombank is such a compromise and working, that is, it is generally suitable for european energy companies . and the analysis that was carried out by a special european commission and special explanations were published, which are that this scheme does not violate the imposed sanctions, but, in fact, european the commission gives nakhodka to the national

government to decide. and what do you do to agree or disagree? and now the situation already shows that there are different positions within the eu. there are some countries. well, first of all, for such political reasons. yes and this is the speech in the first place, and does not agree to such events. and well, a question. to what extent it violates or there does not violate long-term contracts, it is so, uh, in a sense, inconsistent. that's because i don't know, but publicly, what is written in these long-term contracts, yes, that is, this is an important aspect legal, like what conditions, and what is force majeure, what is force majeure and so on publicly we do not know. yes, we can only

judge gazprom's position as soon as we turn off and suspend supplies. well, it may be that it just contributes to the fact that other long-term contracts will suffer, but to some extent to some extent, and in this strategy of gazprom well, there is a rational grain, yes, that is, gazprom now wants to show that if other countries other companies will not agree to these conditions, then, accordingly, this will be followed by an immediate reaction in the form of a suspension of supplies. well, this is some kind of bet. yes, we are ready to stop supplies in order to somehow influence the rest of the participants, too, but this can lead to the fact that, uh, well, as if to a backlash and, accordingly, this whole system of contracts when people start to refuse. and she supports this system , including the export of gazprom and she will start already hmm

slowly break down. or maybe all this scheme will turn into something, well, completely archaic, for example, russia sells gas by barter to those who supply it with something else of strategic importance in return, after all. now there are already a huge number of sanctions that have been adopted at the level of the european union, which directly prohibits the supply of certain goods there. yes, including equipment or let's say equipment for lng that is, even if some european company or even a separate country, a is ready to supply something it will not be able to, because there is a ban at the eu level. therefore, such barter schemes are quite difficult to implement, but within the european union well, i think the following will happen. and what about such disunity, some different positions of european countries? when someone agrees to the russian scheme, someone will not agree, but there is a single market within the eu, yes,

therefore, in fact, those companies that agreed to these conditions, they may well increase purchases of russian gas and , accordingly, resell it to those companies who do not agree to these terms. naturally, a lot of questions arise there, but about the infrastructure there. eh, it 's physical or virtual, right? that is, whether it will be necessary to transfer somewhere additionally. here, ah, so here in advance to say how difficult it will be. it is complicated, but nevertheless, similar things, they will happen, that is, part of these lost volumes will be compensated through, uh, other buyers, but on the whole at the level. eh, i think there, well, gazprom has an understanding that it is still the european market. it will decrease in the long run. that is, it is history. maybe there is support this year next year, but

structurally the european market will decline steadily. and how long will it take the eu to completely abandon russian gas year 3.5? i think it's about the horizon. there from five years to 5-10 years. i would say that this is, in fact, a kind of cycle, the investment construction of new exhibitors. yes, if now european companies, but will conclude long-term contracts, but by american companies that have resources, that is, and in the united states it is possible to increase gas production, they have a resource base for this, but it is necessary to build new plants, and later zhenya gas, respectively , in principle, they have, uh, quite a lot of companies that go around with the projects of these plants, they are being considered. that is, all this must be approved by the us energy regulator. here, however, there

are quite a large number of projects. therefore, if they are provided with long-term demand from europe and some kind of funding, let's say yes, including from european institutions there, what, but build new factories there on the coast of the gulf of mexico. and yes there, but it takes 3 years there, that is, there, well, 2 years, it is there funding and so on. it's possible, and it's, well, enough can happen. yes, well, it turns out in the future, the existing infrastructure is no longer needed. it's been building for decades and there has already been a destruction of value. yes, that is nord stream, uh, two, is essentially frozen, yes, and in the foreseeable future, well, not really, of course. and when it can start working, and even the ukrainian infrastructure, which, in principle, is redundant. yes, that is, relative to even the current volumes that have been in recent years. well, that

is, ukraine went through transit uh, within uh. yes, now it is actually 40, but the infrastructure. well, it is understandable, outdated and so on nominally. it is calculated there for 150 of this one. well, such a certain degradation. she is already has been carried out over the past decades, and to some extent this will probably happen with the infrastructure. belarusian yamal europe yes, because actually now, too, fucked europe is used by 10%. 15% of its capacity, so first. naturally, if demand falls, gazprom will abandon the transit infrastructure. and the main channels will remain nord stream one because there is no transit. yes, this is actually the gazprom gas pipeline. but for southern europe, and there through turkey

turkish stream blue stream and so on, what transit and they are first of all thank you it was marcel salikhov and in another economic dimension of the crisis after advertising transport and logistics do not leave. burger king has never had a 100% marbled beef patty burger, and now there is angus chef only at burger king buy miratorg deli pork kebab and win a chatbot call for all grilling occasions. narrow cold 150 g, unprecedented rich taste in one glass. try

real ice cream, russian cold great incredible taste the magnificent four from rostelecom has become even more profitable adjust the speed of the internet. control the number of minutes. choose a package of interactive tv and online cinema and pay only for what you really use rostelecom technology opportunities. despite the hostilities in ukraine, gas flows through the pipeline to europe through its territory regularly. paradox, but on that hybrid conflict, but the transportation industry suffered considerably from the military-political crisis, more precisely, from its economic component, but it is inseparable from the rest, our regular author alexander popova talks about the problems that have arisen in poland. red points, these red

points are our trucks, which are already in russia at the moment, but these are still at the border crossing in estonia and waiting for entry for 5-6 days, well, the latvian border has already accumulated about 1,000 trucks. working in transport has never looked like a chore, but today, in terms of complexity, it is almost nuclear physics in just a few days the world polish carriers turned upside down. we have problems and time is crucial time is money, but we can't predict anything in everything to blame. big politics immediately after the start of the special operation in ukraine , the polish borders with belarus were blocked by ukrainians and about ukrainian activists, which forced the suspension of freight traffic from the east to europe, attacks began on drivers. they seem to be going, who are the inadequate guys, let's say collected by companies.