programs of change on the island of liberty cuba today report from the scene caribbean crisis and andrey mironov theater performance satire from the eighties who got the decision time? if television survives in 2082, it will not be replaced by some neural networks built directly into the pupils, of course, there will be an international review program, its team will dedicate the issue to the sixtieth anniversary of the crisis of 2022, the island and the fateful one in advance, we urge you not to miss it from the beautiful far away. current events will also understandable and instructive, as now for us those that were 60 years ago at the time of the existential battle between moscow and washington in the autumn of 1962 . now is such a moment, either we will

agree with the russians, or everything will roll to war. yes, now or never, the military stir up passions and prevent them from making the right decision. the worst thing is to allow the military to a political matter. not only in the military, many congressmen are on their side. okon hinted that the president had some personal motives. in this crisis, november 6th is coming before the congressional election for this president in a hurry and ready for the most stupid reasoning if he cared about our chances on november 6 and about his chances for the future. i would order an attack on cuba by the way, america would support me, but this crazy risk , the republicans in congress demand an attack on cuba. they are bluffing to say the president has shown himself

incapable of decisive policy. they want to corner you. they all went crazy. they want to start a war. john kennedy andrey mironov his brother robert yury vasiliev performance burden decisions on the play by fyodor, a burlatsky publicist and, as they would say now, a political consultant walked on the stage of the moscow theater of satire in the eighty-sixth year, beloved by the audience, the corpse responded to the call of the time and the ministry of culture, referring to the caribbean crisis, took place in an emergency room. states, here and there it was already decided. this is the very moment when bombing is not bombing. this meeting would mean that reproduction in burlandic is infuriating. it

is slow, so it is played. i played was not a last name, and here is the american peskov, about the secretary of the press secretary, whose kennedy was played by alexander shirvindt, the name was pierselenger, by the way, mikhail derzhavin, the constant partner of alexander anatolyevich. got the role of the legendary minister. the defenses of robert mcmanara are solid stars. all in all. it was decided to carry out the transfer of troops to cuba under the guise of strategic exercises with the relocation of troops, including to chukotka, hence the name of operation anadyr appeared. the plans were developed by a small team of officers of the general staff, and a group of soviet troops in cuba was formed by the twentieth of june, the general of the army and snot hero of the great patriotic war 10 was appointed commander, and according to

other sources, on july 12, the first ships with personnel and equipment leave the baltic ports, the ship maria ulyanova and the dry cargo ship, khabarovsk, and the end points of the route did not know not only sailors, but even captains on ships loaded with winter clothes, packages with orders are supposed to be opened in stages, for example, upon reaching a certain point or after passing through the strait of gibraltar, opening them they read to head for cuba and avoid conflict. with nato ships in the transfer of troops was involved, a real flotilla of ships of the ministry of the navy of the ussr, people and equipment were carried by 85 civilian ships, which made 183 flights. the temperature in the holds. could reach 50°. food was given out twice a day at night . in the afternoon, the personnel could not go up on deck due to overflights by american aircraft. on july 25, maria ulyanova arrived in harbor with the first

one and a half thousand military personnel after 4 days the remaining main part was brought by the ship, latvia later it will become the base for the headquarters. in total , 10 ships arrived during the week of july, more than 43,000 people arrived, the basis was a division with medium-range missiles r-12 and r14 40 installations on september 16, nuclear charges began to arrive unloading. and the transportation of missiles through the territory of cuba took place in strict secrecy at night . the climax of the cuban missile crisis came at the end of october 62 and was in many ways the pinnacle of the cold war in the soviet-american the confrontation has been growing since the end of the forties, the moment of detente was laughed at by outbursts of hostility, and finally, the quantity turned into a round

anniversary. they would remember in any case, but this year the occasion for a special intensity of tension, if it has not yet surpassed the then one, is approaching it and again there is no certainty whether the fuses will work, will there be enough endurance not to fall into a tailspin? october 14 u2 reconnaissance finds soviet missile launch sites in cuba october 15 cia analysts with the help of a soviet traitor oleg penkovsky determine that these are soviet medium-range ballistic missiles, on october 16 , pictures show president kennedy, options for a response are discussed us troops landing an air strike and sea clouds on october 22, kennedy speaks on television and reports the appearance of soviet missiles in cuba and the imposition of a blockade of the island our government, as and it was promised to keep a close eye on the soviet military

presence october 23 robert kennedy sent to the soviet embassy ambassador dobrynya informs him that there are no missiles in cuba on october 24, from 10:00 am, the naval blockade comes into force. the 35th of october passes one of the most memorable neighboring security council soviet representative zorin denies the presence of missiles in response to an american colleague showing their enlarged pictures. on the same day, a meeting of the presidium was held, at which khrushchev 's proposal to exchange missiles was approved kgb resident alexander fomin, who is looking for a diplomatic solution, offering an exchange the next day on the radio, khrushchev announced another condition for the withdrawal of american missiles from turkey

october 27 is the black saturday of the cuban crisis. soviet air defenses shoot down american reconnaissance aircraft in cuba. pilot major anderson dies on the night of october 28 dobrynin meets with robert kennedy in his office in the building ministry of justice kennedy makes it clear that his brother is ready to withdraw missiles from turkey meeting, dobrynin called and conveyed the essence of the conversation with kennedy, including the fact that the answer should be received today sunday khrushchev dictates consent so that the message reaches washington faster to his address read out on the radio missiles in cuba begin to be dismantled, and after a while the united states removes its installations from turkey we are talking about the colors of the caribbean crisis with

two world-class scientists gremalison, without exaggeration, a living classic of the history and theory of international relations vladimir pechatnov, outstanding history of the cold war, good friend of our program, vladimir olegovich was the crisis an inevitable outcome of tension, that is, objective prerequisites prevailed, or was it still a subjective factor that played a role? the caribbean crisis brought two problems to shame. the first is the problem of cuba and its defense against the united states, and the second is the problem of a strategic imbalance between the ussr and the usa, that is, everything, of course, in the context of the cold war american confrontation, which was generally fraught with a crisis. well, okay. why cuba was a hotspot the very existence under the nose of the united states ally of the main rival was, of course, fraught. uh, crisis situations, exacerbations of crises around cuba, after all, happened later, and in the

seventieth year and seventy-ninth around the so -called soviet brigade, those were in stakes, after all, to both sides. well, for the usa it is clear for the ussr the loss of cuba. it was not only a matter of revolutionary solidarity, but also of geopolitics, since cuba was the most important source of influence of the soviet union in all of latin america, and losing cuba was a serious setback. even defeat in cold war, but it could be defended in different ways. yes, medium-range missiles were not needed for protection. conventional weapons would suffice, well, the maximum could be tactical nuclear weapons. so here we come to the second part of your question, namely, the strategic imbalance means that it existed , both washington and moscow knew well that the balance of power in this dimension is clearly in

favor of the united states khrushchev puke about nuclear weapons and their abundance . remember soviet the union was debunked publicly in the same year in the sixty-second year in a public statement by the us department of defense so repeat both sides knew the real state of affairs, and out of this imbalance. it could have come out differently. it was possible to gradually build up our own strategic forces to achieve priority, as this, in general, happened in the sixties in the end, but khrushchev was in a hurry. he didn't want to wait. it was important for him. here, in one fell swoop, how to change this balance of power by increasing the number of missiles achievable that could reach the united states, he acted from a position of weakness. it’s like a trick in jiu-jitsu, yes, of a kind, but i wouldn’t want to quickly repeat this imbalance with one maneuver in one maneuver,

but in the soviet side and in general, his whole policy, starting from the fact that since the soviet crisis, the features of the sixty-eighth years there was, in general, a policy of escalating tension in order to force the west to make concessions to force respect for the interests of the soviet union reckon with him. the most detente through the intimidation of the uruschan khrushchev uniform on may 20, 1962. after returning from bulgaria, khrushchev met in the kremlin with the minister of foreign affairs, gromyko, his deputy mikoyan, and minister of defense malinovsky, he shared the idea. how to respond to the fire's constant requests for an increase in the soviet military presence in cuba to deploy nuclear weapons there at a meeting of the defense council the next day , mikoyan was categorically opposed by an active supporter of malinovsky v

as a result, members of the presidium of the central committee of the cpsu supported khrushchev a week later, a delegation of its composition, the head of the communist party of uzbekistan, rashidov , officially flies from moscow to havana, as a specialist in agriculture in a hot climate, to help the socialist cuba, but as part of the group, ambassador alekseev and the head of the strategic missile forces of turquoises castro, after listening to the proposal, takes a day to think it over, it was decided that raul castro would fly in july. to moscow to clarify all the details on july 10, rashidov makes a report at the presidium of the central committee foreign partner supported the idea, the presidium voted in support of the plan that malinovsky had previously provided, on july 10, the newest tu-114 flight flew from vnukovo to harbor, a test ultra-long route on board , civil aviation officials and two undocumented passengers, the commander

of the pliev grouping of troops in cuba and the commander of the 43rd missile division, statsenko, through week in moscow for a visit, raul castro home. he is carrying an agreement on the deployment of soviet troops, a group of agricultural specialists and reconnaissance detachments of missile colonels on the calendar on july 17, 62, operation anadyr began the ships went to sea. the potential for a crisis, of course, was. it was laid down, but the subjective factor of voluntarism was required to turn this potential into reality. khrushchev his excitement excitement for this willingness to go to rice. on his impatience and his ignorance, because here an explicit forgiveness was allowed, about which khrushchev and our military adviser warned the winner that it would be impossible to hide these

missiles from the americans. there is a side to the fact that in the us the us will be shocked when they find out about the outcome of the placement of the soviet, uh, professor alison crisis set an example. and zadornov in adventurism. and the curbing of ambitions, which was more the caribbean crisis perfectly illustrates the clash of recklessness and responsibility. fortunately, as we know rationality prevailed, of course, khrushchev's decision to deploy soviet missiles in cuba was reckless. later, his own colleagues called it reckless adventurism. although the launch of the escalation, by and large, the american side is striving hard. khrushchev became the most dangerous moment in the history of mankind, the chance of a nuclear war at first was greater than ever on the other side, when the ussr and the usa almost approached the fatal line, there were 12 and 13 days of

missile escalation. each of the states began to make attempts to find a way out of khrushchev’s proposal to dismantle the missiles deployed in cuba in exchange for confirmation that the americans were not occupying the island and kennedy’s desire to negotiate a secret agreement with the ussr, and you, ideally, american missiles with turkey aside tried to avoid the most an undesirable scenario in the form of an exchange of nuclear strikes vladimir vladimirovich how do you feel? it seems that recklessness coexisted with caution. both were correct and responsibility and without responsibility sit down on the sides, by the way, not only the soviet country often forgets that the body is cheaper. well, firstly, the announcement of a naval blockade is already an act of war, in contrast to the deployment of soviet missiles, which were not strictly a violation of international law, and secondly, kennedy's ultimatum of october 22 with an open

public demand for the withdrawal of all soviet strategic weapons from the island. it was also rice. and what if khrushchev had not been afraid, kennedy had, unlike khrushchev, the possibility of a diplomatic settlement of the crisis? do it through confidential channels and not only through dobrynin well, okay, dobrynin was not in the know, at that time he did not even receive instructions from moscow, but gromyko was in washington on a social visit to the white house on october 18th. this is mail in 2 days, how did the americans find out about the missiles, and chenada wanted to the conversation went around cuba, but chennedi never asked him directly if you have these weapons there or not, but probably because the americans by that time did not yet know what to do, but at least, judging by the documents, this question the question of how to remove this crisis both diplomatically and confidentially was not even discussed, it was not even

discussed, as for responsibility, it generally came after irresponsibility. yes, as a reaction to this mutual mutually willingness to take a big risk when the parties both sides scared. simply put, and through such mutual concessions and help in saving the face of helping each other, and from both sides. they were able to move away from this edge. the caribbean crisis provided extensive material for theoretical understanding of the problem of containment and what is called controlled escalation, but in the process of the crisis, the leaders of their advisers, after all, did not proceed from scientific algorithms. and probably from their own instincts, or something, who have been crunching since their first and only meeting, and so on very much, yes, with kennedy in june in the sixty-first years in vienna endured the impression of kennedy as a weakling. which will tremble if something happens, and, as far as i

know, this impression warmed up khrushchev and then ours went to dobrynin was menshikov, who was clearly not dobrynin yes and here he is, as if adding fuel to the fire, guessing us this azar superiority complex khrushchev, here is what was literally said there in one of the telegrams, but the americans will generally put on their pants if they find themselves in this situation, in this case khrushchev blinked first, but it’s interesting that e and kennedy on the eve of october 25 in its turn. the messenger took on a slightly softer tone, because he was convinced that the blockade was not working. everything is already on the island. weapons have already been brought in enough. there it is necessary to take some other steps, and in response to this softer message, it means that kennedy khrushchev is already 26. he has already answered in full. in general, hinting at the fact that he is ready to withdraw all weapons, just in the

sixty-second year, the first such pioneering work of a well-known american international specialist was published. charles ozgood, who the alternative to e-e war or capitulas was called. here he proposed a scheme for overcoming the crisis, which i am not mistaken called graduated. e, mutually graded reciprocity reduction of international tension is the essence. this algorithm consisted in the fact that some side initiates the first concessions, but does it in such a way as not to create a feeling of weakness, while maintaining strategic consistency. that's in the expectation that the other side will reciprocate. and with every concession thus answered trust grows between both parties which allow them to descend. here, along this spiral, so to speak, where are the escalations, but i don’t think that they even

managed to read a book about kennedy then graham and you did a lot. after all, it is the theoretical aspects of escalation mechanisms that are well described in the literature. for example, herman kahn has searched books when two sides collide, one of which has an advantage on the next step from the well ladder. she has the temptation and even the need to switch to a new round if the state gains an advantage. this significantly changes the position of the opponent, which can sometimes help resolve the conflict, when kennedy announced a blockade, the united states found itself in a more advantageous position than the ussr, since a priori had a large military. assess the situation in the region from your side the ussr saw an enemy with superior military capabilities due to the territorial proximity of the usa was at a distance of 90 miles the ussr was

7,000 miles away from the bay. the decision to jump to the next escalation steps to create more favorable conditions for yourself. maybe in some cases, the right strategy, back in his time, just during the crisis, he formulated while explaining to his colleagues in the presidium of the central committee his methodology, so to speak. he compared the situation to how you fill a glass. raise the tension. yes, a glass, which even if you fill it completely. then the force of the surface tension of the liquid will keep the water from overflowing. that's all art, - i say, it's good that the liquid does not overflow through edge. but if the tension coefficient can probably be calculated mathematically, then in real life, in crisis conditions, complex psychology , the human factor, and so on, of course, it’s probably impossible to calculate when the overflow starts, but it’s so similar to russian roulette

, a very expensive and very dangerous way out way out of the crisis, as far as the current situation is concerned, and here and there it is clearly already the use of nuclear weapons. but then it was, in my opinion, more obvious, and on both sides there was this readiness of cuba for the united states then looked a bit like ukraine for today's russia. that is, a situation where the external player then was the ussr in the karelian crisis. now it's the united states trying to fit in. so to speak, soft friend of your opponent and inflict maximum damage on him there. well, what about the differences? they are certainly, i think, even more significant than the likeness. well, first of all, the nuclear threat. the current one arises against the backdrop of ongoing large-scale hostilities. this already makes

the situation more dangerous, given that the situation locally, regardless of their will. uh, leadership can get out of control and the crisis provides a few examples where this has happened and it's only through a happy coincidence. just luck. uh, they didn't escalate where and second, of course, uh, the current situation. she plays in a completely different way. in a global context, this is a global world, and we see how even the very tensions themselves, even the threats to use these weapons, lead to the fact that the world economy, world finances are under pressure . the energy security of dozens of dozens of countries, but simply the standard of living on the planet of hundreds of millions of people is already suffering from tension alone. graham maybe now is the time to raise the stakes

, an escalation is needed to begin to emerge from the crisis. if i were an adviser in moscow or washington, i would say that we have already raised the stakes enough to understand how bad things will get. if nuclear weapons are used in the current circumstances and vladimir putin's russia and the united states joseph and biden have to play out of the crisis. i know that some attempts are being made, but there should be more in my opinion. we have increased the escalation enough to start negotiating already at the current stage of the student. at harvard, for example, it is now difficult to imagine that a nuclear catastrophe is still possible. nuclear clashes are not far in the past . russia's nuclear arsenal and the us are big enough to destroy entire states. we still live in a world of mutually assured destruction, if the current conflict ends in a large-scale nuclear war between the united states and russia, both

states will disappear thanks. we talked with professor vladimir printable from mgimo and professor graham allison from harvard. born into a jewish family in berlin, survived the war in holland, was an ardent supporter of leftist ideas, worked in yugoslavia, the gdr, but after his arrest became an inveterate anti-communist. castro is written on the stroller, a drawing from the south african newspaper di-shadderland look, not that across the ocean, but from the other continent word cuba and usa written in africans. it used to be called the boer language. perhaps the most famous caricature of the times of the caribbean crisis is arm wrestling 62 from the artist. leslie helen quart on the bombs is marked. h-bomb briton michael kamensk on the features of deterrence in the context of the

cold war bomb. the nuclear inscriptions on both sides are clear, the same, none can be used a retaliatory strike is not averted in the soviet about the karev crisis, they knew much less, however, they wrote and drew about the cuban revolution, of course, a lot here is a poster of the sixty-second year hands off cuba drawing julia ganfa and crocodile magazine. it's about the attempted invasion of cuba in 1961. all images are perfectly recognizable. finally, the cover of crocodile magazine for the sixty-third year. this is the denouement of events. fidel's visit. castro in moscow is festive. it reminds of the fatality of a nuclear war, but there are also optimists from the contrary in 1962. the ussr tried to do something quite rational to place medium-range missiles in cuba that

could compensate for the lack of long-range missiles radius. actions. they were built too slowly the ussr began a program of intercontinental ballistic missiles. they were so huge and complex that only six could be built. but then it became clear that they could not be used . the caribbean crisis. this showed that nuclear weapons are more useless in practice than a water gun. oh come on, they are crushing power the whole world is too powerful to be used, let's say you fight with melee weapons, then a pistol is more effective than an automatic machine, all the more so, and this perhaps the efficiency grows until it reaches the ceiling and at that moment. applicability ends say. you are terribly angry for something with your eight-year-old son and you have a weapon in your hands. first of all, you will put weapons aside, and then you will deal with them, as well as with nuclear weapons, no matter how you call it, no matter how you

decorate and improve it. it is impossible to use it is impossible, even if someone gives the order to use it, it will not be used. well, yes, this is god, but somehow uncomfortable. we install, open, watch russian channels, and all movie series and cartoons and documentaries

for free without registration, we watch in the application or on the website. our earth i will kill them before they start up, then someone will take the roots. if

i don't come for him, he will come for me. i promise the flame belongs to me woman. the cold war is again gathering 141 states, it is in the general assembly united in order to make russia pay. this is our unequivocal message to russia. to achieve

parity balance the state of affairs. what if americans will reveal ahead of time really? i didn't know what a nuclear explosion was .

vladimir petrovich lukin, an outstanding scientist, diplomat, politician, himself remembers the caribbean crisis and communicated a lot with its direct participants in the world economy of international relations and you read something with rapture some texts that i needed professional special forces, there was suddenly a man bursts into a special crane. subsequently

turned out to be one of our most prominent and respected experts on france french politics her release rubinsky and says, they are approaching approaching it turned out that this is the blockade - this, apparently, is somewhere around the twenty-seventh and i must honestly tell you that by youth and frivolity, to some. i wasn't very scared. apparently, due to the fact that the general was such a mood of spring that was not frightening, but in october i don’t know the mood, this is the spring of a political spring, but on the other hand, on the other hand. probably because, to be honest, i thought that at some stage an agreement was inevitable. with agree, why am i then not very

understood? now? i think that, nevertheless, in such times, in such a situation, when time, as it were, speeds up during times of severe, decisive crises, the strongly subjective factor a rises . two people played a decisive role in the subjective factor. and, uh, both active participants in world war ii. they are from the generation that knew what war really was. e, of course, e leaders then had military experience and understood the dangers, but after all, any war conflict is also a passion. this is the desire for victory, as you think. what role did this play, in addition to all the calculations, which, probably, were exactly the gambling that was going on, well, you understand, every human dispute

is azat, a person is arranged in such a way that sports? well , at least 50% does not consist of a comparison of cold arguments and a desire to reveal the truth together. this is the ideal of a dispute, but they themselves are a dispute, but a dispute. uh, there is a lot of charismatic in the dispute, of course, in the summer, and the sixty-second year for a meeting, and at the meeting, the first at the first summit khrushchev and kennedy they did not greatly underestimate each other, and then both leaders are already in progress. here is an increase in the steps of moving up the steps of the crisis, we realized the most important issues. this is when kennedy was told, reported to him by generals e during a meeting of the executive committee of the

national security council. how many people will die if a conflict starts with the use of an egg? uh, he was told that about someone's americans might get hurt said? no , this is unacceptable for us, never any questions. i think a similar feeling was hers khrushchev, although there are no documents on this subject, i had conversations with sergo older than mikoyan. uh famous member, politburo and anastasia ivanovich mikoyan and based on them. i think that something like that happened, by the way, mikoyan from the very beginning had serious reservations about the idea, apparently personally owned by khrushchev. here is the movement, uh, by a group of troops, including the nuclear factor to cuba. yes, about reservations. uh, after all , uh, only 2 years have passed and this crisis, which

, like, was supposed to show how right we are, a khrushchev was incriminated as an example, it means voluntarism and irresponsibility by his own comrades-in-arms, does this mean that it was still an e decision exclusively or mainly his, or just those who supported at one moment, then decided to change it as an idea personally came. in the head of nikita sergeevich, but uh, he began to discuss it, as far as i can judge from my subjective data. he was the first, just told mikoyan, he was the most trusted person, firing khrushchev's bureau at that time time, and he told him, uh, about this topic. koen opposed this idea, that is, she did not speak out. and in private conversations with nikita sergeevich, at

the same time, malinovsky actively supported the minister of defense with them at that time. and when did this issue become more widely discussed? uh, there was a meeting of the uh politburo, if i am not mistaken, in the month of june, and it unanimously came out in favor. i understand that there was unanimity then, but there was a special quality, so to speak. er, but nonetheless. uh, it was a unanimous decision, including the vote. mikoyan, everyone spoke in favor of exactly the same as everyone spoke out. uh, for the cancellation for the withdrawal of troops, then uh missiles, but the responsibility, of course, lies with the politburov as a whole. and although the idea did not belong to sergeevich, then in the soviet union there was not much publicity, and our compatriots did not know much, unlike the americans, who,

therefore, held their breath. still, if we abstract a little from the caribbean crisis and look more broadly, bearing in mind today's public opinion in general in crisis situations, when prestige is called on the cone, or at least , as it is understood, it ultimately plays the role of inflating or pacifying. hmm, you know, you are actually asking the question aleksandrovich is the majority always right? it is not always right, and history has clearly proven this in many, many, many parameters. was the majority right, which demanded that our tsar nicholas ii punish the japanese for bad behavior? to seriously punish so

whether the majority was right, which demanded to start a war against the germans, which led to to what she led in stages to the red wheel solar i think that in a crisis situation, when. we have already said the subjective fact of odessa is growing, the great importance of secret diplomacy is growing is of great importance. that 's the case with the caribbean crisis. yes, he played a huge role. uh played two people. in this secret diplomacy well, in fact, secrets, because not because they did not know that it was coming, but because it was not known what it was about, of course, first of all, anatoly fedorovich dobrynin, uh, was there is also a closed channel, also connected with the embassy. but nevertheless, dobrynin played a decisive role in this, first of all, at his meetings with robert kennedy

and president kennedy's brother, and there, uh, very subtle and very skillful diplomacy was required in order for the ultimatum, which initially put forward, the united states or take away or we will start on october 30, we will start the attack, uh and in the days of naim, only the closest approach of ships during the blockade. it was required there. uh, very skillful diplomacy to turn this into a compromise solution . question and of course it was done. this is a great merit and the second point, because we do not always talk about it directly, but a very acute situation developed in relations between moscow and hawaii as soon as these sergeevich were immediately open on the radio. he said that he was fulfilling the

requirements for the withdrawal of missiles. fidel castro was not told about this in a timely manner, and he was very offended by fidel's insults. castro could lead to anything, including the fact that it was simply physically impossible to remove these missiles with all the ensuing consequences and here an outstanding role, of course, played on stasov antimikoyan, who arrived in cuba at the very beginning of november and in very difficult negotiations, given the personally good attitude of the leaders of the cuban revolution, he managed to achieve, but how would it as the english say reluctant. erh agree with uh basic solution. vladimir lukin recalled

that cuba was then very annoyed with soviet behavior. and what about janella de larosa's report from liberty island today? the island flies over they call the planet. huna love my hotel national cuba is a must-have item in the program of visiting havana, especially celebrities in the hall of fame love it more than 300 photos of politicians actors writers 2014, for example, vladimir putin visited us together with dmitry medvedev who, by the way, visited us twice from the state duma and valentine tereshkova gave us a bust of yuri gagarin, who stayed with us in the sixty- first year, a small museum located in a

bunker. in the gardens of the hotel was a witness and protagonist of the caribbean crisis. but the main thing is nothing inside, and what was discovered against the background of the escalation of the conflict, the cubans are serious. they feared a nuclear war, therefore, trenches were dug in the gardens of this old hotel, and even soviet nuclear weapons were located here, where they were directed towards the united states, right medium-range missile r12 and r14 with a radius of destruction of 2.4 thousand kilometers for each warhead in one megaton events of those years called differently in russia is known for the cuban missile crisis in the united states. and in cuba we say the october crisis, a direct participant in those events, general fabian escalant, the former head of cuban intelligence at that time continued a sabotage operation, the

mongoose whose goal was to overthrow the communist government of fidel. castro , just imagine, from january to august of the year 1962, almost 6,000 terrorists were committed in our country. and acts of sabotage, unthinkable numbers, the deployment of soviet missiles changed the balance of power between the western and socialist camps for this, cuba, to a certain extent , sacrificed itself with or without soviet missiles them in october of the sixty-second year, the crisis was to occur. indeed , soviet officers became close by and brought their families to the island until the early nineties, about 20,000 soviet people lived in cuba. now

their descendants live on the island, the cubans especially fell in love with stew, a symbol of the quality of the soviet, writing industry. it is still called the old rusa here. russian meat in the sixties in cuba was more than 150,000 cars of the soviet union and the united states, and today you can meet american bionics and cadillacs, soviet zhiguli muscovites and even seagulls. it's a pity the united states and the soviet union helped. it was so long ago, but not much since then, what has changed after the october crisis, 60 years have passed. for some, he left an indelible mark; for others, he became just another historical event for people when they realized the gravity of the situation.

we were on the verge of an international and national crisis, the tension then increased too much 9 months after the caribbean crisis in cuba there was a birth boom in 2009 cuban animators. he the patron, the author of the first full-length cartoon on the island, shot his picture about this, according to the director, cuban then hurried to live in the present, because no one knew what would happen tomorrow. so love blossomed in front of the threat from the world, while modern youth for the most part did not say anything about the crisis knows. you haven't heard about the october crisis, and you didn't study it at school. no, they did not study the caribbean crisis 60 years ago. well, the memory of him on the island lives on for the cubans. it became a severe test in the building of socialism. but

let him show a firm will and on his own. choose your friends and allies on the international stage, chief among them being the soviet union kevin duran. and i'm not lada larusa, especially for the international review of tabana. that performance did not last long in the repertoire of the satire theater. yes, and he missed his main audience, the brother of the president of the united states, was to please the great russian theater on the example of a solution relaxed by you, when i was already approaching the theater and shaved at the entrance. that's all they ran out.

so everyone themselves walk at this time, all trembling and was already in the light. he became boarding. that's gorgeous. raskalyovo is the route of a friend of burlatsky, which means that they also said about the caribbean crisis that he is gone. where he rushed, they found him somewhere near the water. this is to the fact that now i think

that, unfortunately, i no longer hope that they will play something in the general cabinet. and i'm waiting. the pro-caribbean crisis will probably not put on a performance. but about the current one. the anniversary has acquired such a sound, for obvious reasons, everyone wants to find in the experience of overcoming that crisis, a recipe for resolving this recipes. no, every crisis is a unique crisis, general colin powell, who became secretary of state. he put forward the so-called pauline doctrine, well, the doctrine, which was named after him. one of the main provisions of this doctrine is the thesis that when you start some risky policy of diplomatic military action, it is very important to know in advance. how

to get out of this action with dignity if something goes wrong. i think that this lesson is not superfluous always and not superfluous even now. can escalation according to the caribbean model to defuse the world atmosphere, now, alas, the confrontation between moscow and washington 60 years ago was a battle for supremacy in a relatively orderly formalized international system. the cuban draw such a system was fixed by the second half of the cold war was unpleasant, but far less dangerous, both sides took precautions. now that's it, otherwise the world has entered into a reorganization of such a scale that its outcome cannot even be guessed from the previous construction, almost nothing will remain the final is open exacerbation. it can work in a completely different way . the only hope is that the nuclear factor, which graham alison spoke about, although weakened, but

will keep from irreparable. you and i have only one way out. i see no other secret agreement with the russians. the risk is huge, the risk is deadly for you and me. well, what a risk. in the name of peace, it 's worth it then, yes, and now it was an international review, goodbye.

look who's fighting with us. we are waiting for help qualified not by running, running, but to get ready and come. volunteers here village before mobilization already came to us and are already joining our ranks. one

for all all for one is first of all helping each other the question arises. this is when we are going. i tell them guys. everything has its time. finish the initial preparation further into the ranks of our children. our torment awaits the fate that we will draw for them now. is russia strong war and pestilence and rebellion and external storms , the pressure of her raging shook her, look everything is worth it. it is not possible to understand russia with the mind with a common arshin . she has a special place in russia, you can only believe. yes, they are russian characters

it seems that a person is simple, but a severe misfortune will come in big or small, and great strength, human beauty rises in him. the highest and sharpest characteristic feature of our people is a sense of justice and a thirst for it without a sense of their own country, especially a very dear and sweet one. in every little thing there is no real human character. this feeling is disinterested and fills us with great interest in everything. spiritual life in russia is more noble i am poisoned by russia i miss it only russia and i think.

let's translate from clerical to understandable everything is wrong scary if there is an instruction. dear friends, i am pleased to invite you to our next issue of the besogon tv author's program, it will be called in the fire of the ford. no, i hope

it will be interesting. i look forward to seeing you.

in moscow, a round table is being held by the ldpr faction with business representatives on the development of the dpr, lpr, kherson and zaporozhye regions, the ldpr concedes for the creation of a free economic zone in new territories. uh, we’ll just discuss the latest events with the head of the ldpr faction in the state duma, the head of the committee on international affairs leoni.