reports about the appearance of soviet missiles in cuba and the introduction of a blockade of the island our government, as promised, closely observed the belovezhskaya pushcha presence on the island october 23 robert kennedy goes to the soviet embassy ambassador dobrynin informs him that there are no missiles in cuba until october 4 from 10:00 in the morning the naval blockade comes into force on october 25. one of the most memorable meetings of the security council takes place. soviet representative zorin denies the presence of missiles in response to an american colleague showing enlarged pictures of them. at on the same day, a meeting of the presidium takes place, at which khrushchev's proposal to exchange missiles is approved on october 26, a message arrives at the white house from abc correspondent john scully on a promise not to attack cuba, and his meeting with kkb president alexander pryamofomin, who is looking for

a diplomatic solution, offering an exchange for the next day, on the radio, khrushchev announced another condition for the withdrawal of american missiles from turkey october 27, the black saturday of the cuban crisis begins soviet air defenses shoot down an american in cuba reconnaissance aircraft. pilot major anderson dies on the night of october 28 dobrynin meets with robert kennedy in his office in the building of the ministry of justice kennedy makes it clear that his brother is ready to withdraw missiles from turkey on october 28. khrushchev convenes the presidium of the central committee enters the meeting dobrynin called and conveyed the essence of the conversation with kennedy, including that the answer should be received today sunday khrushchev dictates consent so that the message reaches washington faster after a while the us is removed. attitudes from

turkey about the colors of the caribbean crisis, we are talking with two world-class scientists gremalison, without exaggeration, a living classic of history and theory of international relations vladimir printnov, outstanding history of the cold war, a good friend of our program vladimir olegovich was the crisis an inevitable outcome of tension, that is, objective prerequisites prevailed or is it still a subjective factor that played a role the caribbean crisis occurred at the junction of two problems. the first is the problem of cuba and protecting it from the united states and the second is the problem of strategic imbalance between the ussr and the usa in the context of the cold war american confrontation, which was generally fraught. well, understandable. why cuba was a hot spot the very existence of an ally of the main rival under the nose of the united states was, of course, fraught. uh, crisis

situations, exacerbations, crises around cuba did happen later and in 1979 around the so-called soviet brigade. the stakes were great for both. well for usa it is clear for the ussr the loss of cuba. it was not only a question of revolutionary solidarity, but also of geopolitics, since cuba was the most important source of influence of the soviet union in all of latin america, and losing cuba meant suffering a serious setback. even the defeat in the cold war could be defended in different ways. yes, medium -range missiles were not needed for protection. conventional weapons would suffice, well, the maximum could be tactical nuclear weapons. so here we come to the second part of your question, which means strategic the imbalance that it existed was well known both

in washington and in moscow that the balance of power in this in this dimension is clearly in favor of the united states khrushchev's bluff about nuclear weapons and their abundance. remember the soviet union was debunked publicly in the same year in the sixty-second year in a public statement by the us department of defense so repeat both sides knew the real state of affairs, and out of this imbalance. it could have come out differently. it was possible to gradually build up our own strategic forces to achieve priority, as it generally happened in the sixties in the end, but khrushchev was in a hurry. he didn't want to wait. it was important to him that in one fell swoop, how to change this balance of power by increasing the number of missiles that could reach the united states, he acted from a position of weakness. it's like a technique in

jiu-jitsu, yes, a kind of, but i would not like to quickly repeat this imbalance with one maneuver to change, uh, the soviet one. uh, aside and in general, his entire policy, starting with the sixth since the soviet crisis, especially. if now the eighth year was, in general, a policy of escalating tension in order to force the west to make concessions, to force respect for the interests of the soviet union to reckon with it. the most detente through the intimidation of khrushchev's form may 20, 1962. after returning from bulgaria, khrushchev met in the kremlin with the minister of foreign affairs, gromyko, his deputy mikoyan, and minister of defense malinovsky, he shared the idea. how to respond to the fire's constant requests for an increase in the soviet military presence in cuba to place nuclear weapons there

at a meeting of the defense council the next day mikoyan was categorically against malinovsky as an active supporter as a result, members of the presidium of the central committee of the cpsu supported khrushchev in a week a delegation consisting of the head of the communist party of uzbekistan rashidov flies out of moscow to harbor in a hot climate, he flies to help the socialist cuba, but as part of the group, ambassador alekseev and the head of the strategic missile forces of turquoises castro, after listening to the proposal, take a day to think it was decided that raul castro would fly in july. on july 10, rashidov delivers a report to the presidium of the central committee to moscow to clarify all the details. the foreign partner supported the idea. the president votes in support of the plan that malinovsky had previously provided, on july 10, the latest tu-114 flight, a trial ultra-long route

on board, takes off from vnukovo to the harbor. civil aviation officials and two commanders of the kubeev grouping of troops and commander of the 43rd missile division statsenko, not documented by the passenger, a week later in moscow with visit, raul castro home. he is carrying an agreement on the deployment of soviet troops, a group of agricultural specialists and reconnaissance detachments of missile colonels on the calendar on july 17, sixty-two. operation anadyr began the ships went to sea. the potential for a crisis, of course, was. it was laid down, but the subjective factor of voluntarism was required to turn this potential into reality. khrushchev his excitement excitement us his willingness to go to rice. on his impatience and his ignorance, because here a clear miscalculation was made,

about which khrushchev and our military adviser at pobeda dementiev warned that it would be impossible to hide these missiles from the american, for his part, that in the usa there will be a shock in the usa when they find out about the result of the deployment of soviet missiles, professor crisis, set an example and zadornov in adventurism. and the curbing of ambitions, which was more the caribbean crisis perfectly illustrates the clash of recklessness and responsibility, fortunately, as we know rationality, reason won up, of course, khrushchev's decision to place in cuba soviet missiles were reckless. later, his own colleagues called it reckless adventurism. although the launch of the escalation, by and large, the american side is striving hard. to stand khrushchev became the most dangerous moment in the history of mankind, nuclear war was greater than ever

on the other hand, when the ussr and the usa almost approached the fatal line, it was the twelfth and from 13 days of missile escalation. each of the states began to make attempts to find a way out of khrushchev's proposal to dismantle the missiles stationed in cuba in return for receiving confirmation from kennedy that the americans are not occupying the island and kennedy's desire to negotiate with the ussr on the signing of a secret agreement. and you, in american missiles with turkey, tried to avoid the most undesirable scenario in the form of an exchange of nuclear strikes vladimir vladimirovich how about you? it seems that recklessness coexisted with caution. both were correct and the responsibility and without the responsibility of the parties, by the way, not only the soviet side often forget that the body is cheaper. well firstly, the declaration of a naval blockade is already an act of war, in contrast to the deployment of soviet missiles, which was not a violation of international law

strictly speaking, and secondly, kennedy's ultimatum of october 22 with an open public demand to withdraw all soviet strategic weapons from the island. it was also a risk. and what if khrushchev had not been afraid, kennedy had, unlike khrushchev , the possibility of a diplomatic settlement of the crisis? do it through confidential channels and not only through dobrynin well, okay, dobrynin was not in the know, then everyone else did not even receive instructions from moscow, but gromyko was in washington on a social visit to the white house on october 18th. this is in 2 days. after the americans found out about the missiles, and the chenade wanted to talk around the lips, but the chenady never asked him directly if you had these weapons there or not, but probably because the americans by that time did not yet know how them to do, but at least, judging by the

documents, this issue was not even discussed the question of how to remove this crisis from the diplomatic and confidentially did not even discuss to himself, as regards responsibility, it generally came after irresponsibility. yes, as a reaction to this mutual mutually willingness to take a big risk when the parties both sides were arguing. simply put, and through such mutual concessions and help in saving the face of helping each other, and from both sides. they were able to move away from this edge. the cuban missile crisis provided ample material for theoretical understanding of the problem of deterrence and what is called controlled escalation, but in the process crisis, the leaders of their advisers, because they did not come from scientific algorithms. and probably out of his own instincts, or something, who had been crunching since their first and only meeting, and so on very much, yes, the wall in june in vienna in 1951 gave

the impression of kennedy as a weakling. which will tremble in case of something, and, as far as i know, khrushchev warmed up this impression and then ours went to dobrynin was menshikov, who was clearly not dobrynin yes and here he was, as it were, adding fuel to the fire, guessing us this excitement complex khrushchev’s superiority is what was literally said there in one of the telegrams, but the americans will generally put on their pants if they find themselves in this situation, in this case khrushchev blinked first, but it’s interesting that e and kennedy on the eve of october 25 in his next message. took a slightly softer tone. because he made sure the blockade didn't work. everything is already on the island . weapons have already been brought in enough. some other steps must be taken there, and in response to this softer message,

it means that kennedy khrushchev has already answered 26 fully. generally. insinuate that he is ready to withdraw all the weapons, just in the 60 second year, the first such pioneering work of the famous american internationalist charles, which was called an alternative to e-war or surrender, came out. here he proposed a scheme for overcoming the crisis, which he called e, i'm not mistaken graduated. e, mutually graded reciprocity reduction of international tension, the essence of this algorithm was that some side takes the initiative of the first concessions, but does it this way, so as not to create a feeling of weakness. keeping the strategic sequence here in the expectation that the other side will respond reciprocity, and with each concession answered in this way,

trust grows between both sides, which allow them to descend. here in this spiral, so to speak, where the escalation is, but i don't think that, in short, i hope to re-read the music book then graham and you did a lot. after all, it is the theoretical aspects of escalation mechanisms that are well described in the literature. for example, herman search books, when two sides collide, one of which has an advantage on the next rung of the escalatory stairs. she has a temptation and even the need to move to a new round if the state receives benefits. this significantly changes the position of the opponent, which can sometimes help resolve the conflict when kennedy announced the obl? the lips of the united states were in a more advantageous position than the ussr, since apriori had large military resources in the region. assess the situation with your on the other hand, the ussr saw an enemy with superior

military capabilities; the us territorial proximity was at a distance of 90 miles. the ussr was 7,000 miles away from the bay. the decision to jump to the next step from the well in order to create more favorable conditions for yourself. maybe in some cases the right strategy, even at one time, just during the crisis, he formulated while explaining to his colleagues on the presidium of the central committee his methodology, so to speak. he compared the situation to how you fill a glass. raise the tension. yes a glass that even if you fill it completely. then the force of the surface tension of the liquid will keep the water from overflowing. that's all art, - i say, it's good that the liquid does not overflow. but if the tension coefficient can probably be calculated mathematically, then in real life in crisis conditions a complex psychology is a human factor

, and so on, of course, it is probably impossible to calculate when the overflow starts, but it is so similar to russian roulette, very expensive and very dangerous a way out of the crisis, as far as the current situation is concerned, both here and there it is clearly already the use of nuclear weapons. but then it was, in my opinion, more obvious, and on both sides there was this readiness. cuba for the usa then looked a bit like ukraine for today's russia. that is, a situation where the external player then was the ussr in the karelian crisis. now it's the united states trying to fit in. so to speak, soft belly of your opponent and inflict maximum damage on him there. well, what about the differences? of course they are, i i think even more significant than the similarity. well

, first of all, the nuclear threat. the current one arises against the backdrop of ongoing large-scale hostilities. this already makes the situation more dangerous, given that the situation on the ground is independent of will. uh, leadership can get out of control and the crisis provides a few examples where this has happened and it's only through a happy coincidence . just luck. uh, they didn't escalate where and second, of course, uh, the current situation. she plays in a completely different way. at in the global context, this is a global world, and we see how even the tension itself and even the threats of using these weapons lead to the fact that the world economy, world finances, are under attack the energy security of dozens of dozens of countries, but simply the standard of living on the planet of

hundreds of millions of people graham is already suffering from tension alone. and maybe now is the time, just to raise the stakes , an escalation is needed to begin to emerge from the crisis. if i were an adviser in moscow or washington, i would said we had already raised the stakes enough to see how bad things were going to be. if nuclear weapons are used in the current circumstances, both russia, vladimir putin and the united states, joseph and biden must look for ways out of the crisis. i know that some attempts are being made, but there should be more in my opinion. we have increased the escalation enough to start negotiating already at the current stage of the student. at harvard, for example, it is now difficult to imagine that a nuclear catastrophe is still possible. the threat of a nuclear collision is not far behind the nuclear arsenal of both russia and the united states are large enough to destroy entire states. we still live in a world of mutually assured

destruction, if the current conflict ends in a large-scale nuclear war between the united states and russia, both states will disappear thanks. we talked with professor vladimir printable from mgimo and professor graham allison from harvard. born into a jewish family in berlin, survived the war in holland, was an ardent supporter of leftist ideas, worked in yugoslavia, the gdr, but after his arrest became an inveterate anti-communist. on the stroller is written castro, a drawing from the south african newspaper dietalland look, not that across the ocean, but from another continent, the word cuba and the usa written in african. it used to be called the boer language. perhaps the most famous caricatures of the caribbean crisis are arm wrestling in the sixty-second year from the artist. leslie allen carter is

marked on the bombs. h hydrogen bomb. british. michael cumings, stood apart from all deterrence in the face of the cold war bombs. nuclear the inscriptions on both sides are the same none can be used. in the soviet union, they knew much less about the karev crisis. however, they wrote and drew a lot about the cuban revolution, of course, a lot here is a poster of the sixty- second year, hands away from cuba, a drawing by yuli gangfa and a crocodile magazine. it's about the attempted invasion of cuba in 1961. all images are perfectly recognizable. finally, the cover of crocodile magazine for the sixty-third year. this is the denouement of events. fidel's visit. castro to moscow festive. it reminds of the fatality of a nuclear war, but there are also optimists from the contrary in 1962

. the ussr tried to do something quite rational to place medium-range missiles in cuba that could compensate for the lack of long-range missiles. actions. they were built too slowly the ussr began a program of intercontinental ballistic missiles. they were so huge and complex that only six could be built. but then it became clear that they could not be used. the caribbean crisis. it showed nuclear weapons are more useless in practice than a water gun. oh come on, they crush the power of the whole world into dust too powerful to be used, let's say you fight with melee weapons, then the gun is more effective than the machine gun, all the more, and it's possible, the efficiency grows until it reaches the ceiling and at this moment . change ends let's say. you are terribly angry for something with your eight-year-old son and

you have a weapon in your hands. first of all, you will put aside your weapons, and then you will deal with them, and with nuclear weapons, no matter how you call it, no matter how you decorate and improve it. it is impossible to use it is impossible, even if someone gives the order to use it, it will not be used. well, yes, this is god, but somehow uncomfortable. transneft is not only the transport of oil - it is the development of high-tech industrial production. the transneft oil pumps plant ensures the independence of russian companies from foreign supplies of pumping equipment modern machines production control system and innovative approaches to product development guarantee its high quality transneft oil pumps energy efficiency and durability. vladimir

petrovich lukin, an outstanding scientist, diplomat, politician , himself remembers the caribbean crisis and talked a lot with its direct participants. i am sitting in the graduate school of the world economy of international relations and reading something with rapture, some texts that i needed professional special wounds, there was suddenly a person bursting into the special crane . later turned out to be one of the most our prominent and respected experts on french french politics yulia rubinsky and says they are approaching approaching it turned out that this blockade is, apparently, somewhere on the twenty- seventh and owes us. honestly say that by

youth and frivolity, to some. i wasn't very scared. apparently, due to the fact that the general was such a not frightening mood some kind of spring mood, and in october the political spring mood is clear, but on the other hand, on the other hand. probably because i, frankly, thought that at some stage an agreement was inevitable. with agree, why did i not really understand then? now? i think that, nevertheless, in such times, in such a situation, when time, as it were, accelerates during times of severe, decisive crises, the strongly subjective factor a rises

, two people played a decisive role in the subjective factor. and, uh, both active participants in world war ii. they are from the generation that knew what war really was. uh, of course, uh, the leaders then had military experience and understood danger, but after all, any war conflict is also excitement. this is the desire for victory, as you think. what role did this play, in addition to all the calculations, which, probably, were that’s exactly the game of chance that was going on, well, you know, every human pelvis disputes excitement, a person is so arranged that sports, well, at least 50% does not consist of comparing cold arguments and the desire to discover the truth together. this is the ideal of a dispute, but they themselves are a dispute and a

dispute. uh, there is a lot of charismatic here, of course, in the summer, and the sixty-second year on meeting, and at the meeting, the first sai at the first summit khrushchev and kennedy they did not greatly underestimate each other, and then both leaders are already in progress. here's stepping up the steps of the crisis, realized the most important issues of this when kennedy was told by his generals e during a meeting of the executive committee of the national security council. how many people will die if a conflict starts with the use of an egg? uh, he was told what about? whose are these americans? can suffer said? no, this is unacceptable for us, never any questions. and i think that

khrushchev had a similar feeling. although there are no documents on this subject, i had conversations with sergo to remain a mikoyan. uh, the famous politburo member and leader anastasia ivanovich mikoyan and based on them. i think that something like this was, by the way, mikoyan from the very beginning had serious reservations about the idea, apparently personally owned by khrushchev. here is the movement. uh, a group of troops, including the nuclear factor in cuba yes, that's about reservations. eh, after all uh, only 2 years have passed and this crisis, which, it seems, was supposed to show how right we are, and khrushchev was incriminated as an example, it means voluntarism and irresponsibility and his own associates, does this mean that it was still a decision to exclude either basically him or just

those who supported at one moment, then opportunistically decided to change how the idea personally came up. in the head of nikita sergeevich, but he began to discuss it, as far as i can judge from my subjective data. he is the first, just mikoyan told that he was the most trusted person to the politburov. khrushchev for that period of time, and he told him, uh, about this topic, koen opposed this idea, that is, did not speak out, and in private conversations with nikita sergeevich, at the same time, malinovsky actively supported the minister of defense with them at that time. and when did this issue become more widely discussed? uh, there was a meeting of the uh politburo, if i am not mistaken, in the month of june, and it unanimously came out in favor. i understand that there

was unanimity then, but it’s special, so to speak properties. eh, but nonetheless. uh, it was a unanimous decision, including the vote. mikoyan, everyone spoke in favor of exactly the same as everyone spoke out. uh, for the cancellation for the withdrawal of troops, then uh missiles, but the responsibility, of course, lies with the politburov as a whole. and although the idea did not belong to sergeevich, then in the soviet union there was no great publicity and our compatriots knew little, unlike the americans, who, therefore, held their breath. still, if we abstract a little from the caribbean crisis and look more broadly, keeping in mind today's public opinion as a whole in crisis situations, when prestige is called on the cone, or in any case, as it is understood, it ultimately plays the role of inflating or

appeasing. uh-huh. you know, you actually ask the question of fedor alexandrovich the majority? it is not always true, and history has clearly proven this, in many, many, many parameters. was the majority right, which demanded that our tsar nicholas ii punish the japanese for bad behavior? seriously punish so was the majority right, which demanded to start a war against the germans? which led to what she led in stages to solzhenitsyn's red wheel. i think that in a crisis situation, when both. we have already

said the subjective fact of odessa is growing , the great importance of secret diplomacy is growing is of great importance. that's the case with the caribbean crisis. yes, he played a huge role. uh, played by two people. in this secret diplomacy, well, in fact , secrets, because not because they didn’t know that it was coming, but because they didn’t know what is talking. this, of course, first of all anatoly fedorovich dobrynin uh, was also a closed channel , also connected with the embassy, ​​but still, dobrynin played a decisive role in this, first of all, uh, at his meetings with robert kennedy with president kennedy's brother and there uh , very subtle and very skillful diplomacy was required in order for the ultimatum that was originally put forward, the united states either take away or we will start attacking on october 30,

uh and in the time of naim only the closest approach of ships during the blockade. it was required there. uh, very skillful diplomacy to turn all this into a compromise solution of the issue and, of course, this was done. this is a great merit and the second point, because we do not always talk about it directly, but a very acute situation developed in relations between moscow and hawaii, as soon as sergeevich immediately openly said on the radio that he was doing it. requirements for the withdrawal of missiles fidel castro was not told about this in a timely manner and he was very strongly and grossly offended, but fidel's insults. castro could have led to anything, including

the fact that it was simply physically impossible to remove these missiles with all the ensuing consequences, and here an outstanding role, of course, played on stas ivanovich mikoyan, who arrived in cuba at the very beginning of november and in very difficult negotiations, given the personally good attitude towards him of the leaders of the cuban he managed to achieve a revolution, but how would it be like the british say reluctantly. erh agree with uh basic solution. vladimir lukin recalled that cuba was then very annoyed with soviet behavior. and that today is a report from liberty island by yanella de laroso? weiss the island of dawn, crimson rings over the planet

. huna love my adele starts cuba is definitely an item in the program of visiting havana, especially celebrities in the hall of fame love him more than 300 photos of politicians actors writers 2014, for example, vladimir putin visited us together with dmitry medvedev who, by the way, visited us twice. and a year later, a delegation from the state duma came to us and valentina tereshkova presented us with a bust of yuri gagarin, who stayed with us in 1961 is a small museum located in a bunka. in the gardens of the hotel, the national maiden was a witness and the protagonist of the caribbean crisis, but the main thing is nothing inside, but what the guns knew against the backdrop of scala and the conflict kill. a nuclear war was seriously feared. therefore, trenches were dug in the gardens of this old hotel and

even a bunker was built. soviet nuclear weapons were located here, where they were directed towards the usa, right, medium-range missiles r12 and r14 with a radius of destruction of 2,4.000 km. for each warhead of one megaton, the events of those years are called differently in russia, the caribbean crisis is known in the usa, the cuban missile crisis. she cuba , we say the october crisis, a direct participant in those events, general fabian escalante, the former head of cuban intelligence at that time, a sabotage operation continued, the mongoose whose goal was to overthrow the communist government of fidel. castro, just imagine, from january to august of the sixty-second year, 6,000 unthinkable terrorist and sabotage acts were committed in our country

figures the deployment of soviet missiles changed the balance of power between the western and the socialist camps for this cuba, to a certain extent, sacrificed itself with soviet missiles or without them in october 1962, the crisis was bound to occur. indeed , soviet officers became close by and brought their families to the island until the early nineties, about 20,000 soviet people lived in cuba. now their descendants live on the island, the cubans especially liked the stew , a symbol of the quality of the soviet, write proma, it is still called karmi here. russa russian meat, sixties in cuba there were more than 150,000 cars and the soviet union and the united states and today

you can meet american bionics, soviet zhiguli, muscovites and even seagulls in the harbor along the streets. in short, we were threatened by the united states and the soviet union helped it was so long ago, but little has been done since then, what has changed after the october crisis, 60 years have passed. for some, he left an indelible mark; for others, he became just another historical event for people when they realized the gravity of the situation. we were on the doorstep international and national crisis tension then too increased 9 months after the caribbean crisis in cuba there was a birth boom in 2009 cuban animators. he is the patron author of the first full-length cartoons on the

island, he shot his picture about this, according to the director, cuban then hurried to live in the present, because no one knew what would happen tomorrow so before the threat of the end of the world. love blossomed, while today's youth, for the most part, knows nothing about the crisis. have you heard about the october crisis and you are at school it has not been studied. the cuban missile crisis ended 60 years ago. well, the memory of him on the island lives on for the cubans. he became an ordeal in building socialism, but let yang show a strong will on his own. choose your friends and allies on the international stage, chief among them being the soviet union kevin duran. and i'm not lada larusa, especially for international viewing cuba that same performance

did not last long in the repertoire of the satire theater. yes, and he missed his main viewer, the brother of the president of the united states, his to please the great russian theater on the example of the decision you see, and when they were already approaching. to the theatre, oh, they were, so they all ran out, so everything, of course, was all trembling and was already sitting in the light. he was waiting for the bombing. here's a great performance. went

friend burlatka, means so about the caribbean fastened, they said he was gone. where he rushed, so he was found, somewhere near the water they played kennedy bribies decided this is to the fact that now is the anniversary of caribbean rice, and i think that, unfortunately, i no longer hope that i will play something in the office. and i'm waiting. the pro-caribbean crisis will probably not put on a performance. but about the current one. the anniversary is yet to come, for obvious

reasons, everyone wants to find in the experience of overcoming that crisis, a recipe for resolving these recipes. no, every crisis is a unique crisis. general colin powell, who became secretary of state. he put forward the doctrine of paul, the so-called, well, the doctrine, which was named after him. one of the main provisions of this doctrine is the thesis that when you start some risky policy of diplomatic military action, it is very important to know in advance. how to get out of this action with dignity if something goes wrong. i think that this lesson is not always superfluous and not superfluous even now. can an escalation along the caribbean model defuse the world atmosphere? now, alas, the confrontation between moscow and

washington 60 years ago was a battle for supremacy in a relatively well-ordered international system. the cuban draw fixed such a system in the second half of the cold the war was unpleasant, but far less dangerous, both sides took precautions. that's all now, otherwise the world has entered into a reorganization of such a scale that its outcome cannot even be guessed from the previous construction, there will be almost nothing left ; keep from the irreparable. you and i have only one way out. i see no other secret agreement with the russians. the risk is enormous, the risk is deadly to

us with you. well what a risky world it 's worth, then, yes, and now it was an international review, goodbye. it's always interesting how it all starts. now everyone will see the producers of good things want and most importantly. but it's best to check.

we received a lot of requests to come out more often. in the west, they are trying to declare us a pariah country . let's look at this story a little

differently. this is an attempt to hear recreate. through painting the whole panorama of the great country of the artist. the armed forces of ukraine do not leave attempts to destroy a civilian crossing in kherson, the air defense system repulsed another strike, the evacuation of civilians continues in the region, our special correspondent yevgeny paton is working on a direct line yevgeny hello. what is the current situation in the crossing area? georgiy i welcome you indeed at night there was another attempt to hit the crossing, according to some reports.