including overseas, but answer a simple question. why is it supervised by the pentagon military department and its numerous contractors with the american side, which so far remain unanswered? and also how long will it take for the staff of the magat to find out if kiev is preparing a

so-called dirty bomb? about how germany and france are ready to counteract washington, which is luring european production to the usa and how they are going to do it from publications in the western media, we are like the territory of luhansk and donetsk people's republics. e clear of surprises vsu. not a press conference by elvira nabiullina and deputy chairman alexei zabudkin, and at the beginning of this, a statement on the chairman following the meeting of the board of directors, please, good afternoon. today we have decided to keep the key rate at 7.5% per annum. the main trends that we observed in recent months have persisted, current consumer price growth rates remain subdued annual inflation is slowing down the economy continues to adapt to

the changes taking place. e, at the same time, new factors have emerged that can be classified as pro-inflationary in the medium term. e. first of all, this is an increase in geopolitical tensions , partly mobilization, as well as a deterioration in the situation in the world economy. and given this decision to keep the rate unchanged, today it seems the most balanced. i will dwell in more detail on the arguments of this decision. the first current inflationary pressure remains subdued, some acceleration of price growth in september compared to august is due to earlier only with one-time factors increase in tariffs for auto insurance and mobile communications. if they are excluded, then the price pressure will be below 4%, in annual terms. uh, the downward correction in consumer goods prices continues, which have

risen in price in the spring of building materials, furniture , electronics, and food. however, price increases. generally. still slowly picking up compared to the very low mayan readings in june july. we expect that monthly price growth in december will be higher, largely due to the postponement of indexation of utility tariffs to december. it will add annual inflation of about a half a percentage point half a percentage point. this year, the price expectations of the enterprise continued to rise; inflationary expectations of the population are at elevated levels. uh, while we are not yet seeing an increase in consumer activity, the savings model of behavior may be associated with increased uncertainty. uh, consumers can also continue to get used to the changed assortment. a new factor influencing

price dynamics is partial mobilization, the coming months, due to a decrease in consumer demand, its effects will be disinflationary, but then pro-inflationary actions may appear through a change in the structure of the labor market, a shortage of personnel in certain specialties, it is still difficult to assess all the economic consequences of the shift in the employment structure. they will manifest themselves gradually through the adjustment of wages and the possible increase in the flow of labor between different industries and regions. ah, we have revised our inflation forecast for this year to 12 dashes 13% and left the forecast for the next five dash seven percent to a target near four percent inflation will return in 2024. second, thanks to the faster adaptation

of the economy to external restrictions, the decline in gdp this year will be less. what was expected. in the middle of the year. this is due to a more positive situation in the third quarter thanks to industrial production and agriculture, where a record harvest is expected this year, the economy focuses on risk in our october report on the regional economy. as a result, we have improved our gdp forecast for this year and believe that the contraction of the economy will be 3-3.5% however, according to operational data, after the stabilization of economic activity in the summer months in september, it began to decline again. among the reasons are weakening consumer demand, as well as worsening conditions for russian exports. sectoral and regional heterogeneity persists. and after the spring suspension

of activities, the recovery in the domestic auto industry began, and the production of medicines and certain types of agricultural equipment is growing at a double-digit pace. big changes take place in the transport sector, international cargo flows have largely reoriented to the ports of the far east, the share of which in sea containers in turnover has increased from forty to seventy percent. uh, the capacity of the railroads leading to these ports. acquired a decisive value. uh, their workload can make expert deliveries difficult. on the one hand, and to slow down the increase in imports of imports of asian markets, on the other. there are examples of coal refineries and petrochemical companies, and for which redirecting supplies to the east remains a major logistical problem ; marketing difficulties are forcing individual companies to reduce production. and in the updated forecast, we left

unchanged the price of urals oil in 2023 2024-2025 at the level of 70-60 and 55 dollars hmm uh per barrel, respectively, uh. c. this assessment, on the one hand, takes into account the worsening outlook for the global economy, including an increase in the risk of a recession, and the result may be a decrease in global demand for raw materials, including for russian oil, on the other parties, guardian plus have taken steps to reduce someone on the production. we believe that these factors offset each other. the recovery of the economy next year will start a little later than we expected in july the bottom point of the recession will be in the middle of next year, demand from the public sector will continue to support economic activity, gdp forecast for next year is left unchanged at a reduction

of one dash of 4%, uh, in the fourth quarter, the dynamics will become positive. a few words about the forecast balance of payments, we raised the forecast slightly, both for exports and imports for this year is not forecast, uh, current account surpluses increased by 10 billion toe, 253 billion us dollars next over the forecast horizon, imports will recover as companies will find new suppliers, establish settlement mechanisms and logistics routes. but exports may decline under the influence of external restrictions, as a result, the current account surplus will also decrease, the trajectory of this decrease is approximately corresponds to that presented in the july forecast. third, monetary conditions generally remained neutral, while at the september

meeting they tightened somewhat, despite the key rate cut . outflow of cash banks increased deposit rates, as for loan rates, they stopped declining and at the same time banks began to demand higher requirements for married couples. this can be judged by the decrease in the share of approved applications. as a result, we are already seeing signs of a slowdown in lending in october. however, lending activity remains high, both in the retail and corporate segments. e, at the same time, part of the increase in the company's ruble loan is associated with the replacement of foreign currency loans and external financing. taking into account the current dynamics, we

raised our forecast for lending to the economy to nine dashes of 12%. similar rates will be maintained in next years. let me turn to the risks that may lead to a deviation from the baseline forecast about inflationary risks in the medium term have increased. e, in terms of external conditions, it can be noted that the situation in the world economy is deteriorating, many countries have been pursuing a soft monetary policy for a long time, creating cheap money in the economy and this policy has led to inevitable imbalances in this case, increasing the risks of financial stability in global markets in response to high inflation. many countries are drastically increasing rates, which also has negative consequences are seeing a slowdown in the growth of the global economy and an increase in the cost of servicing debt. this is

superimposed by the effects of fragmentation of world markets and the growth of geopolitical tensions. further intensification of crisis processes in the world and the expansion of sanctions means a shift towards an even greater reduction in russian exports and a possible weakening of the ruble by the corresponding informational effects. from the side of internal conditions, the further dynamics of inflation expectations remains an important risk for us, and will their increased level affect the savings behavior of the population. in addition, pro-inflationary risks from the labor market have increased, an increase in the labor shortage leads the company to compete for staff and raise wages at a rate higher than labor productivity. a significant group of risks is focused on the supply side the company is gradually solving

problems with maintaining current activities, but investment in development may be constrained by both general uncertainty and difficulties with the purchase delivery of equipment. this means that the recovery of supply in the future may be slower. three groups of factors can be classified as disinfectants, firstly, uh, the preservation of the current savings model of behavior. secondly, a record harvest of agricultural products this year, which may have an impact on domestic market prices while maintaining the complexity of sex. third, a faster recovery in imports of consumer and intermediate goods. in general, disinflationary factors are less pronounced over the forecast horizon, rather than pro-inflationary our forecast is based on the already published parameters of the draft budget for the three-year period and the predictability of the budget policy and the

systematic reduction of the structural budget deficit. over the forecast horizon are important conditions presented in the monetary policy trajectory forecast. and in conclusion about our future decisions, we clearly see that the deep transformation of the russian economy continues, changing their business behavior strategies. adapting to new challenges over the past month events have occurred, risks have arisen, the impact of which on the economy and prices is ambiguous as data on the development of the economy in these conditions becomes available. we will further refine our estimates of these effects and their impact on the forecast, our decision will be aimed at returning inflation to the target of 4% in 2024. thank you for your attention. colleagues, moving on to questions, please, do not

forget to introduce yourself and name your building. and nastya please hello savelyeva anastasia interfax traditional question what options were today on the supply table, you were looking at ups and downs and in september you were already talking about a shrinking space for further rate cuts. can we already say now that it has run out and, uh, somewhat worsened monetary conditions, won't it encourage you to stick to a slightly tighter monetary policy? this time we had a very broad consensus. uh, about the decision that the rate should remain unchanged as far as our future actions. we believe that monetary policy is now in the neutral zone, and in doing so, we have given a neutral signal. uh what does this mean that the further trajectory of the

key rate the further direction of our monetary policy will depend on the incoming data on the economy on inflation inflation expectations, uh, and hmm, depending on which factors will outweigh. uh, maybe , uh, keeping the rate moving up and moving down. this essentially means that we have a neutral signal. colleagues, please, rita second question hello, the release was very detailed, your introduction on monetary policy, so i will allow myself not to ask questions on monetary policy, but in particular. at what stage is the process now. uh, let's say fighting frozen reserves, uh, we are talking about lawsuits, a and another question. and now the media field sounds more and more often, and there are conversations. oh, the mortgage bubble.

i would like you to comment on this moment somehow. thank you in regards. e work on frozen assets. i have already said more than once that this is a rather complicated work, preparatory work, it is being carried out. well, it is probably premature to give any additional comments now, as far as mortgages are concerned. uh, an important segment, and we see that since the twentieth year. e, here, a trend was formed in which the growth in housing prices, e, he was ahead of the growth of nominal ones. types of the population and the second important trend is that we have the dynamics of housing prices in the primary market ahead of the dynamics of prices in the secondary market. and this gap has intensified and mm. we uh, see that uh this can be such

an indirect uh harbinger harbinger. uh, hmm, some overheating in the housing market, and us in particular, and we were concerned about it quite loudly, the spread of subsidized mortgages from the developer, which could increase, uh, the risks of a mortgage bubble . now we see, in general, some cooling of the mortgage market in these conditions , and the volume of applications for mortgages is decreasing and growing at the same time. uh, secondary market supply. uh, housing on the secondary market with discounts. this may lead to a reorientation of demand from the primary secondary market. might contribute to overall price containment and uh, that's what hmm these issues are about. of

course, we will monitor, but in our opinion , in order to avoid such risks of a bubble and overheating. eh, it is important to develop targeted support programs, and not large-scale preferential programs that can create such imbalances. and e lead not to an increase in the availability of housing for citizens, but simply to price increase. colleagues, please, rita margarita mordovina rbc and the first question will be devoted to the opening deal, which is being prepared now. ah, according to the appraiser, the value of the opening group is 359,386 billion rubles. but at the same time, the head of vtb kostin said that the price issue would still be discussed and other issues were agreed with the central bank in your opinion. uh, is the bank of russia ready to sell, and the opening is below the range indicated by the appraiser.

and in general, whether the question of price and opening is debatable and second. eh, the question is also i will ask, and on october 15 a decree was signed in which the central bank was empowered to issue an export permit. uh, more than 10,000 currencies. but to whom such permits can be issued, for what purposes someone applied or already applied for such permits. thank you. thanks for the opening. the appraisal is coming to an end, but, uh, the valuation report has not yet been formally received by the uk fcbs, but even if it does, we will not comment on, uh, indicators, uh, grades a and, of course, we will have discussions with the buyer on the price, these discussions will be be carried out. uh, hmm and in any case, we intend to complete this transaction before the end of this year, so there will be a discussion here soon, of course, based on uh, based on

uh, the appraiser's assessment, and the second, as far as hmm yes, as far as our powers pause. here 's the export permit. uh, more than 10,000 foreign currency. yes, we have such powers. uh, but uh, so far we have no opportunity to increase the limits for the export of cash currency for citizens, because access to cash evolution. we have limited cashless comes more actively like payment by our. in passport goods, uh, we will continue to look at the situation. fedor, please fedor ivanov investvich, hello. i have two questions . the first one is positive news for russian investors that part of the assets will be unfrozen by about 10% and uh, i want to know if any possible response measures are being worked out, uh, to unblock uh and opportunities to sell assets to non-residents from unfriendly countries.

uh, maybe in the same volume, or some stories that will look like a reciprocal, step. and the second question is about what you already mentioned today. these are geopolitical risks and their impact on lending rates. and how now the central bank evaluates the general effect of lowering the interest rate to stimulate the economy, if banks. uh, just the same, they increase the requirements for, more precisely, for borrowers. e keeps the rates quite high because they are just afraid. well, for non-payments on these same loans. as for the first question, uh, indeed, there is such information and private financial institutions are working on unfreezing the frozen assets, uh, our retail investors, uh, and through getting a license trying to get a

license and through the courts and, uh, through the negotiation process. well, uh, well, that hasn't happened yet in terms of response. we will look at the situation with regard to the impact of geopolitical risks, uh, on lending rates in general, lending activity. indeed, despite the fact that we lowered the key rate in september. recently, there has been an increase in lending rates, but this reflects. uh, increasing the risk of the premium, that is, the market we influence the short-term money market rates with our key rate. ah, then the rates for specific borrowers are market rates, they are not administered. they consider these risks as a whole. uh, the level of risk in the economy, but also the risks of a particular borrower, the level of his income. uh, cash flow, debt and so on. and of course, now the banks have revalued

upwards. uh, this is the level of market risk in our opinion. it's uh, we already see it to some slowdown. e lending. e. we will look at how this affects the inflation forecast and, if necessary, refine our monetary and credit policy. colleagues, please, svetlana hello, svetlanarnik ria novosti, two questions, and according to the bank of russia, are additional measures needed to e, balancing exports and imports, and can there be any measures, and has the bank of russia assessed the potential effect on russia's gdp from e- uh the latest cuts in custody plus and the introduction of a european embargo on russian oil? thanks as for hmm how do you say balancing exports imports, but now we have a change. uh, the flows of import exports primarily depend on

the reorientation of these flows to a to our other markets, including the logistics unbundling of logistics e, the problems of narrow infrastructural e, places, e, which exist, and the organization of the settlement system. yes, this is probably now the main thing in order to what affects the flow of exports of imports in the face of external restrictions? ah, as for how would the financial component we e we continue to believe that, uh, the floating exchange rate balances the interests of exporters and importers of this in the best way in these conditions, with regard to the potential effect of imbard from the decision of guardianship plus. uh, hmm from the price ceiling, probably yes. i think all the consequences hmm few, who

represents? yes, what will they be hmm these consequences, uh in aggregate, but nevertheless hmm what is important to us? uh, those impacts could be very different. stay conservative on oil. if you look at our forecast, we were conservative in july and now conservative we have kept the estimate. mm oil prices for the future are the same as in july, because there were two such oppositely directed factors on the one hand, the effect of opeks on the plus. yes, on the other hand. uh, perhaps a decrease in demand for e, russian energy carriers, as under the influence. um hmm the slowdown in the world economy after the impact of various export restrictions, so it is very important for us to remain conservative here. is there anything else to add here?

well, the only thing, of course, is the impact of uh sanctions on gdp, all announced sanctions are taken into account in the forecast. and uh, there is influence. e, therefore, the assumptions of the forecast assume that the physical volume of exports of oil and petroleum products next year will be slightly lower than in fact it will be according to the results of the twenty-second year. thank you . and online question andrey pushkarev, vladivostok newspaper and today, the inflation rate practically does not correlate with the key rate, and in fact, each indicator lives its own life. and what prevents a more dynamic rate cut. eh, i already answered this, the previous ones questions. e, i started talking about the role of our key rate, that the key rate still primarily affects e, the short-term rate, while other factors and premium risk already influence market rates, and

so on and so forth. but nevertheless, the key rate is a very effective tool in controlling inflation. i can give an example in february of this year, when inflation and inflation expectations grew sharply and just the increase in the key rate became the main factor, as a result of which we hmm as a result of which managed to cool inflationary trends and restore financial stability. and hmm, and you say, why can’t we reduce the rate more dynamically, but we, in principle, we reduced it quite dynamically, because in february it was 20%, uh, so now we have 7 1/2%, this is 1% a point is lower than at the beginning of the year and 2% of a point lower than in february, so we are actively reducing the rate for further rate dynamics will depend on what happens in the economy with inflationary interest processes and a very important factor in inflation expectations.

colleagues, please, masha maria kudryavtseva russia 24 question about the development of joint payment systems with turkey and iran, especially after the problems that arose, uh, with our map of the world, but in these countries. here's how it's going at what stage development is, and probably the most important question. and when it can, such a system will fully work. thanks e. well , really. we have difficulties. e hmm and under the influence of sanctions, our partners are afraid of secondary sanctions of influence on them, of course, with hmm using these payment instruments. but we are working with all our partners, but we build things differently with each country. each country is a special detail. we are here, we probably do not comment, but we are trying to establish various alternative opportunities for our citizens, who often go on tourist

trips. uh, on business you could use modern methods. yes, thanks to reuter. i wanted to ask two sets of questions, if i may, the first one is about the banking sector today . citibank is known to sell the portfolio consumers of uralsib bank at the same time city bank and 44 other banks with foreign participation. they are on the list to be published this week. yes, that a special permit would be needed so that transactions with the equity capital of these banks could take place. e, the question i have here is the following order. and what will be the criteria for obtaining permission for foreign banks to foreign shareholders, more precisely, for the sale of their subsidiaries, does the example of a bank network mean the sale

of part of its portfolio, that e sell assets, possible without permission, but just in parts, and the third question in this block, if you allow uh, see or risk that maybe some uh, maybe some banks from this list. you need to bail it out, just because the parent banks will stop their finan. and one more question in the other direction. you mentioned that mobilization can have a sort of inflationary effect, including due to the labor force and so on. and if you have a base point estimate, how much would mobilization add to inflation? thanks in regards uh operations of foreign subsidiaries and russian subsidiaries of foreign banks in russia, we treat them as russian banks, and all regulation in general and supervisory practice is built in exactly the same way. but in fact, transactions with the assets of a number of them on the list require special permission. uh, while such criteria are not established, work is

underway on the decree, and uh, while it is difficult to talk about it, it will be weighed, apparently, the whole set of factors. e in this situation some need for a potential audi. i am so far i don't see any. hmm, there aren't any cases like this that would need it in the short term. we don't see it, because in general the banking system is stable a and hmm about the ability to sell assets. does the decree concern only a deal with a shares? as for the influence of the chechen mobilization a and possible pro-inflationary factors of their assessment, but uh, really evaluate. i already said at the very beginning that it is quite difficult. we will focus on the incoming information. we can now say qualitatively that in the short term plan - this is a disinflationary effect in the long run

pro-inflationary effect. well, maybe alexey darevich, something to add here. come on, really. uh, it's difficult. in fact, the forecast speaks for itself. uh, inflation forecast for this year. he says so. uh, slightly shifted up and obzhan. it's from grandpa up. she reflects. uh, basically transferring fares. e from july last next year to e yes tariff indexation or next year in december. i mean, uh, all the other factors. they seem to be balanced next year, if you see us, too, the inflation forecast has not changed. therefore, the baseline scenario that the cumulative impact of all uh changes in uh that have occurred since july on the inflation trajectory is approximately neutral. yes, but uh, this is certainly more of an expert judgment at the moment than some kind of clear and iconometric extrapolation. , uh,

past experience, and in this sense, at all upcoming meetings, we will refine these estimates based on the incoming data. thank you colleagues next question online e wife written bloomberg please hello, i have two questions, one clarifying my colleagues have already asked a question about balancing exports of imports, but information appeared in the media that government agencies are discussing. uh, well, the option of restricting exports for ta- because imports cannot be increased uh, at a fast pace, is the central bank involved? eh, actually in these discussions. and if yes, then how would you feel about this idea in general and can such an export restriction work in general, that is, did you somehow look at this model and the second question is about

about new regions. and how is the integration of new regions into the regional structure of the bank of russia going or have representatives of the central bank of the new territories taken part in the discussion of the rate of decision on the supply, like other regions. thank you even with regard to uh balancing export imports. i do not know and did not participate in discussions that would concern any administrative restrictions on exports in order to balance exports and imports. eh, in my opinion. this is, uh, hmm, not practical to do. but, well, maybe something to watch, really. e in conditions when our exports exceed imports, and the possibilities of accumulation, e reserve assets are limited, and there should not be any measures to artificially stimulate additional exports, probably only in this way. can you answer this if you do not want to add

colleagues to the export, please next question olga returning to the question. on mortgages in the past at the last press conference, we touched upon the topic of mortgages at 0.1%, and now a new phenomenon has appeared on the mortgage lending market. this is a mortgage monthly payment of 1 rub. before commissioning and up to 3 years. you can use this opportunity until the object passes moreover during this period, interest on the main debt is not even charged. this is something very new in the mortgage market. i would like to ask a question here. what is your view on such mortgage programs, because they caused an incredible stir. but this is really a new product. we are now carefully analyzing. all of its effects are so-called tranche mortgages. yes, we called it a tranche mortgage, it has not yet received wide distribution. uh, but here's how

we see the risks. what could be the risks here? first, could it be a risk for developers? why because with such a mortgage tranche, a modest account will receive less than the amount of only down payments. and this is quite symbolic. uh, the first tranche and the uh, scroll account will fill slower than with a conventional mortgage, but we see that the filling of accounts from crow allows banks to reduce e rates on loans to developers, because they have it collateral and we saw that hmm with developer loans. here according to this scheme. they remain much lower than, say, the overall average corporate sector loans. and so it can increase the rate on loans for project financing. the second thing this can lead to is that it can lead to an increased demand for housing in the form of an investment object, which can be

really attractive for, let's say, even speculative purposes, based on rising housing prices. uh, can company people invest into this housing for the purpose of their subsequent resale, and such almost investment canopies may arise. this can contribute to housing price inflation . that's uh, accelerated growth hmm home sales for investment purposes. and this will further increase the gap e between the dynamics of prices in the primary secondary market. we are already seeing it now. and this can create problems. this is the gap between the primary and secondary market. e for mortgage maintenance, because when people need to sell a home that is mortgaged, it will be on the b market very different in price than the primary housing. and of course, targeting is possible here. the so-called unscrupulous sales,

when people will naturally react to the low cost of servicing a loan. there in the first period. yes, as long as the housing has not been used for a long time and is not fully aware of the future cost of servicing the loan. we see these risks, but we will continue to analyze and see how it will develop as necessary to take appropriate regulatory solutions. colleagues, please, ivan good afternoon ivan shlygin crow's form a few short questions two questions the first question - it is now that many experts began to talk about the benefits of the experience of the forties of the last century, when they had to come to the mobilization model of the economy in order to solve risks, how justified is this opinion such experts. is it worth it now to switch to such a model and is it possible, in principle, uh, the second question is about private investors, who have

now divided one group into two groups. uh, believes that now everything needs to be sold. uh, while there is such an opportunity, the exchange was not closed, but at least something had time to pick up, and another group of investors to talk. see how everything has fallen in price and you need to buy shares of commodity companies as soon as possible, because they have never been at such a low level. uh, now, which of these groups of investors are right, these are the two questions. thank you. so with regard to the first question, but indeed , new tasks have appeared in our economy. i want to note, while the old task has not gone away, and uh, we really went came moved uh into a period of uh hmm major structural transformation, which is influenced by many factors. i won’t even list them, uh, and in my opinion, such a transformation can be successful only on the basis of a market economy, of course, the state should support these uh,

structural changes to open up bottlenecks in infrastructure, and so on and so forth. what the government is doing now. but the redistribution of resources is the most efficient the industry's most efficient sector of the enterprise, of course, must be fully market -driven. and by the way, we see that's what the economy has adjusted to the restrictions much better since february, yes, faster and better than many expected. this is largely due to the fact that the adjustment mechanism was market-based, so i personally have no doubt about it. uh, the second question is about strategy. e different strategies, different approaches, e private investors, but they are always different. yes, there are indeed investors who buy on the market.