hello, the international review is on air at the fyodor lukyanov studio today in the program of the international review of the event of the week of chronicles tank biathlon for ukraine there are no more restrictions for preparing to supply almost everything. the ukrainian

nuclear deterrence crisis is still running the materials of our program. they ran into a fight with erdogan, sweden is not allowed into nato because of the provocation, they boil into oriental passions. in the last program, we painted the rabbit radically black. but in vain. it would be better to make it spotty this season in general fashion on leopard color. well, what is really beautiful is, by the way, the leningrad porcelain. the factory of the classic, germany decided the government announced its readiness to transfer 14 leopard 2 tanks to ukraine and allowed other countries that have this formidable machine to share with kiev a few coppers before the schultz, still publicly hesitated. and even denied not very much. it's clear. why

is it that in the atmosphere that has developed in the north atlantic alliance it is impossible to say no to the armament of ukraine. especially since the minister of foreign affairs in schulz's office , frau dörback, in plain text. says germany is at war with russia and the goal is to inflict a military defeat. leopard 2 is a tank from porsche of the same company. what makes sports cars and which ferdinand porsche founded in the thirties of the last century, they began to develop it immediately after the first leopard entered service in the sixty-fifth year, they tested it together with the american abrams, and the first serial instance. that's up to over, received in the seventy-ninth year. this was the answer the soviet tank of that time was a fairly light and maneuverable vehicle. unlike the heavy abrams on board,

the british challenge has a modern 120 mm smoothbore gun. the old bored l7 , which was previously installed on nato tanks, by the way, the abrams have the same gun as the leopard in the usa, it is licensed. so with the logistics of ammunition , a crew of four will be easier. and here is the fundamental difference. soviet cars in them, as a rule, have an automatic loader, that is, a person reloads the cannon mechanism, only takes aim and fires at the leopard. this is what the crew members do. but german vehicles traditionally have high-quality sights, and fire. you can even have a special stabilizer in motion. diesel engine, in general, perhaps the easiest leopard to maintain. of all the nato tanks , it was made in the seventies for the draft harvey. for example, the power plant is combined into a single unit and can be changed in the field. it is possible in 45 minutes, and

complex repairs are already being done deep in the rear, but the maintenance of these machines. it's like a soviet the auto industry to transfer to a foreign car, everything else , the leopard became a product of european cooperation, but not only europeans were armed with it after the collapse of the ussr, they actively offered it to the car. according to various sources, more than 20 countries of the world bought them for export. moreover, it received high ratings from experts, for example, in the rating of military magazine ordnats, it consistently ranks first. however, nine cars were lost in afghanistan, six from dani and three from canada, moreover these are the tanks of the latest modifications, the sixth and seventh , the scandalous situation has developed after syria when only during one operation the turkish army lost 10 vehicles, the tanks were amazed, even with the old soviet weather systems , one vehicle was literally torn to pieces after the ammunition was blown up, this

is very rare, it should be noted that turkey uses a rather old fifth generation of vehicles, and it does not have dynamic protection , but only 20 cars of the last eighth generation were built. for germany, the decision on tank deliveries, even though scholz last february, promised a change of eras, the inertia of comfortable pacifism of the second half of the 20th century strong, if it were not for pressure from all sides , berlin would probably even now prefer to abstain, however, no one will allow him this. everything is so everything, and the changes in germany and in its relations with the allies, we will talk with russell berman, a professor at stanford and a leading specialist in german affairs , a professor. what is the reason for schultz's hesitation on the issues of sending tanks to ukraine, berlin has repeatedly stated, and weapons have been transferred to kiev's unconditional support more than

once. why is there a hitch on leopards all of a sudden, yes, germany has long declared support for ukraine, but practical action requires a change in german thinking on two levels in the era of chancellor merkel. how do you know the essence between germany and russia? yes, very closely economic ties, they ended, these relations continued the long-standing eastern policy from old habits. it is difficult to refuse after the second world war , germany did not want to see itself at all. as a player. in the military field. german pacifism evaded involvement in hostilities in the form of even indirect participation, as well arms supplies. this required a restructuring of consciousness in the united states, too, or something, a restructuring of consciousness america insisted on the supply of german weapons, although the stimulation of germany to militarization generally contradicts the whole line after world war ii, there is no doubt that german pacifism is preferable to german militarism, of course, no one

wants to return now to germany of the times of the jungers and the world at the beginning of the 20th century, but now whether we like it or not, there are growing trends towards confrontation defense spending should grow and the united states is the largest donor to the defense sector back west no wonder what? such a large economy feels disappointed how germany does not take on the share that germany, until recently, did not reach the minimum obligation of 2% of gdp many ask the usa why should americans pay for the security of germany, which is not at all poor, if it does not pay for itself? almost 200,000 people serve in the german armed forces, of which 26,000 are women,

but even for this, the press does not like them, the authorized bundestag for defense issues, eva the dandy, said that the sphere lacks everything equipment and equipment in service with the ground forces, about 800 battle tanks, mostly of their own production, the recently replenished fleet of armored combat vehicles puma, each costing about 10 million euros. true, during the latest exercises, all of the eighteen tested vehicles failed, and some even caught fire, as for the military navy, then germany has squadrons of submarines , corvettes, frigates and support vessels, but only 30% are ready for full-fledged military operations. with regard to military aviation. which of the drummers v tiger and multipurpose n h90 are less than half combat-ready, while the luftwaffe has

typhoon fighter bombers worth about 100 million euros, as well as old tornadoes and phantom 2 from the 70s , however soon they will be replaced by american f-fighters 35 for $10 billion in early january think tank global farpower. compiled an annual ranking of the most powerful armies in the world, 50 factors were taken into account. including military spending, the variety of weapons and the number of personnel of the bundeswehr did not even enter the top twenty, the german armed forces are defeated even without entering battle, despite the defense budget of 50 billion euros and a special fund. 100 billion. there is not enough money for either ammunition or fuel for the car during the exercise, writes the magazine spiegel, accompanying the devastating article. illustrations with a german soldier who rides on a wooden gun plastic tank toy and launches paper fighter jets last year, germany

approved arms exports worth almost 9 billion euros. this is the second largest value in the history of germany. there is such a point of view that german identity, in general , has always been torn between the desire to the east towards eurasia and to the west towards atlanticism. now the final choice is made in favor of the west, the split between east and west, a very old german tradition is not at all a product of the cold war and the division of the country during the first world war germany perceived itself as an opponent to the west, because the west was france great britain usa germany has very deep historical ties with russia since the time of catherine ii a very important milestone in 1812-1813, modern german identity was born at the end of the napoleonic wars, when the germans fought on side of russia now in

the face of the ukrainian crisis, germany is leaning towards the atlantic side, but i would not be in a hurry to say that this is the final choice. a return movement is also possible, the geographical position of germany is not will change. it will always remain between east and west. and how can the european alignment of forces change? if you try to look at the period after the ukrainian crisis , germany should not be discounted, for example, to the following scenarios, the nationalist government in warsaw and president le pen in paris it will be a completely different europe almost. the one that was in the xix century, before that it is far from necessary, what will happen, but i would consider the probability of 30 percent hmm interesting. well, let's continue to fantasize with such neighbors from the east and west what kind of government will then be in berlin, let's say the administration or pan in paris can pull berlin back to moscow , or the franco-german motor of european integration will simply cease to function

, obviously one ukrainian crisis will have a diverse and multi-level impact. is there still a focus on us ? the alliance there may be more pressure on the union from the other side . tensions with russia are causing different parts of the eu to move in different directions. if if i were a strategist in moscow, i would wonder. did russian diplomacy do enough to prepare the european countries for the ukrainian crisis, i am not a fan of russian foreign policy, but i consider it, in principle, very successful in many cases, but with the preparation of the military campaign, it did not manage to weaken european solidarity within but they were well missed, but now in paris on the wet and the relations of germany france are not brilliant and why after the departure of merkel macron and dredge could become european leaders, but the dredge could not resist the ring of a special desire to become the leader of europe is not noticeable.

in my opinion, the macron, hesitant on the ukrainian issue, it seems that he is quite committed to the idea of ​​​​dialogue with russia, but now he has swung again towards a tougher position, and not by scholz. recently met. they tried to mend relations, but economic and foreign policy differences remain between them, but no dramatic processes are taking place. they, i would say mares forward. we have an opinion that the current crisis is almost planned by the us to undermine the economic power of germany, the german economic power is now experiencing problems, but i don’t think this is a conscious policy of the us one or another consequence, or just its lack of miscalculations in foreign policy, which are to a much greater extent dictated by biden's domestic political motives, not against germany, but he is for detroit events in

europe is an ideological conflict between a realistic view of the world order and such an assertive value agenda, it is no coincidence that the most militant force of the green party, that is, the pacifists so now it will or still there is a chance that europe will return to the good old school, the real flyer, green is indeed the party that is most based on the value agenda, therefore they take the most pro-ukrainian positions , they believe that in this way they defend the rights of victims of mass violations of human rights, but this is no way, nor the largest coalition party will change sooner or later the flame of value enthusiasm. burnout people want, working economy people. that's how it's arranged. this may not be very noble, but it is realistic. you reminded me of the saying of maurice, a french communist of the fifties, you always have to know how to finish a car, the same applies to

a warrior from cars and warriors happen and they often bring results, but sometime they need to be finished. thank you, it was russell berman , germany, the defining country for europe there was always a time when everyone wanted her to take care of herself and develop the economy ended from germany they are waiting for action on where this country will move depends not everything, but a lot. leopards and abrams did not leave donald trump indifferent, first tanks, then nuclear weapons to stop this crazy war. now it's so easy to do, well, everything is always simple for trump, but the expansion and complication of the range of supplies is undoubtedly an escalation. or, as they say now, the transition of the next red lines. earlier.

true, it was believed that the red line, only its intersection entails a crushing response, but in a hybrid war , apparently or not corresponding in any way, the confrontation has its own logic, and the more pressure, the more impressive the answer should be, and the limit impressiveness, really a nuclear factor. nuclear deterrence is a delicate subject, it is impossible to use nuclear weapons, at least that was the consensus in the cold war, but the opponent should not have any doubts that this paradox and its evolution will be used if necessary, we will discuss with dmitry stefanov the institute of the world economy of international relations. hello dima. hello, let's start. let's go with theory. still, the concept of deterrence exists as a system of signals, warnings, hints of signs, how developed is it and what role does it play? indeed, signals in

nuclear deterrence are a very important thing, but the main problem is that we do not have any established system of these signals. everyone understands them in their own way , unconditionally, in order to restrain the opponent, one must somehow bring to him, this or that information, but how is it communicated and how is it perceived? well, you can guess based on the results of certain actions, the main problem is that those comments on these exercises that are taking place should somehow be tied to the official nuclear doctrine to the so-called declarative policy, which is also not some kind of great doctrine, which is not infallible. in case of war. naturally, it will not be read in the event of a nuclear war, but nevertheless there must be some kind of correspondence. it's not always observed. moreover, this is not always observed , and i'm sorry. in the event of a war, they will not read it. but if a decision is made to start it , at the moment before, he will probably remember what is written there or is also no longer there. a very interesting moment. there is specifically in ours. uh, in our respective document

, the basis of state policy in the field of nuclear deterrence. there is a separate paragraph that directly indicates that the decision is naturally made by the president and he can inform the international community or the addressee or someone else that such a decision was made before during or after the application. here, uh, will he be guided by this document? this is of course a big question. uh, because after all, probably, some strategic tactical considerations can have a higher power. and here we, uh, also face such a problem that we do not have any single standard for transparency, openness and ambiguity, what is called a beautiful word in english, ginger decides for itself. maybe, in general, i mean somehow deficient. in one sense or another, it can be one of the norms of transportability in the nuclear sphere. it may be that everyone admits that yes. we deliberately keep the ambiguity, because if we just clearly draw this very red line , after which a nuclear war begins, then this

will be a signal, again a signal for everyone else, that anything can be done before this red line. here, uh, the red line, a very popular word now , the phrase sounds all the time. uh, it feels like this is one of the baskets that mentioned from the most declarative. it 's as if it doesn't work anymore, because, well, my feeling may be erroneous, that no one pays attention. just now, literally , regarding these tanks to ukraine, an official representative of the american administration said that we are closely monitoring the signals. but actually, we haven't heard any signals yet. therefore, we will continue. that is, it works. this is all already shaking the air does not work. but it seems to me, still with the denial of air. that's too strong a word for this. areas, but, because, as it were , nuclear signals are still more or less read out by another problem. here, in the fact that between containment and enforcement, the boundaries have become very thin. if not aesthetic,

respectively, on the one hand. we are trying to force our opponent to refrain from some actions, but this is exactly the same. it can be interpreted as the fact that we are forcing to some other actions and here it also enters. e in the game factor that no one wants to give back, no one wants to show weakness forced us to succumb to nuclear blackmail and this also leads to interesting moments , now such a narrative is spreading, which is very fond of, e, nuclear positionists that nuclear weapons are nothing but problems because everyone hides behind them and makes their own dirty shit, another problem is that the conclusion from this may be that everyone needs to get nuclear weapons, and here again we are faced with a potential crisis of proliferation regimes. here is mentioned about scare. and we have a couple of months ago dmitry had a training on the air, who just said very clearly that the fear was gone. the horror of a nuclear war must be returned, because otherwise, nothing will work. it then caused quite a stormy reaction

, to the point that i received letters from the united states there that you just try to scare us and so on. and as it seems to you, but there is a certain logic in this, as it seems to you. what do astrahams have now , firstly, is it needed, and secondly, does it really exist or is it really forgotten, and i would actually turn the question of fear a little bit from a different angle, because there is not only fear. in the context of the fact that someone is afraid that someone will apply, but also of the one who is going to apply. yeah, we weren't there and it's really scary, because as if worse, as they often say, worse than what does not fall on the ground. after the premiere weapon will be that if the sky does not fall to the ground, because then it's like, well, that's it, open season, as the hunters that they are say

our counterparties also have a controversial issue in the first place, because, as the history of the nuclear crises of the past cold war shows, when we are afraid of each other , this may not end in anything good, and in fact there is a controversial opinion, but deserving attention that, in principle, all detente and more or less serious disarmament began in the eighties, when the united states also realized. uh, the fact that the soviet union is sincerely afraid of the first strike is sincerely afraid of the us war and, accordingly, is doing everything possible to prevent it. but how would and does it all with a huge margin, one cannot say that they were not afraid on the other side. we also know very well the stories about there about the very bending of the female awakened at night . here is about kennedy who said that he was perfectly restrained by several missiles, so he does not understand why hundreds of thousands of them are needed. now, if this fear is now, i think it simply persists, because, as it were. well, what about him? we the problem is that it is

fear, it is already theoretical they are practically in the cold war. nevertheless, they introduced between themselves and people who really fought, who knew the horrors of war, and who saw nuclear tests. and now, of course, we have a completely different generation. true, already from the war, of course, they remind of themselves. in 1945, after the united states dropped an atomic bomb on japan, manhattan project director robert oppenheimer and physicist albert einstein founded the atomic scientists' bulletin organization, a journal of the same name to warn the world of the dangers of nuclear weapons, 2 years later. they created the doomsday clock, which became the symbol of the nuclear age, the clock hands were set at 23:53 7 minutes to midnight showed the time left for humanity before a global catastrophe.

the hands of the clock have been translated more than once. and just the other day, they moved another 10 seconds ahead. now they show 90 seconds to midnight , or the time of unprecedented. in the fifties measured the accumulation of the ussr. us nuclear arsenals fears of a pre-nuclear war permeated all americans. society and culture in the country held nationwide exercises rehearsed the rescue of the president and the evacuation state department, and in schools, children were taught how to build bomb shelters and protect themselves from radioactive fallout in an american short film. crouch down and bleed the main character turtle bird and the staff of the security commission told how to behave in the event of a nuclear catastrophe. commercial firms cashed in on fear, selling safe houses of varying levels of comfort from a hideout in a trench for $13.50

to a luxury home, for $5,000, life magazine even published a story of newlyweds who spent their honeymoon in a room and became and concrete at a depth of 12 feet underground in 1954, during tests of a hydrogen bomb on a bikini, the us administration did not warn other countries here not to enter the zone from uncle as a result, after the explosion, the japanese fishing boat lucky dragon, which was nearby, was covered radioactive fallout , the crew showed signs of radiation poisoning, the incident recalled the tragedy in hiroshima nagasaka. a powerful anti-nuclear movement began in japan in august 1955 in hiroshima, the first world a conference against atomic and hydrogen bombs , then a conference on the peaceful use of nuclear energy was held at the headquarters in the apartment. he was already wrong in november 1961. at the height

of the cold war, about 50,000 women demonstrated in 60 us cities under the noses of ending the arms race. and there is no humanity in the sixty-fourth similar machines of the world took place in australia. and in the seventies in france, in just 2 years , 10 anti-nuclear demonstrations took place, in which 175,000 took part. in june 1982 in new york for a rally against nuclear weapons came out more than a million fought, not only for peace, but also for the suspension of nuclear power plants after the chernobyl disaster, nuclear energy almost disappeared from the agenda of most countries and a number of groups to pantia the nuclear movement, believing that their goal had been achieved, disintegrated. but you remembered detente detente. as a matter of fact, it began and its main part was - these are all treaties

, first of restrictions, then the reduction of ulcerative weapons. we have one last new start treaty left. uh, and the feeling is that in the current atmosphere - it's generally dead number. i mean, well, imagine. right now, it's very difficult to conduct negotiations here. if at all, perhaps, is the age of this kind of agreement over? i think the epoch has not ended, simply because it is difficult to tie them, as it were, to recognize an agreement to a specific international situation due to the fact that this is just a tool, the task of preventing a war, in which, as you know, there can be no winners, therefore there should not be unleashed and signed by all five official nuclear powers. and it seems to be an unofficial day birth kept with this is also not particularly argued, but it remains on the agenda, how to prevent this through risk reduction measures to reduce these dangers. here, too , there are different terminologies, and control violations are just one of the tools. it's not for the sake of it. best wishes. it was not done there for the sake of world peace, these are

quite working tools for ensuring national security, of course, it strengthens international security, but first of all, considerations. they are like a classic understanding. it's about what we it's just easier, we know better to remove opponents, spend less money on unnecessary systems. oh, by the way, very often in this context they say that the chinese do not understand the meaning of the control lanes, so they will not agree on anything, but at the same time they are excellent, what is called a ride on our control-loading with the americans. in the sense that they could calmly develop their systems, without engaging in the exciting process of putting into service raw strategic systems , replacing them with newer ones in five years. here on it was they who didn’t throw away the money, what will happen next, of course, it’s interesting, because china , of course, plans to increase it, but again. we also have other nuclear powers that are also looking at all this, and i cannot say that there is any consensus

that all test weapons should be thrown on the shelf for another job, that they can arrive in different forms. and, of course, those wonderful reference conventions, like dsn ds deep verification, like our inspectors, their inspectors there. here everyone is each other come to watch. this will most likely be a thing of the past. eh, including for logistical reasons. well, here is the feeling, again i am. specialist, i may be wrong, but the political value of this very ambiguity seems to be growing, because well, this hybrid war gives rise to hybrid everything else, including hybrid arms control. we either control or we don't control. oh yes, that's a very sound observation. i would even add here that this ambiguity and hybridity sometimes becomes completely such frightening forms again speak of fear. for example, in the russian tradition , the concept of strategic deterrence has existed for quite a long time, which implies the whole complex

of military and not very military measures to deter the enemy. and now we will answer the americans, they liked it, they have integrated deterrence, which is again aimed at the fact that at every stage, we have tools so that the enemy does not think that he is there, he can defeat us there in an escalation , it is believed that this allows, as it were, to lengthen track to an exchange of nuclear strikes. but for some reason there is such a very unpleasant feeling that in fact it just makes this track more convenient. it is clear but it's better after all, nevertheless. yes, of course, thank you very much for talking with dmitry stefanovich. let's take a break from european security in latin america strangely enough, the plans are calmer, the president of brazil lula brushed his feathers after the failed right bunch and the floor of new ideas from a common currency with neighbors, and so on sergey brilev is not