a dangerous place, i myself do not go to a trick without brass knuckles and without a whip, look. tell your handkerchief its motto, i don’t believe it, because everything that you have just told is not true. operates backwards.

may 19 is the 100th anniversary of the birth of the main soviet americanist and one of the most significant international affairs scholar georgy arbatov, a bright and courageous man at the front during the great patriotic war and in subsequent activities, as one of his students notes, georgy's distinguishing feature has always been elegance and intellectual and in human behavior. georgy arbatov

was born in the spring of 23 in kherson. in 1941 he graduated from school with a gold medal and , on the eve of the war, entered the krasin artillery school for 18 years. georgy arbatov commanded a battery of rocket launchers, passed the kalinin steppe voronezh, the first and second ukrainian fronts , crossed the dnieper twice, after which he was sent to the rear of the war with severe tuberculosis. for him, a young disabled person of the second group ended in the forty-fourth with the rank of captain. returning to moscow, he entered the international faculty of moscow state university, which soon gained independence in the form of mgimo, studied the history of the united states and was engaged in journalism , worked in a publishing house, foreign literature and communist magazines. in the early sixties, he got into a group of consultants to get off as the cpsu for relations with the communist and workers' parties of the socialist countries. and in the sixty

-fourth, her father of soviet-american studies, arbatov, headed her, was an adviser to the country's top leadership from brezhneva andropov to gorbachev and yeltsin in the sixty-seventh year on his initiative the profile institute of the usa and canada of the academy of sciences of the ussr was founded, formally work in was not a diplomat, but participated in many closed negotiations, personally knew all the presidents of the united states and johnson before bush sr. made a significant contribution to the poguzh movement of scientists, which advocated arms control and spreading. artov brought up a whole generation of brilliant specialists, and he himself belonged to the abortion of prominent international experts of the last soviet decades nikolai inozemtsev alexander bovina evgenia primakov valentina zorina

fyodor burlatsky and others they had a paradoxical time for all the formal signs of the ussr. it was at the peak of geopolitical and military power. however, the system experienced growing problems not only of an economic, but also of an ideological nature, the lack of internal flexibility affected the ability to continue the military-political competition of the united states. artifacts of that sparkling era will be recalled by sofya sergeeva one of the parties tried to show the advantage of its own system, enjoys immeasurable success, the exhibition of the achievements of the soviet union in the field of science, technology and culture, opened in the largest exhibition hall of the colosseum, in the first 15 days it was visited by half a million people, the americans were shown all the most modern models of soviet satellites and rockets a miracle of technology. the world's first nuclear-powered

icebreaker. lenin and the model of the passenger tu-114, which transported the soviet delegation. across the ocean the plane was so large that there was no suitable ladder at the airport. let's, let's compete, who will give more goods to the people, the whole system is better, but win, a month later sokolniki opened an american exhibition headed by a delegation of richard nixon, then vice president. this competition will serve the good of our peoples. we should exchange ideas freely in six weeks, the exhibition was visited by almost 3 million people and its exhibits were the best advertisements for capitalism, housewives were amazed by combines and dishwashers, and men flashing by the thunder of the car for the chevrolet exhibition the impala was cut in half for visitors to see everything, and the v8 version was the most expensive in the lineup, and the advertising slogan was sly.

a luxury car for every american , and a job answered soda, their khrushchev tasting was closely watched by nixon. and nikita sergeevich himself, unknowingly, became the face of an american advertising campaign. anikson, who was fed up with pepsi and french fries at home, was taken to a barbecue, which was solemnly opened specially for the second time . it was such a delicious dinner. here, in fact, everything what we have on the table right now. here is borsch, our here is such a broad soul, of course borsch is necessarily sour cream. well, and, accordingly , kebabs, because this is a legendary kebab place, more than 60 years have passed as such an institution, and even today the kebab house is popular even from other parts of moscow and from other cities. here is elementary

barbecue 57. and there we know we know this story. although relations remained strained in the early sixties, khrushchev and kennedy exchanged gifts for the wife of the american president. jacqueline gave a puppy to the famous the arrows flying into space are a living hint of our leadership. but even ordinary americans understood this sound to mean that the soviet union was capable of launching not only satellites, but also nuclear missiles for the first time americans felt defenseless. although i did not know that the ratio of strategic nuclear forces was not in our favor and the cold war. it was necessary to put the situation of equal danger. here was an attempt. operation anadyr the soviet union deployed r12 missiles tactical nuclear weapons good and kennedy and

nikita sergeevich khrushchev had the prudence to stop, being at the edge of nuclear bessma. they realized that further steps to escalate. impossible cannot lead to big trouble after the caribbean crisis under brezhnev. the recommendations of the institute of the usa and canada created by georgy arbatov, the father of soviet american studies, often helped to learn how to avoid sharp corners. i would say that for the sake of their politics, the americans need such an enemy for their well-being, just like you know, phonetic preachers need them clean force. i said we'll do the worst for you. we will deprive you of your rights. reminds me so far, when in the seventies we finally reached parity leaders, superpowers, become almost friends, knowing that leonid ilyich is fond of cars in the seventy-third , nixon gave him a lincoln continental

brezhnev was delighted, seated the american president next to him and sped away, leaving perplexed guards on the side of the road blue short two-door car. he was straight, indeed. as i understand it, a good gift and gave what gives a sports car. this adrenaline is joy. this is the case. he said a phrase about the fact that leonidovich's politics may not be very strong powerful. well that's how a driver he uh will give a professional racer. m. brezhnev and nixon met again when 35 countries in helsinki signed a historic act that laid the foundation. the building of european security has changed a lot since then . finland managed to abandon neutrality and joined nato, and this status corresponds to other architectural techniques. here are the other day finns they fenced themselves off from russia with sophia sergeev's garden fence sergey truskov. dmitry matrosov international review.

the name of georgy arbatov is associated with two fundamental concepts of international détente and arms control . it's good to remember today. and what was détente in general, heartfelt consent was not there. detente and arms control risk management through diplomacy is based on the recognition that there are deep irreconcilable differences between states, in order to manage them to find common ground where they are possible, it is necessary to recognize that the contradiction is inevitable. it has nothing to do with good will. on the contrary, hostility is implied by itself, but does not

imply, for example, the current american concept of the struggle of great powers, as the main driving forces, détente is based on the recognition of the status quo, which may not be satisfactory, however, the decision is made to maintain this status quo and not try to change it, not to seek hegemony dominance, in fact, detente - this is the desire to postpone what political theorists call the security dilemma. in the late 1960s and early 1970s, several incentives prompted us to think about reducing tensions in terms of these objective underlying factors. this is a little secret. this is the achievement of military-strategic parity in united states after the breakthrough of our big sixties, which created a margin of safety in ensuring the country's security and increased the kremlin's interest then in stabilizing the situation stabilizing

the arms race on a mutual basis to save power and prevent an uncontrolled arms race, by this time a certain balance had been reached between the wto and nato, which allowed soviet diplomacy, as it were, the cherished goal of fixing it, the post-war status quo, but if you look at the american shift, that what reasons were his united states here, too, parity. e, military-strategic e, played an important role, because it became clear to the americans that the further continuation of a linear uncontrolled arms race. first of all, it's dangerous. secondly, it does not make sense by that time this situation of the current mutual assured destruction appeared, beyond which further build-up. that is, each side could respond to a nuclear

fall and could not be defeated in this parallel to the first detente in the ussr actually curtailed attempts at internal economic reforms. so the economic factor played a significant role if our preparatory working materials on preparation were greek. themselves a soviet-american seventy-second year. in its economic trade part a is the preparation of a trade agreement. this is a whole complex of other agreements that were signed in moscow in 1972, and i was greatly impressed. how seriously the soviet side then took this aspect to this aspect were interviewed by all ministries profile departments they created their applications considerations a big plan was drawn up for the overall development of these relations, but we know that it was in the direction of western europe, this was, of course, a massive breakthrough in our energy resources of western europe, also during the

same period. maybe, as far as the united states was concerned, what was envisaged, well, in addition to signing a trade agreement with the most favorable regime, it was envisaged the development of trade economic ties , including american investment in technology e, industries such as fuel energy complex, for example, it was planned, or rather, the construction of a separate gas pipeline, tyumen-murmansk with a builder with the construction of a whole plant near murmansk, was proposed. and american investments in this project alone should have amounted to $ 5 billion at that time. this is a lot of money. in addition, it was even about joint ventures in the soviet american, and joint projects in the developing world. so even a schedule was drawn up, approximate approximate, of course, of payments and receipts, which should

were these new relationships to bring with specific figures so that already yes in the plans covered the period. so the seventy-second to the ninety-eighth year. here in the nineties . uh, the soviet union was supposed to come out on a positive balance in these relations. uh, taking into account the fact that it was necessary to reckon with the old share. so our export to america was still quite limited. so the balance was external trade not in our favor, but nevertheless even so i thought that the benefit of this cooperation would exceed overheads. and now the ninetieth year will already be a net dividend for the soviet soviet treasury. that's so far. then the plans of the soviet leadership came in. the us had its own reasons to seek appeasement plus, of course, the vietnam war. this is a very important

factor in the united states, the war strained the resources of the united states did not lead to victory, led to a situation of such imperial overstretch. uh, who also demanded to unload and bring american obligations into line with their limited limited opportunities. moreover, a powerful anti-war movement has emerged in the country, which has essentially turned into a movement against global anti-communism and militarism. this movement captured part of the political class. that consensus collapsed during the cold war , serious restrictions arose on the continuation of the course of military intervention abroad. congress. reduced military spending. forbidding the operations of us intelligence agencies abroad

, criticism grew in society. all this complex and the military-industrial complex of the cia the secret services of this entire state of national security, that is, the american society, in fact, did not want to contribute. further time. this is the american empire and their son's senger. of course , this had to be taken into account. however, already in the second half of the seventies , detente began to rapidly fizzle out. why so hide first of all the turn of a very ideologized human rights policy, which was guided by president james carter carter actually discarded real politics in favor of values, and this became a verdict on any efforts that were made within the framework of détente, the main thing was that the soviet union would become even more of a status quo power, stop spreading its influence in various ways in the third world, and

behave. so to say more restrained responsibly. here, in exchange for those gingerbread that the americans offered us. and the soviet union, the then soviet leadership saw in detente to change even further. they were seen as the result of a new balance of power in the world. yes we have become catch up with the americans, help, so hmm detente for the soviet leadership of the time was not considered to me as a fixation, so to speak, from this as an eternal situation. uh, she was seen as a chance to further strengthen the world position of the soviet union. especially since the west as a whole from the united states at that time found themselves in a folded position. this is an economic world economic crisis. ah, its harbingers. this even means, of course, the defeat of the united states in vietnam and their and the body's political retreat. that's all. this

created a temptation to use this weakening of the west and the weakening of the americans to further strengthen, so to speak , soviet penetration, all the carrots that they offered us in the form of new trade economic relations and to speak very important for the soviet leadership. after all, they also did not take place in the notorious amendment of jackson venik, who was essentially killed, and the signing of the trade ratification of the trade agreement and the most favorable treatment was still the stevenson amendment , which essentially blocked the provision of loans, without which the development of these relations was impossible american loans, state-owned in the soviet union so the carrots did not work out 50 years ago and today the key issue of any change in the nature of relations. to what extent do the parties trust each other and themselves

, that is, within their own societies ? say, i do not trust you at all do not say this in the forehead for very important reasons, which is often forgotten. uh, the twine was that she was , how to say, didn’t have enough support, first of all, not in the soviet union , not especially in the united states a couple of these comrades pursued this new policy , bypassing, as you know, key departments and the pentagon side provided such a quick breakthrough. the speed of maneuverability of the then diplomacy of washington but on the other hand turned around that needed to loosen up a bit. there already nikshin as a result in the studio. yes, this already

begins in the whole family from the third year, how , uh, these departments, bypassed by the white house , began to take. revenge and congress with these amendments, about which we have already spoken and the pentagon the military did not agree to the preservation and freezing of this parity in the soviet union and public opinion, to which this policy, in general, the realism of the balance of power, which was carried out by mixing and silence, turned out to be too immoral, but also in the soviet union something similar, although it happened on a smaller scale, and here is the fact that brezhnev began to lose his capacity, although he seemed to retain his position in the system of power. it begins somewhere in the seventy-fourth year, with a meeting in vladivostok, he obviously was no longer the same series of control of interest, e.g., to his favorite brainchild, which , of course, was used by other departments that also had

their own interests. it is not known that the military military were not enthusiastic. father. even very well, uh, but the cominternists from the international department of the central committee by that time, they had not yet parted with the illusions that the fate of the world would be decided in the developing world, this non-capitalist path of development with soviet help would lead to our victory in the cold war, a question that is impossible not to ask, looking at what is happening around. and is there any chance for something like detente, normal diplomacy between large countries, which should be based on the awareness and recognition of mutual interests, has now been abandoned. after the end of the cold war, the united states became the only superpower. they decided that it is not necessary to pay attention to the concerns and interests of countries like russia, but

this excludes the very possibility of a discharge , respect for the opposite side is needed. what is not now is my conclusion. if we survive those dances with death that we are doing now. we will probably rediscover c. i'm afraid of detente, only before that we will get over, other options and life will severely punish us for our current behavior. yuri arbatova, the political dynamics of the 21st century died in 2010 i was very worried that we might be approaching a more dangerous period than the cold war. danger looms ahead 2 years ago, this was unthinkable. and now i can say, he was in an interview 2 years before his death of the experience and intellect of the statesmen of his generation. now it is clearly not enough. on the other hand. the world has changed so much that, perhaps, those recipes will not be applicable,

the same age as arbatov, still alive, henry kinchenger. he will hit, that a week later he noticed in an interview with the magazine icons with on the eve of the anniversary. it's time to recognize this is a whole new world. and no matter what we do, it may not turn out as planned, there is no line of behavior that would give the desired result with a guarantee. somewhat depressing. well , at least, honestly, it was an international review. see you.

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all of russia is grateful to the participants in the special operation of marriage, and we rely on them for heroism. these are the words of vladimir putin, which were voiced today at a meeting of the council on interethnic relations, representatives of more than 100 nationalities and were awarded high awards for their participation in their own , the president recalled this and emphasized the national the diversity of the country only makes it stronger in the face of various threats about what other important statements were made and what, in the opinion of the head of state, should be the national policy strategy anastasia yefimova will tell