to dance someone else’s muzzle, and by the way, everyone will have to dance, one way or another, for the lady. well, or at best. in libya, where devastating floods, according to various sources , more than 11,000 people have already died, and before that there were data. i remember 20,000 dead and eight hundred thousand wounded went on board the emergency with humanitarian cargo. now the rescue team is in makhachkala for refueling, and our correspondent is heading to libya with them. igor pikhanov. he is directly communicating with us right now in the game. greetings. tell us what our rescuers are delivering to the disaster zone in libya and what they took with them? hello, dmitry, early this morning

, an il-76 russian ministry of emergency situations took off from moscow from zhukovsky airport to benghazi; this plane will deliver 30 tons of cargo, which is urgently needed by local residents. these are, of course, food, medicine, essentials. uh, including this, uh, warm clothes as well. yes, we will learn about what our rescuers took with them to libya a little later. now on our channel there is a live broadcast in at the beginning of the chairman's statement following today's meeting of the board of directors, please, good afternoon. today we have decided to increase the key rate to thirteen percent per annum. uh, steps taken since july to increase the key rate - this is a response to the realization of inflation risks, including due to the impact of the exchange rate. we have updated the macroeconomic forecast and, based on it , we are clarifying the level of the key rate that is necessary to achieve the inflation target of 4% by the end of next year. uh, in current

conditions , a long period of tight monetary policy will be required to return to the target. now let's talk more about the arguments. the first is about inflation in july. we observed a jump in the current rate of price growth in august; the rate decreased slightly, but at the same time , price pressure was increasingly formed due to stable components; an increase in the rate of price growth occurred for a wide range of goods; indicators of core inflation. e, continued to accelerate, a significant contribution to current inflation was made by goods whose price depends on the exchange rate, for example, cars clothes and shoes electronics equipment. and the weakening of the ruble reflects the result of the simultaneous action of several factors; i will dwell on them in more detail.

foreign exchange earnings decreased due to a significant decrease in the value of exports during this year, at the same time demand for imports increased, largely a reflection of the pro-inflationary growth of domestic demand, which was a consequence of stimulating fiscal policy and a strong acceleration in lending, rublev's expansion of demand for imports with limited export receipts revenue led to a weakening of the ruble at the same time in conditions that were not too high. uh, ruble rates citizens. savings in rubles were not so active, and companies willingly took out ruble loans so as not to waste foreign currency liquidity. additional demand for foreign currency was also generated through financial account transactions, for example, by those companies that buy russian assets from foreign refrigerators. this also put pressure on the ruble exchange rate. contrary to popular belief, the currency structure of export payments in itself does not have a significant impact on the dynamics of the exchange rate. even if exports

are paid in rubles. this in most cases means that the buyer previously purchased these rubles. this means that he sold the currency. the exception is situations when, in conditions of relatively low rates, foreign companies that pay in rubles for the supply of russian goods prefer to take rubles on credit; they sell the currency, despite the dynamics and high volatility of the exchange rate. this year financial markets operated as normal regime, there were no problems with liquidity, so we did not see, then and do not see now , risks for financial stability; a sharp movement of the exchange rate in itself was not such a risk. however, it led to an additional increase in inflation and inflation expectations. it is to mitigate these factors that we increased the key rate. taking into account the actual acceleration of price growth, we have increased the inflation forecast for this year to

six point seven percent by the end of next year under the influence of our actions. she will return to the target level and consolidate there. second about the economy gdp in the second quarter grew by 4.9% year-on-year. this high growth rate reflects the recovery of the economy after the downturns of the past year. at the same time, according to our estimates. that part of the economy that is focused on domestic demand. overall, it exceeded the level of the end of 2021. we expect growth rates to be more moderate in the second half of the year. and this, naturally , after a period of rapid recovery growth. economic growth rates are limited availability of resources, especially labor , the situation in the labor market is still tense, especially in labor-intensive industries, in particular in metallurgy, mechanical engineering , and the chemical industry in the report on

the regional economy. we examined in detail the state of the labor market in individual regions. the gdp growth forecast for the current year was left unchanged at 1.5-2.5% , taking into account the positive dynamics in the first half of the year and the expected slowdown in the second. uh, next year we lowered, uh, the upper limit of the forecast for gdp growth will be 0.5 and one and a half percent, in the future the economy will move to a balanced growth rate, which we estimate at one and a half to two and a half percent. third, about monetary conditions, adjustment to the tightening of monetary policy has begun in the financial market, but so far it has not sufficiently affected price conditions and has had virtually no effect on the dynamics of credit. today’s decision, including aimed at strengthening and accelerating this adjustment, there is

an overflow in the deposit market funds of the population from current accounts, time deposits. we expect this to speed up. process due to further increasing the attractiveness of ruble savings. the slower reaction of the credit market is explained mainly by transmission lags, firstly, now banks continue to issue loans on applications approved earlier, and secondly, after a noticeable increase in the rate, borrowers have a desire. uh, jump in. what is called the last car of a departing train and take out a loan. now, until the stakes have become even higher, but in addition to, uh, time lags. there are factors that weaken the effect of our decisions. first of all, it is increased inflation expectations, which reduce the degree of tightness of monetary credit conditions. borrowers compare the loan rate with their expectations for inflation if they predict that inflation

will be high for a long time and at the same time expect an increase in nominal income. in many cases, they are ready to take out loans at high rates, bearing in mind that inflation will depreciate the value. in addition, the presence of large-scale preferential programs, primarily for mortgages , supports high rates of lending and so that the rate increase works in the right direction scale, it is required to increase it more than if there were no such programs . another factor that may be behind high lending activity is related to market expectations. some participants expect a repeat of the 2014 and 2022 scenarios, when we quickly moved to easing monetary policy, but the current cycle is different from previous ones. past episodes of significant rate increases were largely associated with risks to financial

stability, when these risks went away. we reduced the rate this time the situation is different we they also increased the key rate for the implementation of inflation risks. and we will keep it at high levels for quite a long time until we are convinced of the sustainable nature of the slowdown in inflation . a few words. about the yield curve, ofz. it reports lending and deposit rates throughout the economy, so it is an important indicator for us. during periods of disinflation, this curve tends to flatten or even become inverted, that is, long-term rates become lower than long-term rates. short and such a slope of the curve has an impact on the formation of tight monetary credit conditions, leading to a slowdown in inflation. uh, after the extraordinary rate increase and our communications, the ofz curve became almost flat.

uh, the key bet. we directly influence the short end of the curve, and our decision today will increase its slope through an increase in short-term rates. this will lead to the formation of lending rates that are consistent with achieving the inflation target next year. let me move on to external conditions: growth, uh, growth the global economy continues to slow down ; more subdued growth rates in foreign countries will limit the increase in prices for russian export goods. the dynamics of physical export volumes are lower than we expected in july, taking into account actual data. we have lowered our export forecasts at the same time, taking into account the decisions of the trustees. plus, we have slightly increased the forecast for oil prices for this year and next year ; the medium-term forecast for oil has been left unchanged; the forecast for imports has also been reduced,

since we expect it to be adjusted the weakening of the ruble and the more moderate growth rate of domestic demand. as a result, the current account will continue to rise from its lows in the third quarter of this year. and now about the risks for the forecast, their balance is still shifted towards pro-inflationary ones. particular concerns are caused by the possible consolidation of inflation expectations at an elevated level, which creates secondary effects on inflation. in addition, geopolitical risks remain and the likelihood of a harder landing of the world economy, which may affect the demand for russian exports and the dynamics of the exchange rate remain in the field of view and factors from the budget policy.

in conclusion about the prospects for our policy in the base scenario, the average for the rest of the current year the key rate will be 13.6% next year 11.5 and 12 1/2% per annum this implies that we will keep the key rate at an increased level for uh, long enough for a sustained decline in inflation and inflation expectations. our monetary credit policy is aimed to return inflation to four percent by the end of next year and consolidate it at this level. thank you for your attention. and i am ready to answer my colleague’s questions, your questions please. don't forget to introduce yourself and name your assignments. and anastasia, first question please. savelyeva anastasia interfax and the president of russia recently noted the restrained return of foreign exchange earnings by exporters and, uh,

the intentions of a number of russian companies to place assets abroad. well, it’s like they’re stepping on the same steps again rake. do you agree that exporters are now restrained in returning foreign currency earnings? what 's the share? uh, sales of proceeds according to the latest data, do you still think that we need to return to normal, and the mandatory sale of foreign currency revenues. and don’t you think that the time has come to enshrine some rules in writing or, in your opinion, verbal agreements with exporters are sufficient? and the second question is to continue this. and the ministry of finance stated that a discussion is currently underway, and on the transformation of measures into currency control. and the ministry of finance takes a rather conservative position. the central bank is still more liberal on this issue. do you think that it is necessary to cancel all measures except mirror measures, and when can you reach consensus on this issue, and how long will the discussion last? thank you colleagues, sorry, this is just

not your clarification. i see that we started from the main point with a question that worries many, and i know that many of you sent requests. let's shorten the time, if anyone has any clarifying questions on this topic, please. inquire now for us then ivan please. in addition, probably a slightly different wording. it’s just another emphasis - this is the weakening of the ruble that we saw - it was caused precisely by fundamental factors, or after all. here. uh, here you can trace the actions of exporters or speculators. here, yes, this one is more precise, simple. yes natalya please. natalya trushina, moskovsky komsomolets, please clarify the position of the regulator as a whole regarding the ruble exchange rate. is there some kind of limit, say 100 rubles per dollar less or lower

this goal, uh, upon crossing which the bank of russia will begin to tighten the currency restrictions and if this is so, what kind of border and what measures will the bank of russia take first? thank you, please and margarita mordovina rbc i also have a question about currency restrictions. andrey kostin admitted or rather suggested that it is possible to limit the withdrawal of rubles, how do you personally look at this initiative in general, and how seriously is it being discussed by the bank of russia please natalyanskaya vedomosti clarification regarding speculators, will it accept is the central bank discussing any sanctions or mechanisms to combat speculators? thank you yes please, apparently i also

wanted to clarify the last question. since september 14, the bank of russia has increased foreign currency sales by almost 10 times. why didn’t the ruble strengthen because of this? why didn’t the ruble strengthen because of this? additional measures of foreign exchange control foreign exchange restrictions are indeed a discussion on foreign exchange restrictions. many decisions are being made there now. this is largely a government decision. i will now tell the opposition. you understand the central bank, if there is the need to influence capital flows , which affects the exchange rate, yes, then it is better to do this economically, rather than administratively

; in my opinion, these are indeed administrative measures, but should first of all be limited to measures of a mirror response nature. e what does economic peace mean is to increase the attractiveness of ruble savings e create incentives for companies to sell proceeds to a pay for current expenses such as payroll taxes and so on, and they do not take out excess loans instead. uh, last year it was really at its peak. uh, crisis. we have carried out numerous measures. eh, some result. they could give. i mean currency control measures, but we implemented them together with other measures. um, and um. we see that our analysis will show that the main result was associated with the prompt reaction of monetary policy with a sharp rise in interest rates, and then this was supported by the dynamics of exports and imports. you remember export. our income from exports and imports has increased sharply. eh, it has seriously decreased

, decreased, but you need to understand that administrative restriction, if they are actions, well, in my opinion, e we will allocate their broadcast. uh, last year we couldn’t do enough, because there were also, uh, cardinal decisions in other areas. but if we assume that they are effective, then they are usually effective only for a limited time. the longer they last, the less effective they are. eh, they get by, remember the experience of the late nineties and early two thousand years. now, even more so, we live in a situation where companies are forced to build various complex chains, foreign economic activity and payments. and these chains also yes indeed allow you to bypass restrictions and uh , but at the same time these restrictions can create uh difficulties and obstacles to conducting foreign

economic activity for the purchase of necessary goods, services, uh, components and so on and uh, and if we see this trend , if we try to block more and more new peepholes. this is how it goes, but just about translation. you had a question about translation. uh, limit transfers of rubles abroad. so if we do every time, uh, hmm try to close these loopholes, then these ineffective restrictions will increase, like a snowball we will close something , business will find a new gap and so on ad infinitum and administrative costs for business, its inefficiency and ultimately shifting these costs onto citizens. this will only increase and i will give specific examples. why are those standard measures that are being discussed may be ineffective, what is being discussed, first of all, this is to return, for example, to the mandatory sale of foreign currency earnings, by the way, foreign currency.

uh, a significant part of our revenue is already in ruble foreign currency, part of it, uh, revenue. uh, the share of its sales on the market by exporters. she hmm practically. there is always some volatility there, but it remains quite high from the currency, well, having sold your currency. exporters have the opportunity to buy it back in the amounts they deem appropriate. as a result, only the turnover will increase. uh, in the foreign exchange market there are sales of the purchase of this currency, but there is a balance between the supply and demand of the currency. it won't change and at the same time it will create inconvenience for the company, er, for whose revenue is needed to purchase imported equipment costs for additional conversion, but the effect on e. the exchange rate will not work, which means the second topic is the repatriation of foreign currency earnings. transfer of foreign currency funds from a foreign bank to a russian one. but what this means does not mean that

the supply of currency on the russian market will increase by this amount, because regardless of where you keep the savings of this currency in a foreign bank or in a russian bank it is on the market will not need it. she will just stored in foreign currency accounts in a russian bank and at rates. it won't have any impact. by the way, i talked about the analysis, we are analyzing the balance of payments in detail, and you remember , last year they first introduced strict restrictions, including on the repatriation of export sales, necessarily the sale of part of the proceeds, then they were relaxed and we looked at the flow of capital. during these periods , capital flows are insensitive to such requirements for the sale of export proceeds. regardless of this, they changed according to other objective factors. reasons which arose and the trade balance and a sense of certainty of uncertainty in the economy and, in fact, the abolition of these

restrictions did not affect e. hmm, again , objective growth in the volume of repatriation of sales of proceeds, i will once again return to the transfer of funds abroad in rubles. but this is similar to the previous measures of transferring funds to a foreign bank. on my own. they create demand for a currency; demand arises at the moment when this currency is purchased; demand can only be affected by increasing the attractiveness of the ruble as a store of value. and by the way, for the exchange rate does not matter whether rubles are converted from a russian account or from a foreign one; rubles withdrawn there are converted from a foreign account or from a russian account. it is the incentives for this conversion that are important. e hmm therefore, yes, and something else needs to be taken into account. what have you already said about complex supply chains? in fact, part of our operation goes through traders hmm, and if it is economically beneficial

to hmm leave part of the currency with traders for a longer period, then the requirements for repatriation and necessarily sales will not solve this problem. uh, they can't be apply to foreign persons who are outside our jurisdiction. there are no administrative levers of influence on them and hmm uh, only hmm, in my opinion, work here. once again economic incentives. adequate loan cost. and decorative prices, which are used for tax purposes, are important. maybe in order to, uh, through transfer prices of education, not to reduce the need to sell foreign currency to pay taxes. yes and here are some numbers i want to give. a significant part of export earnings is already in rubles. yes, this is according to uh, the latest data for all exports are 42% in rubles. repatriation of the foreign currency part of the proceeds, the foreign currency part of the proceeds is simply decreasing, and if you look at

our exporters and our residents, who hold foreign currency earnings abroad in accounts abroad, otherwise these three volumes practically did not change, there were no foreign exchange restrictions and they constitute less than one percent of the total volume of export foreign exchange earnings. that is, we don’t see here, the same traders, uh, and about 90%, uh, of the company’s foreign currency earnings returned selling continue selling. so from that capital, too, there is also a frequent question about this and how much capital outflow was a factor in the uh weakening of the exchange rate, but indeed this is one of the factors, but in our opinion, not the most significant, moreover, the outflow of capital this year was much less than last year. and if you look at this

balance of payments on the financial account without taking into account reserves, then for 8 months of this year. this is 28.6%, uh, billion dollars, and last year it was 195.1 and exactly the same acquisition net foreign assets. e, v. this is also less this year and uh, so it affects the exchange rate, but, of course, the influence of uh is much less than uh than other factors and uh, as for hmm yes, the weakening of the exchange rate. it is influenced by many factors and exports and imports, and in our opinion, it is just overheated, and such increased domestic demand it places, uh, more ruble demand for imports. and this also leads to a weakening of the exchange rate. uh, as for the psychological limit of the ruble exchange rate, we don’t have

any such psychological limit. uh, course we are floating, but of course we take into account that uh, the dynamics of the exchange rate, uh, its weakening is a pro-inflationary pro-inflationary factor, and we influence and we reacted by raising the key rate to the strengthening of inflationary factors, among which, uh, the exchange rate played a significant role, well, not only the exchange rate, but also the acceleration of lending and so on and so on, i’ll probably stop here. yes, i am alexey borishchev, i will offer to answer this question. thank you very much for your question. this, in fact, i demonstrate that here is our solution for redistribution. e operations. uh, mirroring. uh, investments from the national welfare fund. it is not aimed at influencing the exchange rate; it

is aimed at bringing forward such a surge in the potential surge in demand for currency associated with the repayment of a large issue. uh, eurobonds. eh, ministry of finance e. there was a sufficient supply of currency on the market at this particular point in time, but at the same time and as a result, we see that the rate did not seem to change, despite the fact that we know that repayment will occur tomorrow, accordingly, there are a certain number of investors , who want to continue to own it, as if placing their funds in foreign currency even after the redemption of euros, which are denominated in dollars. they want to buy. i also have foreign currency, respectively. it’s just that we see this redistribution over time. uh our surgeries are elective surgeries. it really does not directly influence the exchange rate, but smoothes out its fluctuations. it does not change the overall supply of currency, because it is simply a redistribution in time of this

supply of demand for currency. yes colleagues please, masha, first row. news agent stas stepanova and my first question is about the mortgage. do you see signs of overheating in the mortgage market and will government measures help to cool the market, for example, in particular , the fact that the down payment on the mortgage is increasing? and the second question, in connection with what is connected with the reduction in the upper growth rate of the russian economy for the next year, thank you. in terms of mortgages, our mortgages are indeed growing at an accelerated pace, if we take it in annual terms, then as of september 1. this about 30%, there are just mortgages. the pace is accelerating due to preferential programs, and we see the share

of preferential programs in mortgages as a whole increasing. and also what is very important and we are concerned about the involvement of riskier groups of clients in mortgages. eh hmm so, for example, in 2 years. mmm, issuing mortgage loans. uh , people with a debt load of more than 80% of their income have almost doubled, and we see that hmm, mortgages with a low down payment of up to 20% have also increased in volume. a small 63% is now, of course, with us worries. eh, in addition to the fact that this leads to a continued gap in housing prices in the primary and secondary markets. it still remains at a level of about 40% and this is a problem of overestimating the value of collateral for mortgage loans in the primary market and with all

the ensuing consequences, and therefore, from october 1, we decided to establish macroproduction premiums to tighten the macroproduction premium significantly tighten it to establish macropotential premiums at a prohibitive level for the riskiest mortgage loans. a first of all, in the market of housing under construction, in order to take into account the final prices that exist in the primary market and we expect that the lending structure will improve from this. and there will be a more balanced rate of growth of mortgage loans, corresponding to the rate of growth, uh, and income and not created. mm. not a creator. uh, the risks of bubbles, here we welcome the hmm government's decision to slightly tighten the requirements for preferential programs.