Skip to main content

tv   [untitled]    December 14, 2011 1:30pm-2:00pm PST

1:30 pm
1:31 pm
1:32 pm
1:33 pm
1:34 pm
1:35 pm
1:36 pm
1:37 pm
1:38 pm
1:39 pm
1:40 pm
1:41 pm
1:42 pm
he a >> is also my boss, which does not mean those two have anything to do with each other. you will read his biography in the program, so i will not insult you by reading it, but let me point out a few things that it does not explicitly say. he is, by every stretch of the imagination, a scholar, a gentle man, a combat-pror, a
1:43 pm
dedicated naval officer, and what we have determined, a true visionary leader. it is an honor that i have to work for admiral walsh. it is not the first time we have had an opportunity to work together, and hopefully it will not be the last. without further ado, ladies and gentlemen, the commander of the u.s. pacific fleet, admiral patrick walsh. [applause] he >> thank you. and thank you for the opportunity to join you here today. what a privilege to be able to follow the table top exercise discretion and the presentation of remarks by the governor. as i think about the work that you are embarked on and the type of steps that you would like to take in the continuum of
1:44 pm
preparation for natural disasters and the response that you would take as responsible officials, think of the next presentation as an opportunity for a case study. think about the questions that leaders need to answer in times of crisis. what will be unique and different about our discussion in this operation was that this was not one singular event. it was a series of cascading crises, aggravated by hundreds and then eventually thousands of aftershocks. it is continually challenged those who were in positions of responsibility in ways -- in
1:45 pm
complex areas that were very, very hard to anticipate. i think one question that is important to ask is how do leaders prepare themselves for a crisis situation, and i think what you heard here this morning is that whether or not you are prepared is one question, but you should assume that you are going to have to deal with situations in time-critical crisis response scenarios. next slide, please. i am here today to represent the u.s. pacific fleet, a fleet that has about 120,000 people, 180 ships, two dozen aircraft, 44 submarines, six carrier strikers, and we will talk about how we have organized our selves to respond to the crisis in japan. in the course of the previous
1:46 pm
two years of this assignment, we have been involved in a six humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. super typhoons in the philippines, vietnam, taiwan. earthquakes in samoa, christchurch, new zealand, chile, operation in japan. on average, what we are seeing in the ring of fire is about every six to eight weeks, a calamity, a natural disaster. in the case of operation tomodache, the reference point that i it would be very helpful for those who want to study this is to go back and look at what nova and the public broadcasting service has done in terms of collecting now scientific measurable data, and one of the points that comes out in that 60-minute documentary is that in
1:47 pm
terms of instrumentation, scientists now know exactly what happened, where it happened. and then, in your case study sort of approach, you can now test the earthquake response plan that you have with the sort of scenarios and the variables that we were having to contend with in this crisis. the account weren't signs of the fleet were represented by the pictures, and typically we focus on the right-hand side of the charge, but what is embedded inside this group is an organization that has learned how to sustain itself at sewa for extended time spans. embedded in that is an understanding of how to work logistics, and understanding to how to respond to lift requirements, and understanding
1:48 pm
of command and control. the plea today -- the fleet today has people who have strong technical competence in being able to respond and answer those sorts of questions. the fleet today is more mature and more seasoned because of the forward-deployed in nature of our operations. and we can apply that in the lessons that we have learned, and i think what you'll recognize is a very adaptable force. so this is what japan looked like before 2:00 p.m. on march 11, 2011. what you see at the top of the chart is the question the dai- ichi power plant -- the fukushima power plant. on the left-hand side is sendai airport. on the other side, any japan.
1:49 pm
this is a bird's-eye view of what the tsunami looked like --
1:50 pm
so as approximately 2:45 p.m. in the afternoon, what we now know is that a 20-meter way -- wave hit the prefecture', ands in the course of that, located approximately 125 miles off the coast at a depth of about 20,000
1:51 pm
feet, the eurasian plate and the pacific plate came in contact with each other. pressures had been building up since the 17th century. and in the release of that energy displaced a very large volume of water, which resulted in a a 60 meter wave traveling at the speed of an airplane. 2:45 in the afternoon, kids were in school. parents were at work. immediately be had a humanitarian situation where families were displaced. this was a 9.1 magnitude earthquake that change to the tilt of the earth's axis. for those that were in tokyo at the time, they experience, as you would expect, a severe
1:52 pm
shock. the buildings held up. the architecture and engineering held in place. there were provisions in place for tsunami. of what no one expected in the course of this disaster was the coastline to drop. when the coast line dropped more than 1 meter, it changed the title characteristics of the wave. the wave reached 6.5 miles inland. almost like an egg beater. when it reached inland, it grabbed everything that it could and drag it out to sea. it resulted in this incoherent picture of ships on top of buildings, buildings and out at sea, and over 1 million families left without power. so, now we are looking at
1:53 pm
pictures of a destructive scale never before witnessed. notice how we have captured this slide here. this is what we know. the lesson that we pass along is that it is important to understand what we do not know. we are looking at the water as it comes into the power plant. as that wave hits, fukushima loses its primary, secondary, and tertiary power supply for the reactors. and there are six of them at fukushima. four were in operation. it is this series of cascading casualties that now first responders felt behind it is the
1:54 pm
course of the events with it the aftershock that continue to challenge the engineers who were attempting to restart water circulation systems to keep the power plants under control. by the time the joint support force arrived from honolulu, 90 people from my headquarters, are arriving in support of the japanese self-defense force, we had explosions because of hydrogen buildup in the individual reactors. we had buildings that had collapsed. we had the fukushima 50. they were dedicated, loyal engineers and workers at the plan -- plant, attempting to keep the temperatures and conditions under control. it was a disaster that all of our national leadership said we would throw everything we have got at it.
1:55 pm
next slide. it is important to understand of what we did not know. we did not know the full extent of the damage. we did not know the full impact of the tsunami. there were entire population centers affected by this. in many of these prefectures that we went to, one of the first things we said was that there was a complete loss of the mayor's office. the complete loss of the municipal leadership installations and buildings. people were having to land on their feet, figuring out where they go. in addition to the isolated communities, we needed to assess the infrastructure that we had in place. looming in the background was the nuclear crisis. this is where information
1:56 pm
became critically important. everyone was aware that their work risks, but they did not know what they were. the important thing was that we were available to help japan in any way that we possibly could. with technical expertise, with equipment. the challenge becomes, where do you begin? the japanese word for the operation is friend. what you are looking at here is how we presented forces and ourselves as a joint work force. as the governor talked about, it is very important to have someone in charge. i very strongly agree with that. he highlighted the role that the military must play. as a joint force, we worked with
1:57 pm
ngo's, the government of japan ministries, and our counterparts in the self-defense force. it was unity of effort, not necessarily unity of command. that was the theme for the command and control architecture that resonated so strongly with the people of japan. the military response offers the rapid capability to fill in the gaps. there are military organizational methods that are very adaptable. what you are looking at here is how we divided up the operation. the mission. the first was a focus on humanitarian assistance. the other was a focus on consequence management. critically important in this discussion was the identification of the lead federal agency for us.
1:58 pm
it was u.s. aid. what they provided for us was an avenue for funding. for direct contact with the government of japan. direct contact with the u.s. embassy. what that does, it helps to establish policy and guidance. for those who are looking at ways to now think of these sorts of operations as case studies in which you can test your ideas with the state of california and how you would respond, i would strongly endorsed that you look at policy and guidance. that is something that cannot be assumed away. as you go from the local level to the municipal level, then the state level, and where you plug in with the federal government, this for assumption that we are on the same page and working off
1:59 pm
the same set of standards is something on which i reach out. to the extent that we were dealing with a contaminated, radiological environment, it was important to have a nuclear regulatory commission. it plugged into the washington, dc environment. the technical expertise that resided in the department of energy. working closely with the government of japan and the power co. in tokyo. what this brings to us now, with an understanding of the role that we need to play, it is an identification of whether there are gaps in the role that was needed. h