we have periodically revisited with all of the contractors and staff from the public utilities commission, the port commission, any of the staffing people that do project management we have a very old city. if anything, we had a tremendous amount of utilities underground. there contractors are being contacted and we expect to have a larger audience for our next review. that is a huge amount of education but also a huge effort underway to do adequate prevention in the area that we know will exist. having said that, specific to

supervisor mirkarimi's question about the electric side of it, i have been heading a group where we look at the review with pg&e over the reliability of the electric system in the city. we have been working and meeting for about a year and a half. as i can say to you today, i can say the electoral system is both a sensitive and complicated system. we have both old and new equipment in our city. it takes us a long time to understand how that system works, how we can improve it, how we can prevent some of the explosions that have occurred in the city. a year and a half ago we experienced several series of explosions in the city, most of which in the downtown corridor. as a result of that, we entered

a study using outside experts as well as pg&e staff to inform us about these underground transformer networks that exist in our city. as a result of that, we focused on how they not only work, but how they were historic lee inspected by pg&e. one of the most serious lesson we learned was that their inspection were faulty. they simply did not work to prevent the kind of exposure that occurred on davis street downtown and on the more celebrated one on post and carney. those explosions resulted in injury to public persons. as a result of the intense review that was done by pg&e

staff, reviewed by outside experts who had informed us, we focused on why there was a mixture of water getting into the oil-based transformers. we have oil-based transformers that have been the most popular transformer networks in our city for years, decades. as a result of that study, we were literally able to work with pg&e to change the inspection process so that the visual inspection that occurred in the past are no longer the standard. we were actually able to get a new standard for our transformers. now they use an infrared transformer, alongside a six- month taking of samples from the oil and studying whether or not that oil has been compromised. those two steps have

transformed, if i may use that word, their inspection technologies and methodologies and we are getting about a 23% less of these explosions occurring. there have been no explosions since a year and a half ago since those very visible ones, no explosions of the particular nature. as i said, it is still a complicated system. as we have learned this past spring, we had another explosion in the tenderloin community, just about three blocks away from city hall. we discovered it was not the oil being compromised in there, but thea dc cable that have failed n the transformer network. we met for months with pg&e staff and concluded those cables

were too old for our city. direct current should not be in our city. therefore, we launched an effort with pg&e in an effort not only to replace them, but to replace the d.c. current cables in the city. that will take time and money but they are on the way to doing that. it is another one of those items, as a result of the cooperative information we are getting and review from outside experts, to tell us what has caused some of these explosions. we focused on the direct current cable system in our city. those are the cables that still run some of the elevators throughout the city. some of the major hotels in the city. we looked at other cities. we got some reports about how they have been able to replace their d.c. cables and go to a

non-d.c. cable system to power the city. we are also meeting with pg&e about the possibility that they completely remove oil-based transformers in the city. we believe there is new technology out there that is being tried from other cities. we are looking at that as well, trying to get the best practices from very large urban settings, old settings like los angeles, chicago, new york, and getting their history of transformer explosions. we will do the same thing with gas line explosions. and we will be working with the puc and pga to determine what best practices would be. i wanted to provide you with a few of those highlights. we can produce a more adequate report that will cover the year and a half of meetings we have had.

at the same time, i want to let you know these power outages resulting from electricity, we have kept a log, but down the road, we could probably use the services of 311 to map out a district by district chart of the outages, how often they occur, and what we have done about them. we have tried to isolate every outage we have had and have tried to see if they are related to a d.c. cable, that were compromise, some of the larger things we are focusing on to increase the reliability of the system but also provide a higher level of scrutiny and safety. with respect to the blood manhole covers, as was also mentioned earlier, there is another best practice that we have uncovered. we have requested, demanded pg&e

to look at all of the manhole covers in the downtown area where we have historically had larger transformer networks. at times, these covers have been very dangerous, as you can realize. there is a new kind of cover that we have been able to identify, called a swivel lock, which can lock itself but still allow gas to escape. the manhole covers have to be designed in such a way so that gas can escape so that it will not build up. if there is an explosion of any sort, they ought to be let -- locked in tight enough so that they do not become a danger to the public. some of these old metal covers have been compromised not only with age but also with the heavy

traffic, the articulate and buses that run downtown, the heavy machinery and equipment running on those roads. as these manholes have been compromised, they can slip out easily. this swivel lock technology, which i think a state-of-the- art, we are demanding that pg&e take a look at that and replace all of the old manhole covers. they can give you an update on that. i would say, my conclusion to date, it is still a delicate system when you are brave and electricity to run our neighborhood. it caps challenges in undergrounding as well as overhead transformers that have exploded because of moisture, age, because of the elements. we are continuing to look at those as well because they can be just as dangerous to our public.

we have requested not only that they use the infrared inspection process for the underground transfer of service but also for the overhead to make sure they are not compromised together with that. so with that, i can follow up with a written report. that concludes our previous data gathering that we had done in our meetings. i am here to answer any questions you might have. supervisor chiu: we have a couple of questions from colleagues. supervisor mirkarimi: another incident that i do not think he mentioned what happened earlier this year was in my district. there was a dramatic incidents, whether through a transformer or whatever the implosion, explosion was, it created quite a scare for a number of constituents residing between districts 5 and 2.

the aftermath was where we heard most of the complaints, the debris that had been left behind. i know there have been wrangling with the city between pg&e, over who would do with the debris. so it is not just the actual incident itself, but the cleanup was not well handled. just looking to the larger perspective, in terms of making sure there is strong follow up. in terms of best practices, i wanted to look at numbers that we got from the cbc -- cpuc.

in 2006 the average begin the customer had twice as many hours without power as southern california edison customers and four times as san diego gas and electric. as you just enumerated, there have been a number of dangers explosions, manhole covers, and other. based on the best practice, that you put forward, best practices against what? what is the standard that we are measuring our expectations to pg&e? >> i am not sure if there is a national standard that is set by all the large cities. i think we are trying to reduce the numbers significantly, so we are proceeding on a progressive

look at what we can do in our city to make sure it is the safest as possible. i do not know what that national standard is. i do not know that there is a city with no outages. what is example? it is up to us to determine that and to also petition the cpuc for that particular acceptability. >> if i could suggest one, -- supervisor mirkarimi: if i could suggest one, we should be as honest as possible in comparisons to all utility companies in the state of california, that being one standard, and that we listed comparisons between those italic and fees -- utility companies that are privately held to those that are publicly held. then let's have some digram to show what is our safety record

compared to those other utilities. even to the private talley companies in california. pg&e seems to have a problem with its service customer area. i am wondering what the best practice standard is that we should try to aspire to. >> i agree with you. that is what i meant by referring to the commission's data and what can and should be the standard for most states, and we should try to better that. supervisor mirkarimi: pg&e typically goes to the cpc for its permission to advance rate hike hearings requests so that it can attend to a number of capital improvements, which is par for the course. who, in city and county's jurisdiction of san francisco are we to make sure that what is

being requested by the cpuc for rate hike dollars in order to repair, that we monitor that those repairs are actually being done? is it sfpuc, the chief administrative office, the fire department? i want to zero in on the conversation we are having about this rapport with pg&e. in actuality, dollars are being expended, consumer repair dollars are being spent for those repairs. i want to focus in on what nexus exists for us in determining whether or not those more pronounced repairs are being done. i am not aware of any system, so if that could be part of the conversations you are having

with pg&e, i think it would be wise for san francisco to devise such a system. >> i do not think there is a singular agency that has been assigned that task to oversee and injure the monitoring of the cpc proceedings, pg&e's request, and whether the program they have submitted are adequately follow up. our office would be glad to work with several of the city agency that will be key to that. i can think in my own head who would be necessary to have that information, but we would be willing to consider working with agencies that do so. supervisor mirkarimi: thank you, mr. lee. supervisor chiu: supervisor maxwell? >> so i am to understand the gas side and everything else you

mentioned to us is relatively new? these are things you entered into after the explosions? is there a process in place then for this to be on going? have we reviewed anything else that we need to be for something else happens? my concern is with the three main cables coming in. maybe pg&e can speak to this. i understand in the city, some of those issues would be covers. the other issues were basically maintenance. they were not inspecting them correctly. so what are we doing to make sure the main cables and all the other cables we have are being maintained and are looking at how we monitor them? are you looking into that as well? can pg&e speak to that?

>> we have agreed that whatever it takes to fulfil the board and the mayor's request on this, we will do to ensure the correct -- safety of our public. also, to increase reliability to the customer. to your first question, while we are just beginning to look at the gas, i think we are submitting to you that we will do this long term. i have been doing the electric side of it for about a year and a half. there have been more incidences that have occurred. i think we need to continue to develop an increased awareness with pg&e and high-level cooperation to cover a complicated system. >> is this all being written down? if you are gone, will someone know this is what they're supposed to do? especially on the gas side. and what are we doing about the main lines and how they are

inspecting those? have we looked at all the inspecting procedures? >> for the electric and gas side, the chief and i will be documenting everything so that anyone can slip into our position to know what had gone on. also, collecting other information that would be pertinent to that. with respect to the gas transmissions, those were the initial question we had after san bruno. i know the chief and i would agree -- we know that there is less pressure because we are at the end of the line, but there is still pressure in those gas lines, so we are paying attention to that. we are working closely with congressman spears to understand the standard and where are our automatic shutoff valves in case we have to make those decisions with pg&e about some incident? >> my understanding is we do not

have automatic shutoff valves. >> we do not, but that does not mean we will not. it is our due diligence to recommend to you and the city what we should be doing, in light of incidents. at the same time, those lines were immediately inspected. we would like more periodic inspection that will be reported to us. >> what kind of inspections? you said they looked at the transformers. maybe these are questions for pg&e. thank you. supervisor chiu: thank you, mr. lee. at this time, if we could ask the representatives from pg&e, i know my colleagues have a lot of questions. do you have an initial presentation you would like to make? >> no, we're here to answer

questions. i am the vice-president of gas operations. supervisor chiu: i will start off with some questions. with the standard no tragedy, what steps -- sambar no tragedy, what steps are you insuring --san bruno san bruno , what steps are you taking to ensure the safety of your customers? >> first, we reduced the operating pressure in those systems. in the city of san francisco, the pressure had already been regulated. the city and county received pressure from the gas transmission lines at a much lower level. as mentioned earlier, we also

immediately did a leak survey of the entire system all the way through the city of san francisco and through gas transmission lines. there was no evidence of any gas leaks in the system. supervisor chiu: supervisor maxwell asked the question about shutoff valves. at this time, are you looking at replacing some of your manual shut off valves with automatic ones? >> week issued a report with this cpc -- we issued a report with the cpuc to see whether or not we should have automatic or remote wells. we will be looking at those to determine if we need to do something differently. we will continue to work with the cpuc on that issue. supervisor chiu: what is the

cost? >> we are not quite clear yet, but it could be anywhere between $100,000 to $1 million, depending on what needs to be done. is their power, telecommunications nearby. is there a location in the street where we can place the actuator? it demands -- it depends on about itself and where it is going to. supervisor chiu: assuming this is approved by the cpuc, is that part of the cost of repairs? >> it is hard to determine how many ballots the repair would be, the repair structure for that. supervisor chiu: mr. lee talked about the explosion we have seen, particularly in the northeast part of the city. you talked about those incidences and what is your prognosis on monday can do to

ensure they never happen again? >> if you are referring to the electric side, i will turn it over to ken. >> we are pushing the heavy diagnostic of our cable. we have the ability now to look at the diagnostics and look forward spots in the cables themselves. that is what we're currently working on now so that we can validate the integrity of the cables coming into the city. as well as those coming through the network. supervisor chiu: how come that had not been done before? >> just the timing of the technology and diagnostics. the attack -- the actual integrity of the cable itself, those are new diagnostics that we are starting to do now. supervisor chiu: supervisor mirkarimi? supervisor mirkarimi: let's

start on the gas side. very much appreciate your answers to our questions. we realize your goal is our goal, that you want to fortified those concerns about safety to the utmost ability. we get that. leading up to the explosion in san bruno, what is added to a lot of the concern and dramatization around it is the fact that people have said they had called in for weeks about the smell of gas, and that that is added to the concern about how a municipality like ours, as well as a utility like yours, is able to take those concerns more seriously so there is not a potential repeat of what happened with the san bruno customers? >> if i could speak to that incident, we got reports in the media that there had been a

cause of gas leaks. pg&e has reviewed its records. calls are recorded coming into the call center unless the caller opts out of it. we have reviewed those phone calls back to july 1 and there were no calls in that area. we did get two calls discussing voters around the neighborhood, from the out skirting areas. in terms of what was in that general area there were no leaks reported or found. we have also reached out to the city of san brno who has reported that they have received no calls for complaints. we have also asked people in the public, if they have any information that we are missing, to please come forward. supervisor mirkarimi: is it or

is it not true that the pipeline in san bruno -- and the question was relevant. before you got here we were asking about the ratings of any pipelines or areas that warrant some level of attention. was it determined that that pipeline was slated for in need of high risk repairs, but then those repairs were delayed? >> the section we are referencing is glenview. there was no recommendation or any note that they needed issues out at that pipeline. the pipeline runs through the city, so 132 could have worked down somewhere along the system, but in san bruno, no work in that location.

supervisor mirkarimi: as it relates to san francisco's infrastructure, what can we take away about any level of concern, matter of attention that needs to be applied so that we are prophylactic we dealing with any potential problems? >> as i mentioned, the city has three lines that feed into the city. they operate at a much lower pressure although they do have pressure. they operate at 145 pounds. they do not have the same stresses in terms of pipeline stresses. for the city of san francisco the primary concern we have is third-party diggings. contractor dig into the pipeline because the city has a great deal of activity around the city at all times. that is our primary concern for the gas system at large.

mr. lee mentioned earlier we reached out to the contractors and escalators in the area. pg&e also reached out to the entire peninsula and is putting out additional as for what we call 811, call before you did. we believe that is the biggest risk to san francisco. we appreciate working with the city and fire chief on eliminating that risk altogether. supervisor mirkarimi: you are likely to take this sensitivity, but try not to, but when you go before the cpuc on rate hikes for capital repairs, this is what i was asking the city, for us to be able to zero in on what we can expect of pg&e when they are certainly trying to obligate the condition of money going for