recusal language again. also, take it from los angeles because the language, after we reviewed it, we found it to are more precise, and also it would benefit from some interpretation that they've done in the language to help clarify that process. and then, you'll see subsection d was added at the city attorney's languaadvice to mak that we include language that we don't include the board of supervisors there. so i will turn it over to the city attorney. >> thank you, pat. this is something that we took a very close comment following a comment from the first budget and finance committee, and also hearing comments others made around the time about that. i think in hearing the questions, there were a number of questions about what is the reaccusal view's purpose, and how would we count this 1% trigger for a review, so i just wanted to provide a bit of

background on that. this language and thrust of this is really a basic tran parency issue. it would provide a way for these who recuse under the law, to do so for a good thing, in order to avoid conflicts. it would give the public a chance to understand repeated recusals, so there would be an opportunity to engage. if there is a repeated recusal, and we'll get into how this would calculate that, there is a process for the ethics commission to review those recusals, and determine if there is a continued conflict that exists for that board or commission member, and the commission can recommend that maybe this commissioner should be sit in that role. it's a transparency tool and a

way to avoid significant conflict in city decision making. what this would create is a system that's parallel to what's been in service in los angeles for a number of years. each time a commissioner appears on an agenda, there would be tools for the commission member to do that. the form would be filed with our office, and essentially, it's a one to one relationship. if there are three recusals as listed here, filed within a 365-day period, or a 1% of all matters that have been appearing on the agenda, that would be something that the commission would then review. and in reviewing that, the commission would look to things like is the number of recusals by a particular commissioner significant? it is the impact of the

recusals significant, so these are questions that would be part or could be part of every review, and we envision that would be a report to the commission, the commission would have an opportunity to respond and to be able to have a discussion whether or not there is a repeated recusal in place that would suggest that that commissioner's financial interests that are causing the repeated recusal might be a reason to talk about when that commissioner should not serve on that commission or be recused or divest of that interest. this is a transparency measure to help with that discussion. so this focuses language more clear in an attempt to be more clear in how this process would work. we're looking at another model that's working in another jurisdiction and also try to be clear with what it is that would trigger the recusal requirement, and what would be

the trigger of a recusal requirement. so with that, i'm happy to answer any questions or hear public comment, but i wanted to provide a bit of background on what the change was here as we look to narrow it. >> commissioner kopp? >> does the los angeles ordinance have a time within which the official must divest or otherwise remove the conflicting interest? >> i don't know. the ethics commission has, as i understand it from their current staff, has not ever required a commissioner to divest. >> so there's no experience with -- >> correct. >> well, it seems to me there should be a time limit, mr. chairman, and i don't know what a practical time limit is, but -- so that the public may comment, i'm going to move an

amendment on page 26, under(c) 2, after the words, fails to divest or otherwise remove the conflicting interest, add the words within 90 days of the ethics commission's determination. >> that's the motion. is there a second? >> chair, chair, may i offer a -- an additional amendment to your amendment? so within 90 days or as reasonably practical, because in the event that it is an interest that it would take longer than 90 days to divest, i don't think that we can cover everything within 90 days. >> commissioner chiu, can i take it that you're seconding commissioner kopp's motion, and

you're offering some additional language. >> yes. >> and commissioner kopp, do you accept that? >> tell me the language. >> so that the divestiture or the removal of interest would be need to be removed within 90 days or as reasonably practicable. >> yes. >> i'll accept that. >> okay. that's been accepted, so we have the motion to amend the amendment to add that language, and commissioners, any discussion? >> it's worded -- you've got a -- as you amend the amendment, in effect, they have 90 days in which to do it, but if they don't do it in 90 days, they can extend it out if they

can show some practical necessity. i would be disposed to say they will do it as promptly as possible, but no longer than 90 days. >> i don't feel -- >> i'll accept that. >> but, i mean -- >> i accept that. >> sometimes you know if it's a divestiture of a private equity interest or something, it might not happen in 90 days. there might be closing terms that would require a longer time period, but if they've entered into an agreement to divest, i can understand that they need regulatory approvals, it would conceivably take longer than 90 days. >> commissioner renne, are you proposing your change in the amendment in term it's of the language that you just stated? >> i will not propose any

change from the language that has been moved and seconded. if the commission is satisfied that the -- extending it beyond 90 days is in the public's interest. >> well, my contemplation that it wouldn't be at the discretion of the commission member or board member, but if they have removed to divest or remove to -- remove the conflicting interest, but it's not practical or possible to complete it within the 90 days, i wouldn't want them to be p l penalized it. if they have sold shares or stock in a private company, but they couldn't complete the divestiture, that if they take

91 days or 100 days, that that would still be acceptable to us. >> or a year. if i may speak through the chair, if i may be recognized. >> yes, commissioner kopp. >> commissioner renne suggests maybe the ethics commission should have the authority to determine whether the time is as practical as -- or as prompt as is practical. >> that's satisfactory. >> yeah. >> from my -- >> maybe that should be it so it isn't open end, and then, you have a dispute as to whether it's practical or impractical. can you give us language, mr. chen. >> actually, i would like to take a step back, if i may, on this provision. so this provision -- >> well, that isn't what i asked. >> well, but i think it may be helpful, regardless. so this provision allows the

ethics commission to make a recommendation as to a official's potential conflict of interest. it is merely a recommendation. so in that recommendation, should the commission wish to issue it, i believe the commission can also specify at the time that it's issued whether they would recommend that that interest is disposed of in 30 days, 90 days, so on and so forth. so i'm not sure if you necessarily need to introduce a limitation one way or the other at this point. >> well, if it's a -- what difference if it makes -- what difference does it make if it's a recommendation, but as far as language is concerned, what difference does it make if it's a recommendation? can you give me language or you want me to write it myself? >> may i take a stab at reiterating what i think i heard? >> yeah. >> so this begins on page 25.

>> yeah, right. >> page 25, it's agenda item 4 amended, page 33. it's shown as page 25 at the end of the -- end of the page on the right hand corner, but it starts reading on-line 24, if the ethics commission so determines, the ethics commission may recommend to the official's appointing authority that the official divest or otherwise remove the conflicting interest, and if the official fails to divest or otherwise remove the conflicting interest, insert, within 30-days or within -- excuse me. within 90 days or as the ethics commission determines as reasonably practicable, the ethics commission may recommend to the official's appointing authority that the official should be removed from office under charter section, etcetera, etcetera. >> i withdraw my previous amendment, and i adapt that language in a motion to amend. >> okay. >> and invite a second.

>> okay. >> i'll second. where are we, in terms of -- commissioner chiu, you've heard the colloquy between commissioner kopp and seconded by commissioner renne. does that also encompass your concerns? >> well, actually it raises new concerns on my part because i don't think this ethics commission should be a position to determine whether a sailor a divestiture is proceeding as timely or as quickly that we would like in that we are simply making a recommendation to the appointing authority. >> yes. >> i don't know. is it a difference that makes a difference? >> only to the effect that you have a motion on the table. >> right. yeah. so -- >> i'm asking whether or not -- i don't want to do anything that short circuits what has -- what your intent is. >> so i think the first motion

that commissioner kopp presented, that he has withdrawn, but that's one that i had seconded. >> okay. >> so i'm fine with that withdrawal. >> all right. terrific. so we have the language that miss pelham put forth that has been proposed by commissioner kopp and has been seconded by commissioner renne. is there any -- and that's as an amendment to an amendment, so when we take the ultimate vote on this, we'll take the amendment to the amendment, and then on the amendment itself. is there any further discussion among the commission on this item? hearing none -- oh. >> i move that we adopt the staff's proposal as to second. >> second. >> 3.207. >> okay. with -- >> with the amendment. >> okay. that motion has been made and seconded. commissioners, any further discussion before we go to

public comment? all right. we'll take public comment. mr. hepner is going to speak on behalf of supervisor peskin. >> correct. thank you, president keane. in your packet, you have a statement that's authored by supervisor peskin. it exists in budget finance and duplicate committee file right now. i think we were having trouble wrapping our minds around why we were creating a disincentive to recuse. we want board members and commissioners to recuse themselves when they meet a requirement to the recusal, and to that end, amendment a provides some good clarification around when a board member or a commission member should recuse themselves. i would suggest this commission and supervisor peskin, rather than, suggested that this commission delete the sub

section relate to repeated recusal that creates this potentially punitive dynamic where if you recuse yourself more than three times, you are subject to removal from your board or commission or the recommendation of ethics commission to be removed from your appointment or commission. that removes the disincentive to recuse. that allows for ethics investigators to instead focus on enforcement of when somebody is properly recusing themselves. the ethics commissions can still be the repository for that information. the public can still go and seek the information how many times you've recused yourself, but let's not create a disincentive to recuse by saying you are subject to dice vestiture from your financial interests if you recuse yourself. let's focus on the correct way

to do it. incidentally, this is also tied to the anything of value issue that commissioner leie because if a commissioner receives anything of value, they must recuse themselves, in your packet, you have a rather eloquent amendment that supervisor peskin has involved, it would be an amendment to anything of definition. that is in your packet before you. it was drafted by the city attorney for inclusion in the packet tuesday. lastly, the calculation of 1% we've talked to staff about how you calculate 1%, and we don't think there is an elegant way to do so. how is the 1% being calculated? retroactively? i understand this exists in l.a., but i don't think we've been provided with a whole lot

of clarity how they calculate 1%. inlet's instead focus on compliance with the recusal requirement. thank you. >> thank you. >> let me ask a question. >> commissioner kopp? >> that is off the subject, but i'm curious. why is this referred to the budget committee? that is above my pay grade. that is the prerogative of the board president. >> my understanding is because the amount of increase cost, they've got it at 200,000. >> oh, the financial. >> which gets it to the financial. >> thanks. >> mr. hepner, i do have a question of you -- oh, i am 'm sorry. >> go ahead, commissioner renne. >> where in the packet did you say proposed amendments? >> i believe they begin on page

87 are supervisor peskin's attached amendments. >> that has a definition of something -- anything of value? >> there is a definition -- a modification to the definition of anything of value. i don't know if it's prudent to be discussing the previous sub section -- >> i think not. we've dealt with that. >> mr. hepner, with repeated recusals, i don't think it's the intent to chill or otherwise deter other board members from recusing themselves if they have a conflict of interest. i think the idea we're wrestling with is repeated recusals. now if a matter comes before the commission, and a commissioner has to recuse

himself in the january and february meeting, and over and over again, is this not a problem? >> thank you, commissioner chiu. i do believe that is best addressed through the reappointment process. i think it is a fair grounds for the public to scrutinize whether that person properly sits on the body. i think that the problem that you will run into either way is making sure that board members and commissioners are properly recusing themselves, and i believe that ethics resources would best be directed at making sure that you properly recuse yourself when a conflict of interest exists. >> well, if you're finished, let me point out another way of looking at it, and that is it may give pause to an appointing power to appoint a member of spur to the planning commission in the first place so that one,

two, three, maybe more recusals don't add -- >> if you may respond, commissioner kopp, through the president, i think that is clearly referenced with the recusal statement. this is -- if you focus on the recusal procedures, you accomplish the entire goal without creating a disincentive to recusing, which i think creates a bad policy move. >> chair, is it the number of times of recusal. i think in the policy process, we sit for a six year terms. does the public have to wait, if i recuse myself eight times over 11 meetings, i can't be reappointed any way, but is this something that the voters and citizens of san francisco need to wait until it becomes an article in the examiner, oh,

like this has become a problem. the commission doesn't have the power to move, but could certainly create transparency around what conflict i may have. >> right. through the chair, again, it's not just the number, and i do believe that the appointing authority also has the authority to remove an appointed person from a commission or a board if the recusals start stacking up. i think the question that i'm getting at is if i'm being faced with a decision whether to recuse myself and someone has given me a ride to work four times in the past year, and the matter is actually a discretionary review before my body, and do i -- and i'm making that line call on whether i've received anything of value, and i know that if i recuse myself one more time,

i'm going to trigger an investigation by the ethics commission, that's a disincentive to recuse myself. that is a problem. the decision should be i'm recusing myself because the perception should be something of value is there. we should be incentives to properly remove incentives from these conflicts of interest. >> where does it provide that an appointing power can remove an appointee? >> maybe the city attorney can help, but i'm confident -- >> i am not confident. i am not. >> that may be the case. i think maybe in my experience, it's been the appointing authority has called for somebody to step down. >> it's done it de facto, not de jury. >> one last question.

the effect after having oneself recused three times and reviewed by the commission is being viewed as a negative. that's not the case. there's no power that the ethics commission has to remove, but there is an opportunity to provide greater clarity to the commission and the public as to the circumstances behind the recusal, so i'm not sure why this is such a terrible thing. >> through the chair, i think that's a policy call for the commissioners toic m make. what you're asking for is a responding to inquiry from the ethics commission and not seeing it something as potentially investigatory. it's a policy call for this commission to make. >> to clarify, this would not be an investigator process, it would be the public bringing forth a review discussion for

the commission. >> thank you. >> okay. further public comments? >> david pillpaugh. i haven't been by for a while. my father passed away, and i've been spending time on that. i'd also note that it's kind of warm outside, so i was looking for a shady character that i can spend some time under and cool down a little bit. any way, on this particular provision, i think that this is attempting to solve a problem that which are e're not sure e exists in the scope and manner that's suggested. i would suggest -- and i agree with lee hepner's comments and perhaps(b) makes sense, but certainly not(c). what i would suggest is that as part of the filing officer's

report annually as part of the form # 00 collection, that they disclose any information, addresses that they report the name of any member during the past calendar year who recused themselves on any calendar matter due to a financial period of interest. we try that for a period of time, and see how many of the form 700 filers who are members of boards and commissions have had to recuse themselves for reason of a financial conflict of interest. there are occasional instances of this. in my experience, they are not many. they're usually related to land use matters and usually discreet land use matters occasionally involving members of the planning commission, board of appeals, most rarely

members of the 0 cii board, as lee hepner said, we should be encouraging proper recusal, not discouraging it. just finally, on the proposed sub section d, it's not clear to me if that applies only in their capacity serving on the board of supervisors or if that left si also would apply to their service on other boards, where their investments may play a role whether or not they need to recuse for reasons of financial conflict of interest. thank you. >> hello, commissioners. debbie lerner from the san francisco human services network. the discussion around this

particular issue in my view has shown that you're not looking at the entire picture of the impact of repeated recusals, and this revision has been a deep concern to our organization and our members throughout this process. many of our volunteer commissioners in san francisco work for nonprofits, and in fact, they are asked to serve on commissions specifically because of their expertise in, for example, health and human service matters or other matters or whatever, so we often see in the department of public health, department of ageing, department of public services, appointees to overseeing commissions who come from nonprofits that also have contracts in that department. and the city benefits because they share their expertise through that commission, through that public service. however, their service does sometimes require them to request recusal, particularly when they are working with an

organization with those contracts, and those contracts come up for a vote. and this is not just a once a year thing. many organizations have multiple year contracts that cover each program or service. i believe for example an organization like catholic city charities have 60 existing city contracts. maybe 40 with the department of health, and the only time that person recuses themselves when that organization comes up, but they're going to recuse themselves over and over. that would subject them to this enhanced and ongoing scrutiny and report filing to the ethics commission specifically because of the very thing that they were appointed for: their expertise and their knowledge around a particular area of interest. so then, you're talking about asking somebody to recovery room the conflict or divest themselves. this isn't an incompetevestmen

is their day job, this is their career, this is the reason they were asked to serve, so it makes no sense. and then, if they don't quit their job, the commission would perhaps go to the appointing authority and say this person shouldn't be on the commission. perhaps if i was in a nonprofit in that situation, and i was asked to serve, i would decline in the first place because frankly, i would not have like come to this commission every time i recuse myself. this is a disincentive, so we do support mr. hepner's and supervisor peskin's suggestion to remove the repeated recusal section from this legislation. thank you. >> thank you.

>> good afternoon, chair keane and commissioners, and also staff. first, i'd just like to very briefly say, i do appreciate very much all the hard work both you, the commission, and staff has put into this. i think it's very evident from the rare uvarious iterations o amendment, different things are being taken into account. without repeating what i think miss lerman and mr. hepner have very eloquently said about the matters of nonprofit employers, sand then also the issue of disincentivizing certain behavior, i want to point out something else, and that's that current law already does require a fair amount of transparency around recusals by

requiri requiring city council members, board members, and commission members to recuse themselves and leave the room. it can be appreciated by members in the room, members of the public, and then those who look up the hearings on youtube and the reports. that's one issue, that there is some degree of transparency around recusals currently. and secondly, many officials under current law are required to recuse themselves from matters relating to their homes. often, for most of us, it's the biggest financial interest that we have, and there's not necessarily an ethical problem with needing to recuse yourself because a matter affects your home just due to the proximity from a particular matter, which

makes a lot of sense when you think about it because that's why we might serve on a particular board or commission because we're part of that community. so i just want to bring that to the commissioners' attention, as well as another potential intended consequence that may affect board members or commissioners who have to repeatedly recuse themselves. so with that, i would respectfully echo what miss lerman and mr. hepner requested that the commission consider on this matter. >> thank you. >> commissioners, ray hartz for san francisco open government. i'd like to align myself with the other speakers. first as an aside i'd like to apologize to commissioner lee

with painting her with the attorney brush. >> and libel us, too. >> yes, thank you. we have a provision in the law for most boards and commissions that the people who attend the meetings or fail to attend meetings are supposed to be reported, and if they have a certain number of failures to attend meetings, that they are reported to their appointing authority and recommended to be removed. well, i know as a practical matter three boards that have a number of commissioners who have not been to a commission meeting in a year, and it's not even reported, let alone is any action taken. so briasically, we have a nonfunctioning member. now here is a situation where you're going to put the onus on the member to report their recusals. how do i say it?

gee, the fair person who's an administrator of a body won't report someone who's not coming to the meetings, why would we expect the person to report themselves for something they've done that is wrong? and we are dealing with approximating tig politicians here, so i know this matter comes before the commission, it's going to be on the agenda five times. i know there is a key here that if i will recuse myself three , there will be an ethics commission review, so i'll recuse myself twice and miss three meetings. number one, that third time, i just won't report it, and there's nothing in here about what's going to happen to me if i don't. and what's going to keep track of the fact that i didn't? nobody that i can see. so i recuse myself time one,

time two. time three, i just keep my mouth shut. and then, there's all the practical matters that the prior speakers brought up. yes, we want people to recuse themselves if there's a conflict of interest. i'll be honest with you, i think there are cases where i see a clear conflict of interest in matters where the person does not recuse themselves, and i question that, and i much rather have a situation where a person has a moral obligation or a feeling of obligation to recuse themselves without having to put the onus on them to then have a penalty that they must pay for doing so. >> commissioners, larry bush from friends of ethics. i'm looking at section 3.209 on page 24 of the material that

you have. it's talking about recusals, and when there's a financial interest. there's nothing in here that says membership in nonprofits on a board of directors. there's nothing here that gives rise to the issues that were just presented to you by members of the public, unless i'm missing it someplace else. it's just totally a bogus issue. thank you. >> thank you. >> thank you. now, you've -- i'm sorry. there's just one turn to each person. okay. any further public comment? all right. then on the question of whether or not we adopt the amendment -- >> mr. chair? >> oh, i'm sorry. commissioner lee? >> 'cause i'd like to offer

another amendment. just a couple of weeks ago, several friends of mine was sharing the exciting news of them starting an informal group, getting milennial community advocates to get interested in civic engagement by learning about city commissions. >> you want to speak a little closer to the -- >> by learning about getting involved with commissioners s boards, and they were excited because they were looking at the new generation of leaders. they have the knowledge, they have the compassion of serving the community doeies, and ther a disconnect between serving the citiy community and servin city. my friend was excited about these young milennials serving the city, they are starting to pay interest to serving on the commissions. reading this, it's going to be

another excuse for some of the -- [ inaudible ] -- see, that's a reason why i don't want to get involved with poli politics, because i want to do good, and they're punishing me. even though mr. bush said it does not mention anything about nonprofits, the financial interest could mean a nonprofit organizations physical impact. so if we are touching upon the experts, these community advocates who know policies, to know the applications of the proper programs and policies to really improve the -- the well-being of the residents of the city, the recusal language is really going to punish them.

so i would like to propose an amendment that would remove the section from the section 3.209, and i don't know if we should take the vote on the previous two amendments and -- >> well, let's -- your motion is that we remove section 3.209 entirely, that is correct? >> right. yeah sfl ok yeah. >> okay. is there a second to that motion? i'm afraid the motion fails for lack of a second. okay. so we are -- commissioners, i think we're prepared to vote. all those in favor of the amendment, please say aye. all opposed? okay. the amendment passes, 4-1.

okay. we move now to the next amendment -- >> i thought there was -- i thought there was an amendment -- >> yeah, i thought the first vote was the amendment to the amendment. >> you're correct. >> so there's still a vote. >> now, the second vote on the under lying amendment made the -- the underlying amendment as the staff has put it forth to us. in regard to that amendment, all those in favor of it please say aye. opposed? so we have -- i think i heard four ayes and one no. correct? okay. the motion passes 4-1. we move now to behested payments disclosure, section 3.600. >> if i may, chair, could i recommend that we take a quick

mark since we're approaching the three hour mark? 20 minutes appropriate? >> 20 minutes -- . >> all right. the ethics commission is back in session. we're now going to move to the last of the items we're dealing with for the amendments to the matter to be put on the ballot in june, and that is behested payment discussion at page six. >> thank you, chair. i think i will direct you to the red line version. i think that'll be the easiest way to just look at these, so if you'll please look at page 76 in the packet, that's where the first change is that i'd like to show you. so as you know, the behested

payment -- >> page six? >> page 76, correct. those are the small numbers on the bottom, not the large. yeah, it's agenda item 4, co come -- comma, amended item, page 76. >> go ahead. >> okay. so as you know, the behested payment reporting system that would be created by this ordinance has been narrowed such that disclosure would only be required if a person makes a behested payment and such person is an interested party, vis-a-vis the city official who is asking them to make the payment. so this version of the ordinance, attachment one,

makes an important change to the definition of interested party, and you can see that change on the final line, line 25 of page 76. and what this does is it says that now if you actively support or oppose a governmental decision by the officer or member of board or commission who is asking you to make a payment, that will only be discloseable if you have a financial interest in that decision, whereas previously, that was not a requirement, so, for example, if you had tried to -- if you contacted a member of the board of supervisors, tried to get them to change their vote on something, and then, they asked you to make a behested payment, that would require disclosure. but now, there's the extra requirement that only is disclosure needed if you have a financial interest. and then, financial interest is

defined above, lines 17 through 19 by reference to california government code, so that would benefit from the body of law that's built up around that. it's a well-established term. and then, a third change is actually above. it's on the previous page, 75. there was a slight tweak to what it means to actively support or propose. what it meant to act to influence, so what was changed to communicate in an attempt to influence. and then lastly, i don't need to direct you to the page, but throughout these sections, we changed the language from proceeding to matter in which someone is involved just because that will now incorporate both being an interested party by being a party or a participant to a proceeding or by someone who has a financial interest in a government decision and

attempting to influence that decision. so matter should encompass both a decision and a proceeding. so those are the changes to these sections. be glad to answer any questions about that. >> okay. is there a motion to approve the amendment? >> move. >> second? >> second. >> okay. the motion is -- >> may i just make -- >> commissioner kopp? >> -- just one grammatical addition on page 33, 77. you go niece, nephew. put in the word "and" first cousin before you go to the next verbal inclusion. >> okay. we can make that grammatical change without any problem. okay. so the -- we have a motion made

and seconded to approve the amendment. commissioners, any discussion? any public comment? >> hello, commissioners. debbie lerman, human services network. first of all, i would like to wholeheartedly support and thank the staff and commissioners for accepting the amendment that it only applies if you have a financial interest. i think this is a significant improvement and removed a lot of the risk around this proposal. i am still concerned about this broad language of including as an interested party people who actively support or oppose, and i'll be honest, the first time

we saw this language was three days ago. i still haven't read this packet, and i have not had the chance to even wrap my head around what that means, but i know the board also expressed concern about that language at the hearing on thursday. and to me, it says if somebody spea speaks at a public hearing or takes any other action to communicate a position, which could include anything as small as signing a petition or somebody who participates in a rally on the steps of city hall, that that would be included in this definition, and i think that it has a real risk of not only chilling civic engagement and the expression of one's first amendment rights, but also, i have no idea how you would even begin to enforce something like that.

are we now supposed to electronically deliver our petition signatures so they can be double-checked to see if there's anybody with a financial interest in there? are we supposed to go out and take attendance at our rallies and take up names? there is the right under the sunshine ordinance to testify at any public hearing anonymously. i just think this is unenforceable and too broad, and i would urge that you go back to the original language that says an interested party is a licensed permanent entitlement, etcetera. perhaps include someone who hires a lobbyist or something like that, make it a very clean definition, but this really broad stuff about taking any action to oppose or something, it could be just somebody who writes a letter to the legislator. it's too much. i have one concern wiabout the

donor reporting section. i have less concern than i used to because we're only talking about people with a financial interest, but i think there should be a safe harbor. if the public official fails to tell a donor that they should support, i don't think the donor should be penalized. we should not be punishing donors for nonprofits. thank you. >> thank you. >> hello chair and commissioners. tworen charles from afj. i'd like to echo debbie's strong sentiments, and i this issue has one many nonprofits had concerns about, and i think

these show they were really listened to and incorporated into this legislation by the staff, so we sincerely appreciate that. specifically adding a financial interest component and time out to state law, i think makes a ton of sense from our perspective. and while i think reasonable minds and well intentioned good government advocates can disagree with the particulars of a disclosure regime, i have to say that from our perspective at least, we support efforts for disclosure and transparency, and i think again, we can debate the particulars, but from our perspective, this is far, far superior to a ban and tieing it to an actual financial interest on the part of the parties is hugely helpful, so thank you for your work on that. >> thank you.

>> commissioners, larry bush for friends of ethics. i'm delighted that this language now is going to be everybody in free for ron conway and for willie brown, who had a wonderful party for ed lee on the night he was elected at the palace hotel with lobster and an open bar that cost thousands and thousands of dollars. i believe they had mc hammer providing entertainment, none of which was reported, all of which was gratis to everybody what walked in the door. but all of that is free now, and there's not going to be any problem, because neither of them had a financial interest problem with the city. same thing with sean parker, and the money that he's been giving. there are a number of people who give a lot of money, and who do goodwill with it, but it's not a behested payment, because it's not a check that's requested by an elected

official. that's the connection that we're talking about. if you look at the behested payments are going to, it's not going to the type of groups that debbie is talking about. what we're hearing now is if you send a valentine to someone, you're in trouble. i would go one step further and say limiting this to financial interests does not represent how city government works. if anybody understands how government works, it's the members of this city commission. i see no recognition in any of this language of how decisions are influenced and how it provides ultimately something coming back. thank you. >> thank you.

>> charlie marstellar with foe. to me, this is our greatest disappointment, the behested payments issue, and it's for the simple fact of someone on your staff that told me when this process a years ago, and that is many of them who are attorneys understand that the laws in their home states were clear that behested payments in those jurisdictions and in many jurisdictions in the country are actually considered bribes and extortion, and they're illegal. and this is the only state that i know of that basically has seen a mission creep when the fppc made a technical error now in retroexpect and established

behested payments as a mechanism that was lawful in california almost 20 years ago. i think it was '97. so i've been in conversation with other people, including some of the nonprofits since that time, and i do think there's benefit since we have institutionalized this practice to look at thresholds, ultimately as our remedy here, and that we need to tighten up on any loop holes that we're going to create when we setup thresholds, because that's the problem. when you don't have an outright ban, you end up with tools that very clever people can exploit, unfortunately.

it's not our intent, not your intent, but the reality is there's a lot of smart people in this city particularly were gifted that way. so i'm disappointed very much that we haven't really come to grips with behested payment to the extent that i think we have, and i'm hoping that at our next crack at some point in the future, we'll have another chance to look at this again. it may be after a series of major corruption scandals that will precipitate an out swell of the public on this issue. thank you. >> thank you. >> commissioners, ray hartz, director, san francisco open government, although he probably doesn't appreciate it, i want to associate myself with mr. marstellar's comments. we have a lot of smart people in this city, and we have a lot of smart politicians, and this

idea of behested payments, it comes up -- they're smart enough to know not to ask for the check, not to ask for the dollar amount, not to specify anything. they have some cut away or cutout or whatever you want to call it ask for them. i'd like to refer you back to this. i have previously referred to the activities of the ethics commission as, quote, rearranging deck chairs on the titanic, end quote. commission president, peter keane in a matter previously heard against our current mayor is quoted as saying, mr. farrell, an elected supervisor of the city and county of san francisco has never had the political will or courage or integrity to come before this commission and look us in the face, end quote. he went onto blame the results on former executive director

john st. croix saying he was clearly totally incompetent in letting the statute of limitations run out or marginally corrupt for going along with the idea of not pursuing farrell, end quote. throughout the history of this commission, when they can't enforce the laws already on the books, which i can't and don't, they find a scape goat and claim they need to rewrite the law. what did einstein say the definition of insanity is? doing the same thing over and over and expecting a different out come, and we are here once again, rearranging the deck chairs. and all the people that we're talking about are the people who appoint you to this commission. i don't know really whether i have any expectation that you

can fairly in an unbiased fashion deal with any of those political issues for the simple fact that the people who appoint you are all politicians. they all run for office. they all ask for these payments, they all accept these payments, and if i remember correctly, part of mr. farrell's argument at the time was well it was one of my staff members who asked for this payment. i knew nothing about it. it's like sergeant schultz on the old comedy, i know nothing. and as your commission president said, didn't have the integrity to come forward. well, bottom line is, if i was having to testify against myself, i wouldn't come before you, either. >> hello, commissioners. thank you for allowing me to speak. my name is mark bruno, and i

didn't come today to speak to thissub, but i've lived here for 30 years, and i'm head of the st. vincent de-paul society, which is a nonprofit. i just want to say as a citizen who's lived and worked in the neighborhood and worked on many political campaigns, that outside of what the law might permit in terms of free speech and give money as a form of free speech, that if you ask most people who voted for me, and voted for other people in the neighborhood, most people would consider what we're calling here a behested payment a sort of bribe, and so without expressing a kind of anger here about who owes who what or mark farrell or the history, i'm not familiar with all of those histories, but i think the common person would consider it wrong that an elected official would be permitted to say hey,

can you help mark bruno's nonprofit, can you please give them $10,000 or $20? that's wrong because the public official has a tremendous amount of power, and has a tremendous amount of sway over who gets jobs and what property values are worth. we all are familiar because we're all familiar with why george washington was eventually given a very high salary, because george washington at the time were investing in properties in george down and the district of columbia. they didn't have money, but they had something else, and that something else was knowledge. they knew a compromise was being made between the north and the south, where the federal capital would be. it was those people who had that knowledge and were able to invest in that property who made money, and yet, on its face at the beginning, those connections weren't really about money, they were about decision