>> tonight ofrontline... the haditha incident was called a massacre. >> they went into houses and killed children-- women and children. 24 people they killed. >> marines accused going on a rampage, killing iraqise civilians in cold blood. >> the news saying that there were 24 innocent civilians killed-- it's not accurate at all. my case proves it. >> the legal battle of the lat accused marine just ended with a plea deal, but what happened that day remains bitterly contested. >> these crimes are heinous crimes, terrible acts.

i would even call what happened in haditha a war crime. >> haditha will be the case that causes the military to come to grips with the rules of engagement in a way that they never have had to before. >> tonight ofrontline, what really happened in haditha. >> frontline is made possible by contributions to your pbs station from viewers like you. thank you. and by the corporation for public broadcasting. major funding is provided by the john d. and catherine t. macarthur foundation, committed to building a more just, verdant and peaceful world. and by reva and david logan, committed to investigative journalism as the guardian of the public interest. additional funding is provided by the park foundation, dedicated to heightening public awareness of critical issues.

>> narrator: the story begins two and a half years ago in a town called haditha in western iraq near the syrian border on the banks of the euphrates river. before the war it was known as a serene oasis, a popular vacation spot. but by the fall of 2005, nearly three years into the war, haditha was war-torn, and sunni insurgents were in complete control.

>> insurgent traffic of foreign fighters, fighters from syria, from places outside of iraq, came through the haditha triad and then down into points south and east like fallujah and on into baghdad. >> narrator: control of haditha was vital in order to protect a massive dam that provided electricity to all of anbar province. to retake haditha, the marine corps sent in some of its most battle-hardened men, kilo company, from the legendary third battalion, first marines-- the thundering third. >> the 3-1's one of the most decorated battalions in the marine corps. their history goes on back through vietnam, korea, world war ii; all the major conflicts that this country's been in, the 3-1's been involved in. >> narrator: iraq was no different. barely a year before they were sent to haditha, kilo company had taken another city back from insurgents in the most intense

urban combat marines had faced since vietnam, the second battle of fallujah. >> fallujah was like the o.k. corral, the wild, wild west. >> when i first joined the marine corps, that's what i thought i'd do as a marine. here's the enemy-- they're right there, go get 'iem, just going house to house. >> narrator: the marines took control of fallujah after four weeks of heavy, close-quarter combat, and kilo company had been in the thick of it all. >> kilo company in fallujah performed magnificently. they took heavy casualties, but they just kept going and going and going. >> narrator: now many of the same men were primed to face a similar situation in haditha. >> all our intel reports and everything had initially said that this was going to be, you know, a full-on, like, fallujah- type style clearing the city and whatnot. and so we were all amped up.

>> narrator: but they were surprised by what they found. >> the night that the battalion set up to go push through haditha and start clearing it, all i heard was crickets. >> no one attacked us. no one did anything. we just... we found a abandoned school and then we set up there. >> narrator: the marines renamed the school "sparta" and made it their base of operation. sergeant frank wuterich, who would later be at the center of the haditha incident, was on his first deployment to iraq. justin sharratt was one of his men. >> to us haditha seemed like a very shady town. i mean, nothing really major happened. but just the way the people reacted with us, and the way we... we tried to help them and we tried to do all this for them. and it just... they just seemed to not like us the whole entire time. >> narrator: the insurgents that

kilo company expected to fight had seemingly disappeared. >> when 3-1 entered the city, insurgents largely fled. we received intelligence that they had gone to the south to regroup and plan. and we expected that, unlike fallujah, where they went toe- to-toe to marine... with marines, they were not willing to do that in haditha. >> narrator: for the first three weeks, their deployment was eerily quiet. the marines uncovered ieds and weapons caches, but there was hardly an insurgent to be seen.6 that was about to change. intelligence officers say they began to notice increased enemy activity in the town. >> the presence of foreign fighters in town was an immediate indicator that something was in the works and that planning for a major attack was... was underway. >> narrator: that major attack would occur on november 19,

2005, a day the men of kilo company will never forget. :oze)r daysn kilo company's deployment, with a routine mission. sergeant frank wuterich would lead a convoy, escorting a fresh unit of iraqi soldiers to a nearby checkpoint and bringing food to fellow marines. >> staff sergeant wuterich and his squad re-supplied us that 7:00 or so. i remember a couple of my friends were with... were in the same squad, so i was talking to them. my squad was on post at the time. they were getting ready to come off post. it was early in the morning. everybody was tired, just talking to them. and then... then they ended up leaving.

>> narrator: sergeant wuterich was in charge of four vehicles and 11 marines. among them were lance corporals miguel terrazas, justin sharratt and stephen tatum; corporals sanick dela cruz and hector salinas; and private first class humberto mendoza. at about 7:00 a.m., as they drove west, a terrific explosion rocked wuterich's convoy. justin sharratt was in the lead vehicleçhz >> i heard a large explosion from behind me. i turned around to, you know, assess what happened. i remember seeing the second humvee and the third humvee. i remember calling that out. and then i don't remember seeing the fourth one.da >> narrator: the fourth humvee had been destroyed. two marines were wounded and the driver, lance corporal miguelri terrazas, was literally torn in half by the explosion. >> he was one of the greatest

marines i've ever known, but you don't have time to mourn. you don't have time to do any of that. >> narrator: wuterich and some of his men engaged a car they deemed hostile near the scene of the explosion, killing its five occupants. they then advanced on these nearby houses after identifying them as the source of incoming fire. what the marines could not have known was that their actions that morning would come to haunt them. but at the time, the fight continued. nearby, the battalion's command directed an unmanned aerial vehicle-- called scan eagle-- to monitor the fighting. this is some of the actual footage. >> the uav video feed that we obtained shortly after the attack took place showed the insurgents fleeing the scene, showed them getting into a car, showed them moving north out of the area.

>> narrator: major jeffrey dinsmore was the battalion's intelligence officer in haditha that november day. this is the first time he's spoken to the press about what happened. >> simultaneously, throughout the morning, other squads from kilo company were coming under ied attack as well. they were either discovering ieds or they were coming under small arms fire attack at various locations in the city. it became apparent that this was the major insurgent re- infiltration of haditha that we had been expecting. >> narrator: joseph haman's squad was dispatched to clear an insurgent safe house and came under intense attack. >> november 19 was the main day in the deployment. that one, sole day was pretty much how fighting was done in fallujah. it was that intense. it was close combat the whole time, where you're inside a house and five, six feet away from someone that's shooting back at you. that was the day of days in

haditha. >> narrator: by the end of the day, at least nine marines had been wounded and lance corporal miguel terrazas had been killed. the death toll for the iraqis was far higher. the marines estimated 12 insurgents had died. in addition, 15 civilians had been killed, including four women and six children. to the marines at the time, the civilian deaths seemed unremarkable in the overall violence of that day and their experiences over multiple deployments in iraq. >> you knew that some people were killed. but, i mean, compared to the time... the deployment before that, i mean, people... i mean,

it just happens. >> narrator: the following day the marine corps issued a press release so inaccurate it would eventually lead to allegations of a cover-up. it made no mention of women and children killed in their homes by marines. instead, it simply said, "a u.s. marine and 15 iraqi civilians were killed yesterday from the blast of a roadside bomb." >> when i first saw it, it seemed a little bit unusual. that's a pretty high number of civilian casualties for your typical ied, your improvised explosive device. >> narrator: still, newspapers went with this version and the story quickly faded. >> it didn'et a whole lot of attention, i think because there were a lot of things going on, both in iraq and around the world. and as time went on, it... it faded. certainly we weren't following that particular case very >> narrator: and kilo company

also moved on. >> i think the unit sort of forgot about what had happened. they saw reports, early reports, about that press release in publications that were overseas and they dismissed them. they sort of said, "well, that... that isn't quite right." but i think they figured, you know, the media doesn't always get it right. sometimes those press releases aren't exactly right, and they didn't see it as problematic. >> turkey? >> narrator: the marines celebrated thanksgiving in their haditha camp... >> happy thanksgiving! >> happy thanksgiving! >> narrator: ...and saluted their fallen comrade, lance corporal miguel terrazas, in a traditional memorial service. >> lance corporal terrazas, he was just the ultimate fun-loving guy. he was one of those guys, if you needed a quick laugh or someone to go talk to, he was always there, and whatever he'd do or say would just make you laugh. >> narrator: but the iraqis had not finished grieving for their dead, as the marines learned

earlier in a meeting with the haditha city council. >> ( translated ): about a week after the incident, the city council met with the u.s. side: major hyatt from civil affairs and the commander of haditha, colonel chessani. many demands were presented in this meeting, and among those demands was opening a formal investigation into the incident. y >> thewere upset about what had occurred. they were upset that the... the marines killed innocent people that day, from what they were saying. >> narrator: in a formal complaint, the city council referred to the incident as "a crime of war" and called the killings in the houses and at the white car "executions." but the marine command gave little credence to these allegations. they strongly suspected that the city council was backed by terr tists. >> the city council demonstrated

through actions, and through information that we had received from various sources, that their allegiances largely lied-- not all of them-- but largely lies... lied with the insurgency. >> narrator: no investigation was launched at that time. and the marines thought that they had put the incident behind them. >> it became more of a meeting of what can both sides do to... you know, this incident occurred, we'll deal with it the best that we can. and from here on out, though, what can we both do to prevent these incidents from happening in the future? ( frenzied talking ) >> narrator: but not everyone in haditha would be satisfied. in fact, this video of the aftermath of the house clearings by wuterich and his men was filmed by an iraqi determined to get the story out to the rest of the world. >> ( translated ): a member of our organization is from

haditha, and by chance during the incident, he was visiting his family there, so he was able to film some of the scenes. >> narrator: abdul rahman al- mashhadani is the co-founder of the hammurabi human rights organization based in baghdad. >> ( translated ): when i first watched the film i couldn't finish it because it was a horrible tragedy-- the mutilation of the bodies, the brutal way of killing. >> narrator: al-mashhadani says they tried to get the tape into the hands of the arab media, but no one would pay attention. finally, he showed it to time magazine's baghdad correspondent, tim mcgirk. >> the video was horrifying, and i said, "well, who did this? this is terrible." i sort of figured it was, you know, fighting, the usual sort of butchery that goes on between

sunnis and shias and they said, "no, it was the u.s. marines based in haditha that carried this out." i was stunned and i didn't believe it. so the next thing i did is i just did a simple google search about the events of november 19. >> narrator: mcgirk found the marine press release dated november 20 saying that the civilians had been killed by a roadside bomb. >> so i thought back, and i remembered several things. i remembered, first of all, the bodies of the people, the women and children, they were in their pajamas. and iraq, it's a very traditional society. people don't go wandering around on the streets in their pajamas to get hit by an ied. >> narrator: there were also purported eyewitnesses on the videotape. their stories, too, were completely at odds with the marines' press release.

>> narrator: mcgirk wondered if commanders might be trying to conceal deliberate killings of civilians by the marines. he wrote to the local marine press officer. >> "why were the marines unable or unwilling to distinguish women and children in daylight at close quarters from potential terrorists? is there any investigation ongoing into these civilian deaths, and if so, have any marines been formally charged?" >> narrator: the officer who wrote back, jeffrey pool, was incredulous. "to be honest, i can't believe you're buying any of this.

there is no investigation. this falls into the same category of al qaeda in iraq propaganda."te >> we know that the hammurabi video is insurgent propaganda because intelligence information received almost immediately after the... the events of november 19 indicated that the video had been recorded by an insurgent propagandist. >> narrator: but mcgirk thought he had good reason to believe the claims on the tape. >> i had worked with the hammurabi people before on other stories, and i think that it's wrong to smear them as pro- insurgent. these are people who are carrying out human rights work in iraq. >> narrator: the marines offered to transport mcgirk to haditha to look into their side of the story. mcgirk declined, saying his editor felt it was too dangerous to go into haditha, but his questioning produced results. >> there was an indication that... that because of his

inquiries, the highest echelons of command were concerned about the events of november 19. >> narrator: within a month, a full-scale investigation was underway. as part of the navy, the marine corps falls under the jurisdiction of the naval criminal investigative service. the ncis committed more than 60 agents to the case. >> to dedicate 65 or so agents full time to one investigation is probably... if... if... one of, if not the largest effort, we've put forth in an investigation in history since i've been on, which is about 25 years. >> narrator: but some in the iraqi government weren't interested in the number of agents. they wanted to play a central role in the investigation. >> ( translated ): we presented a complete file to the american side about what happened in haditha.

less than a week later, the americans told us that we could not be a part of the investigation, but they would keep us updated. >> narrator: just as the ncis started its investigation, time published tim mcgirk's story about the incident. but it ran on page 34 and got little play in the media. >> because it was in iraq, because it was in the war zone, it didn't get a whole lot of bounce, as they say in journalism. there weren't a whole lot of follow-ups to the time magazine story initially. >> narrator: just a few months later, america and the world did take notice when congressman john murtha, a staunch opponent of the war, citing unnamed military sources, made a shocking charge during a press conference. >> it's much worse than reported in time magazine. there was no... there was no firefight. there was no ied that killed

these innocent people. our troops overreacted because of the pressure on them, and they killed innocent civilians in cold blood. >> narrator: to the kilo company marines who were listening, murtha's charges were outrageous. >> hearing the speech from murtha saying that they just went out and with all the pressure on 'em, that they just went out and... and killed all these people, and that there was no ied and there was no firefight that day, i mean, it's a slap in the face. it's... it's... i mean, it disgusts you when one... one... a guy that was loved by everybody in the whole company, almost the whole battalion, was killed by an ied that day. and then my own squad got into a fire fight, which about nine out of 12 people got injured that day from grenades or from being shot at. i mean, and saying that there was no firefight, it's just... i mean, it's... i mean, it's a straight slap in the face. >> they killed the people in the taxi. there was no firing at all. >> narrator: for the next two weeks, murtha made the media rounds. >> he made the point, initially, to show the stress that u.s.

troops were under over in iraq. and he was using it more as a pitch to bring u.s. troops home. >> draw us a picture of what happened at haditha. >> well, i'll tell you exactly what happened: one marine was killed, and the marines just said, "we're going to take care of it." they don't know who the enemy is. the pressure was too much on them. >> his comments certainly got our attention at the washington post. so we... when you have a member of congress saying-- and a marine himself, i mean, someone who has served in the military previously-- coming out and calling an event "cold blooded murder," i think that was the point where people really started looking at this case. >> narrator: time magazine revisited the story in june 2006, this time placing it on the front cover. >> it was put on the front cover because by then it had turned into a political story. murtha had come out with his statements about it, and i think it also came at a time when there was a... an increasing malaise in... in the way the war

was being carried out and why we weren't winning. and following on the heels of abu ghraib, this was one example in which the americans were going about it wrong. how can you win the hearts and minds of the people when... when suddenly there's an incident in which 24 civilians die? >> some are comparing the haditha killings to the vietnam massacre at my lai. >> narrator: haditha led the news for weeks and soon became synonymous with other outrages in the iraq war, like abu ghraib. >> haditha, in my judgment, is a metaphor for how the press unconsciously, being in opposition to a war, will take an incident and, simply by reiterating it and reiterating it and reiterating it, build it into something that it wasn't. >> we're supposed to be fighting this war for democracy, and yet something like this happens that sets us back. it's as bad as abu ghraib, if not worse. >> obviously the allegations are very troubling for me.

>> narrator: as political pressure mounted that summer, the ncis issued its internal report. >> the ncis report, which is thousands of pages long, came back with recommendations for the command that there were crimes committed. >> narrator: at the same time an independent army investigation looked into the actions of senior officers. >> what they found was that there was a pervasive feeling from the unit on the ground all the way up to the top levels of the marine corps leadership in iraq that iraqi lives were not as important as the lives of marines, that the death of innocent civilians are an unfortunate byproduct of war. >> narrator: and the press release at the center of the controversy was also scrutinized. it had been written by marine captain jeffrey pool, who said he'd just assumed any civilians who had died had been killed by insurgents. the report from the field that day had not specified who had shot the civilians.

pool told investigators, "it was all part of the attack. and that was what we were showing-- 15 iraqi civilians killed by an insurgent attack." the army investigation also found that: "there was a tendency at all levels of command to view civilian casualties, even in significant numbers, as relatively routine." >> the report was extremely critical of people as high as... at the two-star-general level, saying that they should have noticed that something was amiss. they should have asked questions. they should have started an... an investigation right away. >> based on the finding of the investigations, various charges have been preferred against four marines relating to the deaths of the iraqi civilians on 19 november, 2005. also, charges have been preferred against four marines for failure to properly report and/or investigate the deaths of the iraqi civilians. >> narrator: finally, in

december 2006, the marines were officially charged, making the incident one of the most significant criminal cases since the start of the iraq war. facing multiple charges of unpremeditated murder for the killings of the iraqi civilians were staff sergeant frank wuterich, sergeant sanick dela cruz, lance corporal justin sharratt, and lance corporal stephen tatum. two other marines involved in the killings that day, lance corporal humberto mendoza and corporal hector salinas, were not charged; both eventually were granted immunity in exchange for their testimony. and the commander of the entire battalion, lieutenant colonel jeffrey chessani, was charged for failing to report the incident and for not thoroughly investigating the events of november 19. three officers under chessani were also charged with offenses related to the aftermath of the

incident. the military court proceedings are underway at kilo's home base, camp pendleton in southern california. the process began in the spring of 2007 with preliminary hearings to determine whether any of the marines would face court martial. after more than a year of having their stories played out in the media, the accused marines told their version of events to an investigating officer. no recordings were allowed in the courtroom, so here, read by actors, are excerpts of the unsworn statements of wuterich and tatum. >> saturday, november 19, 2005 started off as a normal day for 1st squad 3rd platoon kilo company in haditha, iraq.

although the mission was something we had conducted and accomplished dozens of times before, today would be extraordinarily different. the day was chilly and the sky was clear. the city was ominously quiet. i changed the normal route of north on river road and west on haditha road. this is one decision i will always regret. ( explosion ) an explosion louder than anything i have ever heard rocked the entire convoy. i remained calm. i continued to drive west as my a driver started to scream, "the fourth vehicle got hit!" i made my way back to the other side of chestnut and stopped my humvee.

>> narrator: wuterich's squad called for backup and began to search for the triggerman. >> the first thing i noticed outside my vehicle was a white, four-door sedan to the southwest. corporal dela cruz was shouting in broken arabic and using expletives to the military-aged males who occupied the white car. his weapon was at the ready, as it should have been. they were not complying and, in fact, were starting to run in the opposite direction. i took a knee in the road and fired. engaging was the only choice. the threat had to be neutralized. >> narrator: wuterich said he and corporal salinas then heard msalarl fire frse aarou h nearby. and at the order of a superior who had just arrived on the scene, he took corporal salinas, along with lance corporal tatum and private first class mendoza, to clear that house. >> i advised the team something like, "shoot first and ask questions later" or "don't hesitate to shoot."

i can't remember my exact words, but i wanted them to understand that hesitation to shoot would only result in the four of us being killed. >> narrator: for purposes of the hearing, this house was referred to as "house one." it was the first time wuterich had ever been under fire. he had never cleared a house in combat. but two of his men were veterans of fallujah, lance corporals justin sharratt and stephen tatum. like wuterich, tatum presented his story of what happened that day. >> i had been told by my squad leader to treat the house as hostile. before even entering the house, shots had already been fired; upon entering the house, i heard an ak-47 racking. >> narrator: tatum said he threw a grenade into the room that he thought the sound was coming from. >> grenade just went off. dust was in the air, smoke was

ouin the air. couldn't really make out much more than targets. >> narrator: by the time they cleared the first house, three men, two women and a child were dead. next, wuterich said he heard one of his marines shout, "there's a runner," and he ordered his men to the next house, house two, the only place he said the runner could have gone. >> again, we used grenades and cleared the rooms by fire. >> it was dark, couldn't really see a whole lot. i never took more than two or three steps in either one of the rooms. the engagements maybe lasted five, six seconds. >> narrator: just seconds, but five more children and two more women were dead. wuterich said that, while he cleared houses one and two alongside his men, he doesn't remember firing his weapon. but he maintained that his team, tatum and two others, had acted appropriately, despite what happened. >> i am not comfortable with the

fact that women and children died that day. i know i might had a part in it. i don't know if my rounds impacted anybody. that is a burden i will have to bear. >> narrator: the marines searched many houses that day. about 10:30 am, more than three hours after the ied explosion, sharratt said they went to investigate suspicious activity near this house, later referred to as house 3. >> the only thing thatheere there were women and children, which to us, you know, that was kind of weird. we asked them in arabic, you know, if they had any weapons, you know, where the... the men at. >> narrator: the marines said they were told the men were in this house, now referred to as house 4. >> there was a room in front of me with the door open, and i saw a iraqi with a ak-47 pointed at me. so i raised up my squad automatic weapon. and when i pulled the trigger, the weapon jammed. so i pulled back and took cover

behind a... behind the wall. i pulled out the nine-millimeter pistol that i was carrying at the time. i fired a shot and killed him. and to the left, there were three iraqi males, and the first one had an ak-47. so i just open fired on all three of those males until i ran out of bullets. then, staff sergeant wuterich came in and finished the job. >> narrator: the four men killed by wuterich and sharratt were all brothers, members of the ahmed family. sharratt's case was the first to be considered by the investigating officer. he was charged with three counts of unpremeditated murder for the killings in house 4. the central question was whether his actions were appropriate under the rules of engagement, the roe, the conditions underth which u.s. forces are allowed to use deadly force. >> the rules of engagement have

one fundamental underpinning, and that is that every soldier or marine has the right to self- defense. that's the first and foremost element of the rules of engagement. and every marine and soldier can tell you that they have a little card, and they can tell you what the card says. >> narrator: gary myers, justin sharratt's attorney, has been practicing military law since arguing the my lai case during the vietnam war. he contended sharratt's actions were justified under the rules of engagement, because sharratt said he acted in self-defense. >> he saw an ak-47 being raised at him, and he reacted instantly and with precision, as he is trained to do. >> do you swear the statement you're about to make will be the truth, the whole truth...? >> narrator: but iraqi witnesses from house 3 told a very different story-- a story of deliberate, execution-style killings.

the prosecution said the iraqi witnesses declined to testify in person, but frontline has obtained some of this testimony, videotaped in iraq, which the prosecution used to build its case against sharratt. the witnesses swore the marines took everyone out of houses 3 and 4, forced the men to give up their weapons, separated them from the women and children at gunpoint, and led them into house 4. after the marines left, the witnesses said, they found their male relatives grouped together dead. >> narrator: the prosecution declined frontline's request for an interview, as they have been barred from making statements outside of the courtroom.

but at the hearing, they laid out their case against sharratt: that what the witnesses described was, in fact, a cold- blooded execution, not an active fight, as sharratt had claimed. but forensic evidence introduced by the defense cast doubt on the iraqi witness accounts. >> the scene of the death of these four men was completely inconsistent with an execution. the location of rounds in the walls and the windows indicated a... a dynamic situation. these men were moving and, therefore, the notion of execution-style shooting simply evaporated. when you just looked at the forensics of the room, it could not have happened that way. >> narrator: despite the forensic evidence, the prosecution recommended that sharratt's case proceed to a court martial. the next hearings addressed the difficult questions surrounding the shootings earlier in the

day, immediately following the ied explosion. staff sergeant wuterich and sergeant dela cruz were charged with murdering the five iraqi men who exited the white car. they said the men were running away. >> under the rules of engagement that existed on 19 november of 2005, military-age males who are fleeing the scene of an attack of an ied attack were considered insurgents or supporters of insurgents, and could be engaged as threats. >> narrator: but iraqi soldiers on the scene had told investigators that the marines had lined up the men and shot them while they were kneeling. in the hearing, however, the ncis' own forensics expert dismissed this idea, saying the evidence showed the iri men could not have been lined up ini that way.

but by this time, the prosecution had a new weapon. before the hearings began, sergeant dela cruz changed his story after reaching a deal to testify for the prosecution in exchange for immunity. the other accused marines were outraged. >> it hurt. it was one of the most devastating things in my life, knowing that marines that i went to combat with, marines that i was right next to when bullets were flying... it tore me apart on the inside. >> narrator: in his new version of events, dela cruz said wuterich alone shot the men as they stood still, some with their arms raised. he said: "those men are not running, sir. some of their hands are interlocked. ofone them drops lifeonss in a backward position.li i saw staff sergeant wuterich kneeling shooting at their direction."

>> narrator: but the forensics expert, using photographs along with this video taken by scan eagle shortly after the shootings, concluded that there must have been at least two shooters, undermining dela cruz's new account. the defense also argued that wuterich did have reasons to be suspicious about a white car. >> on 19 november, the marines had received intelligence briefings that there was quite a bit of insurgent activity in haditha, and to be on the lookout in specifically for a white car that would be carrying a number of insurgents who were known to be operating in the area. >> narrator: but it turned out these men had no weapons or explosives, and the prosecution argued that wuterich had fired without provocation in violation of the rules of engagement. the investigating officer then turned his attention to houses one and two, where women and children had been killed. >> what the courts are trying to determine is whether or not

these shooters had a reason to legitimately feel a threat while inside those houses, that... that they did what they were supposed to do as marines, that they followed the rules of engagement, that they did what they had been trained to do. what prosecutors will be arguing is that they didn't follow their rules, they didn't do what they were supposed to do. >> narrator: what the squad was supposed to do was clear the area in the direction of house one. sergeant wuterich was given that order by his platoon leader, first lieutenant william kallop, after hearing small arms fire coming from that house. exactly how he would clear the area, however, was up to him as sergeant. >> a sergeant will simply be told what the marines like to call "intent orders," and they'll say, "my intent as the commander-- the platoon commander or something-- is to clear those houses." and he just leaves it up to the sergeant to do his own job. he doesn't try to tell him how to do it.

>> narrator: sergeant wuterich's team would clear house one fallujah-style, thinking it was not necessary to identify the occupants of the house, as they believed it was hostile. a local cameraman working for frontline in haditha talked to two of the eyewitnesses from this house about what they saw. >> narrator: the central question about the actions of the marines in this house

focused on whether it should have been considered hostile in the first place. the prosecution argued that the marines had violated their rules of engagement by not positively identifying targets before using deadly force, saying that, in theory, an entire house could not be considered hostile. but the defense rejected that claim, providing examples where the marines had been trained to do just that. >> i think that the marines have an argument that they went into these houses following their rules of engagement, declared the houses hostile, and believed at the time that they could kill everyone inside because they were deemed a threat. what investigators saw after the fact is what caused them to ask the questions-- the fact that a number of women and children were killed, that there were no weapons in the house. and... and it caused them to ask, "were these marines too aggressive? were they going on a rampage after the... the bomb killed a

member of their unit?" >> narrator: the hearing also addressed the question of house 2, which posed greater challenges for the defense. the marines said they had continued into that house in pursuit of a suspected insurgent. however, the prosecution continued to argue the marines should not have used aggressive house-clearing tactics. they presented evidence that there should have been enough light to identify the women and children before shooting. tatum said he did not see the women and children in house two, and only fired because he was coming to the aid of a fellow marine who was already shooting. wuterich maintained that, as in house 1, he did not remember firing, and he said he had not seen the women and children in house two before they were killed. however, a television appearance on 60 minutes months before his hearing established that, in the first house, he might already have seen dead women and

children before proceeding to house two. >> there may have been women in there, there may have been children in there... >> narrator: still, wuterich's defense team argued that he and his men had cleared house two in accordance with the rules of engagement. >> the need to press on in battle does not dissipate once collateral damage has been discovered. in other words, if... if sergeant wuterich, in... in moving through and... and exiting house 1, saw that some... some people who appeared to have been innocent may have been killed, that doesn't mean that the threat has been eliminated. and he's... he's required to... in order to protect his marines, to pursue the threat until it's neutralized. and... and that's... and that's what he did. >> i don't care who you are-- if you're a marine or an army soldier and you're in the attack, but you haven't lost

anybody, and you see women and children, stop. >> narrator: bing west is a retired marine who has followed the case closely and has written about the complexities of fighting an insurgency. >> i've seen a lot of things on the battlefield that has convinced me, when the insurgent is embedded-- just wearing civilian clothes among... among all the civilians-- it's inevitable that you're going to get into morally wrenching situations when a firefight starts. >> narrator: in the hearings, the defense argued that kilo company had not been trained for such complicated situations in the midst of a hostile house- clearing. >> the training that the marines got and applied in haditha was the... the training of a blunt force. if a house is declared hostile, you clear it-- that's blunt force. if they were a swat team, they would have approached the house in a very different way, perhaps identified themselves in a

different way, perhaps waited out the insurgents in a different way. >> narrator: but colonel john ewers, a marine judge advocate who was involved early on in the haditha investigation, says that all marines are trained to distinguish civilians from insurgents in a hostile environment. >> i think that our marines were appropriately trained for the mission that we were trying to accomplish. the idea that... because we're a blunt force instrument, that we're not... we're ill prepared to do that is a cop-out. the point is... is that we're marines. we're the... we're the toughest guys on the block. we know how to defend ourselves. we know how to... we know how to aggressively take people down. and to suggest that we can't do the shades of gray in between is a cop-out and i think it sells marines short. >> narrator: in the end, two years after the incident, the commanding general in charge finally made his decision and called for courts-martial for both wuterich and tatum, but not

on murder charges and not for the killings in house 1. wuterich's charges were reduced to voluntary manslaughter for killing two women, five children and a man in house two, and killing at least one man at the white car. tatum's charges were reduced to involuntary manslaughter for killing two children in house two. lieutenant colonel jeffrey chessani also faces court martial on charges of willfully failing to investigate the incident and not accurately reporting it up the chain of command. chessani is fighting these charges, saying the record will show that he did appropriately report the incident to his superiors. and in justin sharratt's case, the investigating officer found that he had justifiably perceived a threat and acted within the rules of engagement,

and the commanding general dismissed all charges. al-mashhadani was following the news from iraq. >> ( translated ): i'm not satisfied with the outcome, because the punishments don't come close to the crimes committed in haditha. we expected that the soldiers would be exonerated. from the first moment, we expected that. i thought the soldiers would be let off or claim insanity. all of these excuses we expected from the beginning. >> after more than two years of investigating the case, none of the marines are charged with murder-- a reflection of the complexity of the situation on the ground. there are very difficult questions about rules of engagement, about what the intent of these marines was on that particular day-- what they were responding to and how they responded. while the case initially was portrayed by iraqi civilians as

a massacre, by congressman murtha as killings in cold blood, what the investigation has revealed since is that this was far more complicated than some execution. it was far more complicated than a... a squad of marines going on a rampage. >> narrator: in the summer of 2007, while the marines charged in the haditha case remained at camp pendleton, the rest of kilo company began its fourth deployment in iraq. but this time around, they said the statement of the mission from the top was different: root out the insurgents and, at the same time, win the hearts and minds of the iraqi people. >> we get roe class after roe

class after roe class. and there's, like... it's we're told what... you know, like, you can't... and you can't do this. don't, you know, look for this. you know, and it's just... it's a big deal this time. the hearts and minds is a really big deal this time around and, like, i... and i understand where they're coming from. i... i do. but this is kind of hard for me to... to, you know, kind of shift over to that. >> i'd say it's more difficult now-- it's like chasing a ghost. and you never know-- is that day gonna be the day, you know, that they actually decide to... to face you toe-to-toe? >> what kind of car? >> i guess... opal? >> opel? >> opel. >> narrator: as the men of kilo company carried out their mission day after day, the shadow of haditha was inescapable. it is now policy that, if an iraqi civilian is killed, an investigation must take place.

>> it does make you second-guess yourself. i don't want to spend the rest of my life in leavenworth. but i also want to bring all my boys home safe. >> i think there are... are marines and... you know, who... who would... who would hesitate for too long, or not make the right call based on a... you know, a fear that they might be investigated. >> remember, don't walk on the roads. >> we do hesitate. that's not a bad thing. that it really does take an extra moment, and assuming that risk for the future reward of avoiding some mistakes and maintaining that relationship is worth it. >> the biggest take-away from

haditha for me was this human element where the junior subordinate leader might be a 19-, 20-year-old corporal, who has to make a decision in a split second or in a series of seconds. that will affect where he... he does a calculus of balancing the safety of the marines, the accomplishment of the mission, the threat level of the enemy, and collateral damage. and all these other things that are going on in his mind-- that he has to make in absolute seconds, without hesitation. so, the difference between, you know, murder and killing, he is judge and juror, in that split second in that environment. and, i mean, that is... that's the moral authority that these young men have.

>> in the 2008 court-martial f lieutenant colonel jeffrey chessani, a military judge found that improper command influence had tainted the case and dropped all charges. charges against lance corporal stephen tatum were dropped. in january 2012, staff sergeant frank wuterich pleaded guilty to one count of negligent dereliction of duty in exchange for all other charges being dropped. he was demoted to private, but will serve no time in prison. >> a man was murdered overnight on chicago's south side. >> the violence interrupters have one goal in mind-- to save a life. most of the violence interrupters come from the hierarchy in some of these gangs. >> my best friend got killed. i could get shot tomorrow. >> how can you help me... right now? >> this is unacceptable for me to be holding this young man's obituary. stop. >> we're just trying to stop the violence.

that's it and that's all. >> frontline is made possible by contributions to your pbs station from viewers like you. thank you. and by the corporation for public broadcasting. major funding is provided by the john d. and catherine t. macarthur foundation, committed to building a more just, verdant and peaceful world. and by reva and david logan, committed to investigative journalism as the guardian of the public interest. additional funding is provided by the park foundation, dedicated to heightening public awareness of critical issues. captioned by media access group at wgbh access.wgbh.org >> for more on tonight's program, including the

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