when you look at the last decade and a half or so in... against al qaeda, al qaeda's strength does not... is not linear. we see it rise and then fall in part depending on u.s. effective against it. and other organizations and their ability to gain sanctuary. so we saw in the 1990s and through 2001 what you might call the first wave. embassy bombings in africa, targeting the u.s.s. "cole" in yemen and leading up to and peaking tapt september 11 attacks. >> rose: also this evening, steve coll, the reporter who has covered afghanistan extensively has a new book called "private empire: exxonmobil and american power." tonight part one of that conversation which is about afghanistan. >> the united states should also have learned that no policy that is based on a misunderstanding of the facts or wishful thinking is likely to succeed. and there are a whole series of assumptions built into this transition policy about the ability of the afghan national

arm about the degradation of the taliban and the ability of afghan political lead yooers to fashion a fair transition of power from karzai who-to-whoever comes after. all of these assumptions look quite shaky and you don't want to ask american men and women to make the ultimate sacrifice if you're not willing to confront the facts head on and think honestly about where they may lead you. >> rose: we conclude with kathy freston, a well-known vegan, her book is called "the lean, a revolutionary and simple plan for lasting weight loss." i want to enjoy my life, celebrate food and have things i grew up loving with my family, with my friends. so for me i think the best thing that has worked-- and i think it's translated to other people-- is that if we set our intention to move toward health

sand we lean into it and take steps in the direction of eating better what happens is that we start a momentum by these tiny little things because we can do things that are not difficult and those gradual, practical, easy steps start the pathway toward healthy eating. >> rose: seth jones, steve coll and kathy freston when we continue.

captioning sponsored by rose communications from our studios in new york city, this is charlie rose. >> rose: seth jones is here, he is a senior political scientists at the rand corporation.

he specialized in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency and afghanistan. his latest book details a history of al qaeda and where it stands today. it comes in the wake of the one-year anniversary of the raid that killed osama bin laden. it's called-- the book-- "hunting in the shadows: the pursuit of al qaeda since 9/11." i am pleased to have seth jones back at this table. welcome. >> thank you, charlie. >> rose: good to see you. why do you call it "hunting in the shadows"? >> well, i think argument as we look historically at what's been effective is not a large american presence with large numbers of boots on the ground. it's been a war that's happened in the shadows by clandestine units, special operation forces, law enforcement. so the for... we've been more effective when we've had limited presence that's clandestine, covert in nature than a large boots on the ground presence like we had in iraq. >> rose: does that mean that you would have argued for counterterrorism versus counterinsurgency if there was an either or about it or would you have argued something different at the time the

president was making decisions about an afghanistan policy and then a time the president rewas examining policy. >> no, i don't think smaller numbers of boots on the ground means counterterrorism as oppose to counterinsurgency. i think what we've seen starting with general stanley mcchrystal in 2009 and leading to petraeus in afghanistan was the use of special operations forced to train afghan national and local police forces, including tribal subtribe clan elements. it turns out you can do a lot of counterinsurgency with a smaller number of forces. >> i can't get my hands around the idea of how well the afghan troops are being trained and how much of the load they're prepared to take. certainly with the date of 2014 in mind. general allen here said it's coming along much better than we think. >> well, i think we've got to look at different kinds of units

the afghan special units, the commandos, afghan national army special forces are very well trained, very competent units. the ones working with our joint special operations command doing night raids now that the afghans have the lead are very competent forces. the national army forces vary. they're better than they were five years ago. we're still having problems with national police forces on the ground which are sometimes corrupt which don't often get out of district centers and that's led to an increasing use of local community watch, what's called afghan local police in these areas. some of them good. so the answer depends on which kinds of forces we're talking about. >> what's the presence in afghanistan today? >> it appears to be relatively small. most al qaeda sits across the border in pakistan but the areas we've got to watch very closely

where they've pushed in some presence in kunar provinces. an area that they have a historical relationship with the pashtun and other tribes. we've also seen an indication of al qaeda trying to push some foreign fighters in the east in places like khost co-lee lowe kated with the haqqani network. so i would say al qaeda is looking carefully at the u.s. downsizing withdrawal. >> rose: prepared to do what? >> well, is preparing to establish a sanctuary possibly like they had in the 1990s. >> rose: if mullah omar was back in power would he welcome al qaeda back or would he likely to say we've moved on beyond that? >> well, what the recently declassified bin laden documents those that have been released, are starting to indicate is a relationship between senior al qaeda leaders, including al-zawahiri who's al qaeda number one, and mullah omar, a

relationship often through an individual in the senior taliban leadership so we know that they kept up a fairly regular communication. what it appears to be the case is that the taliban has some concerns about a public senior al qaeda presence in afghanistan. certainly okay within w an al qaeda presence. certainly case with other afghan insurgents groups like the haqqanis, al qaeda has a better presence. i would suspect that the taliban would be okay with an al qaeda presence in their territory. they would probably be careful about making too public of a deal about that. >> rose: what do you think the outlook is for afghanistan? >> a lot depends on what the united states does and a lot depends on what afghanistan's neighbor-- primarily pakistan, does. if the u.s. moves quickly in trying to get out of afghanistan while pakistan government continues to provide large numbers of support and amounts of support to the taliban and

other groups i think we're in for a long ride in this country as the taliban gains control of territory. >> rose: you don't expect the pakistanis to change, do you? >> no, what we've seen is their support the afghan insurgents is likely increased. they see a departure of the u.s. as a way too maximize... >> rose: it's a hedge for the future? >> against what they believe is an indian afghan access in afghanistan. >> rose: so their fear is what happens... what india might do so therefore they want to have a better relationship, who they expect to be perhaps the winners? >> you have to look from pakistan's perspective it has india on one border with whom it's fault several wars and it has a country, afghanistan, whose president, hamid karzai, has a close strategic relationship with the indians. so that puts pakistan strategically in circles so ideally what pakistan is pushing for is what they had in the

1990s which is a regime in kabul that support pakistan, supports islamabad. so a friend. >> let's look at back to the book and towards where we are today. you talk about waves of al qaeda. give me the four waves that you see. >> well what's interesting is when you look at the last decade and a half or so in... against al qaeda, al qaeda's strength does not... is not linear. we see it rise and fall in part depending on u.s. effectiveness against it and in other organizations and their ability to gain a sanctuary. so we saw in president 1990s and through 2001 what you might call the first wave-- embassy bombings in africa, targeting the u.s.s. "cole" in yemen and then leading up to and peaking at the september 11 attacks. that was then followed by... al qaeda lost its sanctuary in afghanistan. several senior leaders were captured over the next two to

three years so it was severely decreased in strength and one of the interesting things, i looked at the now declassified al qaeda documents. a senior al qaeda leader who is believed to be based in iran right now argues by 2003 al qaeda was severely weakened and desperate. >> rose: by 2003. could we have or anybody at that moment delivered what might be considered an effective end to al qaeda? >> well, it's possible at that point if both bin laden and possibly ayman al-zawahiri were targeted it would have lost its sanctuary in afghanistan but also al qaeda was facing something it's not facing right now and that's a tight u.s./pakistani relationship. that does not exist now but that existed at that time. the joint raid to capture khalid sheikh mohammed was an effective joint pakistan/u.s. operation long since gone. >> rose: and did it happen

because of... what caused it to fall apart. >> well, there were a range of things. as the war in afghanistan became more serious and more severe the u.s. began to see growing signs of pakistan support to insurgent groups. afghan insurgent groups. that certainly contributed to it. the drone strikes that the u.s. started conducting in pakistani territory began to work against the pakistan government. >> rose: because there was civilian casualties or... >> well, actually, it appeared to be less civilian casualties and more that it was the u.s. doing them and not the pakistan... >> rose: on their territory. >> on their territory. >> rose: in terms of sovereignty issue as well. >> sovereignty issue i think was a major one. >> rose: and what did the mission to kill osama bin laden do to the relationship? >> the relationship... well, initially it severely undermined it because it showed several things. one is it showed the... from the pakistan standpoint it showed

how it will it will u.s. actually trusted pakistan. from the pakistan... from the american standpoint it also showed in a sense how the u.s. could not trust pakistan that he was so deep in pakistan territory. >> rose: so back to 2004 to 2008. what happened to al qaeda during that period? >> that's a great question. this is what we call the second wave. and the second wave really begin around the time of the u.s. invasion of iraq. what al qaeda is able to do that did not have is establish a foothold after the invasion led by in december, about 2004 al qaeda really gets an affiliate. >> rose: right. >> abu musab al-zarqawi pledges allegiance to bin laden and we see a major increase in attacks by al qaeda in iraq and then we see in 2004 we see the madrid attacks done to get the spanish government to pull its forces out of not just anywhere but out of iraq. then we see in 2005 mohammed

siddiqui kahn in a range of four individual pakistani british conduct the attacks on london. so we're getting a surge in activity and a lot of the radicalization happens because of the war in iraq. all the senior f.b.i. officials i talked to said they begin to see a massive increase in radicalization in the u.s. because of the iraq war. well, by 2005 and 2006 al qaeda in iraq overplays its hand and we see an interesting trend. was what it does is starts conducting a number of civilian casualties, not just embassies and that undermines its support so the u.s. marines, the army, the central intelligence agency and special operations support iraqis as they turn against al qaeda in iraq in anbar province and others. so that contributes to the... the end of the second wave,

these kinds of clandestine efforts. and we saw them a range of other... >> rose: and that's when the surge came in... >> the surge is after that. so the anbar awakening happens in 2006. >> and it was afghan beginning to take place and the members were former sunnis, turning against al qaeda. >> sunnis were turning. not just shi'a but sunnis were turning against al qaeda well before the surge. >> rose: the awakening was mostly sunni, was it not? >> yes but there were shi'a elements over time that certainly supported the effort. >> rose: so what's the next wave? >> the next wave begins around 2008 and into 2009. so al qaeda had been weakened across iraq to some degree if pakistan after the capture of al-libi and the head of external operations for al qaeda was killed in a drone strike. then you get an interesting

development. if the first wave is tied to afghanistan, the second one iraq, the third one is tied very closely to anwar al-awlaki and the seizing of territory in yemen. and it's interesting, because it's a wave that is not just tied directly to a spot in yemen but is also tied to an effective use of the internet and social media by al qaeda to recruit individuals elsewhere. >> rose: al-awlaki was very good at that. >> al-awlaki was an amazing terrorist in the sense that he was good at pushing out propaganda and information on youtube, on myspace, on facebook and on internet jihadi sites but as we know and as i document in the book he was also operationally involved and tactically involved as he was with the christmas bomber. telling him when he left yemen actually helping on the training end. when he left yemen telling him where he had to go, telling him

to wait until he got over american soil to detonate the bomb. but he provided a range of tactical and operational advice to umar farouk abdulmutallab before his attempted detonation. and that made him extremely dangerous. he didn't just talk a game, he acted it. >> rose: so put... play as well though when president obama comes to power. he instruct it is c.i.a. director, then leon panetta, "my number one priority is to get osama bin laden and do grievous damage to al qaeda." did that have an impact on al qaeda? >> it had an impact in particular on core al qaeda in pakistan. and it wasn't just the targeting of osama bin laden. it was a targeting of a range of senior leaders. the key general managers. first almasry was killed, then his successor was killed. the head of external operations was killed with a drone strike. and they will ilyas kashmiri. so a range of senior individuals

that were at very high levels of the organization in addition to the bin laden killing what they did is they made it very difficult for al qaeda and pakistan, at least for the time being to operate because they were so paranoid about surviving. >> and would you say beyond osama bin laden now dead al-zawahiri is still alive that they got 70% of the top al qaeda leadership? >> they've probably got over 50%. >> rose: over 50? that's a significant number when you take away 50% of the leaders of a terrorist organization. >> except if you can replace them effectively. >> rose: that's easy for them to do? >> it's not easy for them to do. it does take time. the other component of this is what we've seen al qaeda do and we've seen al-zawahiri do now, the number one in al qaeda, is adopt a mergers and acquisitions strategy. in a sense, making pakistan less important than it once was, encouraging franchises on multiple continents. >> rose: and where are these franchises located? certainly one is in yemen. >> there are four major ones.

and these are... their leaders have sworn allegiance, loyalty to al-zawahiri. one is in yemen. the second is iraq. a third is in somalia, that's al-shabab and that was the most recent one. then the final one is in north africa, what we call al qaeda in the islamic maghreb. >> rose: so where are we today? >> well, it depends on what indicators we look at. the core in pakistan has been weakened temporarily. if you look at other indicators they present a big more of a concerns picture. if you look at the number of affiliated groups, we've now increased them. al-shabab joined in 2012. the number of attacks in some areas has increased and we've seen this in even iraq. the u.s. has pulled out its hill tear forces from iraq, the levels of violence have gone up by al qaeda in iraq and now we've seen them in some countries like yemen al qaeda in

the arabian peninsula has expanded its territory around the gulf of aiden. so some al qaeda is bigger. it's involved in more violent activity and expanded its control in some countries. that's not good. >> rose: if you had to guess where al-zawahiri is today, where would you guess? >> pakistan. >> rose: certainly pakistan. but in an urban environment or in the north? >> i would say based on the drone strikes against senior al qaeda leaders today he's probably out of range of drones. so... which would force the u.s. to do something along the lines of what they did against bin laden is put american forces into helicopters and push them deeper into pakistani territory. that's a much more... >> rose: and going back and forth and getting access and confirmation. >> that's right. we've seen al qaeda interested in getting out of the tribal

areas if at all possible. >> rose: how good have they been-- obviously not good enough in osama bin laden's case-- in terms of being able to shut down on cell phone usage, to be able to do things that will, in a sense, make them more immune to attack? >> rose: well in one of the last chapters i talked briefly about a note from al-zawahiri to bin laden not long before the... bin laden's fay almay attack where same al-zawahiri is saying "we have to have better security procedures, the drone strikes are killing us." so i would say what we've seen... it's almost a darwinist approach. those al qaeda operatives who have not been effective in getting rid of cell phones, minimizing communications and then actually going out into public areas like marketplaces, they're killed. those that are much more careful about how long they say in a

location, going out in public and picking up a phone, like al-zawahiri, like his deputy now abu ya ya al-libi. and don't forget we have many who have survived. >> rose: what should we be doing that we're not doing? >> well, a couple things i would say. we're in a difficult period right now. the u.s. has said it's now going to focus on the asia-pacific so the department of defense guidance signed by the president pushed out in january 2012 says "we're going to move to asia-pacific. " i would say we have got to be very careful if what that means is it makes us more vulnerable in north africa, the middle east. >> rose: this is reflected both in terms of pentagon policy as well as state department policy? >> right. so afghanistan is a great case. marines have been pulled out of afghanistan-- or at least the numbers have decreased-- and where they v they shown up now? australia.

it's a reflection of a rising... response to a rising china. i think we've got to be really careful here that we keep focused on where the threats to the homeland are coming from. >> rose: and they're still coming from... well, the reason for the shift to china had everything to do with relationships with people who are neighbors in china as much as sending a support to them as much as it did to fearing i assume some direct chinese military threat? >> that's true. still if that is where the... what is called in department of defense lingo "rebalancing" if it means shifting too many resources away from... take nigeria. we've now seen the rise in capabilities of boca haar ram with the osama bin laden documents we now know that bin laden was in touch with the boca haaram leaderships as early as 2009. so this is a concerning

development. in somalia we have americans from communities like minneapolis and phoenix regularly coming to fight in somalia. >> rose: when you look at techniques and what we have learned, first osama bin laden. what did we learn? was there a treasure trove of information, actionable information, that came out of that taking... having access to those computer drives? >> as with any capture or killing of an individual, if you can get a ahold of their computer day e-mail exchanges, letters, cell phones-- and i've done this when i was in special operations-- you can getting access to actionable information. geographic locations, cell phone numbers can be tracked and monitored and e-mail addresses. >> rose: did you see jose rodriguez on "60 minutes" on sunday? >> i did. yes. >> rose: give me your assessment of what he is saying.

the argument he makes. >> well, i mean, part of the issue historically there's been a bit of a divide, i would call it, between the central intelligence agency and the federal bureau of investigation on interro>> rose: of course ths there has. so where do you... what's your judgment about... >> i've seen my share of interrogations. i've never done it myself, i've just not been in that business thankfully because that's a tough one. i would say with the bulk of individuals i've looked at over the last ten years plus most of them we probably don't need enhanced interrogation techniques. almost every major person conducting attacks or trying to conduct attacks against the u.s. faisal shahzad, as is as is as is, you did not need... zazi zazi zazi you didn't need to break them down this way. the question comes for the small number of individuals who can't be broken down through an effective interrogator like ali soufan, for example, is

something like waterboarding effective. maybe. what we don't know is if something else was tried in some of these cases. >> rose: ali soufan's argument is they took it away from him. the c.i.a. came in and said "we're going to take over this." his argument is they were doing well and getting information. the c.i.a.'s argument-- through the person of jose rodriguez-- is no, they weren't. they had stopped getting information and that's why we changed tactics. >> sure. well, i wasn't there... >> rose: but you know the players. >> i know the players. my view again is in the vast majority of cases enhanced interrogation techniques are probably not necessary. >> rose: but in those cases like khalid sheikh mohammed your judgment is what? >> if we can get actionable information about specific plots that will kill large numbers of individuals i think there's a strong argument for taking a look... >> rose: to used enhanced techniques? waterboarding or whatever it might be? >> sure.

>> rose: is that an ongoing debate between the c.i.a. and f.b.i. still? >> sure and i think it will be for some period of time. >> so when you look today at the obama administration's policy against terrorism, how do you assess it? how do you grade it? >> i would say certainly effective in weakening the core al qaeda today in in pakistan. probably less effective when it comes to-- at least as of today-- weakening the nodes in iraq because the u.s. has pulled its forces out so it has much less influence. so far in yemen... and, actually, what we see with the arab spring is that it has weakened a number of regimes and i think response in trying to support, say, the egyptians, now malley, libya, filling a vacuum al qaeda is trying to get into. the response has been slow in some cases. >> rose: so you're arguing because of the arab spring it turned upside down one country after another in terms of its future, often for very good

reasons, but other players are moveing in and they put at risk the nature of a new government in all of those places. >> that is correct. if you look at libya, for example,, libya is essentially a group of militia forces controlling part of the country. >> rose: and what about egypt? >> egypt an interesting case. there's a growing salafist movement. the head of al qaeda now is egyptian himself. >> rose: al-zawahiri is egyptian. >> al-zawahiri is egyptian. a senior al qaeda official in iran also egyptian. and the brother of al-zawahiri was released not long ago from egyptian prison. so egypt, i would say, a very serious potential concern where al qaeda is definitely trying to get... >> rose: if something happened that would be the most egregious threat to national security? >> that would be a very serious threat. >> rose: okay. when you look at iran, what do we know about iran's involvement with al qaeda? >> the iran/al qaeda relationship has been a very complicated one.

after al qaeda lost its sanctuary in afghanistan the bulk of the senior leaders went to pakistan. but a number of them called the management council they were viewed as in case the leadership was decimated in pakistan they would have enough senior leaders in iran that they could continue to fux as an organization. so bin laden encouraged several management council members to go to iran. they were initially welcomed by the iranian quds force, the revolutionary guards. the iranians became increasingly concerned, they were arranging negotiations, which i mentioned, between the c.i.a. and the iranian government trying to get them out. iranians refused and iran then gave the bulk of caring and oversea seeing for al qaeda to iranian intelligence. over the next several years we see a relationship that becomes complicated. al qaeda wants its senior leaders released. iran won't release them and then if you fast forward to today

another interesting case because we have at least five major al qaeda leaders in iran today under various forms of house arrest. we've also seen a range of senior government officials openly arguing that al qaeda in iraq has facilitate it had flow of money and fighters from the broader arab world into pakistan. so it is still a concern that we have an al qaeda today in in iran. >> the guy that is highest ranking that i remember,ened you will help me with the name, what is his name. >> saif alodal, a former head of egyptian military and head of al qaeda's security committee on september 11. >> rose: and supposedly under house arrest. >> supposedly under house arrest. loose house arrest, i'd say, because call indications i have seen he is still able to communicate, move around freely

in iran and was involved several years ago in a major attack in riyadh against the saudis. >> rose: so if you put on... look at all of this, what worries you the most today? >> i think what worries me is the toppling of several regimes in al qaeda gaining sanctuary in countries and some of them are very complicated, like syria. syria's got a case where the u.s. has a vested interest, i think, in encouraging democratization. >> among other reasons because syria is such an ally of iran. >> that's exactly right. at the same time, though, you've got a fractious insurgency in syria. and al qaeda in iraq has pushed a number of fighters into syria to target the assad regime. so you have to be very careful... >> rose: the iranian's are supporting assad. >> the iranians are supporting assad. now we have al qaeda in iraq targeting the assad regime.

so we're not too careful on this. you end up supporting a range of jihadists, including al qaeda against the assad regime. >> my last question, i've never known the answer to the question is why we did not get osama bin laden in tora bora. >> in my view-- and i've talked to a range of individuals involved including c.i.a. on the ground-- is that the u.s. military at that point refused to send in a sufficient number of forces to conduct blocking positions in key areas. >> rose: this is all the way up to general franks? >> that's correct, tommy franks. so what it forced those units on the ground to do-- because it didn't have sufficient numbers of american military forces to block, is... >> rose: so why did they do that? why did the u.s. military make that decision? >> i don't know. i was not there at the time. u.s. was involved in a range of operations against al qaeda. i don't know if franks was so

busy doing so many other things and wasn't convinced bin laden was there because even in may of 2011 it was not 100% certain bin laden was there at the time. so some people on the national security council staff... >> rose: the argument you made is the one i've heard most often, that the military didn't block when they could have. >> so they had to reach out to local tribal militia. >> rose: and we know what happened. this book is called "hunting in the shadows." thank you. pleasure. we continue with steve coll. this is part of two of a conversation with him. he has written a new book called "private empire: exxonmobil and american power" about exxonmobil. his previous book was "ghost wars" which was about afghanistan and is also the subject of his next book. this is a conversation about afghanistan with steve coll. what do you make of what the president said in afghanistan on tuesday night? >> the stroo strategic agreement

is important in for instance pl. it doesn't have flesh on it but they've been working on it for a long time so i understand why they wanted to flag it, to signal to afghans, to pakistan, to the neighborhood we mean it, we're not going home in the way you might think. i guess what i worry about is that it almost feels like the war has been dividing into two tracks. there's a track of public declarations and confidence building speeches and conferences like the one... the nato conference coming up in chicago and then there's the facts on the ground which really are not as encouraging. >> rose: see, that's what i can't get my hands around. people like you and dexter filkins and lots of other people who were there, who are good reporters who know what they see and their eyes don't lie and their interviews don't lie yet you say there's corruption, the military isn't prepared to do what the u.s. seems to believe they can and yet general allen comes to this table and the

president stands up in afghanistan and says they're going to be ready to do the job and to bring the taliban from taking over. >> well, we choose our generals to have confidence because they have to lead our sons and daughters into battle and there's no money in showing weak nns that part of the world so even if you have doubts you might as well suppress them if you're the president of the united states and go out and speak boldly. but the united states should also have learned that no policy that is based on a misunderstanding of the facts or wishful thinking is likely to succeed and there are a whole series of assumptions, built into this transition policy about the ability of the afghan national army, about the degradation of the taliban and the ability of afghan political leaders to fashion a fair transition of power from karzai to whoever comes after. all these assumptions look quite shaky. you don't want to ask american

men and women to make the ultimate sacrifice if you're not willing to confront the facts head on and to think honestly about where they lead you. this isn't an easy policy and i don't have easy answers about alternatives. but what bothers me most is this kind of creeping sense that somehow the american system once again is unable to digest uncomfortable truths about a far away war. we don't want to go through that again. >> rose: does that mean when barack obama came president the if that he had made a decision then in that he just made the which there'd be an accelerated withdrawal-- assuming he could have-- and americans were out there in a rather rapid form way that the end result for afghanistan would still be the same as it is today? >> you know, it's impossible to know. >> rose: but that is a question. >> it is a question. at that time he didn't just

decide to hold the course. he decided to go in and the understanding was and the facts on the ground supported this, the taliban had momentum they hadn't had in years. they were menacing pakistan in ways that pakistan had known... >> rose: at that time? >> in 2008/2009 and even the bush administration enn handing off this policy to the obama administration in effect said "you better doing something about this. we've been busy with iraq. we buy into your campaign narrative. now the time for you to turn to afghanistan and roll back the taliban." so that wasn't just president obama, that was all of the uniform leadership of central command, general petraeus and many policymakers... >> so you're saying nobody stood up to say the military is wrong on this. >> rose: well, joe biden did apparently. i want to dig into that history. he was skeptical... >> rose: this is the argument he made that what we need to do is

go after al qaeda and use counterterrorism rather than counterinsurgency. >> rose: >> i think richard holbrooke with his vietnam experience raised the question, challenged the confident advice that the new president was getting. >> what did they want him top do? just simply to withdraw any kind of massive counterinsurgency? and begin a process of withdrawal and use whatever we knew about the possibility of drone missiles and whatever kind of limited risk force that we had. >> well the alternative wasn't fleshed out because the idea that you could sustain a counterterrorism in an environment where the taliban were kind of washing up into the major cities, that didn't convince. >> rose: is the risk today of the taliban less than it was at that time? >> no. i don't think so. if you're asking me is the risk less today that the taliban will

control major cities in afghanistan in 2017 than it was at that time? i'm not persuaded. it kept the taliban out of control of major cities and creeping control of certain areas. i think any honest analysis of the evidence would bring you that conclusion. >> rose: the problem with that is you don't know what decisive victory means and you don't even know what they considered victory. >> right. >> rose: their argument for victory at the time was simply to stop the taliban from taking over. >> correct. >> rose: it was not to destroy the taliban. >> correct. it was to create conditions in which al qaeda could be destroyed-- which they have achieved, in fairness-- and it was to prevent the taliban from returning to power and thereby creating a second era of sanctuary for al qaeda or al qaeda-like groups based in pakistan. that goal isn't yet secured. it will only be secured if the

president's policy of handing off the afghan states such as it is-- corrupt as it is, limited to major population centers in cities, handing it off to an afghan state that can then hold it on its own without american combat troops in the lead. that still is an uncertain proposition. >> rose: and a very, very iffy proposition. >> iffy proposition. >> rose: do you agree? >> i do. >> rose: back in a moment. stay with us. >> rose: kathy freston is here, her recent book "quantum wellness" and "veganist" have focused on conscious living. her newest book shows how life-style changes can lead to significant results. it's called "the lean." a revolutionary and simple 30-day plan for healthy lasting weight loss. i'm pleased to have her back at this table. welcome. >> thank you, charlie. >> rose: here's what you say, i want to read this to you. you basically say "i love the word "lean."

why do you love the word lean? >> it's all about ease. it's all about gradually moving towards something. it's not strict discipline. there's no hard, fast rules. you're not white knuckling your way through something because i think so many of the diets that have been popular for decades have been about cutting out things. >> rose: carbohydrates. >> yeah, so it's all about strict discipline. that has never worked for me. i want to enjoy my life and celebrate food and have things i grew up loving with my family and friends. so for me i think the best thing that has worked-- and i think it's translated to other people-- is that if we set our intentions to move toward health and we lean into it, we take little steps in the direction of eating better we start a momentum by these tiny little things because we can do things

that are not difficult and those gradual practical easy steps start the pathway toward healthy eating. >> rose: and if you don't do that so many people get on a diet and it's the yo-yo effect. you get on the diet, lose the weight and put it on. i never understood how they get back to being off the diet. is it... it starts with a little moment and then you take another moment and then... it's like working out. you stip a day and another day then there's more days you're skipping than exercising. >> and you're miserable. on so many of these diets if you're eating a skinless breast of chicken and boiled broccoli, that's just not going to make you happy. again you're just white knuckling your way through it. and the body doesn't want that kind of a diet because it's really hard on you. those high-protein low-carb diets that are focusing on animal protein, anything that swims, flies, crawls, or walks that's hard on your body. your body goes into something

called ketosis and it's basically like you're going into starvation mode and your muscles... your body starts eating up your muscless. that's not good after an extended period of time it does a lot of damage to your kid kidneys and invites heart disease. meat obviously, even chicken and fish have saturated fat in them so the bodies... i think we have to give our bodies credit that we don't stick with it. we're rebelled against a diet that isn't good for us. >> rose: let's talk about things you talk about. crowding out is important. what is crowding snout >> crowding out, not cutting out. so instead of saying none of this, none of that. what i do in "the lean" ised i add things in. for instance i say everyday drink eight glasses of water eight times a day. super easy. it's called pre-loading. so in a study published in the journal "obesity," it showed that participants in a 12-week study who drank two cups of water before every main meal

lost five pounds of fat more than people who didn't drink water before the meal and that's an easy thing you can do because you're just crowding out room in your stomach. you're filling your belly, you're hydrating your metabolism and every system in your bod ski to that's important. eaten a a a day, for instance. that's one of the steps along the lean plan. when a al day is about 25% of your fiber. >> rose: so good things crowd out bad things. >> yeah. >> rose: so you want people to get into a natural rhythm. of feeding the body the kinds of things it thrives on. what does the body thrive on? >> the body thrives on anything that grows on trees or in the ground, full of phytonutrients so whole grains like brown rice keen qa, steel cut oats, beans like black beans, legumes, chick peas, lentils.

anything. those things have phi to nutrients, things that we don't even know about that are affecting our jeans they're full of fiber. this is one of the keys to the lean plan. fiber is the one dietary component that's been consistently shown to help people lose weight and keep the weight off. >> rose: and it's also good for digestion. >> absolutely. it lowers cholesterol and your blood pressure. it fills your stomach so that you're not... you're not hungry, first of all. it tells your brain that you're satiated. you've got something in your stomach. and also it helps the food digest more slowly and evenly so your blood glucose level, your blood sugar stays stable throughout the day. so that way you're not going into the hunger cravings. hormones aren't alerted to eat

more. >> what do you make of the attention sugar is getting either in books or studies made by reputable organization. >> >> it's all about blood sugar. you want to stay steady throughout the day. so if you're eating things with white sugar or high fructose corn sweetener, you blood sugar is racing up and so you're feeling good for a minute, you know? and then you just come crashing down. from the insulin response. and so when you come crashing down you're hungry again and you're ravenous and you want something that's going to build the sugar back up so you go for something that is going to shoot your sugar up again. so it's an endless roller coaster of cravings. >> and the sugar from fruits is different than sugar... >> absolutely. most of that is because of the fiber. so you have fiber helping to slow down the digestion, slow down the release of glucose and

there's also great sugar substitutes like stevia and agav vi. it doesn't affect your blood sugar at all so you can sweeten your coffee or tea or sodas or whatever without the blast of sugar. >> what are you going to have for dinner? >> i'm going to go to a japanese restaurant so i'll start with edamame, soybeans. i'm eel have some sackky and tofu, some sliced tofu, some vegetables. and probably finish it off with a big plate of fruit. >> rose: that's it for you? >> uh-huh. but i eat a lot, charlie. i eat a lot. rice. i'll have a big bowl of rice. >> rose: rice is stock? >> rice is fne. >> rose: but most... no sushi? >> no, no. >> rose: why is that bad? >> well, fish is still... has fat in it and saturated fat. granted it's lower than chicken and steak. one skinless breast of chicken, which is darn low in fat, still

has 20% of its calories in fat. which is better than stake >> i thought oily fish was good for you. >> rose: >> i'd rather get mine from flaxseeds or walnuts or soy. >> rose: this is called a revolutionary and simple 30 day plan. we'll talk about the 30 days in a moment. suppose someone says "i'm going try" and you make the case. what will be the result? >> oh, well, you can lose about one to three pounds per week. that may not sound like a lot but it's like a lot. >> rose: the first week you'll lose one to three pounds? >> absolutely. i've had people lose more than that. there are stories of people in the book who have lost 200 pounds. that's a slow steady weight loss your didi jegs will clear out. you veal a flat stomach without the gurgling. your skin will be clearer. we're going to move away from

animal protein and we'll start eating more fiber-filled foods. no animal foods have fiber. only plant foods have fiber. >> what's the difference in this book and the previous book you wrote about being a vegan? >> this is about weight loss specifically. >> rose: i know but the way to achieve weight loss is eating the way you eat in large extent. >> but it's also adding in things. like the eight glasses of water a day. the two tablespoons of flaxseeds. >> rose: i'm going to run through this quick. day one, drink water, lots of water. if you want to comment, say so. day two, have a hearty breakfast. what is that? >> rose: a big bowl of oatmeal... >> rose: oatmeal's okay? >> fantastic. because you're starting up your metabolism. if you don't eat breakfast your body doesn't know when it will get the next calories so it will hold on to the calories and slow down your metabolism by 40%. >> rose: day three eaten a apple. day four clean out the cupboards and just for today say no to your poison. >> we all have our poison. >> rose: what was yours? >> my poison is chips.

so i just don't even have the chips in there. because i'm... i just love chips. i have nuts instead. >> rose: trade your milk and butter for plant-based versions. i don't know what that means. >> that means instead of having milk from a dairy cow have it from almond milk, soy milk, hemp milk, things like that. can i just tell you, charlie? think about this. a little baby calf, right? is supposed to get her mother's milk. it's designed by nature to make that little calf grow a thousand pounds really quickly. we're not meant to grow a thousand pounds... we don't want to become fat, docile and slow. >> rose: do a deep diet for five. what does that mean? >> >> that means take a minute, five minutes everyday and just think about, okay, what's going on? how am i feeling? get in touch with what ice going on? because when you're not in touch with what you're feeling you our stuffing yourself to numb out. just like people do with alcohol. we want to numb out from whatever we're feeling. >> rose: switch up your drinks.

switch up your drinks. >> yeah, instead of drinking sodas because it's loaded with sugar or chemical sweetener and salt. >> rose: like diet soda isn't good. >> it's got chemicals that have been carcinogen i can. so have sparkling water. >> rose: carcinogenic? >> carcinogenic, certain chemicals. put a little stevia in there, fruit concentrate, so you'll have a natural soda. >> rose: day ten, mike your lunch without animal products. mike your lunch without animal products. >> yeah. >> rose: what's the biggest poison of animal products? >> i'll tell you. it's the most concentrated source of fat and calories period, end of conversation. >> rose: which is? >> we are designed as human beings to seek out the most concentrated source because back in the day when we were forging we didn't know when we'd get our next calorie. so the brain rewards us when we eat meat because it's like fat and calories that's good. eat more of that. now we're not foragers, we have

plenty of opportunity. >> rose: so no animal product for lunch, boys and girls. take your vitamins? >> vitamins. >> dave: have your vitamins. >> just a multivitamin. >> rose: what do you take everyday? >> a multivitamin. >> rose: that's it? >> i take a multivitamin because you want to get yourself covered. >> rose: back away from sugar day 24. start seeing your weight loss as real. >> yeah, start really seeing this. i mean, visualize yourself for a minute or two as this actually could happen. it's going to happen. >> rose: juice it. that's day 25. a lot of juices. sfl is that what it is? isn't there sugar in these juices? >> only in a fruit juice. you want to stay away from fruit juice because that too much... >> rose: fruit juice is like... >> orange juice. >> rose: even though you... freshly squeezed orange juice isn't good for you? >> think about all the oranges that go in there. you're not getting the fine cher slows down the release of blood sugar. >> rose: what juices are okay? >> i make a juice with carrots, kale...

>> rose: oh, boy. >> celery. sometimes what i do if i don't have time to make a juice i'll put coconut water in a blender and throw in one or two... >> rose: you like this or do it because it's good for you. >> i feel so good. >> rose: all right. that's the secret. you have to make sure that this is going to make you feel good. >> that's the honest truth. >> rose: even though it might not taste good. >> it begins to taste good. your taste does change. >> rose: eat lower on the glycemic index. of course. cut the oil. what's wrong with oil? i thought oil was good. >> oil is... it damage it is endotheil y'all cells in the lining of your arteries. so that's bad if you have hard disease and it puts on a lot of weight. it's very concentrated fat and calories because you're not eating the ol lives or seeds, you're... and you're not getting that fiber you our ear just getting one t oil. i'm not one of those crazy no oil people. i want to enjoy myself. i love olive oil on bread. but i'm just saying lean away from it. just be aware of it. so you just want to move away.

>> rose: or not too much. is that your message? >> exactly. >> rose: do something purposeful. >> because when you're doing something purposeful you're not all about the food. you're not about obsessing about the food when can i have it because you're living for something that's bigger than the cupcake. >> i never liked cupcakes. you'll see people even n washington standing in line. they've been there for two hours. >> it's like a cake you can hold in your hand. >> rose: i don't eat desserts auchb. >> that's good. >> i eat three meals a day, don't eat dessert, don't eat between meals at all. but eat fish. eat a lot of chicken and fish primarily. but occasionally have steak. >> there's problems with fish. a lot of mercury and a lot of the fish. >> rose: i know you believe that. >> (laughs) it's true! >> rose: there are healthy people in japan. make progress and don't worry about perfection. as voltaire said, per sfex the

enemy of good. >> just lean into it. >> rose: kathy freston is determined, obsessed to make you healthy and give you a long life and look as good as she does. this book is called "the lean." thank you,. >> thank you, charlie. thank you so much. >> rose: see you next time. captioning sponsored by rose communications captioned by media access group at wgbh access.wgbh.org

>> "body electric" is brought to you by new phase. to relieve the miseries of menopause naturally, new phase.