the stories are becoming more dynamic, they change every day. in some cases by the hour. and that i will jump into the text. let's start with china. a week ago president obama some time with the president of china. early on in his new tenure as president of the people's republic of china. your thoughts a few days after that summit about what was accomplished. sort of way we are not going to know what is accomplished for a couple of years. you had these two leaders, one just taking office and the other beginning a second term. essentially investing in their relationship, running down something of foundation. they will continue these one on ones and put in may -- motion various meetings for their staffs on some of the big

issues. how to regulate cyberspace. we are dealing with various or global issues. accomplished with deliverables. they began a serious conversation about what the united states and china would do to manage various global and international challenges. >> i note and you know this as well that a week or so ago henry kissinger turned 90, there was a big celebration for his 90th birthday in new york city. anyone who is anybody showed up for this celebration. >> it is good i was there or i would feel very badly. tavis: whether one likes or loads henry kissinger and we could debate the bid -- the good in the bad, it does raise a question that i want to ask you about how this relationship since the era of kissinger as

secretary of state has changed. secretary ofy was state in seated beside president obama at the table. >> when you go back to the time of kissinger and nixon, this relationship was born out of a shared animosity toward the soviet union. that is the one thing that china and the united states had in common. that worked until the end of the cold war but then the u.s. and china had to invent a positive rationale for their working together and it became economic. that helped again for a decade or so. now we have got a very involved economic relationship. it does good for both sides but it causes more than a little friction. going forward, the real challenge is going to be what the countries can do to agree for dealing with regional problems, be it north korea, problems.he global

what to do about health issues or the spread of nuclear materials and that will ultimately be the test of this relationship and to the extent it works, the 21st century has a much better chance of working out. to the extent it does not work it is bad news for the future. tavis: will have you back on to see what did come out of this position between these presidents. let me move to syria. speaking of stories that are dynamic and changing with the tick of the clock. your sense of where we are headed. >>. is heading where it has been, prolonged internal conflict. fueled by the involvement of outside players. if you are going to have this conversation in a year i do not thinks. will be at peace. it is possible the government will still be there but it will not be in control of much of the country. the opposition will be fighting itself is much as it will be fighting the government. you

could have the country effectively split along several faultlines. this is going to be a prolonged internal but also regional struggle fought on syrian territory and it will find different ways of spelling over. i do not think any involved directly in syria militarily, i do not think our interests warrant it. i do not think we will have results that would justify what it would entail and what it would cost. i think there is a lot of other things we need to be worried about in the region, around the world, and at home. >> would you say the government mighstill be around a year from now, is this your way that -- of saying assad will be in power? be over an enclave of syrian territory. you could have him nominally there but it could be part of a rogue state. you could have the sunnis

controlling large swathes of territory. the idea of a nationstate might become more of a fiction. take exception with some of the tenets of your book but one cannot argue is that dr. king many years ago said that war is the enemy of the poor. he made the link, the way we engage around the world has a direct impact on how we treat or maltreat our citizens at home. i am raising dr. king in that context because i'm wondering why all these years later and king was not the first or only one to make that point but it has been made for decades and it seems to me that the bulk around washington do not get that link so here comes richard expert saying we have to make the link. why does that relationship not seem to sink in in the minds of those who run and make policy in

washington? >> it is a good question. people tend to see the two worlds as a part. those folks who focus on foreign. you have those folks who focus on domestic policy, be it economics or social policy. rarely do they come together. the cabinet come a for example, almost never meets and what it it is for ceremonial reasons as much as anything substantive. the idea that national security is a coin with two sides, foreign interested policy is an idea that never really happens in the real sense in washington because people do not see it that way. >> to your point, that we are overreaching abroad and underperforming at home. how are we overreaching abroad? >> the u.s. overreached badly first with iraqi and ultimately with the idea -- what we did in afghanistan, launching the war against iraq and trying to hold a very different iraqi.

in the case of direct and -- in gohanistan, we were right to in. we made a mistake and the obama years to remake afghanistan. we overreached in retrying -- in trying to remake the middle east in our image. the split between shia and sunni and so forth. we tried to do too much of the wrong thing. i would argue is not that we give up on foreign-policy but we do more in asia. that is where the great powers are and it is where the united states is -- has tools that can do a lot of good. i would rebalance our foreign-policy away from the middle east and stop trying to remake a part of the world coming back to what we were saying about syria that i think is in for a prolonged, difficult era and that will

resist the efforts of the u.s. to recast it in our image. tavis: before i come back to the master policy and underperforming at home, i am titillated by your phrase, to remake the world in our own image. i concur with that. i have seen too many examples where we do that. much to our own peril. what is it about us these years later even what we are up against at home and given how we see the world stage being reset that makes us think that we can remake the world or that we tould or that it is our duty remake the world in our own image? is that not the height of arrogance and hubris? >> there is some arrogance and idealism, funnily enough. american missionaries have been going around the world trying to spread not just the face but elements of american culture. in many cases after world war

ii, the united states had very ambitious and -- ideas in some cases because of the fight against communism about remaking other societies. sometimes it was or not geopolitical goals and some cases it was worn out of american optimism or the idea that it was somehow or -- our duty to spread certain ideas or an opportunity. for all these reasons, some benign, some less so, we have had this impulse to spread our version of democracy, our version of rocket capitalism. do not get me wrong. i tend to think that our version of democracy or most versions of democracy are is arable. i am a great believer in markets but the idea that we can impose these are spread this through american military presence i think is unfortunate and at times you are right. at times it is either arrogant or also at times it is -- betrays a lack of understanding of local realities. that we look at these places as obstructions and we say, we can change them, we have this great

set of ideas. we never get to the bottom of what makes these societies tick. what are they bringing, if you will, to their lives that might make it more difficult for us to try to push them in certain directions tavis. tavis: my sense is that part of the way we betray ourselves, we betray our values is when we overreach two years your term and foreign-policy by, getting in bed with thugs and rogues and dictators when it serves our best interest. that is a betrayal of our values. what say you about whether or not any part of the overreach as you see it globally can be dissected in terms of the way and how and with whom we have these relationships when it is in our best interests. there is a long list of those folks who we have turned on --

who their own people have turned on and we have seen the light one could argue what brought us to that point? >> it is two separate things going on here. one is what i call overreach. that is what i had in mind when i use the word. you are talking about something else which is important. the idea that at times we get close to individuals or regimes that have very little if anything to do with our values. we may do so for reasons of realpolitik. is that wise and on occasion you might it is -- say it is. we may not like it but we have to do it for the certain reasons. we may say this is simply wrong or we have the luxury of not having to do it. i think it is a conversation we have to constantly have which is how much is american foreign- policy informed or guided wire reasons of state and how much is it informed by values? more often than not what i argue, it needs to be informed

by reasons of state but when we -- whens that we are we are inconsistent with our values we pay a price. it can come back to bite us. >> you talk about these military engagements of choice versus engagements of the necessity. how are you -- are we doing on making the right decisions about choice versus necessity when we engage? >> i was against a war of choice that was direct and the war that became afghanistan. the administration is basically right in resisting what would be the war of choice in syria but i think could well turn out to be the most difficult challenge for this administration over the next couple of years is what to do about the iranian nuclear program. that would be a war of choice if we were to begin it. it does not mean it is wrong. it means that we had better be sure before we do at that that is the best available option on the table. >> you argu

you argue that having a us-led global gathering is not an india-led world, not a china- let world, but a world of chaos. i take the point when you -- i read your text but that sounds like a little bit of american exceptionalism so why don't you disabuse me of that notion. >> it could sound like exceptionalism. i am not talking about american in a lateral is him. unilateralism. when i look at other countries i do not see countries that have the capacity, that have the outlook to essentially devote a significant chunk of their resources to building

regional or global arrangements. the united states did this in quite a concerted fashion after world war ii. it has done it off and on ever since. if the u.s. is unwilling or unable to lead, i do not see anybody else stepping up but i would be open to it. if other countries were willing to step up and do their share to do do a stable, prosperous, peaceful world, i would say great. we should be happy to work with them but i do not think it is going to happen. tavis: let me shift to that underperforming at home that you spend a good amount of time in the text talking about as well. i want to ask the question this way. i do not think most americans would disagree that there are a we areof things on which underperforming and i am happy to have you share part of that list with the audience but as you sure that, make the link for me between how underperforming in these areas impacts our standing and our engagement in

foreign-policy. >> there is any number of things. the economy is growing at half or so. , allost-world war ii rate the problems with the lack of people who are working over the last six years, we still have not caught up to where we were in the number of americans employed. long-term unemployment is growing. income inequality is growing. we do not have a modern system. very few people line up at american consulates to come to american elementary and high schools. lots of things are wrong and my argument is severalfold. he cannot set an example that the other world wants to emulate so we lose the struggle of the competition of ideas. unless we get these things right, we are not going to have the resources to be a great power and lead the world.

if there is no alternative to a world led by the united states, than what matters is the ability of the united states to act in the world and to play a large role. this becomes an academic opposition. unless we put our economic and political house in order, we are not going to have that capacity. my argument is not that we overdo these things to make it a better society to the 300 million americans who live here. we have to put our house in order so we will influence the trajectory of the 21st century which will be good for the 7 billion people out there but also if the world is more stable and more prosperous, that is good for us. if good things happen out here, good things are much more likely to happen inside the united states. tavis: does that mean that the answer is to raise taxes? not thinklarge i do so. i would be in favor of certain

kinds of taxes like carbon taxes. i would be in favor of raising taxes on invested capital. i would lower corporate taxes on the provision they brought the money back here and built american factories where americans could be employed. >> do you think that by and -- evenst americans have on their radar foreign- policy concerns, whatever they might be? given the underperforming nature of what is happening in our nation right now? >> the short answer is no. it is not an easy thing for me to say. here i am, i am the president of the council on foreign relations. i would like to see a country that is more focused on what is going on in the world. i do not think americans see the connections between what goes on in the world and what it might mean for us or vice versa.

what goes on here and what it might mean for the rest of the world. circling back to where we began. if i am right and if national security is a coin with two sides, the foreign and mastic, obviously, it is organic. we have to take it into account. we do not teach it in our schools for the most part. when we grew up and had courses like social studies and civics, most of those have disappeared. even at your elite universities, you can get a bachelors degree and barely know the first thing about the world because you can select this or that course in your distribution requirements and never really study history or international politics. or economics. our media does not cover it. foreign bureaus have been shut down. americans are much less aware about the world, know less about the world. at a time when globalization is powerful.

the world will affect the lives of most americans more than ever before, for better and for worse but americans know less about this world if i am right than ever before. ones: this is something should never say to the president on the council on foreign relations and let me say it anyway. if i said that the folk in washington, from the white house to congress on down to making a mockery of national security, they are making a joke of security in the minds of fellow citizens and the argument would be this. every time we see some other nonsense, some other bit of nonsense, snooping and justifying and explaining and rationalizing what this government has done of late. whether you're looking at phone records he looked at. every time a story i cap breaks it makes it difficult for you and others to talk about national security.

americans want to be safe but this is a joke. if anything and everything can be done in the name of national security. >> we have to be careful about two things. one is what we do overseas. we are suffering from intervention fatigue. we did what i felt were the ill-advised wars in iraq and afghanistan. if something appropriate came along where the u.s. should use force, the president would have a hard time rallying the amir can people to that cause. you pay a price, if you will, for having done the wrong thing overseas and domestically, we have to be careful. i probably do not go as far as you but i would say if we expand the words national security to cover anything and everything, it will lose credibility at some point. the administration has to be disciplined, it has to be discerning and when it ups to shoot off a drone or when it carries out certain types of surveillance programs, if it is asking the american people to

give up some of their privacy, the administration has to be sure that the benefits or the gains on behalf of the collective security justify that. those are the kinds of cost- benefit calculations that they have to make themselves and second, they have to explain. tavis: the new book from richard .aass been the head of the council on foreign relations for 10 years. happy anniversary to you as well. >> thank you. great to be with you. fors: that is our show tonight. thanks for watching and as always, keep the faith. >> for more information on today's show, visit tavis smiley at pbs.org. tavis: hi, i'm tavis smiley. join me next time for a conversation with activist john getd about his efforts to

justice for 9/11 responders. that is next time. a will see you then.♪ it's beauty full day and i can't stop myself from smiling ♪ you won't hear this boy complaining ♪ ♪ it's a beautiful day ♪ >> and by contributions to your pbs station from viewers like you. thank you.

>> be more. pbs. tavis: hi, i'm tavis smiley. join me next time for a ♪onversation with

>> you're these wistful,

pathetic people bemoaning your lives which -- >> and also in the play. >> [laughter] >> so it's good casting. >> haskins: "theater talk" is made possible in part by... >> i had bad dreams last night. >> oh? >> i dreamt i was 52 and i wasn't married. >> were you dreaming in the documentary form? >> from new york city, this is "theater talk." i'm susan haskins. >> and i'm michael riedel of the new york post. >> so, michael, there's a wonderful new comedy on broadway -- >> by one of my favorite writers of all time -- chris durang is one of broadway's great comic writers. we haven't seen much of chris in a while, so i'm delighted that he is back on broadway with a very fine new play called "vanya and sonia and masha and spike." now, the title may tell you that

it's kind of chris's comic take on the world of chekhov. and two of the actors from the play are with us today. they are the very, very talented kristine nielsen. welcome to "theater talk." >> thank you. >> and our old friend david hyde pierce, who's back -- you haven't been down here since "curtains," right, david? >> i think that's right. yeah, we were trying to remember the last time. i think it was "curtains." >> yeah, well, it's good to see you both. and i do look the chekhovian beard. >> thank you. >> haskins: oh, it's wonderful. >> so chekhov, they often say, they say his plays are comedies. many people consider chekhov's plays comedies. is chris's play, should it be considered a drama and not a comedy? how do you play it? how do you play a comedy talking about a comedy -- to get too meta here? is that possible? >> well, i think we're lucky that he's written a play about a family, you know, characters. so you start there, of course, and you just wing off from that, whatever hideous circumstances transpire as we do the play. >> so you don't really play it for laughs though, right, even though it is funny?