welcome to "this week in defense news." i'm vago muradian. electronic war fire is increasingly important to how america's soldiers fight. the chief of the army warfare division tells us what his service is doing to prepare its troops for future challenges. but first, the united states marine corps is wrapping up its decade long involvement in afghanistan. at the same time, the marines are retrimpg r thinking their doctrine and equipment news. they want light armored vehicles while shaping its new amphibious tractor to replace the vehicle that was canceled early last year. as the marines develop the requirements for their new fighting vehicle, they face challenges. first the new generation of precision weapons is pushing the marines farther out to sea than ever before complicating

future amphibious operations. new vehicles and aircraft are steadily getting bigger making existing ships increasingly camped when fully loaded out. the man leading the process of shaping the future of the marine corps is lieutenant general richard mills charged with developing tactics and doctrine for the service. welcome to the program. >> thank you for having me. >> welcome as a fellow new yorker. >> it's great to be here. it's a great opportunity to talk about the future of the marine corps. >> you commanded troops in iraq and afghanistan. what are the three enduring lessons that marines will have to take with them well into the future about irregular warfare and counterinsurgency. >> i believe we learned a couple of things coming out of afghanistan and iraq. the need for the cultural awareness piece of any place we go, we have to know the battle space, know our allies, know our enemy better than we have in the past perhaps. we need to carry that forward with us. we'll remember that i think we're also going to remember the fact we need to be

adaptable. you need to be flexible both in our tactics, our procedures and our act to get the -- and our ability to get the equipment our soldiers need as warfare changes and the enemy adapts to our methods and our procedures. lastly i think of course is protection against very simple weapons produced but very effective weapons produced against us at we have to adapt ourselves to very quickly. >> it's written that the marines should dedicate 30,000 of its force on regular warfare and 70,000 -- [indiscernible] is that a good idea and if not, why not? >> the marines have been very flexible for us. in the past we've relied on the inherent flexibility to adapt to provide what we need on the battlefield at the right time and place. i think if you look at us in afghanistan and iraq, the one thing that the marines have shown is their ability to do that. we moved from very high intensity, a kind of

traditional warfare if you will against the iraqi forces initially to a very, very effective coin counterinsurgency operations in afghanistan. i think we'll rely more on -- instead of dedicated tasks we'll rely on the inherent flexibility of marines to adapt. >> when you commanded regional command in afghanistan, you were responsible for training afghan forces. you had said as all national leaders have said, the importance of training the soldiers that are required for western forces to be able to lead in 2014 as scheduled. however, there have been an unprecedented number of attacks where the folks we've trained are turning their weapons on their trainers. that has really led to some significant trust issues. can you succeed in this mission? if you can't fundamentally trust the guys you're training to pick up this job from you? >> i think you have to understand a few things. first of all you have to understand that indeed we do trust our afghan allies.

they have shown they can be trusted on the battlefield. they have operated for us with a number of -- with us for a number of years and done a very good job working alongside us. i think the insurgent has identified the critical gap. if you can drive a wedge between the coalition forces and afghan security forces and make that wedge, divide those forces along the lines of trust, you'll have a huge advantage. because he'sil else. he's failed on the battlefield. he's failed in trying to win over the population n. is a last-ditch attempt i think to cause the coalition and the afghan partnership to fall apart. i don't believe that it will. i believe we can trust the leadership of the afghan security forces and i believe we can trust the vast majority of the afghan forces. there are some people in there we neat to vet more carefully. i think we're going to do that. it's an adaption one more time to enemy procedures. we're trying to drive -- th

are trying to drive that wedge between our forces and afghan forces. >> it's not something you think will be a permanent thing. >> i believe we'll continue to train the afghan security force. it is our way to leave them with a stable situation that they can handle on their own. and believe long term it will be successful. >> the proliferation of precision weapons from cruise missiles to guided rockets and mortars will fundamentally be changing warfare. there's always been a challenge and you have been working on this problem for some time about how that complicated an amphibious operation, when you're trying to move large numbers of troops from the sea to the shore. you've been working on this for some time. what are the epiphanies and how do you deal as ships get pushed further out to sea and the enemy has the ability to prank some of these -- plank some of these guys coming in from the beach. >> it's always been complicated. it's always taken an extreme level of cooperation between

the navy forces that support those operations and the landing force going ashore so we know we have to take a look at some of the new threats that are arising and we're doing that in close cooperation with the u.s. navy. we're going to look at ways to shape the situation before we land. we'll never land into the teeth of a prepared defense the way we had to do in world war ii, but we're going to rely on some of the new changes that are coming out, some of the electronic changes that we have, some of the tools that are available to us that weren't available to us ten years ago where we can deal with the threat to a certain level. we're also going to work very closely with the navy and the air force to ensure that am figuruous operations, the conditions that we would land on would be shaneed prior to -- shaped prior to us going there. thirdly, we're looking at ways in which to disperse, to land at a place where the enemy does not have a defense set up, where we can put forces ashore where the threat is not as prevalent as it may be in other areas.

all of these take very close coordination. all of them take experimentation and all of them take large scale exercises so we can try them out before we actually have to do them for real. so in all of those areas we're working -- we've identified the threat. we're working closely to mitigate that threat. and i believe that there are ways in which we can do that. >> let's go to your sea battle. i think what you're talking about also touches on n. the battle concept is to forge closer cooperation between the air force and the navy, particularly against countries that are very, very well defended and want to deny us the ability to operate anywhere near their territory. the marines have long argued that they need to be seamlessly integrated into the navy's battle ground. the marine corps has come out with a single navy battle concept. talk to me about the concept and why it's so important and what reception it's getting from the navy. >> we believe the single naval battle concept fits very well inside the overall sea battle at the navy and the air force and they're working to develop. we think that that air-sea

battle concept will provide us with the shaping operations that we need to be successful when the decision is made to project power ashore. so we want to make sure that the -- that we are as prepared as the navy and air force is to conduct such operations. the single battle concept talks to that continuation, if you will, as you shape operations, as you prepare the area in which you're going -- you tend to land in to be ready to receive the troops that go ashore and the threat has been mitigated. it also talks to the growth, if you will, to the coming together of smaller naval forces, smaller marine forces into larger forces that can have a diswissive -- decisive effect as they land. all of those we believe work into an overall concept that will allow the united states to retain its forcible entry capabilities and we also think that we integrate very well with the new ships, new doctrines and new systems coming up that will give us quite a capability to go where perhaps we've not been invited

to go and to ensure that we have freedom of action when we get there. our job is to be ready to respond when the nation is -- needs us. i think we're working that way to make sure we have that cape at. >> more with lieutenant general

we're back with lieutenant general richard mills, the dmandzer of -- chanldzer of the marine corps development command. just to follow up. when the expeditionary finding

vehicle was canceled late last year, the marine corps plan working on a replacement for the amphibious combat vehicle. what does it look like, how expensive should it be and what capabilities do you believe it should have? >> it should move ship to shore. we think it's a critical capability and we intend to develop our -- continue to develop our amphibious combat vehicle to allow us to do that. we're going through extensive analysis to determine what's the best vehicle we can afford and we're coming to some conclusions. it will be a self-deemployer, it will be able to carry our marines ship to shore. it will have an ability to defend itself and deliver the marines ashore safely, on time at the right place at the right time. >> some argue that the new vehicle will only be 30% better, for example, a 10 knot speed as sort of a 7 knot speed of the existing amphibious tractor at five times the cost.

others argue they should invest and buy the best combat vehicle they can buy. why is that a bad approach? >> we believe the vehicle itself has to be self-deploy al. has to be able to leave the ship at the initial waves of going ashore and has to move quickly on the beach head and continue operations ashore. again, the study of alternatives tell us the best way to do that is with a self- deemployer. that's the way we're looking. >> the expedition finding vehicle had a very powerful gun on it that marines were looking forward to getting t. are you going to have a powerful gun on this new vehicle as well? >> we'll have the most capability that we can reasonably afford. we want to be able to ensure it has growth potential in the future, if we want to have some changes to what it carries with it, that it is able to accept those changes. so it will be able to defend itself. it will be able to operate with our armored forces once it arrives ashore, and it will move as quickly as we can -- as reasonably we can expect from ship to shore. >> how many marines in the back?

>> right now we plan to have 17 marines. >> the assault ships that will be taking the landing craft air cushions that you're developing now, dates from the 1970's. they're great ships but all of your equipment has grown larger and heavier over the years. the v-22 is larger than the ch- 46. the jf is larger and the vehicle themselves are larger and amphibious force commanders repeatedly have told me we just don't have enough room to take all the stuff we need to take with us on deployment. what do the future amphibious assault ships need to look like and do they need to be something radically different that you can carry 10 or 20-- >> we look schoal with the navy to make sure -- closely with the navy to make sure the ships are designed to meet the requirements that we project. amphibious commanders and i commanded twice and was operations officer, they have always had to make some tough choices on what they want to bring and what they simply

cannot bring because it doesn't fit. that's not particularly a new problem for them and it's something we work with them very closely on. secondly, when we design our new equipment, as we begin to lighten up, as we come out of afghanistan and iraq, some of the equipment simply isn't going to fit. we'll work closely to make sure new equipment is designed to be expeditionary, to fit on the amphibious ships we have and fit on those connectors to get to ashore as expeditionary as possible. >> do you need to-- >> we have things like a group which is a forward thinking group stationed at quantico working with their navy counterparts to take a look at what we night need 20 or 30 years from now. the navy i think will be adaptable to what our requirements are. we have ships that the navy has available to us and we'll make the best use of them. >> naval board will help in that, the new panel that has been created? >> the naval board is a very

effective organization in which senior officers from the navy and from the marine corps can talk about these sorts of issues, comes -- come to some resolution on them and work to a mutually agreeable solution. >> the navy is working on its maritime strategy or rewriting the maritime strategy adopted several years ago to focus more on high end war fighting. the marines corps is participating on that. what is the role and what do you think the rewrite will look like when it comes out? >> i think it's early on in the process to come to any conclusions but the navy is very welcoming of marine participation. we have a team up there in new or port right now working with the writers of the strategy, the developers of the strategy. i think we'll be able to come to again a mutually agreeable doctrine and a mutually agreeable seat that will serve -- strategy that will serve across the range of military operations. >> sir, thanks very much. best of luck to your beloved giants. >> thank you. coming up, the future of u.s.

the past decade of war has highlighted the importance of length strong warfare, the arm of intercepting, analyzing, jamming or spoofing minute radar and radio communications that has become an increasingly key element of u.s. war fighting, in particular to listen to its enemies and defeat roadside bombs. to better prepare its force for the future, the army has added highly realistic electronic warfare scenarios to its rigorous curriculum. now advocates argue that electronic warfare and cyberand information operations are so interlinked they should be consolidated. here to update us on the future of army electronic warfare is the chief of army electronic war fir, -- warfare, the colonel. >> thank you. >> i asked the jen about the enduring lessons of iraq and afghanistan. what are the lessons from these wars that are applicable to the future or the challenges we're looking at fundamentally different if we look at china,

you know, -- or iran or russia or any other country in which we might come into potential friction with. >> great question. thanks. i think the endearing lesson from the last ten years of conflict is that the army must have an organic electronic warfare capability that is available to the maneuver -- commander 24 hours a day, seven days a week. the reliance on the joint community, although the joint community provides an outstanding electronic warfare capable for what it is designed to do, it is not sufs for -- sufficient for the ground maneuver commander and the army ground maneuver commanders need to gain an advantage in the magnetic spectrum 24 hours a day, seven day as week. i think that's the lesson. >> are the natures of the challenge different? one of the things you said our enemies in afghanistan appear more primitive but they're remarkable sophisticated from

electronic spectrum standpoint. what are some of the things -- differs we're going to see from countries that are more sophisticated and are looking at this stuff, for example, china and russia, as fundamental analysts? >> another great question. the real answer in my mind is that, you know, for the last ten years, this has been a regular warfare environment in which the aranalthe other servi been functioning in. i think the adversaries you just described will not rely as heavily on ill regular warfare. therefore, it is a different environment that will have not only some challenges that we're already well prepared for, not only from the joint level, but much better prepared for the ground level for the army. but i think what you also see is a return to a more traditional type of warfare. >> right. much more-- >> much more so than the regular warfare we have been dealing with. >> it used to be an insular community.

you said it's important to incorporate these skills across the entire force. how are you doing that and how important is that-- >> the electronic -- the importance of the commander having that advantage in electromagnetic spectrum is taught to leaders at every level so the training indoctrine command has done a fantastic job of incorporating as you alluded to in your introduction, not only is it being done in the tactical training at places like the national training center, also the joint training center, joint warfare center at fort polk as well. they all are doing this electronic warfare. so soldiers at the grass roots level of conflict down at the squad level are now seeing what it means to work in an environment where maybe you don't have the electromagnetic

spectrum at your command. >> right. >> but that geese all the way -- goes all the way up to the senior leaders. so we're educating those leaders to understand the importance of it now. again, what i think that is doing for the army is that it is emphasizing the importance of it much more than it ever had before. >> do the marines, for example, have moved to consolidate cyberand information operations with electronic warfare as a combined entity. there are those who say that is the right approach. is that the right approach for the army as well? >> i think we're moving down that path right now. the army's newest war fighting function is the command war fighting function. inside the command war fighting function are two core requirements. one is cyberelectromagnettic activities. just the name alone tells you how important cyberspace and electromagnetic activities are. inside that part of the commission command -- of the mission command is electronic warfare and cyberspace operations together under one

synchronized and integrator. the other half of that equation is inform and influence activities of which information operations is part of. >> we've got about a minute left. let me ask you very quickly, what's the latest and greatest equipment you're fielding to the troops and talk to me about your workshop that will be taking place between the 11th and 13th. >> we continue to field various means of electronic attack to soldiers in the field using the majority of our quick reaction capabilities, but at the same time the army's continuing to develop the innovative warfare system, iews. that's moving well along in the milestone of accomplishments. the workshop, this is my fourth workshop. we bring academia, industry and miliry togeer with the common goal of ensuring that electronic warfare becomes that enduring core capability for the army. >> where is the conference happen something. >> in the pentagon from the 11th to the 13th. it's next week of september.

>> best of luck on that. >> thank you very much. appreciate the time.

for years there's been a brewing debate whether electronic warfare should be subordinate to cyberand information operations or the other way around. the marines corps decided the right answer was to merge both communities, a move formalized last year. it was the right decision and one that should be emulated by the entire u.s. military. it's the sophisticated art of intercepting, analyzing or spoofing enemy radar, radio communications or intelligence transmissions. cyber and information operations. the two fields are inextricably linked and increasingly important not only to combat operations on distant

battlefields but domestic security as well. the marines' intent is to fully integrate cyberand information operations as defensive elements of combat units equaled to armored vehicles, aircraft, guided weapons and troops. marine leaders are mandating to ew and cyberno longer remain specialities at higher headquarters but must be integrated all the way down to the platoon left. it's monday the rest of the force should adopt, dominating and exploiting radio and electronic and cyber speckers will be as important as weapons. they must be drilled into routine training and built into organizations so the entire force is prepared and tested for the challenge it is will face in the future. indeed they will shape the conditions for success well before the first shot is fired. thanks for joining us for "this week in defense -- for "this week in defense news." i'm vago muradian. i'll be back next week at a new time sunday mornings at 8:00 a.m. until then, have a great week.

alright everybody, get your heads up.

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