were uncomfortable about the low level of planning for the post-conflict period, had worries abou under-resourceing and sometimes were not given an opportunity to explain to the americans why we thought it should be done differently. in that very major respect, i think our influence was too low but it was too low for the reason that we were a minor partner, in resource terms. >> finally, you were there in the period where you described it as a catastrophic success of winning the war so quickly. and we were paying the price or the -- of the failure of and we were essentially making it up as we went along in a very different environment than we expected. you draw a number of important lessons and we are on the lessons large exercise. are there any other lessons for future policy making that you would draw from the whole of iraq experience? >> i think there are a number of lessons. the full range of them will probably need another session. there are two in particular -- one is to regard the aftermath as just as important a mission as the military action. secondly, to put security first because nothing

uncomfortable about the low level of planning for the post- conflict period, had worries abou under-resourceingand sometimes were not given an opportunity to explain to the americans why we thought it should be done differently. in that very major respect, i think our influence was too low but it was too low for the reason that we were a minor partner, in resource terms. >> finally, you were there in the period where you described it as a catastrophic success of winning the war so quickly. and we were paying the price or the -- of the failure of and we were essentially making it up as we went along in a very different environment than we expected. you draw a number of important lessons and we are on the are there any other lessons for future policy making that you would draw from the whole of iraq experience? >> i think there are a number of lessons. the full range of them will probably need another session. there are two in particular -- one is to regard the aftermath as just as important a mission as the military action. secondly, to put security first because nothing can be done in the polit