policymakers, truman, acheson, eisenhower, big names and saw in detail what they were proposing.who do you think comes out well among u.s. policymakers in terms of understanding the nature of the conflict, the changes that were occurring? >> guest: right. i think hands down ridgeway. i think anyone who reads my book will see how much i really like ridgeway. i think ridgeway, he saved the eighth army. the chinese were pushing the u.n. army farther and farther south. general walker had died accidentally and ridgeway was put into that position as an army commander. the fact that he sort of was able to change the situation, pat i think really important repercussions on the united states. i think this was a time of grabbing mccarthyism. i think a loss in korea would have really been devastating for the democratic institutions and would have set the fire of mccarthyism that much greater, had we actually been pushed off the korean peninsula. i also think had ridgeway not turn the eighth army around there was a great possibility that the work would have been enlarged to china, i.e. the t

policymakers, truman, acheson, eisenhower, and saw in detail what they were proposing. who do you think comes out well among u.s. policymakers in terms of understanding the nature of the conflict, the changes that were occurring? >> guest: well, i think hand down, ridgeway -- i think anyone who reads my book will see how much i really like ridgeway. ridgeway saved the eighth army. the chinese were pushing the u.n. army farther and farther south. general walker had died accidentally, and ridgeway was put into that position of commander, and the fact that he changed -- was able to change the situation, had i think really important repercussions for the united states. i think this is a time of macare theism. i -- mccarthyism. and a loss would have been devastating for the democratic institutions and would have fed the fire of mccarthyism that much greater, had we actually been pushed off the korean peninsula. also think that had ridgeway not turned the eighth army around they would be a great possibility the war would have been enlarged to china, i.e., third world war. so,

but i think there was the it too of dean acheson's -- >> it was used as the title of dean acheson's marvelous book about the truman years. but this is the real creation. and they're not just starting a new company or a broadway show. they're making a country, a nation, and they don't know how it's going to come out. >> rose: if they'd take an poll in philadelphia, in the country in the 13 colonies in 1776 they never would have gone ahead with it. >> only about a third of the people were for it. >> rose: odds were against them. >> and it wasn't popular. it was not popular. the. >> rose: so what manner of man and woman was in favor of it? >> >> to a large degree they were new englanders and virginians. and we have to include the carolinians absolutely. and maryland. but the central states, principally new york and pennsylvania were very much against it. they were led by a man named john dickinson. >> rose: but i'm asking what was the nature of the revolutionist is my question. were they intellectuals? were they political fire brands? were they -- what? >> they were all that. they were intellect

of defense, general eisenhower as the first commander of nato and then as two-term president, dean acheson and george kennon and charles bolan and others, these were people that roosevelt promoted, and they continued to direct the country in strategic terms through the '50s. they did it -- i mean, there were mistakes, of course. roosevelt made mistakes, everyone makes mistakes. but in general, it was almost completely successful and ultimately, of course, as everyone knows the great rivalry with the soviet union ended with the soviet union simply disintegrated, falling like a souffle without ever a shot being exchanged. >> host: well, the last section of "flight of the eagle" is "supreme nation: 1957-present." a couple of issues during our recent history, mr. black, if we could explore those. number one, the effect of the vietnam war. >> guest: yes. yes. well, obviously, i think the effect was terribly serious, and it's with us still. the u.s. is over the paralyzing fear of using its military. indeed, some could make the case -- i haven't particularly tried to make it because i'm not sure

i was informed that as tough global to of my staffers, three of my staffers met with acheson, a staffer of the government reform majority staff on march march 8. this was prior to the audit. so i wanted to clarify that now. >> there were no democratic staff or staffers present. >> its my understanding. >> did anyone ever raised any concerns that there may not have been any democratic staffers prison? >> no one raised a concern to me about that. i don't know. >> i wasn't there. >> and so basically you initiated the audit. >> the letter was the ranking member received. >> you actually initiated. it was in a letter that was easy . >> if the gentleman wants to be involved in protecting these groups, we are happy to have you help us with the tea party complaints. i will tell you over in the senate, the senate democratic leaders were constantly sending letters to the others, from the other side asking that they go after these groups. these are on the record. >> i will help you. >> we got. >> the copy of that, but we did not get a copy of the response to that letter. >> thank you very much for