, they get training by the afghan national police, the afghan uniformed police, local communities hiring from within their communities to defend their communities so they get training by the afghan national police, they get partnership through us and mentorship. they get oversight again through both forces. and they are paid, equipped, uniformed by the ministry of interior. so it is essentially exactly where the afghans need to be. . . out to the east and some other locations where police are able to go out and do civil policing. beat cop things we've seen in the states in larger cities. it is demonstrating to people that your government is working for you. we are doing it government based on the funding we have and showing them that we have cable forces that allow for transition at some point in time. i think that security overall is a positive trend in baraki barak. we are making improvements. on the local and village level, people getting fed up with violence. not only coming to us to seek assistance, but also, in some cases, working always to take care of themselves, because nobody c

it is us setting conditions to allow the afghan security forces to do that. >> what about the afghan security forces in baraki barak? how are things? >> the army is doing well. they live right here with us. the police are here as well. pretty much everything we need is in one spot as far as governments -- army and police. the army are very capable here. we are just getting into the expect months, so we activity to increase from an insertion perspective and from a security forces perspective. communicate. they can provide security. their leaders plan pretty well. >> what do they still need from you? >> what they really need from us is kind of the next step. what we can provide them that they are not as good yet get is, is, for example, is planning and logistical operation. you want to conduct a week-long operation? we can help you organize a way to resupply yourself so that that operation is a week-long and not two days long. those are the kinds of things that we are applying right now. input, not just on an advisory level, but on a partner level. we are on patrol with them. about the

he foresees if this all-afghan jerga is assembled by afghans for afghans without outside interfeerps, they can return afghan to a civil state by creating a civil government acceptable to all afghans regardless of their tribal or ethnic affiliations, but there's a very important condition before this can happen. the pears or groups who participates at this point in the government of afghanistan will not be allowed representation. only individual afghans, the taliban, the afghan government, drug barrens, or the warlords can want attend. the likes of karzai even may join the jerga, but only as ordinary afghan citizens, and we understand that will be very difficult to actually make happen, but we feel it's important to state that's actually what is required. to accomplish this, there is an em pertive that the issue -- imperative, that the issue of islam be removed off center stage where the current acrimony has been and beliefs that link humanity together in a common struggle for a better life for all. parallels have been drawn by numerous experts on the complexity of the tribal dynamic w

afghans accompany our forces on every one of these. they do the callout-- in other words, "come out, we've surrounded the house." they do it, obviously, in the native tongue that's appropriate to that area. >> they do the entry operations. they do the searches, if it's required, and so on. we make mistakes. what we try to do is to learn from the mistakes, to adjust in the wake of them, and to truly turn lessons learned intellectually into actual changes in practices. >> narrator: the story of one jsoc operation that took place last september shows how kill/capture missions risk alienating ordinary afghans. this wasn't a night raid, but a daylight air strike in the northern province of takhar. the military announced that they had killed a prominent taliban commander and his fighters. but it soon emerged that something may have gone wrong. the aftermath of the strike was filmed by a local police officer. >> narrator: locals said the dead were all innocent civilians, election workers on the campaign trail. defense secretary robert gates h

as well as afghan forces. let me just summarize really briefly in conclusion that there are several ways for the u.s. to achieve the limited objectives i noted earlier. one is if al qaeda is destroyed in the afghan-pakistan region and no longer poses a threat to the u.s. homeland. a second is that the taliban bridges ties with al qaeda and a third is if afghan national security forces and its allies is sufficiently degrade the insurgency. at the moment, in my view, all three means should be pursued simultaneously until one of them or some combination of them adequately achieves core u.s. objectives. thank you. >> very helpful. dr. bill. >> also like to thank the committee for speaking to you on the support issue. i've long thought that this is a close call on the analytical merits. if you will make that call in favor of waging the war, if in order to realize the potential of securing of the answers we have at stake, we need to resolve some important ambiguities in the goals that we seek and the end states we a

let's go to the afghan government. we went to the united nations to the afghan consulate and united nations and presented them with a plan saying pretty much the rumors floating out cannot be what you want, let us go in and see. they came back six months later with a visa and said, okay. we went to cbs news saying we got the visa. you got the equipment. you know, can we cut a deal? we went in for cbs news and quickly discovered that coming back with that story from cbs news that they were really looking for a specific narrative, and we brought back something else. we were looking at this not as a superpower confrontation, but looking at afghanistan under the pressure of the superpower confrontation, and that began our whole process because when we observed that, we realized that this poor country was squeezed and left out of the american narrative. did you have something to say? >> not at all. [laughter] >> what about the documentary called afghan massacre by the irish brothers that show that? in november of 2001, a mo

, urban populations, afghan troops, pakistani government, the afghan and possible the pakistani taliban, india, china, russia, turkey, and others to act in ways that would advance the interest in ultimate goals. it's the job for the diplomat more than the military and development experts. it may seem like an impossible job. the sooner we begin it, the higher the chances of success. thank you. >> thank you very much, dr. slaughter. ambassador neumann. >> thank you very much for inviting me to appear here. about a month after my last trip to afghanistan. i found that security has improved in some areas, as everyone is noting, heavy fighting is ahead of us. it took a long time to get in place the military and civilian forces decided on in 2009. longer than many had hoped, although many of those hopes were not very realistic. i think that lag between decision and action is now distorting the discussion of where we are. i believe that the thing to watch is what happens next year. if u.s. forces can transfer some of the difficult areas to afghans and the afghans can hold them, then transition

as well as afghan forces. let me summarize briefly in conclusion that i think there are several ways for the u.s. to achieve the limited objectives that i noted earlier. one is if al qaeda is destroyed in the region and no longer poses a threat to the homeland. the second is if they break ties, and the third is the afghan national security forces and their allies can sufficiently degraded the insurgency. at the moment, in my view, of 3 means should be pursued simultaneously until one of them or some combination adequately achieve the core u.s. objectives. thank you. >> i would also like to thank the committee for the opportunity to speak to you on this important issue. i have long fought that afghanistan has been a close call. if you're going to make the call in favor of waging the war, in order to realize the potential of securing the interests that we have at stake, we need to resolve son for and ambiguities and the goals that we seek. in the 2001, we saw very ambitious and steaks, and the result was unhappy

for afghans the best example is the cave become a hospital. the building is located in a working class suburb of kabul it serves one point five million people. you see because the day before this building is so you can see everything is the side for us a.c.'s five years ago thanks to a gift from the international community. after this building's not working speciated the secrets photos today it is falling apart or so yards you can see everything is this right over there. the toilets and bathrooms are closed because of leaks they're currently being used to store broken furniture or cases it is because the show this is nothing new a lot if he goes. public just because he there watch the tough this little fake way to fight off if we used to cut hair then at the destroyed the first story the first of the roof of the. building because of the earliest make up north of us. there was there used to be this some food just the two of those this is the for a second assert their building if we used it out it will lead to the first floor you see that's wher

go into afghan villages they go to africa and houses they go into afghan communities and search and do night raids and have various different you know activities that are not considered sensitive to the culture of afghanistan to the people of afghanistan so it's because of those kind of perceptions people are slowly started to look at the international community in different contexts but at the same time we're also have to realize that because of the international community afghanistan is in a much better condition afghanistan has an infrastructure afghanistan has a parliament has had two presidential elections but at the same time i think there's much more that could be done in this regard. many people and you of course read it here that it say that the have their government is. an efficient and corrupt is it true and there what in your opinion should be done to make it more efficient and less correct look it's understandable for people to criticize the afghan government because of corruption but you worked what is specifically important for people to realize is that they're different

the afghan subcontractor. the prosecutor's office in kabul has launched an investigation to answer that question. the italian n.-g. o. initial goodwill accepted to meet with us. interests headquarters are in rome they have not been back to come. their water is leaking and since we couldn't water prove it because we didn't have the equipment we did what we could. a tal's a broken but that happens but i still can't understand its. still the fact that it's still running amazes me i was sure that it was closed as it. is the head of intercepts he did not oversee the hospital building site himself his n.g.o.s specializes in. and in two thousand to have ghana stand was a rough place and no companies were capable. so we accepted the job when i saw the report describing the final results oh i could say it was great you did a good job the report was leaked enemy written by specialists. from the afghan government no no no from you know international technicians they should say to me and that's what i'm saying so if you s

for afghans the best example is they came to come to hospital. the building is located in a working class suburb of companies it serves one point five million people. you see because i wanted a good quality this building is so you can see everything is destroyed for us a.c.'s five years ago thanks to a gift from the international community hospitals renovated and a new wing and in this building is not working speciated the second story today it is falling apart. you can see everything is a cycle but. the toilets and a bathroom is are closed up because of leaks they're currently being used to store broken furniture or case specifically because on addition there is no sleep the lot if you go see. all that have just because if there was a top this from the right way ahead of me if we used to tap hair then it was destroyed the first story of the roof of the building his of the earliest make up of the yes. it was there used to be this some food is the this is the first second or third of the world and if we use the top it will leak to the first floor

for afghans the best example is they came to come to hospital. the building is located in a working class suburb of companies it serves one point five million people. you see because i wanted a good quality of this building is so low you can see everything is destroyed for us a.c.s. five years ago thanks to a gift from the international community hospitals religious leaders and a new wing added this building is not working speciated the second stores today it is falling apart. you can see everything is the size of it. the toilets and about terms are closed up because of leaks they're currently being used to store broken furniture or cases if they take on addition there is nothing like getting a dose. of it just because if they want to top this. way to cut off the if we used to tap hair then it was tried to first story first of the roof of the out of the building his of the earliest make up off of us. there was there is some food is still to us this is the first second or third of the body and if we use the top it will leak through the first floor

, urban populations, afghan troops, pakistani government, the afghan and possible the pakistani taliban, india, china, russia, turkey, and others to act in ways that would advance the interest in ultimate goals. it's the job for the diplomat more than the military and development experts. it may seem like an impossible job. the sooner we begin it, the higher the chances of success. thank you. >> thank you very much, dr. slaughter. ambassador neumann. >> thank you very much for inviting me to appear here. about a month after my last trip to afghanistan. i found that security has improved in some areas, as everyone is noting, heavy fighting is ahead of us. it took a long time to get in place the military and civilian forces decided on in 2009. longer than many had hoped, although many of those hopes were not very realistic. i think that lag between decision and action is now distorting the discussion of where we are. i believe that the thing to watch is what happens next year. if u.s. forces can transfer some of the difficult areas to afghans and the afghans can hold them, then transition

for afghans the best example is the cane or come the hospital. the building is located in a working class suburb of company it serves one point five million people. you see because of fun to do. this but it is so dull you can see everything is destroyed for us ac outside years ago thanks to a gift from the international community the hospital was renovated and a new wing out of this building is not working speciated the second story today it is falling apart. you can see everything is this retro but. the toilets and bathrooms are closed up because of leaks they're currently being used to store broken furniture or case specifically because this show is now sleeping a lot as he goes. by that just because he i don't want to tell this story when the company if we used to tap there then it really destroyed the first story the first thing the roof of the other. building because of the earliest make up off of us ok there was there used to be this some food is the two of us this is the first second or third of the body and if we use the top it will leak

and afghan n.g.o.s are suspected of running shady operations. when he was planning minister basher those confirmed that these operations were dishonest after investigating these n.g.o.s he requested that eight out of ten be closed. there are two thousand three hundred fifty five n.g.o.s in afghanistan the majority ninety percent a local. leader one thousand nine hundred and thirty five are outright thieves which who openly waste the phones that they are allocating loves the public funds internationally your people. trust from people seventy percent of their budget is spent on logistics. cooks is it body guards that come over. two. we requested was that these two just n.g.o.s be clicked the film with you on this it was a witch which you feel this is i found only four hundred twenty of them to be honest see show us if we kick out the corrupt to the thieves to the court it'll give you the onus to positions a charge too good to e.g. how i feel. special post was never able to carry out his plans. he had to resign from the government after his proposi

this is a journalist for afghans. it is an afghan. people but you're right they can't be critical of the government. it's the basically how can they put. up with you can say with. i'm laughing but i should really be crying because you can fulfill it specifically those gifts or do they still have to pay how to they were killed because they paid something like two or three hundred dollars or something but it could three hundred dollars for nine hundred square metres just about. who had enough power to award such gifts to friends of the regime. since the land officially belongs to the defense ministry the generous donor must have been a military. officer to sit there and all this all this land was given by a national fire him who is defense minister and the first ice person to respond is . one of the most powerful and feared men in the country. i take for chief who first came to light during the soviet war which he fought alongside commander must food then against the taliban in september two thousand and one my suit is assassinated by a

, urban populations, afghan troops, pakistani government, the afghan and possible the pakistani taliban, india, china, russia, turkey, and others to act in ways that would advance the interest in ultimate goals. it's the job for the diplomat more than the military and development experts. it may seem like an impossible job. the sooner we begin it, the higher the chances of success. thank you. >> thank you very much, dr. slaughter. ambassador neumann. >> thank you very much for inviting me to appear here. about a month after my last trip to afghanistan. i found that security has improved in some areas, as everyone is noting, heavy fighting is ahead of us. it took a long time to get in place the military and civilian forces decided on in 2009. longer than many had hoped, although many of those hopes were not very realistic. i think that lag between decision and action is now distorting the discussion of where we are. i believe that the thing to watch is what happens next year. if u.s. forces can transfer some of the difficult areas to afghans and the afghans can hold them, then transition

this is a journalist for afghan villagers an afghan. says this is your people but you're right if they can't be critical of the government up with the news that the quezon city how can they. eat it up with you because he was also acutely i'm laughing but i should really be crying because you can look it is a city with those gifts or do they still have to pay. off because they paid something like two or three hundred dollars some people get chris three hundred dollars for nine hundred square meters just about. who had enough power to ward such gifts to friends of the regime. since the land officially belongs to the defense ministry the generous donor most of the. the military. search and all this all this man who's given my emotional for him who is defense minister and the first vice president. musharraf one of the most powerful and feared men in the country. i take for chief who first came to light during the soviet war which he fought alongside come under my suit then against the taliban in september two thousand and one my suit is ass

the afghans. we don't need to recreate the u.s. army model in the afghan national army. we really need to focus on the police force, and we are starting to do that. there is something called the afghan local police program. people have tried this over the centuries in afghanistan of equipping and harming the local police. it creates problems because if you are in the air on a bombing mission and see a guy with the rifle, you have to be sure, is this a local policeman? he's not wearing a uniform. this is one of our gas? is see a bad guy? it is a difficult problem. so we need to refocus that. i would say pull our troops mainly into the bases and let then do the training from our big bases. let the countryside be under afghan control. it was under askin control before we arrived. they defeated the soviet army with money and some weapons from us, but not with our -- with us running the show. they're not incompetent defending their villages, and that they have to they will. i will never forget a britis

maybe we can do that without the afghan government. to senator kerrey's point, it is still a sovereign country. difficult to be negotiating with the enemy of the government independently of the government, but i would say we try a comprehensive settlement. if we can't get that we negotiate in other ways. we had to push back on the taliban so that we would then be in a position to negotiate the kind of solution you are talking about. we are not there to fight the taliban for the sake of fighting the taliban. >> we obviously have a disagreement. i do not believe we have had to because i am not trying to get the taliban to become great citizens participating in the political life. i have one simple, that they do not reestablished the sort of relationship they had with out -- al qaeda. i don't believe we had to of militarily go to war. i believe we had the option of attacking the taliban directly, plus i believe the taliban based upon statements they have made and that have been reported back, they themselves have come to question their de

there are tens of thousands of insurgents in the afghan/pakistan region. there are probably, you know, if you're being generous, 400 or 500 members of al qaeda. >> smith: why would guys like these in this film be sworn to or say that they are followers of bin laden, as opposed to joining the taliban, or simply being a local militia with their own local interests? >> bergen: yeah. i guess being a follower of bin laden maybe makes you a bigger guy and identifies you with a larger global movement. yeah, bin laden is admired by a lot of jihadis because he stuck it to the west. we've had multiple accounts of people who've joined jihadists groups, and, you know, they talk about their love for bin laden. you know, often when they make suicide videotapes before they go to what they think is their, you know, 72 virgins, they will mention that their hero was osama bin laden. >> smith: and now we have a series of popular uprisings throughout the middle east. what does it mean for al qaeda, these... this arab spring? >> bergen: i mean, i think it's about the worst new

to the afghans. we don't need to re-create the u.s. army model in the afghan national army. and that we really need to focus on the police force that we are starting to do that. there's something called the afghan local police program. it's not -- people have tried this over the centuries in afghanistan of equipping and are made to local police. it may create problems for you because when you're in the air on a mission nec account with a rifle, you've got to be sure this is a local police man for he -- he's not wearing a uniform, or is he one of our guys? or is he a bad guy? it's a difficult problem, but it's probably solvable. so we need to refocus that inevitably pull our troops mainly into the bases and let them do the training from our big pieces and let the countryside we under afghan control. it was under afghan control before we arrived. they defeated the soviet army with money and some weapons from us, but not with us running the shuttle. so they are not incompetent at sending their villages.

stance saying the drawdown is on but the operation against al qaeda will now be relegated to the afghan army the focus of that operation of the u.s. personnel in afghanistan is on al qaeda the operation continues the july two thousand and eleven transition date for the beginning of the drawdown remains. very much in place the pace of that drawdown will be determined by conditions on the ground but it is still very unlikely that this is less would leave the income entirely especially given the much glossed over suspicion of pakistan's knowledge of bin laden's presence in the country and not long ago general david petraeus himself cast a shadow over the prospect of withdrawing from afghanistan while the security progress achieved over the past year is significant it is also fragile and reversible nevertheless the bin laden's death could surely do is help pave an easier way to negotiations and then out of a van to stand a way that would allow the u.s. to walk away as a vector as even iran hails the success of its operation against bin laden say now it has no excuse to stay in the region ru

they have afghan border police, afghan national police. we resupply them with ammunition that was not taken over. there weren't hundreds of insurgents likely. last week. a lot of this really when you get up, we've really got to understand the insurgents have a pretty good information ops campaign. and so, we've got to take that with a grain of salt. at the same time you want to make sure we provide the support for partners when they do need it, but we can't be everywhere. hopefully that gets your question. i'm a drawdown piece, that is really a decision for the president and general petraeus. as i look around regional command east come i'm thankful for the forces we have right now. we didn't get our last surge brigades of the end of august. they came in the august time frame. they continue to do great things. in fact, we're just not being able to see the effect is coalition surge over the last several months. again, when they took over through the summer and fall timeframe, we were still getting the input tray. we really did think we have

it was under afghan control before we arrived. they defeated the soviet army with money and some weapons from us, but not with our, not with us running the show. so they are not incompetent at defending their villages. and this they have to do it, they will do it. but i will never forget a british soldier who i asked one day, are you making any headway, and he said if i go through another afghan village and i see a kid my age sitting in the shade while i've got my body armor and i'm humping down the road and waiting for the next ied to go off, i might put a bullet in that s.o.b., and the guy was laughing at him. the afghan kid he saw his age was laughing at him. he thinks he was laughing at him. he probably wasn't. but that's what was going through his mind. and here's this guy just my age, he should be the one with the rifle. why am i doing this? and, you know, that's a fair question for our soldiers to be asking. >> we've got the watches, they've got the time, that's the answer, right? >> they just came up with -- i'm a normalli

too bad for us and for the afghan kids. the rural districts are swarming with taliban who sometimes burn the schools down and often kidnap journalists for them or because of the war many villages have been deserted their inhabitants fleeing to the capital whose population has doubled to about four million. case in point campbell is the. the place where schools are needed the most . i guess we need so many things construction must go faster it's really necessary it's going to slow but as we lack so much space in our school that we have to refuse our admissions that is more of us is not elations very high headed of our set. yet there is one neighborhood in kabul where construction is thriving where there are no delays. welcome to ship to the stronghold of afghanistan's new lords. for the past three years fortified conses and mushrooms in shipley. each still has its own private security. of course there's the taliban threat but that's not a. sheer force at the heart of the conflict with the new authorities would like to concea

>> business is good if you make boots for the afghan army. hundreds of thousands of fresh troops are being thrown into the fight against the taliban. osama bin laden is the cause of afghanistan's current troubles, they tell us, and they're glad he has been killed. osama was the reason for thousands of afghan deaths, he said. people as still being killed because of him. we hate him. he was a killer, says this man. every day, we walk in fear because of him. he was not a good man. most afghans seemed to approve the killing of osama bin laden. certainly, the tone of the media coverage has been pretty positive. one group of afghans whose opinion really matters are those fighting for those who choose to fight the international forces. getting rid of osama bin laden will not end the war in afghanistan. the taliban is often a local insurgency with few real links to al qaeda. some worry that the international community will start to withdraw from afghanistan now that the leader is dead. foster says >> i am warning against such a possibility. as outsid

that can only be done through mutual respect of the afghan people, mutual respect of the afghan governments, and understanding they have a different culture and we have to understand where they come from because they are from a different culture. before we came here, we did a lot of training on afghan culture. a's a very hard to transplant 19 or 20 year-old man or woman to a different country for the first time and say go operate. by the way, you're not an american anymore. challenging for all of us, and the important thing is we are all human beings with mutual respect and you have to understand day live in a different culture. we have all heard the decisions that have to be made on cutting back on resources. i have not seen that. i have everything i need to do as a brigade commander to accomplish my mission. as things begin to change, my government will tell me where i have to cut back, but honestly, i don't see at this point. i had everything i need to accomplish my mission. >> if you could tell one thing to the american public, or the portion of it that represents our viewership, what w