communities are stand up their own police force, they get training by the afghan national police, the afghan uniformed police, local communities hiring from within their communities to defend their communities so they get training by the afghan national police, they get partnership through us and mentorship. they get oversight again through both forces. and they are paid, equipped, uniformed by the ministry of interior. so it is essentially exactly where the afghans need to be. . . out to the east and some other locations where police are able to go out and do civil policing. beat cop things we've seen in the states in larger cities. it is demonstrating to people that your government is working for you. we are doing it government based on the funding we have and showing them that we have cable forces that allow for transition at some point in time. i think that security overall is a positive trend in baraki barak. we are making improvements. on the local and village level, people getting fed up with violence. not only coming to us to seek assistance, but also, in some cases, working always to take care of themselve

and they get training by the afghan national police. local communities hiring from within their communities to defend their communities. so they get training by the afghan national police. they get partnership. they get oversight through forces. and they are paid, equipped, uniformed by the ministry of the interior. so it is essentially exactly where the afghans need to be. during this critical time of transitioning the security over to the afghan. >> from a security standpoint, as we look at the afghan army, it's out there patroling, securing the population and making a connection with the local people and showing them that they are capable force. police and transitioning from counterinsurgency operations where they are focusing right now and moving into the civil functions we will see them over time. we will start to see some transitions, especially close to the district center. out to the east and some other locations where police are able to go out and do civil policing. beat cop things we've seen in thes states in larger cities. it is de

footprint, and an afghan local police for print. that puts us -- i can give you the numbers by a year or your staff after the hearing. but it puts as well below the $12.8 billion were afghan nationals a first -- afghan security forces for fiscal year 2012. and it varies by year. >> is a more than $6 billion a year? >> depending on the air, between $6,000,000,000.1410103554 dollars per year. but all it -- $6,000,000,000.1410103554 dollars per year. >> what is afghanistan, why would we want to stop attacks and the united states emanating from there, and one way of doing that is to eliminate training camps or support situations there in afghanistan. let me ask this question. some people long before the death of osama bin laden were writing about the fact that the attack on in addis its emanated -- on the united states emanated after iraq came into kuwait, the saudis calling for support from the united states, some reluctantly, a lot of american troops landing in saudi arabia, and not only for the war but staying there. this created a si

the afghan local police program and village stability operations i was involved in from the beginning in 2009. and i would just say what i'm talking about is decreasing the footprint, but supporting afghan's fight for themselves. what we have seen in helmand, kandahar we've seen afghan communities who have actively fought for them. i was one of the americans serving in afghanistan along those lines. but i would say i agree with you afghans are willing to combat the taliban, both the central government and locals and we've seen that. >> good. well, i want to put in the record from your statement, dr. jones, that you would have in 2014, 40,000 troops, american troops, boots on the ground. i don't think that's the right footprint. we ought to stop the combat forces and concentrate on the other ways. >> we're live outside the u.s. senate. they're in recess for another 10 minutes or so till 2:15 eastern for their party lunches. they'll come back and consider the judicial nomination of edward chen for u.s. district judge for northern california. senators have been meeting during their party

the work being done to establish the afghan local police, that third layer of defense, security by the afghans, is in place and working. the special forces teams are co-located with those afghan local police, particularly in the valley, have settled that. and the taliban has not come back this fighting season as they expected them to do. we have hard work to do. i understand the emotions and heartfelt tug that the previous speaker brought to us, mr. speaker, but it's hard not to listen to that and not make decisions, but decisions can't be made simply on those emotions. you cannot separate what's going on in afghanistan with pakistan. we have to look at the entire package of that part of the world and our national security interests there which are linked together with the interest in afghanistan and pakistan. i respectfully rise to respectfully disagree with my colleagues on this amendment. there are better ways to elicit threes plans than this amendment. i ask my fellow colleagues to vote against the amendment. i yield back. the chair: the gentleman from massachusetts. mr. mcgovern:

they get training from the afghan police. local communities hiring from within their communities to defend their communities. they get training by the afghan national police and get partnership and mentor ship through us. it they get oversight and they are paid, equipped, and uniformed by the interior, so it is exactly where they need to be during this critical time of transitioning security over to the afghans. >> the afghan army is out there patrolling, securing population, making a connection with the local people, showing them day are capable force. police are transitioning from counterinsurgency operations, moving into civil policing functions we see over time. we will start to see some transition -- we're seeing right now in some areas in some locations, where the police are able to go out and do beat cop activities. it is demonstrating to people that the government is working, we are doing development based on the funding that we have and showing they have capable forces that allow for transition at some point. >> i think se

that is the alp, the afghan local police, the committees are stepping up their own police force. ey get training by the afghan uniformed police. local communities hiring from within their communities to defend their communities. they get training by the afghan basis. it partnering and mentor should. economy oversight from both forces and they are paid, a quick, uniformed by the ministry of interior. -- paid, he quipped, uniformed by the ministry of interior. -- vpaid, equipped and uniformed by the ministry of interior. >> a as we look at the afghan army, from a security standpoint, is out there patrolling, out there insecuritsecuring the local popn and showing that they are a cable force. police as well. they're focused on moving into those civil relationships that we see over time. i think we will start to see some transition. some areas are especially close to the district. they get out and you kind of beat cop kind of thing -- and they do a kind of beat cop kind of thing. we are doing development based on the funding that we have, and messaging, and showing that we have capable

afghan national army. we really need to focus on the police force, and we are starting to do that. there is something called the afghan local police program. people have tried this over the centuries in afghanistan of equipping and harming the local police. it creates problems because if you are in the air on a bombing mission and see a guy with the rifle, you have to be sure, is this a local policeman? he's not wearing a uniform. this is one of our gas? is see a bad guy? it is a difficult problem. so we need to refocus that. i would say pull our troops mainly into the bases and let then do the training from our big bases. let the countryside be under afghan control. it was under askin control before we arrived. they defeated the soviet army with money and some weapons from us, but not with our -- with us running the show. they're not incompetent defending their villages, and that they have to they will. i will never forget a british soldier who last monday, are you making any headway. he said, if i go through another afghan village and i see a kid my age sitting in this age will ask that my body armor and i'm hunting down

afghan national army. and then we really need to focus on the police force. and we are starting to do that. there's something called the afghan local police program. it's not new. people have tried this over the centuries in afghanistan. of equipping and arming the local police. it creates some problems for you because if you're in the air and you're on a bombing mission and you see a guy with a rifle, you've got to be see is this a local policeman, or is this -- he's not wearing a uni-- -- uniform. it's a difficult problem, but it's soluble. i would say pull our troops mainly into the bases and let them do the training from our big bases, and let the countryside be under afghan control. it was under afghan control before we arrived. they defeated the soviet army with money and some weapons from us, but not with our, not with us running the show. so they are not incompetent at defending their villages. and this they have to do it, they will do it. but i will never forget a british soldier who i asked one day, are you making any headway, and he said if i go through another afghan village and i see a kid my age sitting in the shade w

afghan national army. and that we really need to focus on the police force that we are starting to do that. there's something called the afghan local police program. it's not -- people have tried this over the centuries in afghanistan of equipping and are made to local police. it may create problems for you because when you're in the air on a mission nec account with a rifle, you've got to be sure this is a local police man for he -- he's not wearing a uniform, or is he one of our guys? or is he a bad guy? it's a difficult problem, but it's probably solvable. so we need to refocus that inevitably pull our troops mainly into the bases and let them do the training from our big pieces and let the countryside we under afghan control. it was under afghan control before we arrived. they defeated the soviet army with money and some weapons from us, but not with us running the shuttle. so they are not incompetent at sending their villages. if they have to do it, they will do it. i will never forget a british soldier who asked monday, are you making any headway? he said, if i go through another afghan village in nicaea kid my age sitting in

the additional part of that number was up to 30,000 afghan and local police. this is but a top down national security force and a bottle up for the movie. -- subject to provisos. one being amplified. demobilization needs to be planned for during mobilization. postponing data as a consideration that we will deal with is dangerous parade -- a dangerous. they are doing literacy training that is designed to enable an eventual reabsorption of discourse into a productive economy as it builds down. more generally, i think it is a fair criticism can be made that we're not devoting enough attention to this systematically thinking about the bill down process. the other proviso is that there is a strong tendency to see the problem of building an indigenous military force in afghanistan and quantitative numerical terms. do we have enough police, soldiers, trainers? when you look at the history of the military performance of developing world's armies, but very rarely does failure occurs when it occurs because they do not have enough training courses or enough advisers. whe

it did not involve significant turning up of afghan police or army forces at either the national or local level. now the afghan national army and police is probably more than 300,000. essentially we have done all that, particularly in the last couple years, plus there was not a real diplomatic dimension to be allowed the six plus two form to go into disuse. the united states did not try to test the taliban as to whether they had changed their ways when it came to association with al qaeda. so essentially those are the differences. but we did, also, the big difference, but we started doing and i would into doing is bringing to an end combat operations against the taliban. starting to a half years ago the united states made the policy decision that it would henceforth target that tall banned militarily. that was the principal rationale for the military increases taken in 2009 as well as the subsequent surge. i believe that was ill-advised, and i want to go back to the face before that where the united states no longer targets the taliban militarily. on the assumption that television presenc

it did not involve significant turning up of afghan police or army forces at either the national or local level. now the afghan national army and police is probably more than 300,000. essentially we have done all that, particularly in the last couple years, plus there was not a real diplomatic dimension to be allowed the six plus two form to go into disuse. the united states did not try to test the taliban as to whether they had changed their ways when it came to association with al qaeda. so essentially those are the differences. but we did, also, the big difference, but we started doing and i would into doing is bringing to an end combat operations against the taliban. starting to a half years ago the united states made the policy decision that it would henceforth target that tall banned militarily. that was the principal rationale for the military increases taken in 2009 as well as the subsequent surge. i believe that was ill-advised, and i want to go back to the face before that where the united states no longer targets the taliban militarily. on the assumption that television presenc

it did not involve significant turning up of afghan police or army forces at either the national or local level. now the afghan national army and police is probably more than 300,000. essentially we have done all that, particularly in the last couple years, plus there was not a real diplomatic dimension to be allowed the six plus two form to go into disuse. the united states did not try to test the taliban as to whether they had changed their ways when it came to association with al qaeda. so essentially those are the differences. but we did, also, the big difference, but we started doing and i would into doing is bringing to an end combat operations against the taliban. starting to a half years ago the united states made the policy decision that it would henceforth target that tall banned militarily. that was the principal rationale for the military increases taken in 2009 as well as the subsequent surge. i believe that was ill-advised, and i want to go back to the face before that where the united states no longer targets the taliban militarily. on the assumption that television presenc

police, spevely in logar -- specifically in logar. local communities hiring from within their communities to defend their communities, so they get training by the afghanational police. they get partnership through us and mentorship. they get oversight again through -- and they are aid-equipped, union formed by the ministry of the interior. so it is essentially exactly where the afghans need to be during this critical time of transitioning security over to the afghans. >> from a security standpoint as we look at the afghan army, it is out there parole trolling, securing the population making a connection with the local people and showing them that they are in capable force. police as well, transitioning from counterinsurgency operations where they are kind of focused right now and moving into those civil policing functions that we see. i think we'll start to see some transitions to that. we're seeing it in some areas, especially very lows to the district center. where the police are able to go out and do civil policing, get out, kind of -- stuff that we have seen back in the states. i really think it is just demonstrating to people that your government

intensify through the search of the taliban, the afghan national security forces and the new afghan police to develop to the government's capacity as well as local governments and currently what is known as reconciliation reintegration corporation recognized at the higher level of for integration and means of people who are tired of the dissolution. and specifically to your three questions, i think were set at the military and set in the conditions for success in some of those other areas like military operations -- tech collaborations. we're making sure that the ansi grows in the timeframe and i remember from general bill caldwell to give you a feel for it was very usefully that the 31st of march target to 155,000 was on the 31st of march 159,000 so it's numbers are compact in the quality. the police target is 122,000 the hundred 25,000 that targets for the 31st of october 171,600 of 140 -- 134,000 respectively. he's told me there had of them. so i think is the core of our strategy is transition in all its aspects, in our case in particular friend icehouse operations to ans run operations, then that seems to be on track. i wouldn't say that it'

sufment and afghan troops south of kabul on patrols of local villages and a mission to clear roads of ieds. he also talked with commanders about security and the status of training of the army and police. the u.s. is scheduled to begin withdrawing troops from afghanistan in july. >> what the brigade is trying to do here is we have the area of operations three provinces. very critical areas around kabul to try to get expand the security bubble that i'm sure you've heard general petraeus talking about from kabul to make sure that security, governance, and development are increased and improved here in

those items, we have encouraged them to be produced locally to employ afghans, to employ women, to be able to supply the needs of the army and police force as they go forward. so that is a continuing process of building the economy, and i can tell you, from having observed the level of economic activity in afghanistan a couple of years ago in comparison to what it is today, in virtually the entire country, you see a very strong entrepreneurial spirit here. small shops are opening up on the side of the roads, large glass-front buildings being built in kabul. people do not invest in glass buildings unless they have some confidence about the security and stability and the positive outlook in the future for their economy. host: one more call. fort worth, texas, republican line. troy, good morning. caller: thank you, commander general, for taking the time to speak with us. i was wondering if you could take the time to speak about the morale of troops in afghanistan. the department of homeland security is calling returning veterans the biggest threat. guest: well, of course, the primary reason that we came to afghanistan was to eject al

the average cost for afghan national security forces is $32 million. for local policeit is $6,000 per year. we are talking about fairly small amounts of money. 10,000 afghan local police, $60 million. and we are seeing major progress in the south on this issue. the u.s. government assessments indicate this. so i would say some of the progress we have had in the south is actually coming with a very small expense. >> by way of brief amplification, with respect to the cost of what would be required to keep afghanistan stable in the long run, it is important distinguish between wartime and peacetime costs. if we look back to what afghanistan and absorbed from the international system during a period of stability in the mid-20s century, they were receiving something in the order of $200 million from all sources. relative to what we are now spending to wage this war, it is extraordinarily cheap. even if you raise that, to account for the needs of wartime reconstruction or a different afghanistan or other requirements by a factor of 10, it would still be at a small fraction o