. >> on august 3rd 2014 us and afghan special operations forces deployed to charkh district about sixty miles south of kabul to clear taliban from the area. there's nothing unusual about this. us special operations forces often accompany afghan soldiers on these sorts of missions. i was in afghanistan at the time of the operation. a source called me to tell me that soldiers had beaten a man to death. he also told me it was too dangerous to go to charkh, so i drove as close as i could - to the provincial capital. this is the video i shot just days after the operation. >> at first it seemed like another footnote in the war. but after i returned home to copenhagen, more details began to emerge from my contacts in charkh. then six months later the un came out with its 2014 report citing civilian casualties. i found a short reference to the operation in it. >> the operation resulted in 28 civilian casualties (15 deaths and 13 injured). >> fifteen dead. how could fifteen civilian deaths from a joint us and afghan military operation go by almost unnoticed to the outside world? the report said

. >> on august 3rd 2014 us and afghan special operations forces deployed to charkh district about sixty miles south of kabul to clear taliban from the area. there's nothing unusual about this. us special operations forces often accompany afghan soldiers on these sorts of missions. i was in afghanistan at the time of the operation. a source called me to tell me that soldiers had beaten a man to death.

. >> on august 3rd 2014 us and afghan special operations forces deployed to charkh district about sixty miles south of kabul

. >> on august 3rd 2014 us and afghan special operations forces deployed to charkh district about sixty miles south of kabul to clear taliban from the area. there's nothing unusual about this. us special operations forces often accompany afghan soldiers on these sorts of missions. i was in afghanistant

were talkingase we about, special operations forces who were assisting the afghan special operating forces, that it into play for several days. inyou recall, the situation late september, the taliban entered the village -- city ofk unduz. they ask for assistance -- the police asked for assistance from the security and some that responded were our special operations soldiers. they had been there for several ons when the event occurred the third of october. i am sure that is a factor in all of the operations that our men and women are involved in. in this case, it happens less and less frequently because we are not involved in extended combat operations. in this case, we had a special operating team as well as another air force crew that was in the event. it is something that is part of all operations. the rotation by ensuring soldiers are trained to endure and persevere and areas of fatigue. that is something -- i would like to talk about some of the things we are doing to try and help the afghan army police in a similar situation. highalso have extremely off tempo this year so we are worki

. >> on august 3rd 2014 us and afghan special operations forces deployed to charkh district about sixty miles south of kabul to clear taliban from the area. there's nothing unusual about this. us special operations forces often accompany afghan soldiers on these sorts of missions.

were talkingase we about, special operations forces who were assisting the afghan special operating forces, that it into play for several days. inyou recall, the situation late september, the taliban entered the village -- city ofk unduz. they ask for assistance -- the police asked for assistance from the security and some that responded were our special operations soldiers. they had been there for several ons when the event occurred the third of october. i am sure that is a factor in all of the operations that our men and women are involved in. in this case, it happens less and less frequently because we are not involved in extended combat operations. in this case, we had a special operating team as well as another air force crew that was in the event. it is something that is part of all operations. the rotation by ensuring soldiers are trained to endure and persevere and areas of fatigue. that is something -- i would like to talk about some of the things we are doing to try and help the afghan army police in a similar situation. highalso have extremely off tempo this year so we are worki

internet recently but the current version it was simply a mistake, that afghan forces called this in through u.s. special operations's a long history, as we both know, of the u.s. targeting civilian facilities going into the 18991 gulf war. there was the bombing of the shelter which killed hundreds hf iraqis. there was the bombing bombing bf pharmaceutical plant under bill clinton sudan, the bombing of the radio television in serbia. >> al jazeera bombed in iraq and afghanistan. >> al-jazeera's senior correspondent killed in april of 2003 in baghdad in a u.s. strike, and then a journalist killed in the shelling of the palestine hotel, then the shelling of the sheraton hotel in baghdad, where jazeera journalists were the only guests in the hotel at the time, and on and on and on. the commander of u.s. forces in afghanistan, general campbell, said in front of congress a couple of days ago that obama's plan to just keep a kind of small force based at the embassy to do counterterrorism and force protection, was not sustainable, and that it would be better to have no one there than just a thousand troops, and he is now

internet recently, but the current version that it was simply a mistake, that afghan forces had called us after u.s. special operationforces. there is a long history as you and i both know of the u.s. of targeting civilians facilities going to the 1991 gulf war. it was the bombing of the shelter which killed hundreds of iraqis. there was the bombing of the pharmaceutical plant under bill clinton, the bombing of greater television serbia during the 1999 -- >> al-jazeera was bombed in iraq and afghanistan spent al-jazeera's senior correspondent killed in april 2003 in baghdad and a u.s. strike. in a reuters cameraman and a spanish journalist killed in the shelling of the palestine hotel. then the shelling of the sheraton hotel in baghdad which is your journalist were the only guests in a hotel at the time. and on and on and on. the commander of u.s. forces in afghanistan general campbell said in front of congress a couple of days ago that obama's plan was to just keep a small force based at the embassy to do counterterrorism and force protection was not sustainable, and that we better to have no one of their than just

united states special operations forces and their afghan counterparts were rapidly deployed to a camp adjacent to the kunduz airfield in the early morning on september 29. by that evening they were forced to defend the kunduz airfield from a taliban attack the u.s. sought to maintain defensive position and airfield throughout the night until the early morning on september 30. later that day u.s. soft and other counterparts moved into the city and established themselves in the provincial chief of police. between the time that the team was established in the compound, at the time of the incident on october 3 u.s. and afghan soft partners propel heavy and sustained in the tax and conducted multiple defensive strikes and kunduz. by october 3, u.s. soft main entrance recover longer than it did recover longer than intended and continued support of afghan forces. as a result by the early morning hours of october 3 u.s. at the pcop compound had been engaged in heavy fighting for nearly five consecutive days and nights. during the evening of october 2, afghan soft advised u.s. soft commander t

was one of the worst accidents of the afghan war, and it was caused by what general john campbell described as a perfect storm of mistakes special operations forces. >> this was a tragic but avoidable accident caused primarily by human error. >> reporter: after nearly five days of nonstop fighting in the city of kunduz, american commandos were holed up in a police station with afghan troops. the afghans requested a strike on a nearby government building which had been taken over by taliban fighters. an acritic-130 gunship was called in by the american ground commander. the gunship was given the coordinates of the government building, but its targeting system zeroed in on an open field instead. the air crew visually identified the closest structure that resembled the government building they were supposed to strike. they did not know it, but that building was in fact the hospital run by doctors without borders. before opening fire, the gunship provided the coordinates of the target to a command center at bagram airfield. the command center knew those coordinates belonged to the hospital, which was on a no strike list, but nobody put two and two to

worst accidents of the afghan war, and it was caused by what general john campbell described as "a perfect storm of mistakes," committed by america's elite special operations forces. >> this was a tragic but avoidable accident caused primarily by human error. >> reporter: after nearly five days of nonstop fighting in the commandos were holed up in a police station with afghan troops. the afghans requested a strike on a nearby government building which had been taken over by taliban fighters. an ac-130 gunship was called in by the american ground commander. the gunship was given the coordinates of the government building, but its targeting system zeroed in on an open field instead. the air crew visually identified the closest structure that resembled the government building they were supposed to strike. they did not know it, but that building was in fact the hospital run by doctors without borders. before opening fire, the gunship provided the coordinates of the target to a command center at bagram airfield. the command center knew those coordinates belonged to the hospital, which was on a "no strike" list, but nobody put two and two together. the gunship opened f

afghan special forces and u.s. special forces? [indiscernible] i can tell you that the investigation found that the u.s. special operations forces commander did rely on the information provided by afghan partners. the investigation also found that information was correct. as i stated earlier, the investigation found some of the u.s. individuals did violate the rules of engagement and we will take appropriate -- >> you have to take precautions around civilians -- does that not [indiscernible] it looks like your systems were not working. these systems were set up to protect civilians. gen. shoffner: the investigation found the actions of the aircrew and special operations did not take place. -- the actions were not appropriate to the things that were taking place. i will not comment on that further. that's all the time i have her questions, but before i depart, i want to emphasize that we made a terrible mistake, that resulted in unnecessary deaths. we have been committed from the beginning to a transparent and thorough investigation and we will do everything possible to prevent this from happening again. this investigation

worst accidents of the afghan war, and it was caused by what general john campbell described as "a perfect storm of mistakes," committed by america's elite special operations forces. >> this was a trag but avoidadae accident caused primarily by human error. >> reporter: after nearly five days of nonstop fighting in the city of kunduz, american commandos were holed up in a police station with afghan troops. the afghans requested a strike on a nearby government building which had been taken over by taliban fighters. an ac-130 gunship was called in by the american ground commander. the gunship was given the coordinates of the government building, but its targeting system zeroed in on an open field instead. the air crew visually identified the closest structure that resembled the government building they were supposed to strike. they did not know it, but that building was in fact the hospital run by doctors without borders. before openini fire, the gunship provided the coordinates of the target to a command center at bagram airfield. the command center knew those coordinates belonged to the hospital, which was on a "no strike" list, but nobody put two and two togethe

worst accidents of the afghan war, and it was caused by what general john campbell described as "a perfect storm of mistakes," committed by america's elite special operations forces. >> this was a tragic but avoidable accident caused primarily by human error. >> reporter: after nearly five days of nonstop fighting in the city of kunduz, american commandos were holed up in a police station with afghan troops. the afghans requested a strike on a nearby government building which had been taken over by taliban fighters. an ac-130 gunship was called in by the american ground commander. the gunship was given the coordinates of the government building, but its targeting system zeroed in on an open field instead. the air crew visually identified the closest structure that resembled the government building they were supposed to strike. they did not know it, but that building was in fact the hospital run by doctors without borders. before opening fire, the gunship provided the coordinates of the target to a command center at bagram airfield. the command center knew those coordinates belonged to the hospital, which was on a "no strike" list, but nobody put two and two toget

operations. today, the united states is out of the combat business. why is that any different? the afghan special military forcesill face the same challenges. the psychological costs of backing terrorists will have the same effects in terms of .esentment given the fact that you have forces that are probably still some distance to go in terms of capabilities, and yet faces the same kind of operational problems, why should we have to be more optimistic if it now takes the lead in these operations compared to the nato strategy? mr. daudzai: let me put it this way. if we thought about them taking the lead in 2005, it was impossible. reallyated it was international partners and international assistance. it was about 2010-2009 that the idea came that now it is created, and they will gradually become more strong and professional. the plan was to hand over more more responsibilities to them. there was a mutual understanding that by 2014, the responsibility should be handed over entirely, which happened. of thatyou an example same year, 2014, the transition responsibility was supposed to of 2014.ted by the end in practic

special operations forces commander did rely on information provided by the afghan partners. the investigation also found that that information was correct. as i stated earlier the investigation found that some of you as individuals involved did violate the rules of engagement and we will take a proper action on that -- [inaudible] >> it looks like your systems were not working. [inaudible] >> the investigation found that the actions of the air crew in a special operations command were not appropriate to the threats that they faced. the investigating officers recommendations on this matter have been referred to the proper authorities for disposition, and i will not comment on the for the. at all the time i have a question but fort to port highway to emphasize we made a terrible mistake that resulted in unnecessary deaths. we have been committed from the beginning to a transparent and thorough investigation, and will do everything possible to prevent this from happening again. this investigation was an important step in this process, but it is just one step toward full account