this chain of command is the commander at afmao. it goes on up through the assistant personnel officer of the air force, to the three-star, three-star personnel officer for the air force, chief of staff of the air force. when we looked at this command, this command structure we figured that there was very little command oversight possible from it. first of all, the afmao commander did not have uniform code of military justice authority which all commanders need. he was not, what i would call a centrally selected commander. the a-1-s was a civilian, ses at the time. and had no command authority of his own and of course the three-star above the a-1-s has no command authority either. so you have a commander in name who has no command authority, no true command authority reporting to a chain of command that is a staff chain that is not responsible to commanders and this, in our opinion, showed lack of command oversight. if any of you think that organizations within this building would better supervise field activities than other command

they are also training issues that we found at afmao. these training issues, although the people they're quite skilled skilled at what they do come in the issues are more of a routine training that needs to be conduct it over time. we found some issues with regard to meeting in terms of whether it was weird fast enough. we also found some other resourcing issues throughout afmao and by the way the air force is addressing it. finally, it is important to note that as you look through the report, there are many other recommendations that we urge the air force to make, before the panel, it is clear to us by correcting the lack of oversight for command, lack of oversight for technical capabilities, lack of oversight for policy, et cetera, et cetera, all of these things need to be fixed in the report provides a way for them to be fixed in a very timely manner. the panel also recommended the establishment of a board of visitors as technical experts, not unlike the board of visitor -- or the panel that we assembled to be able to report through t

there are also training issues that we found at afmao. these training issues -- of the the people there are quite skilled and what they do, the training issues are more of a routine training needs to be connected overtime. we found some issues with regard to manning in terms of whether it was robust enough -- robust enough. we also found some other resources issues the routes afmao that need to be addressed. and the air force, by the way, is addressing it. finally, it's important to note that as you looked through the report there are many other recommendations that we urge the air force to make, but for the panel, it's clear test that correcting the lack of oversight for command, lack of oversight for technical committees, lack of oversight for policy, all of these things need to be fixed, and the report provides a way for them to be fixed in a very timely manner. the panel also recommended the establishment of a board of visitors, of technical experts, not unlike the board of -- the board, the panel that we assembled to be able to repor

third, we strongly endorse the need for the tail third inspection program appropriate to afmao mission. there force is already working to create the needed inspection criteria and the first inspection under the new program is scheduled to take place this june. fourth, the conduct and will continue to conduct training exercises that cover the health and safety of their personnel. in addition, leadership will solicit the air staff and a national industry professionals to provide recommendations on training that will be beneficial to our team. we support the panel's recommendations for the standing board of visitors including outside professionals. but then oversee and advice on the latest and best practices in addition the current leadership is working with the national association of directors to have them give recommendations on training that would be beneficial to the team. we also agreed the panel's recommendation to the right size the organization and build a surge capability to deal with larger incidents and contingencies should they occur and we will undertake a manpower study. al