a 2002 cia report states that questions persist about al libbi's forthrightness and truthfulness, andt in some instances he seems to have fabricated information. after the infact, al libi will reimportacant the story that wa extracted by egypt's brutal interrogation. >> at the time he said two different things at two different times, and we will tell the policy consumers and other analysts in the community both stories. you choose to believe what you choose to believe. but i don't know which one is accurate. >> the administration chooses to believe the connection. >> we've learned that iraq has trained al qaeda members in bomb making and poisons and deadly gases. >> right up to the war and beyond, it remains a key administration argument for war. and the public largely trusts it to be true. >> if you look at all the key pieces of evidence that they presented publicly at the time on every single one of them not only was there doubt, there was debate within the intelligence agencies of the u.s. government. >> the intelligence community assessed that saddam hussein was building a mobile