job over time we will help reduce the appeal of extremism and weaken the attraction of the al-qaeda narrative. now, let me turn to another priority region for our counterterrorism efforts. to a certain extent which is a good news story. al-qaeda and the islamic magram has failed to meet the objectiv objectives. the group has been unable to conduct major sophisticated attacks since the summer of 2008. this is due in large measure to pressure from algerian forces. furthermore, aqim is in chronic financial trouble particularly in algeria and unable to reach hits recruiting goals. and whether it would establish itself in europe and carry out attacks there. this is a possibility that we always need to be on guard about. but that said we viewed the near term likelihood of expansion of operations is less likely than just a few years ago. this is in large measure to the -- due to the pressure that the group has been under in algeria and the strong counterterrorism efforts by france. in the saw hill, however, the picture is different. aqim maintains two separate groups of fighters in northern mali and

against international terrorism and in particular that we were failing effectively to counter al qaeda's narrative. in my roughly ten months in office, i have to say my view of our tactical capabilities in the area of intelligence, military, and law enforcement have been more than amply confirmed. and i have to say my colleagues working in these years have developed abilities far beyond anything i could have imagined when i left government at the end of 1999, after serving on staff. but my view that we had not yet raised our efforts to a truly strategic level was also confirmed, and that we had not yet really begun the hard work of devising policies that would have stemmed the tide of recruits and undermined the appeal of al qaeda in the world's view. i am pleased to say that under president obama's leadership i think we are addressing that short coming. we are now formulating policies that seek to shape and constrain the environment that terrorists operate in. in other words, when terrorist discover that mir surroundings are more hostile to them, their ability to evade detection will diminish and

task over job we can help reduce the appeal of extremism and weekend the attraction of the al qaeda narrative and yemeni let me turn to another prairie region to a certain extent this is a good news story islamic maghreb and al qaeda is on the defensive which effectively is the homeland of northeastern ontario. the group is an enviable to conduct sophisticated tax due to pressure from the algerian forces which have broken of cells and disrupted any number of operations. furthermore thank you i am it is in fried -- chronic financial trouble in algeria and unable to reach recruiting goals. one of the questions of aqim is of it could carry added tax somewhere but we view the likelihood of such an expansion of operation most likely than just a few years ago it is a large measure due to the pressure that group has been under and the strong counterterrorism efforts by france however the picture is different aqim has a and two separate groups of fighters had also increased kidnappings against western targets in the last two years aqim stepped up the pace kidnapping austrian tourist and canadian dipl

student at georgetown university and my question related to what you said about combating the narrative of al qaeda is something you refer to a number of times and in the response to date with the micro strategy and other ways talking about the people you met with in pakistan you leave out the elements of what is involved but something you talk about all so that i felt was may be less addressed but was combating extremism here in the u.s. and the extent which it's been on the rise and when i wonder is as an official of the u.s. department do you think there are lessons to be learned from government for example in europe that dealt with this than the u.s. and so with those are and i'm thinking in particular of the british government which when i was at homeland security had a robust program they were developing specifically focused on this issue. thank you. >> i absolutely think we have a lot to learn from others and that's why i have this from the foreign office in my bureau right now working on these issues and why we are talking to our partners in the netherlands, france, you name it about differ

my question relates to combating narrative of al qaeda. something i referred to in number of times.the response you gave with your micro strategies and other ways talking about people you know in pakistan, you laid out some of the elements you involved there. something you also talked about i felt was less addressed combating extreme i am in the u.s. which is the sense on rise. i wonder as official of the u.s. state department do you think there are lessons to be learned from governments for example, in europe have dealt with this for longer than the u.s., and if so what those are? imthinking in particular of british government when i was at homeland security had a pretty robust program they were developing specifically focused on this issue. thank you. >> i absolutely think we have a lot to learn from others and, that's why i have from foreign office in my bureau working on these issues and why we're talking to our partners in the netherlands, france, you name it, about different, undertaking in this area. i think that we would make a big mistake in interpreting american exceptiona

student at georgetown university and my question related to what you said about combating the narrative of the al qaeda that you referred to a number of times with what you talk about the micro strategies and laid out some of the elements of what is involved but also may be combating extremism and what i wonder as an official do think there are lessons to be learned from governments and europe that have dealt with this longer and what those are? i am thinking the british government when i was in rolled home as security developing focused on this issue. thank you. >> we have a lot to learn from others that is why a i have someone in my office working on these issues right now and why we are talking to our partners in another man's and if other parts of you name it to undertaking in this area. i think we would make a big mistake interprets being exceptional listen to see weird viewed from radicalization i think i wrote to in the book before going into statistical inevitability we have been fortunate thus far to have a low level for all kinds of complicated issues having to do with social mobility origins

unlike al qaeda, it does not advocate the use of terrorism, but it is fervently anti-western and deeply committed to the narrative. when h.t. recruiters worked on nawaz, they played on his sense of alienation. they broke you down, so that you were no longer british; you, a person who had had no religion, became a muslim. >> nawaz: yeah. along came these islamist activists and said, "you're being targeted because you're muslim, and non-muslims hate islam," when the skinheads who attacked me didn't have a clue i was a muslim. they were looking at the color of my skin. >> stahl: and you bought it? >> nawaz: i did. as an angry, young, naive 15-, 16-year-old. >> stahl: and you became a muslim? >> nawaz: and i became suddenly not just a muslim in faith; i became a muslim in politics, somebody whose politics were predefined by one interpretation of islam. >> stahl: what is your job, once you join up? >> nawaz: to recruit as many people as possible to this group, and spread this narrative far and wide. >> stahl: after working in england for five years, he was sent abroad to spread the narrative, to pakistan and then to d