andy johnson represents those were democrats. the republican party in 18 624 rechristened itself the national union party, the purpose here is to say this is a big tent for all those people that want to win the war. those copperhead democrats those surrender monkeys are not interested in winning the war. johnson represents those war democrats, he represents southern unionism. it was a profound, cherished hope of the republican administration, an article of faith, again i alluded to this that there was this massive white others who had a latent hostility to the planter class that might be brought on board with the free labor agenda. and a belief in a latent southern unionism. johnson is the preeminent symbol of southern unionism, was a good representative of the piece that they wanted to make. link and also initiated an experiment in wartime reconstruction, a very lenient sort of wartime reconstruction, lincoln's philosophy was encapsulated in that malice toward none, charity towards all address. radical republicans in congress ha

andy finished paul johnson's book eisenhower, a life.he recommends steven ambrose's two volume biography of eisenhower which taste traces his path from solder to president. a memoir by his grandson david eisenhower and david's wife, julie nix so eisenhower. on his list, eisen house the white house years. next eisenhower's personal account of strategies, battles and outcome of world war ii in, crusade in europe. and completing the list, representative tom cole recommends gene edward smith's portrait of the 34th president in, eisenhower in "war and peace." to see what other books congressman cole recommended visit cole.house.gov. . .

i later, years later asked president johnson what he really thought of that episode. he said, "you know, andyl martin was right, but he should have told me about it ahead of time." the war, fought half a world away evespec ofmecan li omeoe titis. the ardonarpolicy significanwe inn, buon agrcost we askedomntatorrichargi o economistse ti w rtt wa ne policy?" certainly by the mid to late 1960s, everybody realized monetary policy was important. even in the old days most people realized that although you can't push on a string you could pull on one. in an economy beset by inflation the reverse links, reduced reserves to less money, to less spending to lower prices, worked well, perhaps too well. we might get not just lowered prices, but also lowered real gnp. and not just lowered real gnp in general, but higher interest rates and the collapse of interest-sensitive industries like housing and commercial construction. the crunch in the credit crunch of 1966 was for real. monetary policy, it seemed was a lot stronger tool than many had imagined. there was a general rethinking of the whole subject of