there's a difference between an aoa indicator and aoa sensors. and aoa sensors had an impact, but aoa indicator, it's not a primary flight system, it's not a second of flight system. in all of my thousands of flight, i don't think i've been in a plane with aoa in it. there's been emphasis placed on aoa indicators in the cockpit and it's a little frustrating because to be quite honest with you, those are more for, for a maintenance reference than they are for -- they're not a flight instrument by any stretch, but with that mr. chairman, i appreciate this hearing. >> thanks, gentleman. i'm told that ms. davis has a brief question. ms. davis. >> thank you, chairman. so the certification process is my primary concern here, as a legislator, as a member of congress who sits on the tni committee. our job is to create the framework under which regulations will be promulgated. those will be the things that keep the public safe. the first thing i want to say, this might be the first time in boeing's history that we're facing a situation where the culture o

he knew some of these things after lion air and we knew after lion air that boeing was aware of the aoa disagree light, the angle of attack indicator disagree light didn't work. so that was known before ethiopia 302. all the families in the room were from ethiopia 302, so that was a very sore point. i was trying to think of reasons he didn't know the answers to many questions or couldn't answer the questions. you know, there is a criminal investigation out there. i was a federal prosecutor for a number of years too. and if someone has received -- and i'm the not saying this happened in this case. if someone has received a criminal subpoena and they're a grand jury witness, you can't go talk to them, ask them what they're going to say to the grand jury at peril of being called witness tampering or attempting to suppress evidence. it's possible some of these people have received grand jury subpoenas or have been questioned by the fbi or the office of the inspector general and that's the case, it's ill-advised to try to debrief these people, make them tell you everything they're going to t

sus hermanos y a su papÁ porque ellos cada vez que ven que la gente necesita ayuda, la ofrecen tr .aoa4 persona la que han fallecido, entre estas cuatro civiles pro fuego cruzado. entretanto, 400 elementos de Élite de ejército mexicano se encuentra en el culiacÁn lo que le permite a la gente retomar sus actividades normales. es ciudad de mÉxico, alejandro roldÁn, univisiÓn. enrique: cambiamos de tema. en julio icialmente, quienes solicitaron este alivio migratorio antes de esta fecha, no sabÍan afectados por la determinaciÓn del presidente. no obstante, siendo de migrante cuyo caso fueron resueltas en las cortes de inmigraciÓn continÚan detenidos por autoridades migratorias mientras establecen si la medida es retroactiva o no. en poco menos de tres aÑos el presidente donald trump ha tenido cuatro secretarios de seguridad interna. ahora evalÚa candidato para reemplazar a kevin quien dejÓ la secretaria encargada, entre otras cosas, de implementar la polÍtica anti migrante de donald trump. entre los aspirantes destaca uno de los autores de la polÍtica con la que miles de niÑos por separad

did you test the reliability of the aoa sensors in jen untgener? test the reliability on a single sensor, consult the pilots on the lack of mcas and flight manuals the aoa sensor's degree of alert to ensure reliability? did you test the human factor response these are things from the lion air report and my guess is you didn't test those and that's at the heart of this. if you did and you have data on that and it was provided to the faa that's what we want to see >> senator, we did test the mcas uncommanded inputs to the stabilizer system. due to whatever causes was driving it not specifically due to an aoa sensor we assessed that hazard level. we -- >> which now do you think is wrong? >> in hindsight, senator, yes. >> thank you because i agree. >> yeah. >> senator, if i could just add a point to that because as john pointed out, we relied on these long-standing industry standards as part of our evaluation of response time behind mcas and that is one of the areas that -- >> here's the thing i'm -- >> we found a shortfall. >> here's the thing i'm con

did you test the reliability of the aoa censors in general? did you test the reliability on a single sensor? did you consult with the pilots on the lack of guidance on mcas in the flight manuals? did you test the aoa sensor's degree of alert to ensure reliability? these are things from the report. my guess is you did not test those and that is at the heart of this. if you did, and you have data and it was provided to the faa that's what we want to see. , >> senator, we did test the mcas on command inputs to the stabilizer system due to whatever causes were driving it. not specifically due to an aoa sensor. we assessed that hazard level. we -- >> which now do you think is wrong? >> in hindsight, senator, yes. >> thank you, because i agree. >> senator, if i could add a point to that, as john pointed out, we relied on the these longstanding industry standards as part of our evaluation of response time. that is one of the areas -- >> here's the thing i'm very confused about which is the larger issue. look we want to get this right , because we wan

but many more, many millions are saved by what the aoa is about to undertake. in fact, ever do a flash forward, by the summer, american kitchens were feeding every day, so i daily basis about 10 million citizens, and here you see, i'm going to come back to this map a little bit later but you see how the foot will get into ports and, coming in through the black sea port here and here is where the famine it's beyond the vulgar river valley but this is where it's located. at the time when this operation was unfolding, certainly by the summer of 1923 when it ends, the american rescue operation is hailed as the largest of the 20th century, that remark made by --. by the decade, it was all but forgotten, and particular by americans. at the very end today i will explain to you how that happened. the official papers of the american relief administration, hundreds are located in the hoover archives on the stanford campus, saturated most of my research for a book on this episode, beginning back in 1987 but i did come twice, in 1989, 1990, approved to be essential for my

not specifically due to an aoa sensor. we assessed that hazard level, we talk -- >> which now do you think is wrong? >> in hindsight, senator, yes. >> thank you, because i agree. >> senator, if i could add a point to that, as john pointed out, we relied on the long stngistn standing standards -- >> here's the thing i'm very confused about which is the larger issue. we want to get this right because we want to go forward. we know there's going to be automation in many aspects of our lives. this robust testing that must occur and third party validation, i just don't thds how you have censors on the outside of a plane and you're going to let that send a command to the inside of the plane that basically says trim the plane 2.5 degrees and all of a sudden you're going to be yelled at from somebody saying pull up and at the same time you're being forced down in your nose and you have seconds to respond because you're in take off. that doesn't seem like a lot of robust test waugz dons done. i have a few seconds left. i want to ju

is, as youlide here emphasize, flight control will now compare inputs from both aoa sensors.s, why wasn't it that day from day one -- that way from day one? why wasn't it that way from day one? if you can do it with an extra wire or a software fix or whatever, why didn't you do it from day one? why not have the redundancy? >> vista chairman, we've asked ourselves our same question over and over -- mr. chairman, we've asked ourselves that same question over and over. the original concept from a safety standpoint was to build the mcas, extend the current speed trim system on the previous generation of the 73 system. that is a system that had about 200 million safelite hours on it. one of our safety principles is to take safe systems and emblem meant them. >> all right, thank you. my time is expired. i want to turn to the ranking member, mr. graves. know where to start. to the, justback kind of clarification to that first slide for mcas. can we bring that up? >> can we bring that slide backup, the one that shows the flight deck with mcas? , this mcas warning to me is more of an

that e-mail saying, quote, are we vulnerable to single aoa sensor failures?ear where the conversation went from there. but the scenario raised is largely believed to be the one that doomed the lion air flight and the ethiopian airlines flight. boeing has fired one executive so far. but mullenburg side stepped questio questions whether or not he would resign. he also side stepped questions whether he would take a pay cut. >>> renewed cries of voter suppression in georgia. 4% of all registered voters in georgia. state officials say they will be removed in december if they do not vote or respond to official election mail. the state calls it a routine process. but voting rights advocates say the purge is part of the effort to suppress voting. >>> foie gras banned in the big apple. mayor bill de blasio said he was sign it into law. foie gras is made by force-feeding ducks and geese with a tube in their stomach. the sponsor of the bill calls the practice inhumane. those who try to sell foie gras, despite the ban, will face a civic penalty up to $2,000 for each viol

that e-mail saying, quote, are we vulnerable to single aoa sensor failures?where the conversation went from there. but the scenario raised is largely believed to be the one that doomed the lion air flight and the ethiopian airlines flight. boeing has fired one executive so far. but muilenburg side stepped questions whether or not he would resign. he said, that's not where he's focused. he also side stepped questions whether he would take a pay cut. christine and dave? >> renee marsh, thank you. >>> let's get a check on cnn business this thursday morning. looking at markets around the world, mixed right now. european shares, leaning mostly lower. on wall street, futures right now, down a little bit here. you know, stocks rallied wednesday after the fed cut interest rates for a third time in a row. the fed has erased all of last year's rate hikes. the s&p 500 eked out a fresh all-time high. the dow finished up 115. the nasdaq closed higher, as well. >>> an iconic brewing company is changing its name and laying off workers. molson coors is consolidating to two b

computers on board the airplane so each flight control computer previously received its input from one aoa sensor on the left or right in the software changes going forward now both flight control computers received data from both sensors, compare it, only if they agree, they'll activate. >> thank you senator moran. >> thank you have you determined that the failures that resulted in tragic consequences, were they failures in policies and protocols that boeing had in place or was it a failure to comply with those protocols and policies that resulted in these consequences >> senator, in some cases we relied on long-standing industry standards, policies. we're now raising questions around those that gets back to the pilot response time discussion we had earlier. in some cases we missed on implementation, as i mentioned earlier with the angle of attack sensor overall we did follow the certification process and steps, but nonetheless, we learned from both these accidents and the fixes we need to make are clear. >> so the fixes are both in policy and in making certain that policies are followed

with the aoa failure, it activates and its 2.5 degrees every ten seconds, pretty radical. and boeing assumed it would take pilots 40 seconds to realize and react to the stabilizers is that correct? >> mr. chairman, again, as we do what is called hazard analysis to the airplane design -- >> that was the assumption that the long-standing industry assumption. >> lion air reports that it took eight seconds to react, then we have information provided to the committee by boeing which will now be the second slide. and it says a slow reaction time scenario, ten seconds down to the failure to be catastrophic. do you think that was clearly communicated to the regulators that a 102nd delay which doesn't seem like a lo a lot of time toe particularly when you look at the report and the cacophony going on in the flight deck when they didn't even know the system existed? was the faa aware of this document? >> mr. chairman, i can't speak to the specific document though john may be able to. i think it's important to note that this part of the design process we use a set of industry-standar