. >> does that mean aphis is in charge? yes or no. >> aphis is in charge of investigating cdc's select laboratories. not in charge of the overall enterprise. >> do you think we need to clarify who is going to be in charge of the overall enterprise? >> we're certainly willing to look at every suggestion to improve laboratory safety and security. >> would it be useful if we had one agency in charge of all of the inspections and making sure people were doing things in the right way? >> i've seen several suggestions for how we could improve the process of the oversight and select agent oversight. and my sense is that each of those ideas, each of these ideas is certainly worth exploring. >> what do you think about that, dr. kingsbury. do you think it would be useful to have one agency in charge? >> we've said for a number of years there needs to be some entity in charge of a national strategy. not necessarily in charge of every laboratory in the country. the other thing -- >> so you're saying an agency in charge of developing th

>> yes. >> gao and aphis both examinations. dr, yousbury and believe this was an appropriate response to this incident, don't you? >> yes, i do. >> yes, i do. >> we should not forget that the way the cdc conducts this is to help keep the american public safe. cdc serves a critical role for studying dangerous pathogens to finding cures and vaccines for deadly diseases. these labs are critical to our nation's response to bioterrorism threats, so i am interested in learning about how this moratorium and the lab closures are affecting critical research that these labs were conducting. den, how did the moratorium and lab closures limit the cdc capabilities, what happens to the studies, some of which i am guessing were operating on detailed schedules, while they were being conducted in the labs? >> we are looking at the labs in detail and identifying any laboratories which need to resume transfers for individual patient care or for public health response with highest priority, and we expect that those laboratories we will be able to

aphis? >> yes. >> gao and both conducted examinations. dr. kingsbury and dr. -- ypu believe this was an appropriate response to this incident, don't you? >> yes, i do. >> yes, i do. >> we should not forget that the way the cdc conducts this is to help keep the american public safe. cdc serves a critical role for studying dangerous pathogens to finding cures and vaccines for deadly diseases. these labs are critical to our nation's response to bioterrorism threats, so i am interested in learning about how this moratorium and the lab closures are affecting critical research that these labs were conducting. dr. frieden, how did the moratorium and lab closures limit the cdc capabilities, what happens to the studies, some of which i am guessing were operating on detailed schedules, while they were being conducted in the labs? >> we are looking at the labs in detail and identifying any laboratories which need to resume transfers for individual patient care or for public health response with highest

i'm wondering why hasn't aphis conducted inspections? >> we conduct surprise inspections to enforce compliance between renewal inspections which is every three years. we, as we stated, we came on in -- late 2012 as the oversight entity for c.d.c. at roybal lab, we've actually been there six, seven, if you include this last incident in time in the last year and a half so we have not had an opportunity to do a surprise inspection since we're there regularly. >> so the last time a surprise inspection was done was when? >> we have not done a surprise inspection prior to taking over in 2012. i'm not familiar with before that. >> and obviously i won't ruin the surprise by asking when one is planned but it does seem like we -- >> we intend to follow-up -- >> that's a great tool to have. >> absolutely. and certainly first and foremost, we're going to be following up on the current incident with them in making a revisit when c.d.c. indicates that they are ready for us to revisit. and then we will be doing surprise inspections after that point. >>

to provide aphis with its plan for coming into compliance by july 25. and before allowing c.d.c. to resume select agent work in the laboratories, we will conduct a re-inspection to ensure that all corrective actions have been taken. mr. chairman, this concludes my testimony. i would be happy to answer any questions that you or members of the subcommittee have. >> thank you, dr. dick. y, please point the microphone very close to your mouth. closer than that. >> pardon me? >> ring the mic -- bring being mic really close. >> is that better? thank you very much for inviting us to come to talk to you about some of our past work on biosafety issues. as mr. waxman noted in his statement, we have been doing this work for quite a while. we started with the original anthrax attacks, and we have gone on to a number of other issues over the years. our past work has a couple of major themes. one of them is a lack of strategic planning and oversight of the whole picture of biosafety laboratories. aphis and cdc are only a part of that picture and since 2001, there have been an increasing number

dick, in light of the anthrax incident investigation, aphis recently completed, do you think that prior inspections of cdc laboratories were sufficie sufficient? >> i do. >> well, given the fact that select agents were stored in an designated places, shouldn't such problems have come to light fully as a result of prior inspections to? >> yeah, i think the important thing to recognize is that when we review their protocols, the protocols were in place. and because of the primary cause of this incident, and that was that this bacteria was not inactivated, it was transferred to a laboratory that would not necessarily have to have a locked cabinet. and so, therefore, when we provide our report on select agents, as was indicated earlier, we also report on those laboratories where that select agent went. in this case, not deactivated. >> all right. that concludes my questions. mr. chairman, i yield back the balance of my time. >> now recognize mr. long for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. dr. frieden, are you familiar with this picture? >> i certainly am. >> i'm going to turn 59 in l

i'm doctor jere dick, associate administrator for aphis within usda. aphis conducted a thorough inspection of the incident to learn how it happened and determine appropriate remedial measures. we will continue to monitor the cdc's response to ensure all necessary corrective action is taken. and that when work resumes at the laboratories it will be done in full compliance with the health and safety of employees and the public at the forefront. usda was designated by congress as the partner with cdc and the oversight of select agents because of our expertise and experience, essentially working with select agents over the past century. through our efforts to prevent dangers to these agents from impacting u.s. agriculture and the environment. for decades, aphis is also safely operated high containment laboratories that handle select agents, including those of concern to human health. our personnel, our leading diagnosticians and experts working in the high containment laboratories. to ensure objectivity, aphis and cdc signed a memorandum of understanding i