the key battle with aqap is in the countryside. the u.s. government needs to pay more attention to this problem and craft a suitable strategy. as part of this effort to washington institute for near east policy is conducting a series of studies whether al qaeda is operated. the u.s. approach must be decentralized, locally based, long-term and holistic blending military and civil approaches. this is an impediment to expanded u.s. presence in the countryside. the president in saudi arabia and yemen's political action in a stalemate now is the time to offer a sign of expanded aid package to help the government stabilize the problems. we should adopt a forward strategy consisting of four main components. these are more about how we are organized in yemen rather than how many resources we are devoted to a problem. the u.s. needs a robust for an internal defense program. washington should consider an expanded training initiative for yemen security services concentrating on counter-terrorism and conventional forces. u.s. trainers should deploy to

and to provide with material support including personnel between aqap and al-shabaab. al-shabaab is the top al qaeda leaders such as the mastermind of 1998 u.s. embassy bombings in east africa was gunned down last month in somalia after a 13 year manhunt. al-shabaab a spragens a malida in support of aqap and to the yemeni government this year as well as flying the battle of al qaeda and iraq. finally, and al-shabaab bombing in neighboring ugonda of one year ago targeted killed 74 people including one american. james clapper, president obama's director of national intelligence said, quote, vigilance that al-shabaab -- vigilant al-shabaab means focus fighting to control somalia to protect the u.s. homeland. that convinced me of the necessity to launch a careful examination of the threat. does to -- doesn't agree that it's real and al-shabaab's leaders called for attacks against american including the retaliation of killing bin laden must be taken seriously. just yesterday macules of what president's nominee to to cover the counterterrorism center focused on all chabad an

i think we aqap as an organization increasingly opportunistic that demonstrates a very quick learning curve, very clearly, it has intention and capacity to strike yemen regionally and internationally. it seems they have the capacity to do so. not just in yemen, but the other side of this, the potential for aqap to reach back into committees in this country and in western europe in english language, non-arabic language materials, through the internet, to reach individuals that are not otherwise part of the counter-terrorism landscape. there is another issue today that has been released. the organization is continuing to do this despite what we see going on in the country. >> i think we're ready to wrap up. anything you there are witnesses want to say for the record -- anything any of our witnesses want to say for the record? what we need to hear in the senate and the house? areas you think we need to focus on in the next couple of months? >> one thing i realize we have challenging economic times and fiscal times. i think sometimes we mistake throwing lots of resources as a problem as a

after aqap's failed christmas day attack that the transfer stopped. in my mind, this was an unacceptable risk for us to take. he mentioned in my office the question on the task force in part because you were guided by the executive order on closing gitmo. i suspect that the one-year deadline for closing gitmo affected task force analysis and decisions. when the only original two options for each detainee for the prosecution or transfer, it seems like there would have been significant pressure to lean towards transfer. i wonder if this explains why, after the initial task force review, found 92 detainee's suitable for transfer to my second review came up with 40 more transferable detainee's, and another 40 for conditional detention, which at the time was essentially delete transferred. congressman frank wolf of virginia who has expressed similar concerns about the transfer decisions in a letter to the kennedy and some of the interactions he had with you regarding the potential transfer of uighurs into the united states. i am concerned a member of congr

after aqap's failed christmas day attack that the transfer stopped. in my mind, this was an unacceptable risk for us to take. he mentioned in my office the question on the task force in part because you were guided by the executive order on closing gitmo. i suspect that the one-year deadline for closing gitmo affected task force analysis and decisions. when the only original two options for each detainee for the prosecution or transfer, it seems like there would have been significant pressure to lean towards transfer. i wonder if this explains why, after the initial task force review, found 92 detainee's suitable for transfer to my second review came up with 40 more transferable detainee's, and another 40 for conditional detention, which at the time was essentially delete transferred. congressman frank wolf of virginia who has expressed similar concerns about the transfer decisions in a letter to the kennedy and some of the interactions he had with you regarding the potential transfer of uighurs into the united states. i am concerned a member of congr

or a new former gitmo detainee is where with aqap leadership in yemen but only after aqap failed christmasday tech that the transfer stopped work in my mind this was the an acceptable risk to take. dimension in my office of pressure on the task force because you are guided by the executive order to close gitmo vice suspect the t deadline affected task force analysis and decisions. and the original options werepr prosecution retrieves for it seems like there would be significantew pressure to lean toward the transfer and wonder if this explains why found 82 detainee suitable for transfer but a second came up with 40 more transferable detainee said another 34 conditional detention which at the time was essentially delayed transfer. congressman wolf of virginia who has expressed similar concerns in a letter to the committee and some of the interactions that he had with year regarded the potential transfer into the united states, i am concerned a member of congress thinks he has been misled is what would be helpful to explainofhtebfu and 2 you to have your opportunity ise forthcoming but inclu

i've also heard from african union personnel, they are greatly concerned about the link between aqapand al shabaab. i think it is worrisome. this has gone beyond somalia. we also have the bombing of al shabaab in uganda just a year ago this month. there are links that are now starting to extend beyond the borders. this is what should concern the united states. >> well, there's a refugee problem in kenya now as well. >> there is that also. one more question back to the strength and potential for the african union for stabilization purposes. minimum, that's the trajectory here? >> i think the african union forces made -- when they went in there, they went in without a clear strategy other than a broad mandate to the peace keepers and to protect the government. for most of the last four years, nine or ten months ago, the chief duty was to literally the physical protection of the so-called government that was confined to the presidential villa and, you know, occasional mad dashes to the airport. >> so they are concentrated in one place. >> in one place. since then they have made some exp

according to press reports, this was in connection with aqap. that in and of itself does not prove a lot, but i have heard from african union personnel that they are very concerned about the link between awap and -- aqap and al shabaab. this goes beyond somalia. we also have the bombing from uganda of just one year ago this month. there are links that are now starting to extend beyond the borders which is what should concern the united states. >> there is a refugee problem in kenya. >> there is that problem as well. >> one more question about the potential for the african union for stabilization purposes. is it minimal? what is the projection? >> the african union forces, when they went in there, they went in without a clear strategy other than a broad mandate to be peacekeepers and protect of the government. for most of the last four years, until about nine or 10 months ago, their chief duty was, literally, the physical protection of the so-called government that was confined to the presidential villa and mad dashes to the government. >> but th

aqap remains the most active in the network. it poses a serious threat to the united states. sl shabad continues to call for strikes against the united states. we will not let our guard down. we will continue to pummel al qaeda and its ilk. we will remain vigilant here at home. still, as we approached the 10th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, as we seek to understand where we are, we need to look no further of the compound where osama bin laden spent his final days. he was there for years, isolated from the world. but even he understood the sorry state of his organization and its ideology. --ormation's seized from the information's seized from the -- information seized from the compound reveals his concerns about long-term viability, calling for more large-scale attacks against americans but encountered resistance from his followers. he went with years without seeing any spectacular attacks. he saw his senior leaders being taken down one by one. he was worried about being able to replace them effectively. perhaps most importantly, osama bin laden said al-qaeda is losing the b