we still regard, we, regard the aqap, that is the tears in yemen, still pose -- the terrorists in yemen, still pose the greatest threat to us to an internally the most frequent threat for us will continue to be homegrown violent extremists. >> how has sequestered affected the preparedness of your organization? and budgetary constraints, generally. >> well, it's having an effect. as i said in my oral statement, the combination of the compromises, decisions we've made, and budget reductions occasioned by sequestration, or sequestration like reductions, is, th that you were to the efft of all this is what i worry about. -- bekking that could affect. and the reduction in our capacity. it's not as great as it was citesunday year or two ago. and if we continue these cuts, it will continue to have a negative impact. >> is there a particular capability that is most at risk or vulnerable? >> the most important asset, and this is been a consistent tenant of min minds as long as i've ben this job, is our most important resource is our people. and that's why i'm so concerned about the effect on the

the -- aqap >> refers the original al qaeda move meant and the remnants to include zahler heery, theleader of the al qaeda movement. and so, to me that is my working definition is the core al qaeda and its origins in the pakistan and now primarily fata region. >> do you get across the board to carry out attacks, are you just do not qaeda affiliate? are you answer us a real? or some other terrorist group or related to al qaeda? >> well, i am not sure i understand the question, that there are sort of designated affiliates. five of them, aqap, we now regard that franchise if you build indiana and is what we regard now is the primary threat of all the franchises in terms of threat to the homeland. >> you understand the question. then maybe berkeley bar clear. the reason we haven't been able to get the pentagon's attackers is because they are not designated al qaeda. >> i don't think that has many varied on the investigation and hopefully prosecution of the perpetrators of the benghazi attack. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i yield that. >> in october 2012. struck with my staff. >> thank you

at the same time you assess that aqap poses a significant threat and remains on -- intent on targeting the u.s. and interests overseas. i would like to have your first start off but i will -- i want kind of a general discussion about al qaeda. not just core al qaeda but there threat to the u.s. domestically and overseas. each of you have kind of a different interest. with respect to homegrown terrorists in the future there. these are the questions i would like for you to address. how would you characterize the probability of an al qaeda sponsored or inspired attack against the u.s. homeland today as compared to 2001? if al qaeda is evolving from a centralized core group to decentralized goebel movement of multiple organizations, capable of attacking the u.s., would you say the threat has decreased or increased? has the threat diminished or increased and what is the impact on limitations that are proposed to be put on sections 215 and 702 likely to have on the future of the intelligence community with regard to collection? director? >> thank you. while the ideological center of the al q

in 2013, we saw aqap, aq's yemeni faction, and the group's north african affiliate, aqim, pose a very severe threat to the u.s. in august, the threat forced the state department to close 19 embassies across the middle east and north africa in response to an aqap plot that was-thanks to your efforts- intercepted. on the other hand, aqim successfully conducted an attack against western interests in mali and algeria, while somalia-based terrorist group al shabaab committed a brutal attack in kenya. china continues with great concern on their cyber policy and in the east china sea. beijing's so-called "air defense identification zone," which would require u.s. forces to identify themselves and their mission to chinese forces as they fly near or over certain tiny islands, is a troubling power and land grab. it is also an affront to international law. these moves increase the risk of misunderstanding and miscalculations between washington and china, making the role of intelligence that much more important. in russia, our athletes, and athletes from around the world, will be convening in jus

we still regard the aqap pose the most dangerous external threat to us. internally, the most frequent threat will continue to be homegrown violent extremists. >> how has sequester affected this preparedness of your organization? it is having an effect. >> as i said in my statement, the combination of compromises and decisions we have made and budget reductions is the effect of all this is that i worry about. the reduction in our capacity. it is not as great as it was a year or two ago. if we continue with these cuts, we will have a negative impact. >> is there a particular capability that is most at risk? >> the most important asset is our people. that is why i am concerned about the effect of the morale of the workforce. with shutdowns and pay freezes and furloughs, i am concerned. we want to be able to recruit the people we need. our attrition is around 4.4%. if those two factors begin to be affected, that will become a manic of our challenge. the thing i worry most about is the impact on people. >> if i may, from a preparedness perspective, the integra

and north africa in response to an aqap plot that was thanks to your efforts, intercepted. on the other hand, aqim success to conduct an attack against western interests in mali. as for china, he continued to look with great concern on their cyber activities. they are counterspace posture and on the recent moves in east china sea. beijing's so-called air defense identification center which would require u.s. forces to identify themselves and their mission to chinese forces as they fly near or over certain tiny islands in a land grab. it's also an affront to international law. these moves increase the risk of misunderstanding and miscalculation between washington and china making the role of intelligence that much more important. in russia our athletes and athletes from around the world will be convening in just a few short days to compete in the 2014 winter olympics. we have seen some troubling terrorist activity and we must keep up our guard. in afghanistan, 2014 marks the year in which combat operations end. we know our vital national security interest their will not ceas

regard the aqap pose the most dangerous external threat to us. internally, the most frequent threat will continue to be homegrown violent extremists. >> how has sequester affected this preparedness of your organization? it is having an effect. >> as i said in my statement, the combination of compromises and decisions we have made and is the effectons of all this is that i worry about. capacity.ion in our it is not as great as it was a year or two ago. cuts,continue with these we will have a negative impact. particular a capability that is most at risk? asset isst important our people. that is why i am concerned about the effect of the morale of the workforce. with shutdowns and pay freezes , i am concerned. we want to be able to recruit the people we need. our attrition is around 4.4%. those two factors begin to be affected, that will become a manic of our challenge. the thing i worry most about is the impact on people. may, from a preparedness perspective, the integration of we intelligence community, have exemplified the agencies represented he

>> well, i think an organization like al qaeda and the arabian peninsula aqap poses a much greater sort of tactical near-term oarpgal threat to the homeland and does ideological center of core al qaeda and the fata pakistan. >>. >> given the recent revolution of the "washington post" that the leader of the branch in dour ma libya sb who is former detalk aboutee, as you know at guantanamo bay and trained in bin laden camp in yemen. and was in fact on al qaeda's payroll. shouldn't his group also be considered part of core al qaeda? >> well, they're not. and of course core al qaeda the central leadership picks and chooses who is among the wannabes or actually nighted or if you will so designated as an al qaeda organization. so there are a lot of these organizations that profess extremism have in some cases the same goal with but are not a part of al qaeda. soot jamaal organization in egypt. a violent organization but not yet a part of al qaeda formally to the extent it has meaning. >> so the determination of core al qaeda -- who is making that? it would seem to me that characteristic of al