professor feller: and he should deal with it like arthur schlesinger did? >> i would not say that.or feller: how did arthur schlesinger deal with the fact of andrew jackson as a slaveholder? >> he sort of paints this idea the democrats becoming the anti-slavery party. professor feller: yeah, so jackson is a slaveholder does not appear to my memory in schlesinger at all. and i think the only time when they really mentioned that he owned slaves is when jackson is on his deathbed and says, i hope to meet you all in heaven, one and all, white and black. and you are right. slavery only appears -- and i think we talked about this -- the slavery issue only appears as the fruitless conceit of a bunch of reformers who ought to be out campaigning for the independence of the treasury. they do not really care about what happens to the downtrodden until the democrats embrace it and lo and behold, provide the real life blood of abraham lincoln's republican party. [laughter] >> when he draws this line connecting the democracy to the emergence and eventual fruition of the republican party, the dir

chris childs -- chris childs effort to set off what arthur schlesinger called the most dangerous momentin history. what happened then. careful clear consideration no time to go through the details but it's worth remembering that at the peak moment of the crisis october 26-27, 1962, kennedy received a letter from khrushchev offering to end the crisis peacefully by simultaneous public withdrawal of russian missiles from cuba and u.s. missiles from turkey. these were jupiter missiles, liquid propelled, meaning slow to set in motion which means that they were first strike weapons, not intended for deterrent. they were also obsolete weapons. the u.s. had already issued had already issued an order to withdraw them because they were being replaced by even more lethal weapons. so that was kennedy's choice. shall we publicly withdraw obsolete missiles from first strike missiles from turkey on the border of russia, which are being replaced by even more lethal missiles, or should we refuse? he refused. his own estimate subjective estimate of nuclear war at the time was between one-third and one ha