precedence, so for example when bill clinton becomes brought-- president he is a great admirer of arthur schlesinger. he wants someone like schlesinger there, so he talks to taylor, very distinguished historian and said i want you to be my arthur schlesinger and he says mr. president, i'm not sure that's a good precedence, but he does eventually edged you know does go into the white house. he does have these conversations with the president and other examples, teddy roosevelt is given access by ronald reagan and writes actually controversial biography of reagan, so there are ways in which writers command, but i think your question is writing 1 cents. there is no one who really is brought in the same way as someone who's influencing policy and understanding what's going on and involved in decision-making, but who write from day one i think is understood and believed by kennedy that actually you are here because ultimately you're going to have another task that in some ways you will be writing or involved in or helping in the age kennedy projects. >> thank you. >> and wish you would enlarge a little b

but, you know, arthur schlesinger talked about the cycles of american history, and we go through these changes. it'll change again. it'll come back. >> do you suspect there are dinners like that in this white house? >> no, and i wouldn't go anyway. [laughter] >> in the front row. >> thanks very much. dr. dallek, i'm thinking now about the panoply of presidents of which you've written which suggests you know something about what characterizes the successful from the not so successful presidents. and i'm wondering the extent to which you can say to what extent is character central, to what extent are conditions central? >> well, of course, they're both terribly important. as the ancient greeks used to say -- [inaudible] and you see it in the current administration. the guy, this trump, is a man who is, i think, a malignant fares suggestion -- narcissist, and he's someone who is so self-absorbed, so preoccupied with himself and with the idea that people should see him as great he can't move outside himself to see the larger picture. now, you know, everybody who runs for president, they've

early 1980s, you had liberal intellectual liar arthur schlesinger, jr. and john ken neglect goal breath who were visiting moscow and lauding the economic accomplishments of the soviet union and they were lauding it. we now know that the soviet union was an economic basket case . when gore chef came in 1985 a couple of years later he was horrified at the shape of the economy. they'd been spending so much money on arms and an arms race. so, what was ronald reagan saying at the same time that people like lessing erand golbraith were saying if was telling the british government that marxism and leninism was headed to the ash heap of history. you can fine that people were pooh-poohing that but he was absolutely right, and of course, before the end of that decade, and by the eastbound of that decade, the berlin wall was down and the soviet union in 1991 was no more. that sense of humor. in december of 1981, -- i had rewritten my reagan byow again and i wanted to present a copy of it to him, and my publisher said, look, be sure and have a chapter in there about

arthur schlesinger said the most dangerous autumn in history was autumn, 1952.83, remember that movie of the week, the abc movie "the day after." >> the guy had -- yeah, "the day after" where the guy saved himself from nuclear annihilation by ducking behind i think it was his datsun dashboard on his car. yeah, i remember that movie very well, thank you. he ducked and covered. >> any port in a storm. and so i think the -- this is -- i think what's happening is in a post-september 11 world we have realized we are vulnerable and then you then take the fact that we have a state actor in north korea who is nuclearized and has spent the last x number of months/years, threatening us and so it's not an irrational fear and i think that's what makes this arguably the most complicated diplomatic task in our memory certainly is how do you try to take care of this regime that does not seem to act according to the usual rational terms of national behavior. >> and it bears repeating this is a threat that has been coming at us for a very long time and there were warnings from o