after the war, he had an access all areas pass to the atomic energy commission. to say exactly how many bombs the americans were able to build. and i believe he there by enabled the soviets to build their own bomb two years ahead of what was expected. —— thereby. he was in on the planning of nato. he gave away absolutely everything, particularly between 1944 and 1948. you say he was a patriot. but he became an ideological servant of the soviet union. after he fled he didn't show any reluctance to make his life in moscow, to support the soviet union, until the day of his death. how could he hold those two things in balance? i think untilthe could he hold those two things in balance? i think until the cold war got under way properly, after 1945, he could tell himself he was working foran he could tell himself he was working for an ally, which russia indeed was. and throughout his life, and also in moscow in the last 30 years of his life, he believes that communism was the only way towards world peace. —— believed. so in fa ct, world peace. —— believed. so in fact,

so, atomic energy commission documents describe the land as "virtually uninhabited." about that framing. an agency official was quoted as calling it "a good place to throw used razor blades." for real. raisescists questions -- questions about the government's obligations toward people who lived and continue to live in the great basin. we looked at the rhetorical framework of testing. also the language of testing. you can help me with this because you read how solnit approaches these questions. i that we could look at images that combine tests themselves with a view of the landscape, and from there we will think about one strand of activism connecting to an the earlier case we considered that might have resonance with the baby to survey -- tooth survey. i want to show you a visualization a japanese artist made, depicting all of the nuclear testing between 1935 and 1998. did we have a chance to watch the whole thing last night? i will show you just a really small snippet. hereoing to fast-forward 1960-ish. prof. kohout: so this is what, two years and a couple months wor

development of the hydrogen bomb, and he is sitting in his -- in augusta and gets a visit from the atomic energy commission secretary to say we have done another explosion and can tell you now that the h-bomb we just tested in the pacific has been a success and here's the size of it, the scale of it, the epic dimensions of this thing. this is just as he is entering into this presidency. and throughout his eight years in office, the united states would continue to develop and expand those nuclear weapons. so as a military man, eisenhower felt these were weapons -- he wanted to have them viable use if necessary. he thought that by dealing them it would be back likely you would never have to use it because it was deter the soviet union. but the amount of money spent was enormous and the power of the nuclear deterrent was terrifying. so, eisenhower spoke in his -- with his advisers about how to tell the public how dangerous all this stuff is without scaring them into a panicment he gave a number of public speeches designed to answer this question which things are really bad but don't panic. and i can tell you,