when it was clear that ayatollah sustani not back down and the religious shia members would not do anythingbut support sustani, we had to find another route around it. there was a well-known meeting amongst those who were participating when i and eventually stopped listening between the ambassador bremer and the iraqi council and interjected that when there was a chicken and egg problem, one way to get through is to design a double circuit of the track, two chickens and two eggs. we designed the process of drawing up some preliminary constitutional principles through an administrative law leading to a first round of elections after which there would be the right to have a proper constitution by elected officials leading to a second round of elections under the constitution. that was the heart of the november 15 agreement. >> was the only means of communication communicating with ayatollah sustani through the shia idc? >> there was no way i was going to succeed in getting a private conversation with the ayatollah usustani who refused to see the administrator for the communication was either